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I argue that scientific and poetic modes of objectivity are perspectival duals: 'views' from
and onto basic natural forces, respectively. I ground this analysis in a general account of
objectivity, not in terms of either 'universal' or 'inter-subjective' validity, but as receptivity to
basic features of reality. Contra traditionalists, bare truth, factual knowledge, and universally
valid representation are not inherently valuable. But modern critics who focus primarily on the
self-expressive aspect of science are also wrong to claim that our knowledge is or should be
ultimately mediated by ourselves.
In objective science, we represent nature as a field of phenomena determined by and
within explanatorily-basic physical structures that encode the causal impact of elemental
physical forces. These causally-basic forces hence ground the possibility of objective scientific
theory, even though (I argue) they are systematically excluded from its representational contents.
I show how my notions of force and field emerge partly through my effort to naturalize concepts
of 'God' and 'Laws' in 17th-century natural philosophy. In science, we use the structure of basic
forces' impact to see corresponding objects. We do not see these forces themselves—and this
relates to the 'transcendence' of 'God'. I supplement this historical analysis by critiquing standard
accounts of objectivity, and by synthesizing elements from neo-Kantian epistemology and
current 'structural' realism into a view that I call 'dynamic structuralism'. Finally, I argue that
physics systematically relies on passive characterizations of phenomena like inertia and
impressed force. Dynamic alternatives that are just as empirically adequate are possible, but they
are non-scientific.
Poetic objectivity involves a direct presentation of nature as an order of interacting forces.
I elaborate first by developing a novel theory of the relation between beauty and sublimity,
mediated by a basic category of 'sensory force' (e.g. a 'singing' tone in a beautiful melody). I then
describe the interaction between sensory and affective dimensions of aesthetic experience, in
relation to an original historical analysis of passion and 'disinterestedness' in Kant, Schiller and
Nietzsche. I synthesize these lines of analysis into a critique of the role of 'expression' in art. I
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also resist 'spectator'-centric aesthetics, in this connection, by developing an account of artistic
objectivity in dialogue with Ruskin's critique of the 'pathetic fallacy'. I contrast artistic objectivity
with Romantic ideals of self-expression, while elaborating its positive relation to certain currents
within Victorian and Modernist aesthetics, including Imagists' stress on 'exteriority'.
My project creatively extends Nietzsche's view that philosophical and scientific theories
are 'perspectival' expressions of theorists' drives. It is a virtue of Nietzsche's account that he takes
the outlet of strong human drives in creative acts of theorizing to be just one among many higher
modes of 'will to power' in nature—many of which are totally impersonal. But Nietzsche is still
too focused on self-expression or willing one's own power. Objective science involves external
forces' 'expression' in and through us, not just 'expressing' our own powers. And Nietzsche's
vitalistic 'will to power' must be replaced by a basic ontology that better accommodates
inorganic phenomena, like the 'lawful' order of celestial motions. Thus I aim to de-
anthropomorphize and 'de-organicize' post-Kantian notions of willful striving and organic
development, while preserving for force the primary ontological and evaluative status that
theorists from Schiller and Goethe to Schelling and Schlegel to Emerson and Nietzsche




1. Objectivity and Nihilism in Modern Scientific Culture
Objectivity is under systematic assault. This modern attack on older ideals of objectivity
has often been fairly well targeted. But it has also clearly exacerbated tensions, adding to what is
by now the conspicuous resurgence of frank tribalism in once-'polite' liberal societies. “Why is it
not good for our view of reality to reflect who we are and what we care about?,” warring factions
seem increasingly inclined to wonder out loud. “Why shouldn't we affirm our unique identities
by embracing our 'subjectivity'? Why should we believe that 'bare facts' get at the real nature of
things, more so than does the way that the world looks through the 'lens' of our basic values, our
cultures, our languages, our history, our quest for recognition, our life experiences, our truth?
Haven't we learned that all knowledge is value-laden and perspectival? So why not drop the
pretense of neutrality that underlies old-fashioned accounts of objectivity, and instead try to
create new knowledge that is as 'laden' as possible with our own standpoint, not other people's?”
But the modern assault on objectivity remains largely unnoticed, even so, because
objectivity is now often misunderstood, even where it has not been cast aside. Moderates who
lament the loss of faith in the ideal of universally valid representations—the ideal of reaching
claims about the world which are just as true 'for' one person or culture as 'for' any other, because
they presuppose no particular 'point of view' at all, or at least nothing beyond a generically
human point of view—moderates who cling to this ideal are grasping at straws. Fractured liberal
societies now care less and less about this sort of neutrality, and, regardless, it should not be our
basic goal. Equally misguided, though, are recent attempts to replace older notions of objectivity
with overtly politicized appeals to liberal democratic regulation of knowledge production, or to
the putatively deeper insight possessed by groups occupying marginalized social 'standpoints',
etc. Objectivity is neither a matter of open and inclusive deliberation nor of any privileged
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insight that subordinated groups may have into the social structures that reinforce their
subordination. Objectivity is essentially related to power—not to social power, per se, let alone
to unjust social hierarchy, as some of its critics claim; but to power in a more fundamental sense. 
Objectivity is best understood as a state of focused and focalizing outwardness: as the
drive and ability to understand elemental reality; as genuine receptivity, not to everything, but to
those things which are of greatest power and ultimate value—to the impersonal forces that are
highest above us. We achieve this kind of exteriority in part by understanding ourselves in terms
of the arational 'cultural' and 'natural' forces that ground our own individual or collective
identities. But self-understanding of this sort is only one aspect of objectivity. Objectivity is a
systematic orientation away from inwardness, including myopic focus on truth or facticity, and
outwards towards the elemental. Self-involvement and anthropocentrism are subjective. But a
bare drive to truth is also subjective, as a reflection of indifference to real hierarchies of being.
We will not be 'saved' from return to barbarism by a new 'fact-based liberal consensus'. And we
will only be degraded by a new identitarian ethos on Left and Right which exalts childish forms
of self-affirmation. We must recall the world beyond ourselves. We still require inhuman gods.
Modern science offers one path to objectivity, but not the only one. Scientific objectivity
involves adopting the 'standpoint' of elemental reality, or its 'perspective' onto the less real. Thus
we achieve a more objective vision of the solar system by adopting the 'point of view' of the Sun,
and not that of Earth or Jupiter. The Sun determines the motions of the planets in its orbit, and in
this respect the Sun is more real than the planets—its mere satellites. However, the Sun is also
affected to an extent by the planets' gravity. Hence, we attain a still more objective view of the
solar system by adopting the 'perspective' of its center of mass, within which the Sun and planets
are all given their due. What is this objective 'standpoint'? It is not the standpoint of any object in
space. It is the standpoint of gravity itself, a view from mass-energy insofar as it is the locus of
gravity. It is a pure dynamical space in which all gravitationally-impacted objects in the solar
system—the Sun, the planets, asteroids, electrons, and human beings alike—are located. It is the
'view' from one basic aspect of physical reality, onto the manifold objects through which it
appears. Scientific objectivity is an outward orientation towards elemental reality, achieved by
adopting the 'standpoint' of fundamental natural forces: causally basic, arational, amoral forces.
Aesthetic experience and poetic understanding offer a second basic path to objectivity. In
genuine aesthetic experience we immediately behold elemental reality, in its sensuous aspect.
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Beautiful and sublime forms appear before us. Colors glow and tones sing out. The thunderhead
is illuminated blood-red and fire-orange with the arcing rays of the setting sun. It overwhelms us,
as pure sensory force. In this sensory confrontation with reality, we are pulled back down to
earth from the suffocating heights of moral idealization and rational speculation. But we are
equally pulled up from the mire of base particularity, elevated out of hedonistic desire, self-
seeking individualism, and crass chauvinism, into higher forms of creative passion. This mode of
objectivity is not the moralist's appeal to an idealized standpoint of 'universal humanity', let alone
a still more abstract 'view from nowhere', or a 'God's-eye view' from pure Mind. It is the direct
presentation of elemental reality—the experience of directly perceiving real, telluric force.
Nor is this mode of objectivity restricted to aesthetic experience. The objective religious
believer, too, immediately beholds his gods' presence in the world. The 'transcendent God' of
Abrahamic monotheistic faith thus reflects, in part, a falling-away from an older kind of
objective religious experience. The modern 'death of God' and rise of secular humanism have in
turn only amplified this falling-away, rendering its nihilistic dimension even more explicit.
Genuine myth, art, and 'pre-modern' religion are all forms of poetic understanding. Poetic
objectivity, including aesthetic objectivity, is outwardness achieved through the direct experience
of elemental reality. This is the obverse of scientific objectivity, whereby we only have direct
experience of objects: mere appearances of elemental reality, or things insofar as they are
impacted by higher forces whose 'perspectives' we take. In science we adopt the 'point of view'
of elemental forces—the standpoint of the gods beholding mankind and other lower orders of
being. In poetic understanding we instead adopt the 'perspective' of things impacted by higher
forces—the standpoint of man beholding the gods, for instance, or consciously acting under their
influence. Both are true objectivity. But scientific and poetic objectivity are perspectival duals.
Science represents nature as a field of mere objects, or phenomena determined by and within
forces' fields-of-effect. Poetry presents the same nature directly as an order of interacting forces. 
The modern attack on objectivity has been ongoing in more or less subtle forms at least
since Kant's 'Copernican revolution' in the late 18th century.1 Its first major casualty was the
earlier modern ideal of a literal God's-eye view, or the way that things appear to the infinite
Mind of Judeo-Christian theology, but not to naive human perception. As part of a broader
1 Daston and Galison (2007) chart the emergence of objectivity as an epistemological ideal in 19th-century science.
Perhaps, then, it would be fair to say that objectivity has been under attack from the moment of its inception. 
More deeply, perhaps it would be fair to say that objectivity could only have been under attack from the moment 
of its inception, given that it emerged in relation to modern theories of the moral-rational subject and its value.
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process of secularization, this religious ideal developed into the now more familiar aspiration to
a 'view from nowhere': a globally or universally valid perspective on the world, beyond all local
reference-frames and particular subjects' idiosyncratic points of view. But at the sociological
level, even this secular ideal has now lost much of its prior force. Public discourse is riddled with
skeptical charges that our representations of the world can never really be 'detached from the
contingencies of the self,' or made fully 'independent of specific subjective capacities.'2 And even
if it were still widely accepted that this kind of detached vision is possible, there is clearly also
waning social faith in its value.
This loss of faith in the value of bare truth or factual knowledge is the more fundamental
challenge to standard accounts of objectivity. For even if we can learn countless facts about the
world as it is 'in itself'—not as it merely appears to us from our own individual, cultural, or
human 'standpoint'—this does not entail that it is inherently or even instrumentally valuable to do
so. And many now doubt that it is. Hence, in part, the 'echo chambers' and 'information siloing'
proliferating in tandem with modern information technology and new media forms. And hence,
in part, the ongoing normalization of 'alternative facts' among political partisans of all stripes.
The principal battle line in this modern contest over knowledge is best framed in terms of
an opposition that is more often applied to art, between mimesis and expression. Mimesis
(roughly, 'imitation') is associated with traditionalistic accounts of representational art, in terms
of a basic impulse to 'copy' the world—to accurately reproduce natural forms, and especially to
capture things' sensible appearances. Expressive theorists counter that it is no great virtue to
reproduce things that already exist. Rather, they claim, the real dignity of art lies in giving outlet
to creative impulses which yield new forms, never before seen in nature. And truly artistic forms
are meaningful, expressive critics add, in that they signify the feelings, values, or experiences of
their individual creators, if not the broader cultural attitudes, material social conditions, or
generic human traits that condition their creative activity. Thus for Wordsworth, very simply,
“Poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings.”3 Likewise, but at the species level, for
Schiller poetry is “nothing but giving mankind its most complete possible expression.”4
2 As opposed to Thomas Nagel's standard notion of objectivity: “A view or form of thought is more objective than 
another if it relies less on the specifics of the individual's makeup and position in the world, or on the character 
of the particular type of creature he is. The wider the range of subjective types to which a form of understanding 
is accessible—the less it depends on specific subjective capacities—the more objective it is” (Nagel 1986, 5).
3 Quoted in Abrams 1953, 21.
4 On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (Schiller 1966, 111) (original emphasis).
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M. H. Abrams maps this distinction onto different orientations towards four basic
“elements in the total situation of a work of art”: the work, the artist, the audience, and the
universe (i.e. the “existing things” from which the work's “subject” is taken to “derive”).5
Namely, mimetic theories privilege the universe, whereas expressive theories privilege the artist.
(Abrams calls orientations towards the audience or work 'pragmatic' or 'objective', respectively.)
Of course, “any reasonably adequate theory takes some account of all four elements.” But still “a
critic tends to derive from one of these terms his principal categories for defining, classifying,
and analyzing a work of art, as well as the major criteria by which he judges its value.”6
So too, then, we can identity 'mimetic' and 'expressive' strains in the theory of knowledge.
Traditionalists who invoke the ideal of a 'view from nowhere' think that science should provide a
true 'copy' of the world, accurately reporting facts about mind-independent reality. But many
modern critics counter that scientific knowledge is inevitably expressive, in the sense that it
reflects individual scientists' experiences or values, if not broader cultural attitudes, social
conditions, or human capacities—even when it purports to be neutral copying. Many modern
critics also believe that scientific theory should be expressive, whether at the individual, cultural,
or species level. Moreover, much as Abrams argues that the expressive orientation to art emerged
as a “comprehensive approach to art, shared by a large number of critics” only in the early
nineteenth century,7 an analogous claim is plausible with respect to the rise of expressive theories
of knowledge. It is not my central goal to defend this historical claim, however, I will show that
Kant and Nietzsche (among others) played major roles in this developmental process.
Standard 'expressive' theories of art presuppose that it is the artist who expresses himself
in the artwork, or at most a broader artistic tradition, culture, or total 'Spirit'. Likewise, standard
'expressive' theories of knowledge presuppose that it is the human knower who expresses herself
in systems of knowledge, or at most a broader epistemic community, culture, or total 'Spirit'.
This is a profound mistake. In truly objective forms of art and science, the creative artist or
scientist genuinely 'expresses' himself only insofar as he is also determined from without by
inhuman natural forces, higher than any mere cultural force of historical determination.
Contra mimetic theorists of science, bare truth or factual knowledge is not inherently
valuable. (As Deleuze rightly observes, “[t]here are imbecile thoughts, imbecile discourses, that
5 Abrams 1953, 6 et passim.
6 Abrams 1953, 6. 
7 Abrams 1953, 3.
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are made up entirely of truths,” namely the “base” truths of a “base, heavy and leaden soul.”8)
But it is also perverse always only to be 'expressing' ourselves in our knowledge of empirical
reality. The expressive theorist is wrong to claim that our representations of the world are or
should be ultimately mediated by ourselves, whether individually or collectively. Rather, truly
objective scientific knowledge is a vision of observable phenomena, systematically mediated by
the 'expressive' forms of causally basic, often entirely impersonal, natural forces.
By contrast, consider the role that the Kantian 'transcendental' turn in metaphysics and
epistemology has played in the modern assault on objectivity. Again, objective representation
has been widely construed in terms of seeing things as they are 'in themselves', not just as they
appear to specific kinds of subjects. And Kantians famously insist that we cannot achieve this
sort of 'unconditioned' vision. According to Kant and his followers, rather, we can only
experience things as as they appear to us mediated by the basic 'forms' of our own cognitive
powers: space and time construed as forms of our sensible intuition, or faculty for being affected
by things through sensation; the pure 'categorical' forms of understanding, e.g. causality and
substance, which delimit the basic structure of all possible experience insofar as it can be taken
up in acts of objective judgment; and pure concepts of reason that can never show up as real
empirical objects, or features thereof, but which nevertheless provide rationally-necessitated
'regulative ideals' for our practices: God, human freedom, and the systematic unity of nature.
Orthodox Kantians claim that while these 'forms' block our access to reality 'in itself', they at
least transcend cultural and historical boundaries. Kant claims that all humans experience the
same causal relations among the same objects in the same space, and are rationally obligated to
act as if we are free and equal subjects before one God. (In the Kantian sense, 'humanity' is a
generic term for theoretically and practically rational beings who sensibly apprehend objects in
space and time, not a term for a biological kind, per se.) All human knowledge thus becomes an
expression of human powers. Hence, Kant gave birth to the Romantic epistemological tradition.
But objectivity's modern critics often deny the possibility or value of any such standpoint
that (putatively) depends only upon capacities or ideas shared by all human beings or rational
subjects. Many of the same critics who are skeptical of 'disinterested' inquiry are equally
skeptical that there are universal human interests, or at least that real inquiry is often truly
grounded in them. Many of the same critics who cast aspersions on the idea of judgments valid
8 Deleuze 1983, 105.
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for all beings, rendered from nowhere by no-kind-of-being-in-particular, equally disdain theories
of human nature meant to ground judgments valid for all human beings—apparently without
regard for the influence of local historical and cultural context on all real systems of thought.
These sorts of quasi-Kantian considerations have contributed greatly to the growth of modern
skepticism regarding the cross-cultural and trans-historical validity of scientific knowledge. This
is starkly opposed to Kant's own intent in arguing that subjects actively impose certain generic
cognitive 'forms' on all the possible objects of their experience. Nevertheless, modern critics who
view concepts or representation in general as an insuperable epistemic barrier between us and
reality 'in itself', in a way that (they claim) precludes the possibility of knowledge valid for all
human beings, are perhaps the most influential inheritors of Kant's 'Copernican' insight that
“objects must conform to our cognition.”9 Thus the modern assault on objectivity has targeted
both the 'view from nowhere' and weaker Kantian ideals of species-wide inter-subjective validity.
Kant's 'Copernican revolution' also sheds light on the relationship between the 'God's-eye
view' and the secularized 'view from nowhere'. The fact that we cannot know things as they are
in themselves clearly remained problematic, for Kant. He may have officially insisted that inter-
subjective validity is enough, that we can find genuine satisfaction in knowing things as they
appear to us via universal forms of human experience. Likewise, contemporary 'critical'
epistemologists who balk at the prospect of universal forms of human experience may even insist
that it is enough to be able to know things as they appear mediated by culturally- and
historically-specific representational frameworks. But this all rings fairly hollow. In positing the
thing-in-itself, Kant implicitly valorized objectivity construed traditionally as unmediated access
to the thing-in-itself. While Kantians and latter-day 'critical' epistemologists insist that
'unconditioned' knowledge is impossible, that is, they often still implicitly treat it as desirable—
an unrealizable ideal. Thus Kant allowed that a purely rational being with a non-sensible power
of 'intellectual intuition' could have objective knowledge of things insofar as they are
immediately given to them in purely conceptual form. This is what he meant by 'transcendent'
knowledge of things qua noumena rather than empirical knowledge of sensible phenomena (KrV
A248-250 / B305). And Kant described God's knowledge as intellectual intuition, in this sense
(KrV B72). At least implicitly, then, Kant treated our intersubjectively-valid knowledge as less
valuable than God's unconditioned knowledge of noumenal reality. Hence, more broadly, the
9 Critique of Pure Reason (KrV), B xvi. All translations are from the Guyer and Wood edition (Kant 1998).
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claim that objectivity requires only inter-subjective validity is often made somewhat in bad faith.
Kant's account of God's intellectual intuition of 'things in themselves' amounts to a more
complex version of a common trope in modern rationalistic philosophy. Kant complicated the
relationship between his own version of the 'God's-eye view' and human scientific cognition, in a
departure from earlier Enlightenment thought. But the resultant 'critique' was still essentially a
triumphalist exaltation of human reason, according to which 'rational' ideas of God, freedom, and
the systematic unity of nature are the aims that give all our action and inquiry its basic purpose. 
Before Kant, the idea that science affords insight into divine Mind—albeit only of an
incomplete or indirect sort, given human finitude—had captured the imaginations of many early
modern natural philosophers and their followers. On a Newtonian view, for instance, the laws of
nature were acts of divine Will.10 Thus Roger Cotes, Newton's colleague in mathematics at
Cambridge, waxes pious in his editorial Preface to the second edition of the Principia:
Surely, this World—so beautifully diversified in all its forms and motions—
could not have arisen except from the perfectly free will of God, who provides 
and governs all things. From this source, then, have all the laws that are called 
laws of nature come, in which many traces of the highest wisdom and counsel 
certainly appear, but no traces of necessity. [...]He must be blind who does not at
once see, from the best and wisest structures of things, the infinite wisdom and 
goodness of their almighty creator; and he must be mad who refuses to 
acknowledge them.
Newton himself tended towards greater circumspection about religious matters in his natural
philosophical writings, apparently for methodological reasons. But he still wrote in his General
Scholium that “[t]his most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets, could only [non nisi]
proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being,” and in Query 31
of his study on Opticks that “the wonderful Uniformity in the Planetary System must be allowed
the Effect of Choice.” For Newton, in short, “active Principles such as is that of Gravity” were
“general Laws of Nature,” by the “help” of which “all material Things seem to have been
composed of the hard and solid Particles[...], variously associated in the first Creation by the
Counsel of an Intelligent Agent.” And this ultimately reflects the fact that “it became him who
created them to set them in order.”11 Like his followers, then, Newton took his theory of gravity
10 Compare Harrison 2013, 144.
11 Opticks Query 31.
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to illuminate “such Principles as might work, with considering Men, for the Belief of a Deity,”12
and in particular the God of his own Christian faith.13 The Newtonian world was thus a Christian
cosmos, freely ordered into a lawful system by an almighty and rational God. (See Appendix A.)
Newtonians took the laws of nature to be accessible only through extensive empirical
investigation, as opposed to a priori reflection, on the grounds that the laws of nature are the
decrees of a God who is all-powerful and so unconstrained in the exercise of his will.14 Hence,
they did not claim that we could access a God's-eye view of the world through rational
introspection. But they did still clearly believe that empirical inquiry could provide us with some
kind of real insight into God's Intellect or Wisdom, not just his Power. Hence, in a 1712 issue of
the influential Spectator magazine, Joseph Addison extols the virtues of “[a] Sir Isaac Newton”
who can “look through a whole Planetary System[...]and draw from it as many Demonstrations
of infinite Power and Wisdom, as a more confined Understanding is able to deduce from the
System of an Human Body.”15 In fact, Addison maintains, to the extent that “Reason” is “more
extended” and “more able to grapple with immense Objects,” as in the Newtonian system, it
makes “greater still” discoveries “of Wisdom and Providence in the Work of the Creation.”16
Kant lost faith in our ability to gain any access to the God's-eye view that earlier modern
natural philosophers thus associated with scientific knowledge of natural law. Hence, for Kant
12 Newton 1958, 280.
13 See the General Scholium for Newton's characterization of God as 'Pantokrator' and 'Lord God', whereby he 
places special emphasis on God's power and 'true', all-encompassing dominion.
14 Immediately after maintaining that in the laws of nature “many traces of the highest wisdom and counsel 
certainly appear, but no traces of necessity,” Cotes adds that “[a]ccordingly we should not seek these laws by 
using untrustworthy conjectures, but learn them by observing and experimenting[...]All sound and true 
philosophy is based on phenomena, which may lead us—however unwilling and reluctant— to principles in 
which the best counsel and highest dominion of an all-wise and all-powerful being are most clearly discerned; 
these principles will not be rejected because certain men may perhaps not like them.” So John Henry summarizes
the dominant view among historians of the period: “the defence of empiricist approaches was often associated 
with a theological position that can be characterized as voluntarist” (Henry 2009, 84). On the connection 
between empiricism and theological voluntarism, see also Foster 1934, 1935, and 1936; Oakley 1961a, 1961b, 
and 1966; McGuire 1972; Klaaren 1977; Heimann 1978; Milton 1981 and 1998; Osler 1985, 1991, and 1994; 
Malet 1997; and Henry 2004. Cf. Harrison 2002, 2004, and 2009.
Regarding Harrison-style worries about positing a strong historical connection between empiricism and 
theological voluntarism, I consider the following response by John Henry to be extremely reasonable: “There 
may be intellectual historians out there who have talked in terms of the inexorable logic of particular positions, 
but if there are, I can’t imagine them holding this position for long. Indeed, I can imagine myself, or other 
intellectual historians, using the example of Descartes precisely to show that there is no necessary connection 
between voluntarism and empiricism, there is no inexorable logic which connects them. Nevertheless, I would 
want to go on, it remains true to say that the defence of empiricist approaches was often associated with a 
theological position that can be characterized as voluntarist” (Henry 2009, 84).
15 Spectator no. 543.
16 Ibid.
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the God's-eye view became a real yet inaccessible view from nowhere onto things as they are 'in
themselves', apprehended intellectually without any mediation by sense. But Kant supplemented
this inaccessible 'noumenal' view with an accessible 'transcendental subject's-eye view' that he
thought could still perform many core epistemological functions. However, many 20th- and 21st-
century critics have in turn lost faith even in this Kantian 'view from generic human rationality'.
Nietzsche anticipated the basic arc of this ideological development, almost a century and
a half ago, in diagnosing a genealogical relationship between modern nihilism and the ongoing
historical defeat of Christian metaphysical belief at the hand of 'scientific conscience'.17 Modern
history reveals an extended “self-overcoming of morality, out of truthfulness” (EH “Destiny” 3),
Nietzsche argued,18 encompassing several interrelated phenomena: post-Enlightenment societies'
growing disillusionment with attempts to view nature as 'proof of the goodness and governance
of a god' (or even as if it were such proof); a concomitant increase in societal “faith in science”
(GS 344; GM III:24); and finally the ensuing collapse into radical “nihilism” (GM P 5)19 as this
secularized form of “Christian truthfulness” (GM III:27),20 too, ultimately turns against itself.
Nietzsche thus viewed the modern loss of faith in truth as the apotheosis of the very same
'self-overcoming of morality out of truthfulness' that previously involved exalting truth and
scientific knowledge at the expense of faith and religious revelation. The “unconditional will to
truth” ultimately undermines itself, precisely because it is a recapitulation of the perversely
ascetic “will to death” that has always been the rotten core of Judeo-Christian moral conscience
(GS 344). Moralized asceticism first denies itself the metaphysical solace21 afforded by belief in
17 I cite Nietzsche’s texts by section and part number using the standard English abbreviations: A = The Antichrist, 
BGE = Beyond Good and Evil, BT = The Birth of Tragedy, EH = Ecce Homo, GM = On the Genealogy of 
Morals, GS = The Gay Science, NCW = Nietzsche Contra Wagner, TI = Twilight of the Idols, WP = The Will to 
Power, Z = Thus Spoke Zarathustra. I use the Kaufmann and Hollingdale translations. For some notes, I cite 
KSA = Kritische Gesamtausgabe, edited by Colli and Montinari, by volume, fragment and aphorism number.
18 Similarly: “The priest too knows[...]that there is no longer any 'God', any 'sinner', any 'Redeemer'—that 'free will'
and 'moral world order' are lies: seriousness, the profound self-overcoming of the spirit, no longer permits 
anybody not to know about this” (A 38).
19 See also KSA 12:7[64], KSA 12:10[42], KSA 13:14[86], KSA 12:10[192], KSA 12:9[35], KSA 13:11[108].
20 More fully: “All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming[...]In this way 
Christianity as a dogma was destroyed by its own morality; in the same way Christianity as morality must now 
perish, too: we stand on the threshold of this event. After Christian truthfulness has drawn one inference after 
another, it must end by drawing its most striking inference, its inference against itself'” (GM III:27). Consider 
also: “[...]in us the will to truth becomes conscious of itself as a problem[...]As the will to truth thus gains self-
consciousness[...]morality will gradually perish now” (GM III:27); “It is not the victory of science that 
distinguishes our nineteenth century, but the victory of scientific method over science” (KSA 13:15[51]); “...
[H]istory must itself resolve the problem of history, knowledge must turn its sting against itself” (HL 8).
21 On 'metaphysical solace' and the later Nietzsche's thoroughgoing skepticism thereof, see the prefatory “Attempt 
at a Self-Criticism” that he appended to The Birth of Tragedy (1772) in 1886.
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Christianity's personal God. Correspondingly, in epistemology there is a rejection of objectivity
construed literally as a 'God's-eye view' onto reality 'in itself'. Next, moralized asceticism denies
itself the residual comfort of secularized belief in the moral purposiveness of history, let alone
nature more broadly, and then even the comfort of secularized belief in the shared intelligibility
of human experience. Correspondingly, there is a rejection of even a 'view from universal
humanity' onto things insofar as they appear in and through generic Kantian 'forms' of human
cognition or Marxian 'universal class interests'.22 Secularized Judeo-Christian morality thus
triumphs over God, but then also over itself. The secular humanist recognizes his own ideals as
unreal—as wishful thinking to be rejected by serious-minded adults, in the name of honesty. But
the unconditional drive to honesty that (Nietzsche thinks) leads us to reject both God and
objective morality is itself a “metaphysical faith” in the value of truth, and an expression of
moralized asceticism in its own right (GS 344). The unconditional will to truth thus rejects itself,
as mere subjective preference in a world devoid of all objective value. ''What in us really wants
'truth'?','' we therefore finally ask ourselves (BGE 1), partly in thrall to nihilistic despair. What is
the value of our will to truth? 
Nietzsche also understood, however, that the will to truth is not just a sign of modern
societal collapse into nihilism. For he sees this 'self-overcoming of morality out of truthfulness',
including the self-overcoming of truthfulness that is its negative apotheosis, as producing a
world-historical crossroads. On the one hand, again, the 'self-overcoming of morality out of
truthfulness' gives rise to pandemic nihilism. On the other hand, though, the 'self-overcoming of
morality' also amounts to a destruction of slavish Judeo-Christian values, which may yet
facilitate the creation of new and more 'life-affirming' values. Thus in the latter respect—but not
the former—the self-overcoming of morality constitutes “that long secret work which has been
saved up for the finest and most honest, also the most malicious, consciences of today” (BGE
32).23 Correspondingly, intellectual conscience can be ascetic in a pejorative sense, a sign of self-
22 Thus György Lukács, the Marxist progenitor of modern standpoint theory, writes that “[t]he self-understanding 
of the proletariat is [] simultaneously the objective understanding of the nature of society,” adding that “[w]hen 
the proletariat furthers its own class-aims it sumultaneously achieves the conscious realisation of the —objective
—aims of society (Lukács 1923/1971, 149). Marx himself sometimes expressed skepticism about 'general 
interests'—claiming in the Grundrisse, for instance, that “[t]he general interest is precisely the generality of self-
seeking interest” (see Heller 1976, 62–4). However, this apparent skepticism must be reconciled with Marx's 
account in the German Ideology, where he does seem to view proletarian interests as truly general or universal. 
What is at issue here is likely just what Marx means by 'interest', more than any deep disagreement with Lukács.
23 “...the self-overcoming of morality—let this be the name for that long secret work which has been saved up for 
the finest and most honest, also the most malicious, consciences of today” (BGE 32).
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loathing and the festering resentment of the weak towards the power of superabundant life to
'retouch' and 'falsify' the world in its own image. But it can also be a mark of natural strength,
and a path towards humanity's self-overcoming in the creation of a new and higher type.
Thus for “genuine philosophers,” Nietzsche insists, “knowing' is creating, [...and] will to
truth is—will to power” (BGE 211). In the case of 'genuine philosophers', that is, the impulse “to
assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the manifold, and to overlook or repulse whatever is
totally contradictory” is not unconditional or selfless pursuit of truth. Rather, it expresses the
“spirit's power to appropriate the foreign” precisely by “retouching and falsifying the whole to
suit itself,” its drive to “growth, in a word—or, more precisely, the feeling of growth, the feeling
of increased power” (BGE 230).24 In short, the genuine philosopher's creative appropriation of
reality in systematically 'falsifying' bodies of theory is for Nietzsche a mode of artistic
representation. And here just as elsewhere, presumably, “[w]e possess art lest we perish of the
truth” (WP 822 [1888]).25 Nietzsche thus advances not only a common genealogical critique of
the mimetic 'view from nowhere' and Kant's more Romantic-expressive notion of a mediated
'view from universal humanity', but also his own less moralistic version of an expressive theory
of knowledge. (See Appendix B.)
Neither 'mimetic' nor Kantian or Nietzschean 'expressive' theories of knowledge are
acceptable, however. Contra mimetic theories, it is not inherently valuable to 'copy' existence in
thought, however accurately we may do so. But contra expressive theories of knowledge, it is
also perverse always only to be 'expressing' ourselves, whether as a 'sensuous-rational' species or
as individual 'genuine philosophers'—especially perverse, indeed, in the domain of knowledge or
world-representation. After all, is there not more to reality than ourselves? Do we not close
ourselves off to the broader world if we always only 'express', impressing our 'inner' lives onto
'external' nature, and never instead act in the name of something beyond ourselves?
Knowledge should be neither 'fact-reporting' nor 'self-expression'. Knowledge should
provide us with genuine understanding. The Romantic-expressive theorist of knowledge is right
that science does not provide unmediated representational access to mind-independent reality.
But she is wrong to claim that our access to mind-independent reality is always mediated by
ourselves, whether individually or collectively. Insofar as it is objective, rather, science is a
24 The context here is not explicitly cognitive or epistemological—i.e. Nietzsche is discussing a general impulse 
towards simplification. But he would presumably endorse the connection I am drawing.
25 There is no mention of science in this context, so I am quoting quite freely.
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formal representation of the objective appearance o f fundamental aspects of reality—i.e., the
way that which is fundamentally real manifests in and through that which is less real, that which
is essentially an object for its appearance. Objective representational knowledge is a vision of
inessential phenomena, systematically mediated by the expressive 'forms' of more fundamental
aspects of reality: higher, often entirely impersonal and inhuman, natural forces.
Thus I offer a 'poetics' of force for modern scientific culture: a philosophy of nature based
in the ontological and evaluative priority of impersonal force, which provides a way to analyze
science's impact as an objective cultural form, like great art or myth, rather than merely as
subjective 'self-expression' or as listless 'fact-reporting'. If there is any hope for a kind of
experience that is both truly modern and truly objective, then it rests upon our capacity for
broadly 'poetic' receptivity to nature as it is disclosed by science—but only insofar as scientific
explanation, like artistic creation, can be a cultural appearance of elemental natural forces. Only
in this way can we hope to realize Schelling's vision of “a new mythology[...]which shall be the
creation, not of some individual author, but of a new [culture], personifying, as it were, one
single poet,”26 without collapsing into an unduly inward or anthropocentric version of 'poetry'.
Truly natural science is objective appearance: a pure image of elemental natural forces' impact.
Nature itself neither aims at nor achieves self-knowledge through this objective scientific
'self-imaging' of natural force. Quite the opposite: the human drive to objective scientific
knowledge is essentially just one among many manifestations of natural force, most of which are
entirely arational and impersonal. The development of scientific theory is often literally the
impact of arational and impersonal natural forces manifesting, without aim or intention, through
the mediating force of human cognitive powers. Nature itself is incapable of self-knowledge—
contra the gross anthropomorphism of post-Kantian 'absolute' idealism and Romantic
Naturphilosophie, in the vein of Hegel and Schelling. Nature is not a rational system or an
organically-unified whole, but an order of hierarchically-related and agonistically-interacting
forces, comprising relations of arational impact. Human activity, including scientific inquiry, is
neither the goal of nature's largely inhuman force nor its highest manifestation.
But scientific theory does manifest the real impact of the arational natural forces that
ground its own explanatory power. In science, these forces are channeled through human beings
in acts of systematization and explanation. We concentrate and intensify the world, distilling it
26 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (Schelling 1978, 232-3). I have replaced 'race' with 'culture', to 
avoid the former's problematic associations in contemporary English.
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down into its 'really real' fundaments, and represent all other phenomena purely in the image of
this elemental reality. This act of scientific abstraction is not essentially one of rationalization or
universalization, any more than artistic abstraction is—although science does reveal universal
law and conceptual form, in a way that art does not. The result of science is a veil of objective
appearances: the world imagistically represented as a system of objects recapitulating the
structure of underlying forces' impact. The objects of scientific representation are things insofar
as they are determined by explanatorily basic dynamic structures. These structures in turn encode
the real causal impact of elemental natural forces, which hence ground the possibility of
objective representation even though they are systematically excluded from its contents.
We know force in pure empirical science through intellectual intuition—not by
representing force itself, but by apprehending the explanatory power of the structures of forces'
causal impact on empirical phenomena. In the limit of pure physical science, these real dynamic
structures are purely intelligible, as opposed to the sensible forms that ground experiences of
beauty. But the dynamic structures underlying physical scientific objectivity are not rational
forms, or putative universal 'essences' of particular phenomena. Real dynamic structures are the
individual fields of concrete natural forces' causal impact, insofar as these fields are described in
terms of purely generic relations among measurable physical properties. As generic kinds, these
relations are universal. But real dynamic structures are particular instantiations of these generic
relations (they are perhaps a species of metaphysical 'trope'). And while dynamic structures
necessarily comprise purely intelligible, universal relations, they are not essentially universal.
Dynamic structures are essentially just causally-salient 'patterns' within observable phenomena.
Some such 'patterns' are describable in terms of universal functional relations among measurable
physical properties. Only such patterns are 'dynamic structures', in the sense relevant here. And
physical science distinctively highlights these structures. But they are not essentially scientific. 
By analogy, consider the common claim that we are all are essentially human beings, and
not members of different cultures. One might be a humanist, in this sense, and yet still believe
that there is a legitimate place for 'cultural studies' departments within the academy. Hence, a
humanist might believe that a given social phenomenon essentially concerns the lives or
experience of a given cultural group insofar as it is the distinctive object of a corresponding
'cultural studies' discipline, while still believing that the given phenomenon is essentially an
expression of 'human spirit', more broadly. Likewise, even if empirical scientists focus only on
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generic patterns in 'the phenomena'—i.e. only on empirical structures which can be
conceptualized—this does not entail that these patterns are essentially conceptualizable. It
simply entails that these dynamic structures are essentially conceptualizable insofar as they are
the objects of a distinctively scientific mode of understanding. But science is not the only source
of understanding. Aesthetic experience of a volcano might go beyond the limits of conceptual
description in a way that scientific description does not, and yet still yield real understanding.
Hence, a scientific description of volcanic activity might not essentially involve concepts, if this
description is only inessentially scientific. This is my basic claim regarding dynamic structures.
They are essentially rational or 'universal' insofar as they are objects of scientific understanding.
But they are not essentially objects of scientific understanding, because science is not privileged
as a source of understanding, let alone as an element of reality. Hence, dynamic structures are
not essentially characterized by those of their features which make them distinctively scientific.
Nor are our conceptual representations of these dynamic structures essentially universal
forms—although they are universal forms. Rather, objective concepts of dynamic structure are
universal 'pictures' of individual fields of concrete natural forces' causal impact. They are
arational natural forces manifesting as intellectual images of their own impact. Purely ideal
conceptual forms have no objective validity. Objective concepts are always pure natural forms,
or structures of real forces' possible impact. By representing the world in the mode of scientific
objectivity, as a field of objects determined by concepts of explanatorily basic dynamic
structures, we creatively re-enact and in this way intuitively apprehend higher natural forces.
Objectivity is a systematic orientation towards elemental reality. Scientific objectivity, in
particular, calls us to the 'standpoint' of explanatorily-basic aspects of the world—the real,
amoral natural world, including real, amoral human beings and cultural formations. This is why
scientific objectivity appears 'detached' or 'disinterested': not because it is a 'view from nowhere',
but because it is a view from unsentimental, amoral forces. In objective scientific representation,
things are reduced to 'objects' appearing for 'subjects'. But these need not be human, or even
rational, subjects. Scientific objectivity treats explanatorily-fundamental aspects of the natural
world as the 'subjects' for which observable things appear as 'objects'. The 'transcendental' forms
of scientific objectivity are neither rational laws (as if) imposed by an intelligent God nor generic
structuring principles of human cognition. They are mind-independent and explanatorily-basic
physical structures, which are intelligible but not essentially rational, any more than the slope of
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a mountain or the rotation of a hurricane is rational. They are natural forms.
To apprehend natural form is not to apprehend nature as rational or as essentially
intelligible, therefore. Rather, insofar as nature is intelligible by us, in part (but not only) through
scientific inquiry, it is because our own cognitive powers have been determined from without, by
higher natural forces. Human intellect is in essence a power to be determined by mind-
independent natural forces, by enacting corresponding natural forms' explanatory power.
Science is systematic knowledge. The systematicity of an objective theory, in turn, is its
objective validity as an image of real dynamic impact. The systematicity of scientific theory is,
roughly, an intellectual analogue of sublime aesthetic form. The systematic character of objective
scientific knowledge is higher natural force impacting us, in the mode of pure objective
appearance or field-of-effect. In objective scientific understanding, we are struck by the purely
intelligible force of nature. Objective scientific representation essentially involves hierarchical
interaction between the (superior) cognizing subject and the (inferior) objects it represents. But
in and through this cognitive mastery over external nature, higher natural forces determine us.
The systematic form of objective scientific theory is the impact of higher natural forces on us.
Objective representation is a kind of human cognitive mastery over inferior natural objects,
which we achieve only insofar as we ourselves are in turn determined by higher natural forces.
The highest reality is force, or the objective exercise of power. Force is not a coherent
substance, and 'Nature' is not a real whole. This is not a pantheistic philosophy. Nature—the
natural world—is a hierarchical order of forces, with an agonistically-interacting plurality of
fundamental forces at its bedrock. If one were to call these gods, then this outlook is a kind of
naturalized polytheism. But mine are not anthropomorphic deities. They are impersonal forces. I
deify but do not anthropomorphize inhuman natural forces. Objective vision is not a singular
God's-eye view, but a network of agonistically-interacting gods'-eye views reflecting the
impersonal 'standpoints' of fundamental forces. My worldview is a naturalistic and polytheistic
inhumanism—modern science reinterpreted as a suitable vehicle for re-appropriation in the name
of objective paganism. This development is the self-overcoming of modern scientific naturalism.
This book is therefore religious, in the sense that it is an attempt to actively manifest an
immediate receptivity to ultimate grounds of value. And because it is direct, not 'critical', it is out
of step with academic norms. In this respect, little has changed since Nietzsche criticized the
“great majority of industrious scholars and the other accessories of the universities” in his day:
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On the basis of [the German scholar's] whole trade (and, as noted, on the basis of
the tradelike industriousness to which he is committed by his modern conscience)
he is inclined toward a superior, almost good-natured amusement in the face of
religion, occasionally mixed with a dash of disdain for the 'uncleanliness' of the
spirit which he assumes wherever a church is still acknowledged. The scholar
succeeds only with the help of history (no t on the basis of his own personal
experience) to muster a reverent seriousness and a certain shy consideration in the
face of religion. But even if he raises his feeling into real gratitude toward it, he
still has not personally approached, not even by a single step, what still exists now
as church or piety; perhaps even the opposite. 
… [H]ow much naivete, venerable, childlike, and boundlessly clumsy naivete lies
in the scholar's faith in his superiority, in the good conscience of his tolerance, in
the unsuspecting simple certainty with which his instinct treats the religious man as
an inferior and lower type that he has outgrown, leaving it behind, beneath him—
him, that presumptuous little dwarf and rabble man, the assiduous and speedy
head- and handiworker [der kleine anmaassliche Zwerg und Pöbelmann, der
fleissig-flinke Kopf- und Handarbeiter] of 'ideas,' of 'modern ideas'! (BGE 58)
This disdain of 'uncritical' spirituality is a failing on the part of the scholar—the faux 'intellectual'
who, in his effort to maintain an air of respectability, often only reveals himself to be unserious.
Can we muster a little more courage, in spite of the times? Can we finally overcome this
nihilistic alienation, endemic to modern intellectual culture, that Emerson had already diagnosed
by 1836? “Our age is retrospective,” he noted—at a point when a fresh start in the New World,
with a more forward-looking ethos, still seemed to him and others like a realistic possibility:
[Our age] builds the sepulchres of the fathers. It writes biographies,
histories, and criticism. The foregoing generations beheld God and nature
face to face; we, through their eyes. Why should not we also enjoy an
original relation to the universe? Why should not we have a poetry and
philosophy of insight and not of tradition, and a religion by revelation to us,
and not the history of theirs? Embosomed for a season in nature, whose
floods of life stream around and through us, and invite us by the powers
they supply, to action proportioned to nature, why should we grope among
the dry bones of the past, or put the living generation into masquerade out of
its faded wardrobe? The sun shines to-day also. There is more wool and flax
in the fields. There are new lands, new men, new thoughts. Let us demand
our own works and laws and worship.27
27 Emerson 1983, 7. Compare Nietzsche (who read Emerson extensively, albeit not this particular essay): “[L]et us 
now picture the abstract man, untutored by myth; abstract education; abstract morality; abstract law; the abstract 
state; let us imagine the lawless roving of the artistic imagination, unchecked by any native myth; let us think of 
a culture that has no fixed and sacred primordial site but is doomed to exhaust all possibilities and to nourish 
itself wretchedly on all other cultures—there we have the present age, the result of that Socratism which is bent 
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Emerson's embrace of 'insight' and disdain for 'tradition' were (and are) American to the core, for
better and worse. Mediated in part by Transcendentalists' uptake of British Romantic poetry—
hence also, via poets like Coleridge, the indirect influence of early German Romanticism and
post-Kantian idealism—the hard-headed 'common sense' of British empiricism gave way, in 19 th-
century American thought, to a more mystical notion of 'direct' or 'original' experience. Thus, on
Emerson's view, 'experience' in the British sense offers mere 'details' that obscure a higher truth:
Every thing is beautiful seen from the point of the intellect, or as truth. But
all is sour if seen as experience. Details are melancholy; the plan is seemly
and noble. In the actual world—the painful kingdom of time and place—
dwell care and canker and fear. With thought, with the ideal, is immortal
hilarity, the rose of joy. Round it all the Muses sing. But grief cleaves to
names and persons and the partial interests of to-day and yesterday.28 
While this characterization bears the unmistakable trace of modern philosophical idealism, the
hyper-intellectualism of Continental rationalists and the lofty systematic speculation of post-
Kantian metaphysicians also gave way, with Americans like Emerson, to a simpler, almost
childlike enthusiasm for nature and a more primal elevation of 'insight' over high theory.
Emerson's praise of vitality and creative expression is genuinely more wild—more 'coarse' and
more ecstatic—than Schiller's or Goethe's, let alone Hegel's or Schelling's. This primitivist
streak, more broadly, underlies the (partial) validity of the cliché that American culture idealizes
a distinctively 'rugged' brand of individualism, relative to that of the European liberal tradition.
(More pejoratively, of course, it also fosters our notorious anti-intellectualism and ahistoricity.)
Emerson's naturalism, this quintessentially American mode of half-secular and half-
religious, almost-but-not-quite-primal exaltation of the 'floods of life' manifest in 'new lands,
new men, new thoughts', was a major influence on Nietzsche's philosophical outlook. As part of
a broader group of mediating figures, also including Schiller, Emerson developed post-Kantian
on the destruction of myth. And now the mythless man stands eternally hungry, surrounded by all past ages, and 
digs and grubs for roots, even if he has to dig for them among the remotest antiquities. The tremendous historical
need of our unsatisfied modern culture, the assembling around one of countless other cultures, the consuming 
desire for knowledge—what does all this point to, if not to the loss of myth, the loss of the mythical home, the 
mythical maternal womb? Let us ask ourselves whether the feverish and uncanny excitement of this culture is 
anything but the greedy seizing and snatching at food of a hungry man—and who would care to contribute 
anything to a culture that cannot be satisfied no matter how much it devours, and at whose contact the most 
vigorous and wholesome nourishment is changed into 'history and criticism'?” (BT 23).
28 Emerson 1950, 211.
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conceptions of life in a naturalistic direction that Nietzsche then dramatically extended into his
own radical amoralism and metaphysical vision of unending conflict among arational 'drives'
[Triebe]. In Nietzsche's theory of universal will to power, the Romantic 'flood of life' was finally
severed from its German idealistic associations (via notions of organic unity and growth) with
moral-rational order and teleological development towards ideal forms. Neither Emerson nor
Schiller embraced amoralism, and both valued nature's 'elevation' into 'spirit' by way of
intellectual form. But in their attempts to develop moralized interpretations of natural
phenomena like vitality and organic growth, they unintentionally had the opposite effect: rather
than convincingly bringing organic phenomena under the ambit of anthropocentric categories of
rationality or freedom, they instead provided apt descriptions of human life and activity as truly
natural, or essentially just expressions of superabundant life. For Nietzsche, this illuminated the
real nature of human traits like 'freedom' and 'reason' that supposedly set us above the rest of the
world. Namely, our appeals to 'moral equality', 'freedom', 'reason', and so on, are ultimately just
sublimated expressions of amoral and arational drives. Some of these basic drives appear moral,
like natural drives to love and friendship, but others are manifestly 'evil', like our drive to cruelty.
This is crucial yet often-misunderstood context for Nietzsche's expressive theory of
knowledge—especially insofar as it bears on my own account of modern scientific culture.
Nietzsche does not favor unsublimated 'natural passion' over sublimated 'higher culture', or vice
versa, generally speaking. Rather, he is fundamentally indifferent to the distinction. Our basic
drives can manifest in their full force as 'culture', or as refinement into 'culture', on his view. But
Nietzsche ultimately values basic drives' powerful expression, without preferring either that this
occur as sublimated 'higher culture' or as 'savage' natural impulse. Indeed, he is often precisely
concerned to show how drives' attenuating 'vaporization' into the 'imaginative and spiritual'
domain runs counter to higher forms of will to power or self-overcoming. Thus when he says
that 'genuine philosophers' are those for whom 'knowing is creating', Nietzsche is indicating a
kind of 'creativity' that he takes to be pervasive in the natural world—not a 'higher' or 'spiritual'
mode of activity distinctive to human beings. This is part of the epistemological import of the
metaphysics of will to power: even sublimated 'culture' like scientific theory is ultimately just a
manifestation of life, construed in terms of a drive to continual self-overcoming.
I take this to be an attractive feature of Nietzsche's view, which I wish to appropriate for
my own account of force. Force does not 'aim' to manifest in the form of 'higher culture' as
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opposed to 'savage' impulse. Nor are 'high-cultural' manifestations of force better than 'unrefined'
ones, generally speaking. Rather, the relative value of 'refined' and 'coarse' phenomena, just like
anything else, is ultimately determined by the relative degree or intensity of force that they
manifest. I say this directly by analogy to Nietzsche's view that “[w]hat determines rank, sets of
rank, is only quanta of power, and nothing else” (WP 855). (Likewise, the “objective measure of
value” is for Nietzsche “[s]olely the quantum of enhanced and organized power” [WP 674].)
Hence, even though Nietzsche is unduly preoccupied with self-expression, nevertheless
his conception of expression is at least grounded in a metaphysical account of will to power that
he takes to draw us into ontological relation with non-human animals and plants, if not all real
things. We 'express' ourselves—we will our own power—in ways that other living things do not.
And science is one of these uniquely human modes of willing power, clearly. But for Nietzsche
science is essentially a way of willing power, and only inessentially a human way of doing so.
More recent analyses of 'power relations' or 'social values' in science ignore this deeper
ontological and ethical foundation, reverting to more narrowly anthropomorphic or
anthropocentric conceptions of (self-)expression. Thus commentators like Foucault, under the
influence of his misreading of Nietzsche, treat 'power' as an essentially social phenomenon.
Foucauldian 'archaeologists of knowledge' perform pseudo-Nietzschean 'genealogical analyses'
of theories or concepts that we take for granted, which (they claim) always reveal the pervasive
influence of social hierarchies, institutional power dynamics, and so on. On the affirmative side,
this general interpretive framework also underlies now-fashionable appeals to overt and covert
hermeneutic resistance by 'subalterns', “'starting off thought' from the lives of marginalized
peoples,”29 and so on. Thus feminist 'standpoint' theorists argue that grounding knowledge in the
standpoint of women (in sexist societies) is “epistemologically advantageous”30 or “epistemically
privileged in some crucial respects,”31 if not just in general “scientifically better.”32 Nor is this
interpretive approach restricted to the political extremes—although centrists typically do not
frame their analyses in terms of 'power', per se. Rather, many centrist and center-left theorists
associate norms of well-functioning scientific inquiry directly with norms of well-functioning
liberal democracy, while adopting a corresponding conceit of 'liberal neutrality'. According to
this conceit, political 'self-expression' in the mode of liberal democracy is not will to power or
29 Harding 1993, 56.
30 Jaggar 2004, 57.
31 Wylie 2003, 26.
32 Harding 1993, 61.
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self-assertion, per se, but rather just a way of impartially arbitrating disagreements among self-
interested individuals or political factions. Hence, the liberal centrist may see empirical science
as an epistemological expression of universal moral equality—insofar as it relies upon evidence
available to all, kowtows to no political authority or religious prejudice, etc.—but not of power.
Modern analyses of 'social and political values in science' amount to a systematic
regression from Nietzsche's more radical naturalism, back into moralized anthropocentrism. It is
a major virtue of Nietzsche's epistemology that he interprets the 'creative' or 'artistic' activity
involved in higher modes of 'will to truth' as essentially similar in kind to the 'self-overcoming'
or 'superabundant' vitality that he values in the rest of the natural world. For Nietzsche, higher
modes of knowledge are neither simply 'copies' of the world nor essentially human modes of
self-expression. Rather, higher modes of knowledge are human self-expression construed as just
one among many higher forms of will to power in nature—many of which are 'savage' and
entirely impersonal. Thus science is part of nature insofar as it is inherently valuable, is reality
and not just a 'picture' of it, for Nietzsche. This feature of his account should be retained. But two
other basic aspects of Nietzsche's epistemology must be abandoned or seriously modified.
First, as I have already emphasized, Nietzsche's lingering Romantic insistence upon the
value of self-expression, or (in his terms) willing one's own power, must be relaxed. Self-
expression is often just self-indulgence. And even to the extent that it can be valuable, self-
expression is clearly not the only valuable mode of 'willing power'. So too are self-sacrifice and
obedience to genuine authority—including external authority, not just one's own 'master drives'.
What does it mean to will something else's power, let alone to do so in the context of scientific
inquiry? Here I take interpersonal relationships and religious devotion to provide two intuitive
paradigms. Love and friendship both involve ennobling elevation above petty egoism and the
crass pursuit of self-interest. In both love and friendship, this involves receptivity to
determination from without—allowing one's actions to 'express' other people's essential traits,
not just one's own positive disposition towards them. But at the same time, in healthy love or
friendship one is clearly never merely an object for the outlet of another person's 'will to power'.
Even in worshipping a deity, we ought not submit in the mode of slavish self-abnegation.
We do not throw ourselves into volcanoes or intentionally drown ourselves in the ocean, simply
because we are impressed by their awesome power. But we do (or at least should) recognize
powers higher than ourselves, and value them. The religious believer glorifies his gods, in part
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by making sacrifices to them that have real cost for himself. He also takes his own most noble
acts to glorify his gods, and indeed to be influenced by them. The gods then act in and through
him. Yet there is still never any doubt that the divinely-inspired man is not himself a god. He is
elevated into greatness under the influence of powers beyond and distinct from himself.
Likewise, then, objective scientific theory involves higher forces' 'expression' in and through us. 
Here the scientific naturalist will inevitably object: Isn't this appeal to 'divine inspiration'
just a metaphor, if not an outright fantasy? But the answer depends on what one takes the 'gods'
to be. What if one could genuinely worship 'gods' that the scientific naturalist should, as such,
recognize to be real? And what if scientific theory itself could be a mode of worshipping them?
This is the context in which I insist upon objective scientific understanding as human beings'
determination by higher, impersonal and causally fundamental natural forces. The typical
scientific naturalist, or even the typical 'social constructivist', will insist that bare physical force
is ethically and politically inert, hence not 'higher' in any relevant sense. I take this dismissive
attitude to reflect several interrelated phenomena: a radical misunderstanding of force, fueled by
modern science and philosophy; a perverse humanistic faith in our own superiority relative to the
rest of nature; and a widespread inability to see values as anything but human creations—a
nihilistic misapprehension of reality as a field of inert 'facts' onto which we project 'meaning'.
These are all profound mistakes, which a more satisfactory theory of science must leave behind.
Second, Nietzsche's metaphysics places too much emphasis on life. The natural world is
constituted mostly by inorganic and entirely impersonal modes of force, like fundamental
physical forces. Life is simply an occasional, specialized formation of physical force—physical
force which does not 'aim' at or 'will' its own organization into living systems, even merely
'ideally'. And human activity, including scientific inquiry, is simply an occasional, specialized
formation of life. Nietzsche is thus wrong to identify life, construed as will to power or a drive to
continual self-overcoming, as metaphysically fundamental. Nietzsche's organicist conception of
will to power must be replaced by a metaphysics of power that better accommodates inorganic
natural phenomena—the weight of the boulder, the cold regularity and order of celestial motions,
and so forth. My notion of force is meant in this spirit. I aim to de-anthropomorphize and 'de-
organicize' post-Kantian notions of willful activity and organic development, in order to achieve
greater explanatory scope and avoid merely figurative description, while still preserving for
force the kind of fundamental ontological and evaluative status that post-Kantian theorists from
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Schiller and Goethe to Schelling and Hegel to Emerson and Nietzsche attributed to will or to life.
Objective scientific knowledge is a formal manifestation of fundamental natural forces, in
and through human beings. The higher forces 'expressed' in objective scientific theories need not
be part of these theories' representational content. Rather, they dictate what is represented in
these theories, and how. In this sense, the 'expression' of higher natural forces grounds objective
scientific representation, without necessarily being depicted in or described by it. One cannot
understand science without recognizing that its deepest grounds may thus lie beyond its contents.
Philosophy need not be dispassionate in order to be true, and scientific knowledge
grounded in poetic vision need not thereby collapse into wild speculation or merely figurative
description. Genuine philosophers have always overcome the petty scholarly impulse towards
'seriousness' at all costs—bourgeois intellectualism's last and most perverse bulwark against
'unenlightened' culture—where deeper understanding demands this. A modern and yet still truly
objective culture must pass beyond the scholar's paralytic fixation on 'critique', to a deeper
embrace of scientific knowledge as a locus of indirect mythopoetic insight into elemental reality.
2. Dynamism:
On Force as Reality
2.1. Reality is force. To be real is to exercise power, to be a locus of force. A thing that is
only determined by higher forces, as a mere object for their outlet, is unreal—nothing but an
appearance, nothing but an image of underlying reality. Objective reality is the all-encompassing
field of interacting forces. This basic field is not itself a force. It is an unreal but objectively valid
space, or dimensional structure, that contains all things insofar as they are objects impacted by
force. Objective reality is an unreal but objectively valid representation of nature as an all-
encompassing field-of-effect. Nature is real, however. Nature is the real order of primitive
forces, interacting prior to any containment by embedding spaces or unifying Forms. We directly
apprehend nature in poetry. And we represent nature as objective reality in science.
Impact is the effect of force. To be real is to have impact. Reality is not subjective effort,
but objectively impactful force. And reality is force with impact, not on mere objects, but on
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other forceful things. Impact considered abstractly, apart from its own force, is only the effect of
force. Abstract impact is pure appearance. Impact abstracted also from the force that determines
it as impact is pure subjective appearance. The apparent motion of the Sun in the sky is a
subjective appearance of the Sun's gravitational impact on the Earth. Viewed in relation to
underlying force, impact is objective appearance. The plant's power of growth is an objective
appearance of the Sun's illuminating force. Objective reality is force insofar as it objectively
appears as real impact, in and through that which it determines as objects. The Sun's objective
reality is manifest in and through the plant's power of growth, which is determined by the Sun.
Agon and hierarchy are two basic ways in which forces interact. Agon is interaction
among well-matched forces, or reciprocal determination. Real friendship and enmity are both
forms of agon, as is healthy romantic love. Hierarchy is the action of superior force on inferior
force, or the unilateral determination of one force as merely an object for a higher force—merely
an object, not in all contexts, but within this hierarchical interaction. 'Higher' forces are stronger,
more forceful forces. The Moon is a higher force than the ocean insofar as the ocean's tides are
dictated by the Moon's position, but almost not at all vice versa. Describing inferior force as a
'mere object' is an abstraction. Higher forces never really impact mere objects. But hierarchy is
real. And in real hierarchies, inferior forces are mere objects for higher forces, to the extent that
they are higher. Agon is dynamic equality, and hierarchy is dynamic inequality. Dynamic
equality is natural equality. Dynamic inequality is natural inequality. Agon and hierarchy are the
only real forms of equality and inequality.
The Sun and plant are naturally unequal insofar as the plant 'needs' the Sun in a way that
the Sun does not 'need' the plant. Marx challenges this asymmetry, under the influence of
Hegelian dialectics, claiming that “[t]he sun is the object of the plant[...]just as the plant is an
object of the sun.”33 But Marx is wrong. While the plant (or its energy and growth) is clearly an
'expression' of the sun's 'life-awakening power', as Marx says, the sun is not an 'expression' of the
plant's power. This intuitive asymmetry is perfectly real, and is philosophically significant.
Marxist-Hegelian dialectics involves an unrealistic denial of natural hierarchy, bound up with a
broader drive to moralize even the basic categories of metaphysical analysis. (See Appendix D.)
Moralists, whether they are overt idealists or else crypto-idealistic advocates of moralized
'materialism', view the world subjectively, through the lens of will-power considered apart from
33 “Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole” (Marx and Engels 1978, 116).
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the impact that grounds its genuine reality. The moralist thus sees humans as 'rational wills' or as
loci of purely 'passionate' or 'natural' drives to freedom and equality—as pure Mind or as
Moralized Bodily Desire. But rational 'willing' and moralized 'passion' are only subjective effort:
the internal feeling of striving towards a purely ideal or unnatural aim that cannot be realized in
the actual world. The idea is treated as the ground of action. But the deed in fact determines the
ethical ideal. 'Rational will' and 'moral passion' are subjective appearances of real will-power.
The real—the 'really real'—is that which explains and underlies appearances. The real is
the fundamental, the basic, the elemental, the essential ground of all else. The real is that which
determines things, whether it be other things or itself, as its mere appearances. The real is that
which exercises power in relation to its objects, in this sense. And the reality of that which is real
is this exercise of power. The real is force. Reality itself, the Being of beings, is force.
Force is amoral: neither morally good nor morally bad. Force is beyond good and evil, as
Nietzsche says, but not therefore beyond all ethical value. We, as natural beings, live beyond
good and evil. We value amorally. We know this, in many cases, although we often refuse to
admit it. If we do acknowledge our instinctive amorality, we diagnose it as original sin, or
(perhaps now more often) as the sign of artificially-imposed hierarchies and cultural bias. In the
scientific domain, likewise, we look to reduce nature to a field of mere objects: material things
that physically condition without spiritually determining the meaning or the value of our actions.
We recognize power only in the mode of our own rationality or freedom—to act in relation to a
mere ideal of universal humanity, and to theorize in relation to a mere ideal of the law-governed
unity of nature. We degrade real arational passions; we indiscriminately impute equal 'moral
worth' to the spiritually noble and ignoble alike; we fail to understand our own power of
intellect; and we casually dismiss our comprehensive determination by impersonal forces as
irrelevant, or else as a 'problem' to be 'solved' by technocratic strivers. We deny reality. Why?
2.2. To be sure, some canonical philosophers have gestured at the identity of force and
reality. In Plato's Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger suggests that “the definition of being [onta] is
simply power [dunamis].” That is, “anything which possesses any sort of power to affect
another, or to be affected by another, if only for a single moment, however trifling the cause and
however slight the effect, has real existence.”34 In a broadly similar spirit, Leibniz claims in his
34 Plato, Sophist 247e.
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Specimen Dynamicum (1695) that “to act is the mark of substances [agere est character
substantiarum],”35 elaborating elsewhere that “[e]very individual created substance exerts
physical action and passion on all the others.”36 Perhaps most notoriously, but also most directly
to the point, Nietzsche envisions an all-pervasive 'will to power' [Wille zur Macht]:
This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end[...]a sea of forces
flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with
tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms; out of the
simplest forms striving toward the most complex, out of the stillest, most rigid,
coldest forms toward the hottest, most turbulent, most self-contradictory, and then
again returning home to the simple out of this abundance, out of the play of
contradictions back to the joy of concord, still affirming itself in this uniformity of
its courses and its years, blessing itself as that which must return eternally, as a
becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness: this, my Dionysian
world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery
world of the twofold voluptuous delight, my 'beyond good and evil,' without goal,
unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good
will toward itself—do you want a name for this world? A solution for all its
riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most
midnightly men?— This world is the will to power—and nothing besides! (WP
1067 [1885])
Nor is will to power just an ultimate substance or entity, for Nietzsche, like a basic physical
particle or field. Rather, the theory of will to power is in part ontological, in Heidegger's sense:
an account of the reality of that which is real—i.e., of what it is for things to be, to have being.
“[L]ife itself simply is will to power” (BGE 259), on Nietzsche's view; and in turn “Being—we
have no idea of it apart from the idea of 'living',” for “[h]ow can anything dead 'be'?” (WP 582).37
None of this is to say that Nietzsche's 'will to power' [Wille zur Macht] is the same as the
35 Leibniz 1989, 118.
36 'Primary Truths' (1686?) (Leibniz 1989, 33). Cf. John Earman's broader remark that “[t]he Leibniz corpus, like 
the Bible, can be cited in support of almost any idea [...]” (Earman 1989, 17).
37 See Heidegger 1991a/b. While some commentators interpret Nietzsche as attributing a will to power only to 
things that are alive in an intuitive sense, he occasionally suggests that the will to power is literally everywhere. 
E.g. “[L]ife is merely a special case of the will to power” (KSA 13:14[121])). Besides WP 582, see Richardson 
1996, 18 n.4 for further examples. Nietzsche can thus arguably be viewed as a kind of radical organicist—
Heidegger brings this out, as well.
A methodological note: while I make fairly wide use of Nietzsche's unpublished notes, particularly 
regarding the will to power, I aim to do so in a manner consistent with Brian Leiter's suggestion that this material
“should only supplement, not constitute, the core of an interpretation” (Leiter 1995, 113 n.1). Here I proceed in 
the spirit of John Richardson's effort to “show[] how well … [Nietzsche's] thoughts can be clarified by being 
organized systematically around th[e] partly concealed core” of his theory of will to power (Richardson 1996, 9).
Cf. Magnus 1986, 1988.
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Eleatic Stranger's 'power' [dunamis] or Leibniz's 'action' [actus/agere], or that any of the three
align completely with force, as I view it. They do not. For example, dunamis has connotations of
potentiality or mere capacity that I strongly wish to avoid. But I aim to systematically develop a
thesis that is nevertheless recognizably similar in spirit: to be real is to be a locus of force.
Nietzsche's theory of will to power is perhaps closet to my own account of force, but is
unacceptable as it stands. Nietzsche's view remains to some extent nihilistic, even though his is a
genuinely impassioned, truly higher kind of nihilism. Namely, Nietzsche offers a proto-
existentialist and semi-nihilistic account of values as the 'artistic' products of human creative
genius, which reflect the systematic 'falsification' of reality in the image of value-creators'
constitutive 'drives' [Triebe]. This Nietzschean view is evocative of a now-commonplace kind of
atheistical materialism: a vision of reality as a field of intrinsically valueless objects or mere
matters of fact, onto which human beings in turn creatively 'project' meaning. Less
psychologistically, however, and more deeply, Nietzsche's theory of will to power can also be
understood as a theory of reality: a vision of the world as pervaded throughout by an inherently
valuable vital force or drive to 'self-overcoming'. This notion of universal 'self-overcoming' is
descendent from earlier Romantic accounts of life as that which incessantly surges out beyond
itself, with a creative energy taken to ultimately underlie all natural process. Nietzsche rightly
works to eliminate the teleological dimension of strictly Romantic notions of organic
development and (closely related) post-Kantian idealistic notions of will. But his notion of will
to power nevertheless remains excessively organicist—too closely bound up with life, self-
expression, and continual development to be plausibly applicable to all of reality. Reality is not
just vital force, but force more generally, including inorganic force insofar as it is implicated in
the 'cold' order and precision of fundamental physical law. Reality is not Nietzschean will to
power, or 'self-overcoming' construed as the 'law of 'life', but rather force. Force has intrinsic
value. And human creativity is not the only or the highest exertion of force. In truly objective
forms of cultural production, the human creator genuinely 'expresses' his own individual or
social force only insofar as he is also determined from without by inhuman natural forces, higher
than any mere force of sociocultural or political-economical determination.
2.3. 'Force' denotes several things, of course, in everyday language. It can denote
compulsion, violence, or constraint. Perhaps it especially connotes purely physical modes of
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compulsion, but certainly not exclusively so—e.g. consider the emotional force of a melody, or
the intellectual force manifest in a great work like Newton's Principia. 'Force' can denote
strength, or energy, and especially their active expression. It can denote power, or power's active
expression. It can denote power to induce change, specifically, and especially changes in place
(i.e. motion), in motion (i.e. acceleration), or in momentum. And it can denote a fundamental
physical interaction, as in gravity, electromagnetism, or the strong and weak nuclear forces.
Most intuitively, force is simply related to impact—to having an effect. Most intuitively,
that is, a force is simply a real cause. This is how I have characterized force above, in essence.
Force is just the objectively impactful exercise of power. Any real causal power, when actively
expressed, produces real effects. Likewise, as I elaborate at length below, young children seem to
understand force simply in terms of activity or doing something. Perhaps they are not so wrong.
Perhaps we would benefit from adopting a more childlike—which is not to say childish—attitude
towards force. Perhaps children and 'prescientific' man know force better than does enlightened
man. Perhaps enlightened notions of force are sublimated, all too sublimated?
More intuitive notions of force may seem so thin or so diffuse as to be useless for the
purposes of rigorous metaphysics, let alone those of empirical science. After all, modern physics
carefully distinguishes force from momentum, from energy, and from work, even if ordinary
language or prescientific consciousness does not. And whereas metaphysical theory may
conceptualize force as impact in general, or as (the generic cause of) change, action, or
resistance,38 modern physics associates force with change of momentum, specifically. But how,
exactly, does the specificity of modern scientific notions of force bear on the viability of
Nietzsche's vision of the world as 'a sea of forces flowing and rushing together'? Why does his
proclamation that “Everything is force [Alles ist Kraft],”39 or my own claim that reality is force,
seem so different in spirit from standard physical scientific claims that all natural phenomena
arise from the law-governed operation of fundamental forces? Is it so different? Must it be?
2.4. The identity of reality and force is not Romantic, exactly, although it is related to a
certain kind of 19th-century Romantic impulse. The Romantic organicist imagines reality as life,
38 E.g. in his Principles of Philosophy, Descartes refers to “the force of each body to act against another or to resist 
the action of that other.” He suggests in turn, incidentally, that this universal bodily force consists in “the single 
fact that each thing strives, as far as is in its power, to remain in the same state” [Part II, principle 43; Descartes 
1982, 63]. This notion of self-preservative 'striving' of course influenced Spinoza's later doctrine of 'conatus'.
39 KSA 10:1[3] [1882].
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and thus views the world as pervaded by vital force or organic form.40 But life is not the basis of
reality. Vital force is only one real kind of force. Not all real things are alive, and 'Nature' is not a
real organic whole. Romantic idealists imagine reality as willful activity or creative self-
expression, whereby subjects—and ultimately one all-encompassing Subject—render themselves
concrete or objectively real.41 Thus, in acting so as to realize a goal, we make the 'world' conform
to our 'mind'. But we also render ourselves objective in theoretical contemplation of humans and
the rest of nature, idealists claim, insofar as we thereby apprehend our ultimate identity with
nature. (Imagine 19th-century quasi-secular evangelical psychedelia: the 'Cosmos', a 'World Soul',
and the like.42) Post-Kantian idealism thus posits 'dialectical' syntheses of mind and body, subject
and object, universal and particular.43 But willful activity is not the basis of reality. The exercise
of real will-power is only one real kind of force. Not all real things have will, let alone
consciousness. 'Spirit' is certainly not a real Subject achieving Self-Knowledge through us. Nor
does nature objectively conform to any real 'Idea'.44
Romantic idealism and organicism are often interrelated through specific notions of form.
Romantic organicists see life as 'formative force', or else as holistic organic form towards which
mechanistic physical interaction (they claim) teleologically aims—the archetypal leaf-structure
that is only concretely realized as an infinite process of development between 'moments', Nature
construed as a systematic whole, and so on.45 Qua idealists, in turn, Romantics see the systematic
40 See e.g. Richards 2002 for a helpful, overarching study. On vital force, note his account of Bildungstrieb in 
Blumenbach and Lebenskraft in Reil and Humboldt (Richards 2002, 216–229; 255–261). See also Larson 1979.
41 Compare Friedrich Schlegel's views on poetry and creative expression in Schlegel 1968 and Schlegel 1971.
42 E.g. consider Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling's Von der Weltseele (On the World Soul) (1798), and 
Alexander von Humboldt's five-volume Kosmos (1845–1862) (Schelling 1806; Humboldt 1845–).
43 Beiser (2003a, 69–70) summarizes the core philosophical underpinnings of this idea: “Beginning in 1796 the 
notebooks of the Philosophische Lehrjahre show how [Friedrich Schlegel] was moving towards a doctrine he 
called—years before Schelling and Hegel—'absolute idealism.' According to this doctrine, everything in reality 
conforms to reason, which consists in the forms, ideas, or purpose of things. There is no fundamental difference 
between the objective and subjective because both are differing degrees of organization and development of a 
single rational activity, which acts through constantly dividing what is one and uniting what is divided. In the 
later notebooks Schlegel's concept of reason becomes much more complex. It is no longer simply identified with 
the Platonic eros [ … ] Still, the Platonic provenance of his concept remains: reason is the intelligible structure of
things, what we perceive in beauty through the power of intellectual intuition.” See also Beiser 2003b.
44 Cf. “It is indeed correct that romantic epistemology and metaphysics is better understood as a reaction against 
Kant's and Fichte's idealism, and that it must not be conflated with the grand speculative systems of Fichte, 
Schelling, and Hegel. It does not follow from these points, however, that Frühromantik is a rejection of idealism 
tout court. Indeed, given the Platonic legacy of Frühromantik, it is possible, even necessary, to regard it as its 
own form of idealism. Following the usage of Schlegel and Schelling, we could call it an absolute or objective 
idealism. It is idealism not in the sense that everything depends on some self-conscious subject, but in the sense 
that everything conforms to the idea, the purpose, or the logos of things” (Beiser 2003a, 66).
45 “[The romantics] were no less naturalistic than Spinoza: they too affirmed that everything is within nature, and 
that everything in nature conforms to law.[...]It is not that there are special organic laws, which are somehow 
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forms towards which these processes 'aim' as, literally, ideas. (While ideas are apparently linked
to ideating subjects, 'objective' idealists insist upon the ideality or essential rational intelligibility
of reality, arguably without positing any underlying Subject for whom Nature appears as an
Idea.46) But 'formative force' is not the basis of reality. Physical forces do not 'aim' to produce
any kind of structures, let alone organic forms, even 'ideally'. Insofar as physical forces yield
organic form, it simply emerges. Natural processes are not directed towards ideas. Even where
organic forms do emerge, this does not prove their real causal power as the Spiritual logos or
essential rationality of nature, let alone their appearance for a real Mind. Organic growth or
creative development is not the fundamental principle of the natural world. Romanticism is
mystical, and vitalism is un-scientific. Pure dynamism is not.
2.5 . A different account of reality will strike many readers as far more intuitive.
According to widespread belief, namely, to be real is to exist. 'Everything that exists is equally
real, and reality itself is just existence—if 'reality' is anything at all!,' modern man proudly
declaims against much of the metaphysical tradition. But the real is not just that which exists.
Plato rightly never meant to claim that the Forms are 'really existent' or 'more existent', when he
characterized them as 'really real Being' [ousia ontōs ousa],47 'more real' [mallon onta] than the
sensible particulars that participate in them.48 
The conflation of reality and existence immediately runs aground against the problem of
beyond the jurisdiction of mechanism; rather, it is that mechanism is subordinate to organicism. The mechanical 
is simply a limited case of the teleological, deriving from a partial perspective that considers only the parts in 
their immediate conditions; but it does not ask for the whys and wherefores of these initial conditions in the first 
place; instead, it allows the series of causes to regress ad infinitum” (Beiser 2003a, 150).
46 “[Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schlegel] attacked [Fichte's] idealism for its subjectivism, more specifically for its 
conception of the principle of subject-object identity as residing in the ego or subject alone. To overcome the 
one-sidedness of Fichte's subjective idealism, they insisted on complementing it with Spinoza's realism or 
naturalism. If the absolute were subject-object identity, they argued, then it should be possible to conceive it as 
both objective and subjective, as both real and ideal. The argument is most explicit in Schelling's 1800 System 
des transcendentalen Idealismus; yet it was already implicit in the fragments of Hölderlin, and in the notebooks 
of Novalis and Schlegel, as early as 1796” (Beiser 2003a, 78). On Fichte, in relation to Kant, see Beiser 1987.
47 Phaedrus 247e.
48 Republic 515d. See Vlastos 1965, 1966; Guthrie 1975. Representatively: “Plato does not believe that while the 
Form does exist, its sensible instances do and do not. In the Timaeus (52A) he declares 'that there are first, the 
unchanging Form... ; second, its namesake and like, generated, ever changing, … ; third, Space …' In full view 
of the greater reality of the Form, and the lesser reality of the other two members of the trio, Plato says that all 
three exist, and says it again without qualification a few lines later (52D 2-4)” (Vlastos 1966, 11). “What did 
[Plato] mean when he said in the Cave simile that puppets are 'more real' than their shadows [mallon onta, 515d]?
What indeed do we mean when we say that a man is more real than his shadow? Not, perhaps, that he exists 
more than his shadow, or even that he is more 'genuine', but that the shadow's existence is a secondary one, 
dependent on the existence and presence of the man and a source of light” (Guthrie 1975, 497-8)
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subjectivity. Many things that exist do so merely as appearances for subjects. And although
subjective phenomena exist, nevertheless they are less real. The bloody dagger that Hamlet
hallucinates, with its handle pointing toward his hand, does exist in his mind. But it is merely
ideal. It is less real than the poisoned blade with which he later delivers a death blow to Laertes.
The hallucinated dagger impacts Hamlet, to be sure, motivating his plot for revenge, in part, and
perhaps even partly determining its fated outcome. To this extent, hence as mediated by Hamlet,
the hallucinated dagger is objectively real. But the physical blade alone cuts. And in this respect
it is more real. Subjective phenomena may well exist, but objective phenomena are more real.
Nor is reality simply mind-independent existence. Subjective phenomena are not always
non-existent, and subjective representations are not necessarily inaccurate. Objective reality is
not simply existence, and objective validity is not simply truth or epistemic justifiability. A
description of the world comprising nothing but perfectly accurate statements about mind-
independent things directly observable by human beings—e.g., trees, thunderclouds, and the
slope of mountains, but not photosynthesis or electrons or the curvature of space-time—could
well be a subjective worldview. This is not because sensory perception presents us 'merely' with
concrete particulars, or with qualities like color and smell that appear to us but not to all
conceivable subjects. Rather, this type of description is (scientifically) subjective insofar as its
selective focus on humanly-observable things reduces its explanatory power. Regardless of its
significance for empirical scientific epistemology, the threshold of human observability is not an
especially load-bearing 'joint' in the explanatory structure of nature.49 Imperceptible things are
neither less real nor more real than sensible things, generally speaking, although physical
scientific objectivity does involve the systematic explanatory subordination of observable
phenomena to an underlying unobservable reality. More fundamental aspects of reality can also
appear sensuously, however, as in aesthetic experience. A fully objective perspective is not a
'view from nowhere' onto bare facts, but a view from elemental reality onto its own appearances.
To be clear, the 'view from nowhere' is interpreted in two main ways, neither of which is
compelling: first, as the standpoint we inhabit whenever we assert facts about the way mind-
independent things are, independently of the way they appear merely to certain kinds of
perceiving subjects; and second, as a God's-eye or Mind's-eye view. Many now accept the
former view, and find the latter bizarre or metaphysically otiose. But the banal 'fact-reporting'
49 The 'joint of nature' metaphor is familiar via Plato (Phaedrus 265e).
31
view is conceptually and intellectually-historically descendent from the otiose 'God's-eye view'.
At any rate, the 'fact-reporting' view is too weak to ground a true account of objectivity, and the
'Gods-eye view' is both impossible and an unworthy goal.
To the former point, again, a description of the world comprising nothing but perfectly
accurate statements about mind-independent things observable by human beings—e.g., trees,
thunderclouds, and the slope of mountains, but not photosynthesis or electrons or the curvature
of space-time—would evidently be a subjective worldview, from a scientific perspective. Here it
might be objected that the individual statements in this theory could all be objectively valid, even
if the theory as a whole is not, insofar as the theory shines an anthropocentric 'spotlight' onto
reality and so reveals a subjectively-selected subset of objective truths. This may sound
reasonable, but it raises a question: what is an objectively-selected subset of objective truths? The
account of objective vision as the viewpoint of no-kind-of-subject-in-particular yields no
acceptable answer—and arguably no answer at all, even though the tree-thunder-mountain theory
in question is obviously subjective. Perhaps it suggests that a maximally objective point of view
includes all factual truths about the world. But while some may find this plausible, it is not.
Listing 'everything that is the case' is not objective, just indiscriminate. My account does better:
objectivity requires us to disclose fundamental aspects of reality, paring away inessential facts,
and considering them only insofar as they are systematically grounded in fundamental reality.
This brings us to the second interpretation of the 'view from nowhere'. Nietzsche was
right to insist that the quest for 'disinterestedness' often reflects a perverse drive to self-
abnegation—an otherworldly impulse to escape the perspectival 'limitations' that in fact define
our real natures and distinctive value, in attainment to the serene viewpoint of the Nothing into
which all too many secretly wish to be released. Sometimes it clearly does. But it need not, at
least so overtly. Indeed, the 'view from nowhere' is arguably a kind of 'God's-eye view', and the
impulse to attain a God's-eye view is in some sense highly anthropocentric, even if the resulting
image of the world is not anthropomorphic. To privilege the perspective of an infinite Mind,
unconditioned by sensuous desire, is evidently to exalt an ethically-loaded image of ourselves as
essentially rational beings—to worship ourselves as freely self-determining spirits or minds.50
50 Here one might object that to think of God as a disembodied Mind, but humans as embodied, is not to worship 
ourselves as disembodied minds or essentially (just) rational beings. But this is to misunderstand the charge of 
psychological projection. Feuerbach himself acknowledges that there is an obvious sense in which “God is not 
what man is” and “man is not what God is”: man is finite, imperfect, temporal, weak, and sinful; whereas God is 
infinite, perfect, eternal, almighty, and holy (Feuerbach 1841/1957, 33). Yet despite this apparent difference, 
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This anthropocentrism is thinly veiled by a projection of our own rational faculties onto
the external world, mediated by the concept of a personal God, infinite Mind, or universal Spirit.
As Feuerbach and Marx argued, that is, consciousness of God—or Nature viewed in the image of
God—is at root an alienated mode of human self-consciousness. (This is true with respect to the
God of the Judeo-Christian tradition, as Feuerbach and Marx claimed, but it is not equally
plausible with respect to all anthropomorphic deities of historical world religion.51) The 'absolute
idealism' developed most fully by Schelling and Hegel made the link between the 'view from
nowhere' and Christian conceptions of divinity unusually explicit. But this was only the
apotheosis of a far broader modern quest for objectivity in the form of unconditioned knowledge.
Post-Kantian idealism was simply the most systematic attempt to embed the ideal of a view from
nowhere within the Christian tradition of rational theology that has been its implicit ground
throughout modernity. Hence, the value of objectivity traditionally construed stands or falls with
the value of rationalistic theories of human nature. The view from nowhere is not really the view
of no-kind-of-being-in-particular. It is the view of a purely rational being. The view from
nowhere is thus impossible insofar as a purely rational being would be an unreal, supernatural,
merely ideal being. And it is inherently valuable only insofar as (purely epistemic) rationality is.
All of this is consistent with Nietzsche's point, however, if one accepts that rationalistic
theories of human nature stem from a self-abnegating 'will to nothingness'. And this is
Nietzsche's view, in fact, as well as my own. Plato's love of the Forms is a displaced hatred of
the real world—the physical reality he dismisses as merely the shadowy 'imitation' of an
underlying domain of pure intelligible Being. Likewise, in seeing all human beings as equal
moral subjects, the moralist does not see real humanity, but only its ghostly intellectualized
shadow—abstract 'spirits', 'noumenal souls', 'rational egos', and the like.52 In constructing the
God's attributes are ultimately just “our positive, essential qualities, our realities,” projected beyond all actual 
human limitations by our understanding in the fullest expression of its abstractive power (ibid., 38-9, see also 
ibid., 98). God is humanity “purified” of all features of real human existence that the religious believer sees as 
evils or imperfections (ibid., 181). In this light, it is clear that God's disembodiment is believers' vision, not of 
how humans are in all respects, but of how it is best for us to be—and moreover of how we are insofar as we 
have immaterial souls, i.e., insofar as we are humans rather than just animals or merely sensuous beings.
51 Unlike many anthropomorphic deities, the Judeo-Christian God seems to epitomize only virtues seen as uniquely
human: this God operates mainly in the mode of a rationally self-determining Mind unconditioned by passions, 
always acts with perfect moral benevolence towards all things, etc. This tendency is arguably most pronounced 
in Christianity, although this is not to claim that Old Testament wrathfulness vanishes, except perhaps in Christ.
52 Needless to say, in making this claim I am not endorsing systems of social hierarchy grounded in race, gender, 
class, etc. But I am insisting that not all individuals have equal worth—strictly within a given race, gender, or 
class, for example, some individuals clearly demand more respect than others. (In the name of good taste, I will 
leave it to the reader to imagine concrete examples of this.) Hence, I endorse an amoral system of ethical value.
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illusory ideal of a purely rational perspective, Platonists and their Judeo-Christian or secular
humanistic descendants denigrate all real perspectival vision. I take it that this is a central part of
Nietzsche's point when he claims that “it meant standing truth on her head and denying
perspective, the basic condition of all life, when one spoke of spirit and the good as Plato did.”53
Thus his diagnosis of Judeo-Christian morality as “Platonism for 'the people',”54 a democratized
rationalism emerging from this same hatred of real amoral nature, and real amoral man.
The traditional 'view from nowhere' purports to be the 'unconditioned' perspective of 'no-
kind-of-being-in-particular'. In fact, it is often interpreted as the perspective of a purely rational
being, at least implicitly. But this 'Mind's-eye view' is unreal, and a bad ideal in the first place.
Although Plato clearly saw that bare existence is not enough to constitute something as
fully real, he, too, was wrong about the basic nature of reality. The most real, the ultimate ground
of objective validity, is not the universal or the purely rational. The real is not Platonic Form—
e.g. the ideal Bed in which all concrete particular beds 'participate', and of which pictures of beds
are in turn mere 'appearances of appearances'. The real is not that which exists as an Idea for
infinite Mind. Nor is the real the unknowable thing-in-itself of Kantian idealism. Nor is the real
the generic phenomenal object of human cognition. Nor is the real that which appears only to
specific social collectives, let alone to individual members thereof. Nor is the real the entirety of
things that exist. The real is not 'everything that is the case'. The real is not the 'empirical'. The
real is not Nature viewed as an all-encompassing systematic whole. The real is not God.
The real—the 'really real'—is that which explains and underlies appearances. The real is
the fundamental, the basic, the elemental, the essential ground of all else. The real is that which
determines things, whether it be other things or itself, as its mere appearances. The real is that
which exercises power in relation to its objects, in this sense. And the reality of that which is real
is this exercise of power. The real is force. Reality itself, the Being of beings, is force.
2.6. Every real, truly distinct kind of thing is distinct only insofar as it is the locus of a
distinctive mode of force, or way of impacting things. Electromagnetic force and gravity have
different structural forms, for instance, such that gravity dominates at large scales. Colors impact
us and other animals differently than do sounds. Within musical form, even, rhythm and pure
tone impact us differently. Likewise, every real individual thing is distinct from other real
53 Beyond Good and Evil, Preface (Nietzsche 1886/1966, 3).
54 Beyond Good and Evil, Preface (Nietzsche 1886/1966, 3).
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individuals only insofar as it is the locus of an individualized mode of force. Thus Goethe's real
historical impact is distinct from Alexander the Great's—more sublimated, perhaps, superficially
more 'spiritual' and more purely 'creative'. Forces are not objectively distinguished 'in
themselves', apart from their impact on things. Rather, forces are objectively distinguished in
relation to their objects, as real grounds of impact.
The identity of reality and force is far from counter-intuitive. It is extremely intuitive—so
much so that it may seem childish or naive. But it not therefore wrong. It just has the simplicity
of the elemental, and the clarity of all primordial knowledge. It is obviously true. That the
identity of reality and force is in one sense obvious, however, does not mean that there is nothing
to be gained by examining it more closely, and systematically.
I will systematically draw out the implications of the identity of reality and force, with
special attention to its bearing on the relationship between three phenomena: interaction,
encompassing agon and hierarchy; extension, encompassing shape and space; and appearance,
encompassing objective and subjective appearance. Extension and appearance are both clearly
related to form: 'form' commonly denotes both extension (e.g. shape or structure) and that-which-
appears. Nor is this an accident of language. Extension and appearance are interrelated, and the
ground of this interrelation is force. Unreal but objectively valid structures are fields. Objective
fields are the pure extensive impact or structural appearance of real forces. Objectively valid
spaces are a species of objective field, viz., the pure extensive impact of universal forces:
abstract images of real structures that universal forces produce in their objects. But this is to
anticipate issues that will naturally arise only later. For now, another issue is more pressing:
'Power' and 'force' have become almost synonymous with evil, for us, almost identical to
morally arbitrary compulsion and unjust domination. We therefore wish that reality were not
force. We tell ourselves, often in bad faith, that it is not. We act as if all it took to be real were to
exist, or as if our moral ideals were more real than any amoral natural force could be. To the
extent that we acknowledge the ubiquity of arational forces in modern science, we insist that
they are ethically inert and politically meaningless.55 We fail to know ourselves, and to value
55 A. L. Hammond (1969, 9) rightly notes that notions of “reality, of the relatively more real, and the natural as the 
existent: hence the independent, the enduring, the more than subjective, the nonartificial, the effective, the 
affected, the important, what is there … ” are all “'good' notions,” i.e. have positive valence. Likewise, W. T. 
Stace (1952, 127) argues that “there exists in the human mind an ineradicable tendency to identify value with 
reality—that is, if value is here understood as the supreme value of divine blessedness.” Is identifying reality 
with value, in this way, a simple 'naturalistic fallacy'? No, it is not. The real is not the merely factual or simply 
existent. Hence to infer value from reality is not to infer an 'ought' from a mere 'is'. That said, methodologically, I
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ourselves as we truly are. We fail to understand nature, and wrongly set ourselves above it. We
spurn reality. We hate force, or at least we often act as if we do. But why? Why do we deny the
obvious? Why do we not accept force as reality? Why do we degrade force, and not value it?
3. Control-Freaks and Moralistic Force-Denial
3.1. As modern we fear power, and so always attempt to control it. Encased in modern
society and molded by its fetish for self-regulation—for 'comfort' in universal freedom from
compulsion by force—our stomachs turn at the sight of blood, or any cry of pain. We demand
that our meat be pre-cleaned, post-dated, and plastic-wrapped. We demand that our state-
sanctioned executions be performed by compassionate technicians administering sedative-laced
injections to minimize the suffering of their hapless 'patients'. We demand that our military
actions be distant and precisely-targeted strikes carried out by remotely-operated drones. We
demand that our helicopter-parents carefully manage our children's lives so that they experience
the least resistance and the most affirmation possible. To be sure, we also acknowledge the
absurdity and hypocrisy of these postures, in guilt-wracked moments of partial self-awareness.
We solemnly apologize and, as always, call for progressive reform. But these absurdities are
entirely our own. They stem from our nature as an excessively refined and 'sublimated' culture,
as thoroughly civilized. Our grumbling and self-satire rings hollow. This moralized self-
flagellation and these glib expressions of guilt are also entirely our own: the internalized petty
cruelty corresponding to our external repression. We are modern—all too modern.
The modern fear of power also manifests in our attitudes towards natural science. This
includes both how we view the world as described by science, and how we view the scientific
endeavor itself—for instance, in accounts of the nature and value of theoretical contemplation.
On the ontological side, again, beholden to a perverse conception of modern science, we often
seek to reduce nature to a field of mere objects that physically condition without spiritually
determining the meaning or the value of our actions. We recognize power only in the mode of
our own rationality or moral freedom, and hence casually dismiss our systematic determination
by inhuman natural forces as ethically and politically insignificant, in itself. We insist upon a
'fact-value' divide, because this denuded vision of reality allows us to feel 'above it all', secure in
certainly begin with the dual premises that (1) science tells us about reality and (2) the real world is valuable.
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our 'spiritual' autonomy even though as we know that as 'empirical' beings we are always
heteronomous. We fear real power, and so pretend that we 'transcend' the order of natural force.
Traditional accounts of theoretical contemplation often reflect the same basic fear of
powers beyond our control. The Platonic idealist seeks release from natural flux via intellectual
communion with eternal Forms. But these Forms' apparent 'power' over particulars—e.g. the
appearance that all physical beds 'participate' in, or are 'rationally determined' by, the ideal Bed
—is only her own power of abstraction. And the world of particulars she seeks to leave behind is
precisely the world in which she is a finite being, destined for death and cast about in spite of her
'will' by higher forces. (Plato is not 'modern', in the relevant sense; but he is one major historical
influence on the development of modern thought, partly in this respect. These relations will
become clearer below.) The idealist fears that, as a natural being, he is unfree. In exalting
contemplation of ideal forms or universal principles, he reveals a deeper longing for 'spiritual'
elevation up from 'animal' desire and impersonal force, up from bondage into freedom.56
Thus Schiller claims that when Man is in his merely “physical condition, subject to the
power of Nature alone,” the “world to him is merely destiny, not yet object; everything has
existence for him only insofar as it secures existence for him; what neither gives to him nor takes
from him, is to him simply not there.”57 By contrast, contemplation or reflection ['Die
Betrachtung (Reflexion)'] is “man's first free relation to the universe which surrounds him”:
If desire directly apprehends its object, contemplation thrusts its object
into the distance, thereby turning it into its true and inalienable
possession and thus securing it from passion. The necessity of Nature
which governed him with undivided power in the condition of mere
sensation, abandons him when reflection begins; an instantaneous calm
ensues in the senses; time itself, the eternally moving, stands still while
the dispersed rays of consciousness are gathered together, and form, an
image of the infinite, is reflected upon the transient foundation.[...]From
being a slave of Nature, so long as he merely perceives her, Man
becomes her lawgiver as soon as she becomes his thought. She who had
formerly ruled him only as force, now stands as object before the
judgment of his glance. What is object to him has no longer power over
56 Compare also Feuerbach: “The free, abstract thinker knows nothing higher than freedom; he does not need to 
attach it to a personal being; for him freedom in itself, as such, is a real positive thing. A mathematical, 
astronomical mind, a man of pure understanding, an objective man, who is not shut up in himself, who feels free 
and happy only in the contemplation of objective rational relations, in the reason which lies in things in 
themselves—such a man will regard the substance of Spinoza, or some similar idea, as his highest being, and be 
full of antipathy towards a personal, i.e., subjective God” (Feuerbach 1957, 99).
57 Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (AE), Letter 24 (Schiller 2014, 113).
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him; for in order to be object it must experience his own power[...]Man
is superior to every terror of Nature so long as he knows how to give
form to it, and to turn it into his object. Just as he begins to assert his
self-dependence in the face of Nature as phenomenon, so he also asserts
his dignity in the face of Nature as power, and with noble freedom he
rises up against his deities.58 
Insofar as science is essentially related to theoretical contemplation, then, modern thinkers like
Schiller take it to be an expression of human freedom. We express our freedom, on this view, in
part by cognitively appropriating the external world—including the natural forces that physically
determine us—using our power of reason. We reveal universal law or intelligible form in nature,
and thereby show that it must conform to our nature (as rational beings), rather than vice versa.
As Schiller emphasizes, notably, this 'freedom' is not just freedom from determination by
external powers in the natural world, but also freedom from determination by our own passions
or arational desires. That is, modern critics often claim that scientific cognition or theoretical
contemplation involves a kind of ennobling freedom from desire or 'disinterested' state of calm.
Robert Boyle provides a clear formulation of this view in his Occasional Reflections (1665):
Whereas, though my inclinations for Astronomy make me so diligent a
Gazer on the Stars, that in spight of my great Obnoxiousness to the
inclemency of the nocturnal air, I gladly spend the coldest hours of the night
in contemplating them ; I can yet look upon these bright Ornaments of
Heaven it self, with a mind as calm and serene, as those very nights that are
fittest to observe them in. I know divers men for whom Nature seems to have
cut out too much work, in giving them, in an unconfinedly amorous
disposition of mind, strong Appetites for almost all the fair Objects that
present themselves to their sight : These amorous Persons may be, I grant,
very much delighted when they first gaze Upon a Constellation of fair
Ladies, but the Heart commonly pays dear for the Pleasure of the Eye, and
the eager desires that Beauty creates, are in such men excited too often not to
be frequently disappointed, and are wont to be accompani'd with so many
jealousies, and fears, and repulses, and difficulties, and dangers, and
remorses, and despairs, that the unhappy Lovers (if those that love more than
one can merit that Title) do rather languish than live, if you will believe
either their own querulous words, or their pale and melancholy looks, which
would make one think they were just entring into the Grave, or had been
newly digged out of it. Whereas a person that has his Affections, and Senses,
at that command, which Reason and Religion require, and confer, can look
upon the same Objects with pleas'd but not with dazl'd Eyes : He considers
58 AE, Letter 25 (Schiller 2014, 120–121).
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these bright and curious Productions, as fair animated Statues of Nature's
framing, and contenting himself to admire the workmanship, adores onely
the Divine Artificer, whose infinite amiableness is but faintly shadow'd forth
even by such lovely Creatures. And therefore what has been said of
Mistresses, may be more justly applicable to all the other Objects of Men's
too eager Passions. To be short, looking upon these curiousest Productions of
Nature, with a Philosopher's and a Christian's Eyes, he can cast them on
those bright Objects with pleasure, and yet withdraw them without trouble,
and allowing Beauty to contribute to his Delight, without being able to create
him any Disquiet ; though it afford him a less transporting Pleasure than it
somtimes do's the Amorist, yet, all things consider'd, it may afford him a
greater Pleasure, by being more innocent, more untroubl'd, and more lasting ;
And there may be such a Difference betwixt the Contentment of this calm
admirer of Beauty, and that of a greedy and unconfin'd Prostituter of his
Heart to it, as there is betwixt the unquiet Pleasure that the sight of the Stars
gives to this Child, and the rational Contentment it may afford to an
Astronomer.59
Here Boyle contrasts the Astronomer's more 'calm and serene' form of 'rational Contentment'
against both the 'unquiet pleasure' of the Child and the 'strong Appetites' or 'eager desires' of
'amorous Persons'. The anti-sensualistic dimension of this account is overt: in privileging
'rational' pleasure, Boyle clearly elevates 'reason' over 'sense', 'mind' over 'body', and so forth.
This anti-sensualism, too, reflects the modern fear of power. Passions are natural
powers.60 The modern philosophical conceit of 'rational desire' or 'will', as opposed to passion,
reflects a misguided impulse to deny that we are internally driven by our own force or power.
The modern philosophical rationalist insists that our actions should be justified, not merely
caused. She fails to truly come to terms with the fact rational justification, too, is grounded in
power. Our drives produce the 'justifications' that we offer. Our justifications are just
'expressions' of our own internal drives, or else 'expressions' of external forces acting in and
through us. As modern, we hate, fear, and deny this. We wish to control ourselves, to manage
and regulate our own drives, as if we were 'rational egos' looking down upon them from above.
We wish to be 'souls'. But in fact we are just force. We wish to be self-determining. But in fact
we are determined from without by higher natural forces. Even when we achieve genuine self-
control, this is just internal hierarchy, which our strongest drives compel by force—compelled
obedience and self-mastery.
59 Boyle, Occasional Reflections, Reflection VIII (Boyle 1848, 325–7).
60 This may seem like an odd claim, given the etymology of the word 'passion'—but see pp. 141–142 below.
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3.2. As civilized modern people, then, we are viscerally disturbed by Ernst Jünger's
account of war as a frenzied release of energy “comparable only to eros,” which transforms
battlefields into objects for a 'Caesaristic will' that “endlessly brings forth magnificent and
merciless spectacles”:
Only a few are granted the opportunity to sink in to this sublime
purposelessness [erhabene Zwecklosigkeit], as one would sink into an work of
art, or into the starry heavens. Whoever felt only the denial, only his own
suffering and not the affirmation [Bejahung], the higher movement in this war,
lived through the war as a slave. He did not have an inner but only an outer
experience of the war. (Jünger 1922/1942, 111)61
It would be hard to dismiss Jünger's characterization as naive—after all, it was inspired by his
own extensive combat experience in World War I (famously recounted in a 1920 memoir, Storm
of Steel), for which he received an Iron Cross.62 Still, we are skeptical, if not horrified. We feel
disgusted and even outraged by this crass display of barbarism, this reckless aestheticization of
brutality—this “boyish rapture that leads[...]to an apotheosis of war,” as Walter Benjamin puts
it,63 and hence always to needless death, destruction, and misery. We are reminded of the insane
violence of trench warfare, but also, perhaps, of the perverse cruelty of the concentration camps,
the ruthless genocide of indigenous peoples, or the dehumanization of chattel slavery. This in
turn nauseates us. And rightly so, if we take these associations for granted. But should we?
Our dirty secret, the blood-stained hands we cannot wash clean though we scrub to the
bone, is that we are not merely repulsed by higher force and terrifying power. To be sure, the
memory of American slavery can have no other emotional impact on any but the most vile
person than to elicit genuine horror, disgust, anger, or sadness. Likewise for the Holocaust, or the
Rape of Nanjing. This is appropriate, of course and needless to say. But we are not merely
repulsed by radical subordination to higher force, when we take it to be genuine. We are not
always merely outraged by objectification and amoral hierarchy, or by savagely aestheticized
'merciless spectacle'. We—most of us—are not always horrified by inhuman power.
Nor is this just because we sometimes fail to adequately empathize with others' suffering.
61 I follow the translation in Herf 1984, 76–77.
62 Jünger 1961.
63 Benjamin 1979, 121. The context is Benjamin's critical review ('Theories of German Fascism') of Jünger's edited 
volume on War and Warrior [Krieg und Krieger] (Jünger 1930).
40
Most of us understand that war is sometimes necessary, even if many of us now pretend self-
righteously that we do not. Most of us are able to distinguish between soldiers raping civilians
and killing enemy combatants. Most of us do not believe that 'meat is murder', even though the
animals we eat feel pain. Appropriate respect for chickens does not entail that they have 'rights'
not to be killed or eaten by us, most of us still know, although it may well entail that many
modern industrial farming practices are excessively cruel. Most of us understand that it is not just
lunacy to feed a pet cat a vegan diet, in order to assuage one's childlike guilt at the thought of
killing, but also a profound form of disrespect for carnivorous life. Most of us know that while
earthquakes or tsunamis are brutally and often tragically amoral, nevertheless they are not evil.
3.3. Nor do we simply acquiesce to higher force. We do not merely acknowledge the
existence of hierarchies, or the inevitability of determination by superior force. We also value it.
We affirm higher power. The wrath of God is not only real and terrifying, for the believer. It is
also holy. Even for the irreligious, likewise, the force of a hurricane's winds is not only real and
terrifying. It is also transfixing, captivating, astonishing, amazing. It is, quite clearly, sublime.
The moralist works frantically to explain away our attraction to amoral yet sublime force.
However, the result is never quite convincing. For instance, Kant allows that nature is
dynamically sublime insofar as it manifests as a “power” that “arous[es] fear,” yet which “has no
dominion over us” (KU 5: 260). By contrast, we experience the mathematically sublime in the
“aesthetic judging of …an immeasurable whole” (KU 5: 256), i.e. in attempting to intuitively
(not conceptually)64 apprehend vast magnitudes that we cannot fully comprehend in this way.65
Hence, for Kant, things that elicit feelings of the dynamically sublime include “[b]old,
overhanging, as it were threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up into the heavens, bringing
with them flashes of lightning and crashes of thunder, volcanoes with their all-destroying
violence, hurricanes with the devastation they leave behind, the boundless ocean set into a rage, a
lofty waterfall on a mighty river, etc.” (KU 5: 260-261). By contrast, natural phenomena like the
night sky and the 'boundless ocean' when it is not 'set into a rage' presumably elicit feelings of
64 “The estimation of magnitude by means of numerical concepts (or their signs in algebra) is mathematical, but 
that in mere intuition (measured by eye) is aesthetic” (KU 5:251).
65 “Now in the aesthetic judging of such an immeasurable whole, the sublime does not lie as much in the magnitude
of the number as in the fact that as we progress we always arrive at ever greater units; the systematic division of 
the structure of the world contributes to this, representing to us all that is great in nature as in its turn small, but 
actually representing our imagination in all its boundlessness, and with it nature, as paling into insignificance 
beside the ideas of reason if it is supposed to provide a presentation adequate to them” (KU 5:256-7).
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the mathematically sublime. In turn, Kant offers a moralized interpretation of the dynamically
sublime, in the context of his general definition of the sublime as “[that] which even to be able to
think of demonstrates a faculty of the mind that surpasses every measure of the senses” (KU
5:250). In the case of even the dynamic sublime, that is, we supposedly have a feeling of
reason's superiority over sense.
But this is not plausible. Kant is wrong to insist, for instance, that the experience of the
impersonal power of nature elicits a feeling of the sublime only insofar as we feel ourselves to
be, qua rational beings, ultimately safe from this power. Representatively: “the sight of them
[i.e. 'bold, overhanging, as it were threatening cliffs, etc.] only becomes all the more attractive
the more fearful it is, as long as we find ourselves in safety” (KU 5:261).66 Kant's thought is that
physical safety from overwhelming natural forces functions as a metaphorical proxy for our
spiritual transcendence of the physical world, and hence as a symbol of our essential rationality.
“[W]e gladly call these objects sublime,” he claims, “because they elevate the strength of our
soul above its usual level, and allow us to discover within ourselves a capacity for resistance of
quite another kind, which gives us the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent all-
powerfulness of nature” (KU 5:261). But this analysis is mawkish and moralistic, even puerile.
Contra Kant, nature really—not just 'apparently'—contains higher forces, and we are not
'superior' to these forces simply by virtue of being smarter than them. Nor does one have to be
personally safe from overwhelming natural force in order to find it sublime. The experience of
the sublime force of a hurricane is not just available to someone listening to the wind's muffled
howl and gazing out transfixed at sheets of water sweeping down from the heavens from behind
the protective shield of a well-constructed modern building. It is also available to the storm-
chaser bracing herself against the wind, feeling the sting of raindrops whipping against her face,
heart beating out of her chest as roofs peel away, debris blows by, and a downed power-line
nearby shoots sizzling jolts of flashing electricity onto the street. Perhaps she does not feel
entirely safe, and perhaps this is precisely related to her experience of the sublime. Likewise, the
rock climber scaling the sheer cliff face 'free solo', with no ropes, does not feel safe. He does not
experience the superiority of his 'faculty of mind' over the merely 'sensuous' power of the rock
face. Rather, he experiences his own physical mastery in relation to the overwhelming power of
the mountain. He is calm, perhaps, but certainly aware that he is in constant and grave danger,
66 Here, as at several other points in his aesthetic theory, Kant borrows heavily from Edmund Burke's account in 
his Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) (Burke 1958).
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that he will fall to certain death with the slightest misstep or awkward shift in weight. 
So too, then, the experience of the sublime violence of war is not only available to
Abigail Adams, mulling over the fate of her countrymen as she listens to the 'incessant roar' of
cannon fire from a position of relative safety (“The sound I think is one of the Grandest in Nature
and is of the true Species of the Sublime…”67). It is also available to a soldier rising up from the
ankle-deep mud at the bottom of a trench during a momentary lull in the incoming bombardment,
and leaping forth with his comrades at the order of a commanding officer to charge the enemy
line—not in ignorance that he may well die at any moment, but rather just steeled with resolve
that he is doing as he must, and with sublime indifference to his individual prospects for survival.
This is one aspect of Jünger's view, surely. And it is not insane, abhorrent, or at all confusing.
Another aspect of Jünger's view perhaps remains less intuitive, for most modern readers.
Namely, he values precisely the 'purposelessness' of war that most see as grounds for criticism:
Whenever we confront efforts of such proportions [viz., those involved in the first
World War], possessing the special quality of 'purposelessness' ['Zwecklosigkeit']—
say the erection of mighty constructions like pyramids and cathedrals, or wars that
call into play the ultimate mainsprings of life—economic explanations, no matter
how illuminating, are not sufficient. This is the reason that the school of historical
materialism can only touch the surface of the process. To explain efforts of this sort,
we ought rather focus our first suspicions on phenomena of a cultic variety. (Jünger
1998, 129)68
Here we are, then, back to what seems like an immoderate aestheticism—at best, a misguided
elevation of a purely aesthetic experience of the sublime over more serious moral concerns. At
worst, Jünger may also seem to have veered away from the truly sublime, to have fallen prey to a
perverted mode aesthetic evaluation, and to be exalting what is in fact just sheer ugly brutality.
But surely we can all intuitively understand something of what Jünger is saying, even here. After
all, even Kant exalts aesthetic experience as a domain of purely 'disinterested' pleasure, free from
both sensuous and rational desires, for either the merely 'agreeable' or the truly 'good'. Kant links
this 'disinterested' pleasure to a feeling of 'free play' in our cognitive faculties. But the truth is
more primal. Aesthetic freedom from desire is just the feeling of being impassioned:
experiencing oneself as a locus of power, radiating outward in the absence of any external need.
67 Letter to John Adams, 1775; quoted in Danto 2003, 148.
68 I have substituted 'purposelessness' for the the translator's 'uselessness'.
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The pyramid and the cathedral are loci of power—like the hurricane, like the mountain, like the
climber scaling the cliff, like the soldier fighting courageously, and like the battlefield itself. 
3.4 Sublimity is not a morality play or an allegory for human spiritual transcendence.
This bizarrely anthropocentric analytical approach encourages the misconception that second-
rate 19th-century American and British landscape painting, in the vein of Bierstadt's Among the
Sierra Nevada Mountains (1868), elicits feelings of the sublime. But this sort of crass Romantic
spectacle, with its cartoonish glow of 'heavenly' clouds and Disney-esque gentle animals, is not
sublime. It is only heavy-handedly 'spiritual'. It is one rung up from Bob Ross's 'happy trees'. It is
cloyingly sentimental, and far more childish than the 'boyish rapture' that Benjamin criticizes in
figures like Jünger. It reeks of hostility towards real, amoral nature. It is anti-aesthetic.
Is this really the side one must take, in order to avoid perversely fetishizing violence? Are
we really going to let moralists brow-beat us into denying nature yet again, in the domain of the
sublime, by threatening us with unnecessary reminders that force can hurt us? Are we really
going to let moralists brow-beat us into denying sublime force, by always holding over our heads
that the concentration camps were evil, that slavery was dehumanizing, and that war is often just
horrible? Does this refute sublime force?
What happened to the truism that the back-alley mugger or rapist is not just immoral, but
also often clearly weak? What happened to our ability to distinguish real power from mere
neurotic control? Why can we not speak to each other less like naughty children who must be
constantly reminded that it's good to be nice and bad to be mean? Are we really so weak and
obtuse, so decadent, so excessively 'spiritualized'? Or can we finally cast the moralist aside as the
priestly con man—the poison-tongued guilt-huckster and self-righteous control-freak—that he
is? Can we finally rouse ourselves from the fever-dream of modern moral conscience, back into
clear-eyed primordial receptivity to the value and the ultimate reality of elemental force?
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CHAPTER II.
Force as an Object for Conceptual Genealogy
[The idea of Force] is the great conception which, developed in the
early part of the seventeenth century from the rude idea of a cause,
and constantly improved upon since, has shown us how to explain all
the changes of motion which bodies experience, and how to think
about all physical phenomena; which has given birth to modern
science, and changed the face of the globe; and which, aside from its
more special uses, has played a principal part in directing the course
of modern thought, and in furthering modern social development. It
is, therefore, worth some pains to comprehend it. 
-Charles Sanders Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”69
4. 'God', 'Law', and 'Matter' as Physical Forces, Fields-of-Effect, and Phenomena:
On Early Modern Theology as a Guide to Current Scientific Metaphysics
4.1. The modern scientific idea of mathematized laws of nature was almost always
viewed by its proponents in an explicitly Christian light, throughout the period of its major
development and unprecedented rise to prominence in the 17th century.70 Thus, for pious early
modern natural philosophers, the law-governed cosmos that they had revealed was a clear and
awesome sign of God's infinite intellect and absolute power, if not also His total benevolence.
69 Peirce 1955, 33.
70 Regarding my claim of 'first major development and unprecedented rise to prominence', consider e.g. Francis 
Oakley's observation that “historians are generally agreed that in the course of the seventeenth century the idea 
of the laws of nature sprang from comparative obscurity into a lasting prominence” (Oakley 1961a, 433);” John 
Henry's appeal to “the new emphasis upon laws of nature in the seventeenth [century]” and “the appearance of 
the laws of nature in the scientific literature of the seventeenth century” (Henry 2004, 87–88); and Daniel 
Garber's contention that “[t]he idea of a world governed by specific mathematical laws of nature that can be 
articulated and manipulated, used to explain and predict natural phenomena was largely the invention of the 
seventeenth century” (Garber 2013, 45). See also Crombie 1996, 86–87; Daston and Stolleis 2008, 2. Cf. the 
slightly earlier periodization implicit in Joseph Needham's asking “why, after so many centuries of existence as a
theological commonplace in European civilization, the idea of laws of Nature attained a position of such 
importance in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries” (Needham 1951a, 29).
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For Robert Boyle just as for many of his peers, then, the 'World' was ultimately “the great Book,
not so much of Nature, as of the God of Nature,”71 Whom man cannot but “admire, praise, and
thanke” for His natural 'Workes'72 in a spirit of “the highest wonder and the lowliest adoration.”73
Therefore Boyle, just like Newton and many others, would presumably have fully endorsed
Descartes' earlier injunction to Marin Mersenne in a letter from 1630: “Please do not hesitate to
assert and proclaim everywhere that it is God who has laid down these laws in nature [i.e. these
'mathematical truths which you call eternal'] just as a king lays down laws in his kingdom.”74
(For Newton, recall, “active Principles such as is that of Gravity” are “general Laws of Nature,”
by the “help” of which “all material Things seem to have been composed of the hard and solid
Particles[...], variously associated in the first Creation by the Counsel of an Intelligent Agent.”75)
In itself, this religious inflection is unremarkable. That thinkers in a deeply Christianized
society viewed a core modern scientific idea in terms of their religious faith is to be expected.
The laws of nature could not but be figured as an image of God's glory and perfection in early
modern Europe—for surely, as Feuerbach observes, the 'religious sentiment' “looks at all things
through the medium of religion, it sees all in God,[…]sees all in images and as an image.”76
Moreover, many commentators doubt that the religious context of the early modern idea of laws
of nature, or that of the Scientific Revolution more broadly, sheds any great light on the nature or
the value of contemporary scientific research. Thus Joseph Needham acknowledges the role of
Christian theology in the development of the modern scientific conception of laws of nature, but
nevertheless maintains that “[i]n the outlook of modern science there is, of course, no residue of
the notions of command and duty in the 'laws' of Nature.”77 Likewise but more broadly, Richard
S. Westfall suggests that “[n]atural philosophy does not[...]have to concern itself with God at
all,” despite having done so in the past—and he insists that, in fact, “[w]ith us it does not.”78
And yet, more than two centuries after Newton's death, Einstein viewed the universe as a
“single significant whole,” in the presence of whose impersonal “intelligence” and “harmony of
71 Boyle 1665/1848, 44. 
72 Boyle highlights the 'uses' of the 'following book' in his Preamble to the second volume of his Some 
Considerations touching the Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy (Boyle 1663/1671): “[...] the 
improvement of the minds of men, and (especially) the assisting them to understand the Workes of God, and 
thereby engage them to admire, praise and thanke him for them.”
73 Boyle 1685/1835, 26.
74 Quoted in Henry 2004, 102.
75 Opticks Query 31. See Appendix A.
76 Feuerbach 1957, 95.
77 Needham 1951b, 229. See also Needham 1951a.
78 Westfall 1986, 234.
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natural law” we can only experience a “cosmic religious feeling” of “rapturous amazement” and
transcendent release from the “prison” of individual existence.79 The 'intelligence' that Einstein
here invokes is surely not identical to the God of Descartes or Boyle or Newton. But to claim
that Einstein's natural philosophy is 'not at all concerned with God' would be excessive: his idea
of cosmic 'intelligence' clearly bears traces of influence from earlier modern theology and natural
religion, as well as some ongoing conceptual connection with the God of Newton or Descartes.
Nor is this merely due to idiosyncratic mysticism or 'private' religiosity on Einstein's part.
For instance, consider the contemporary philosopher of science Tim Maudlin's claim that the
laws of nature “operate to generate or produce” later states of the universe from its initial state.80
To be sure, Maudlin does not invoke any cosmic 'intelligence'. For him, rather, laws of nature are
just “the patterns that nature respects.”81 But this account is still stranger than it might seem, in
ways that speak to its partial continuity with pre-secularized antecedents. For if these lawful
'patterns' are abstract entities, then Maudlin would be committed to the view that abstract
'patterns' literally 'generate' physical states of affairs.82 This would in turn bear meaningful
resemblance to early modern accounts of the laws of nature as pure acts of Will (not physical
compulsion) whereby God rationally orders matter, if not also to post-Kantian 'absolute' idealists'
vision of “everything in reality conform[ing] to reason, which consists in the forms, ideas, or
purpose of things.”83 Or, in order to avoid this, one could deny that laws of nature truly 'produce'
physical states. However, this would be to abandon Maudlin's central claim. Alternatively, one
could say that laws of nature are concrete 'patterns' which 'produce' either themselves or the
phenomena they comprise—where either option presents its own further conceptual difficulties.
Regardless, Maudlin's appeal to nature “respecting” law-like patterns evidently conflicts
with Needham's claim that there is 'no residue of the notions of command and duty' in the idea of
laws of nature within 'the outlook of modern science'. Maudlin still speaks in terms of inanimate
objects 'obeying' laws of nature, the laws 'allowing' or 'permitting' certain outcomes, and so
79 From “Religion and Science” and “The Religiousness of Science” in Mein Weltbild (1934) (Einstein 1949). 
Regarding the 'impersonality' of Einstein's 'intelligent' stand-in for God, note his remark that “there is no 
anthropomorphic conception of God corresponding to [the cosmic religious feeling]” (Einstein 1949, 26)
80 Maudlin 2007, 174.
81 Maudlin 2007, 15.
82 I do not claim that Maudlin conceives of the laws of nature as abstract entities, although he may: it is hard to tell.
83 Beiser 2003a, 69. Here Beiser is describing Friedrich Schlegel's view as articulated in notebooks from 1796, in 
particular, albeit as part of a broader characterization of early German Romanticism [Frühromantik]. Beiser 
(ibid., 70) in turn notes the clear “Platonic provenance” of Schlegel's view: “reason is the intelligible structure of 
things, what we perceive in beauty through the power of intellectual intuition.” See also Beiser 2003b.
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forth.84 Of course, like any typical scientific naturalist, he might well insist that these are simply
figurative descriptions of totally de-anthropomorphized relations. But what relations, exactly?
Consider 'obedience', for example. Most innocuously, to 'obey' something is just to behave in
accordance with it. Hence, perhaps objects 'obey' the laws of nature just in the sense of behaving
in accordance with them, and 'respect' the laws of nature just in the sense of conforming to them.
But then what would become of the laws' putative power to 'generate' physical states? And must
the 'constraint' that the laws 'allow' not be different from the 'constraint' of any natural pattern on
the objects that realize it, on Maudlin's view?85 And does this not mean that he must take objects'
'obedience' to the laws of nature to be more than bare conformity to them? What is this 'more',
then? And how is it not precisely the 'residue' of earlier 'notions of command and obedience'?
It would be a shallow kind of whig history to elide the profound impact of Christianity on
early modern natural philosophy. But it is a similar kind of whig history to deny the real and
ongoing influence of early modern religion on contemporary scientific theory and method. This
is not to deny that science has undergone a comprehensive process of secularization, of course.
Nor is it to claim that contemporary scientific practice is correlated with either explicit or
implicit belief in the personal God of early modern Christianity. But it is to insist that we would
do well to historicize ourselves, too, by more frankly and carefully examining currents of deep
structural continuity, as well as discontinuity, between the Christian metaphysical traditions
underlying early modern natural philosophy and the secularized metaphysics of our own science.
To this end, it bears experimenting with the following simple methodological proposal:
let us examine some of the central attributes imputed to God in early modern science and natural
theology, with attention both to different traditions' emphasis on distinct 'divine' attributes and to
the differential plausibility of extending these distinct attributes forward into our own secularized
science. This will illuminate early modern natural philosophy as well as contemporary science
and philosophy of science, by providing a greater depth of intellectual historical and conceptual
context for both. Moreover, this approach affords an opportunity for productive interdisciplinary
84 E.g. he suggests that “to say what is physically possible is to say what the constraint of those patterns allows” 
(Maudlin 2007, 15); he claims that “the planets obey Kepler’s law” (ibid., 37), and that “[the special sciences] 
seek to impose a taxonomy on the physical structure of the world[...]in such a way that the objects as categorized
by the taxonomy fairly reliably obey some lawlike generalizations which can be stated in terms of the taxonomy”
(ibid., 159); and appeals to “the outcomes permitted by the laws” (ibid., 19).
85 E.g. Maudlin distinguishes between laws and 'regularities'. However, to “the ontological question of what makes 
a regularity into a law of nature,” he answers only that “lawhood is a primitive status” (Maudlin 2007, 17). But 
note that this appeal to the 'ontologically primitive' status of lawhood does nothing to refute my claim that 
Maudlin's view is historically and conceptually linked to Christian religious metaphysics.
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synthesis across the humanities. By bringing to bear insights from the history of early modern
science and religion, for instance, we can achieve fruitful new perspectives on contemporary
debates in naturalistic metaphysics and philosophy of science. And reciprocally, likewise,
contemporary debates in scientific epistemology and metaphysics can help to bring additional
argumentative focus and normative force to historical investigations of early modern natural
philosophy, illuminating though more strictly historical approaches often certainly are.
Note that this alternative approach differs fundamentally from efforts to re-appropriate
attributes of God for humanity—whether in the mode of Kantian and post-Kantian idealism, or
as in the 'materialist' version of Hegelian philosophy that Feuerbach developed and Marx later
popularized. Hence, my point is not the familiar Feuerbachian or Marxist one that consciousness
of God is just (they claim) an alienated mode of human self-consciousness (see Appendix C).
Rather, my basic contention is that early modern natural theological conceptions of God are
alienated modes of apprehending elemental physical forces, and the explanatorily-basic fields of
their physically-possible causal impact on observable objects. Reciprocally, though, we can also
better understand the metaphysical foundations of contemporary science—and in particular add
clarity to current notions of force, fields, unobservable reality, and laws of nature—by examining
their genealogical relation to the theological traditions that influenced early modern science.
4.2. Several main results of this methodological experiment in using early modern natural
theology as a (partial) guide to current scientific metaphysics may be summarized in advance:
(1) 'Power' is the clearest candidate for a readily-naturalizable 'divine' attribute. In order
to de-anthropomorphize it, we must appeal to amoral, arational, inhuman power. The exercise of
such power is not will, but rather just pure force. Debates about God's 'transcendence' or
'immanence' are in turn related in complex ways to ongoing debates about the nature and status
of 'theoretical' entities, as well as the role (or lack thereof) of causal explanation in modern
physics. It might seem self-evident that physical force is purely immanent, or else that there is no
need to invoke 'force' at all in the context of modern physics. But in fact this is far from clear.
(2) Distinctively physical force is that which causally produces observable phenomena,
specifically insofar as they are interrelated by corresponding physical structures. Physical forces
do not 'push around' or re-arrange pre-existing observable phenomena, like some early moderns
took God to organize material particles. Rather, physical forces causally produce observable
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phenomena themselves. These observable phenomena instantiate physical structures, in their
relations to one another, and it is through recognizing the explanatory power of these relational
structures among phenomena that we justifiably infer the activity of underlying physical forces.
(3) Physical structures, in this sense, are the fields of corresponding physical forces.
These fields do not causally produce observable objects. They are the intelligible forms of forces'
causal impact on the observable world. Physical fields are pure impact-structures. They explain
phenomena structurally, not causally. Forces explain observable phenomena causally.
(4) The way in which physical fields non-causally 'determine' observable phenomena is
conceptually and historically related to the way that early moderns took God's influence on the
material order to be different in kind both from mere physical compulsion—as ordering by the
'Will' of an 'Intelligent' Being, rather than by natural force—and from the 'grounding' of material
substance in more 'immanent' rational forms or intelligible essences. This non-causal mode of
explanation is retained in modern science, at the level of the relationship between observable
phenomena and the basic structural relations that they instantiate. But these explanatorily-basic
physical structures are the fields of underlying physical forces, which are the real causal grounds
of the structured observable phenomena that empirical science discloses. This ongoing
connection between natural laws and underlying forces is the 'residue' of early modern ideas of a
transcendent God who imposes a lawful order on material substances that is beyond their nature.
(5) Physical structure is not the only kind of structure there is. For instance, it differs
fundamentally from beautiful form. Physical structure is essentially linked to the kind of relation
that obtains between explanatorily-basic laws, principles, etc., and the empirical objects or
phenomena that (in good theories) they systematically explain. That is, physical structure is the
'phenomenal image' of systematic explanatory power. Physical structures are explanatorily-basic
'patterns' in empirical phenomena. This in turn relates to the role of traditional theoretical virtues
like simplicity and breadth of scope in scientific theory choice. And this relationship between
physical structure and theoretical virtue in turn echoes early modern appeals to God as the
ground of 'simplicity', 'harmony', etc., in nature as disclosed by science. The basic relationship
between physical structure and explanation is a 'residue' of earlier appeals to divine 'Intellect'.
(6) Physical forces and fields, in the above sense, are basic to all domains of modern
empirical science (insofar as all domains of modern empirical science are concerned to achieve
systematic explanatory power vis-à-vis observable phenomena). But the physical sciences also
50
systematically invoke objects that are arguably strictly intelligible, in the sense of lacking
sensory qualities, spatiotemporal form, and any other properties that could be intuitively
'pictured'. Neo-Kantians like Ernst Cassirer have noted this, along with many modern physicists.
This, too, is likely historically and conceptually descendent from natural theologists' appeals to
divine 'Intellect', as well as to God's purely Immaterial nature and His 'transcendent' status. 
(7) The 'Freedom' of God is historically and conceptually connected to empiricism, by
way of the voluntarist tradition in medieval and early modern theology. The simplest naturalistic
correlate to this putative 'Freedom' is just the pure arationality of elemental physical force—
which renders the basic explanatory structure of nature inaccessible via rational introspection.
(8) The 'Oneness' of God is historically and conceptually related to the 'unity of science'.
Kant translated this 'Oneness' to humanity, in the mode of the 'transcendental unity of
apperception'—i.e. the unified consciousness of a 'transcendental subject'—that he takes to be a
condition of possibility for objective phenomenal experience. Modern appeals to the 'unity of
science' are thus a kind of 'residue' of monotheistic faith, which should arguably be abandoned.
Attempts by Kant to re-ground the 'systematic unity of nature' in the nature of rationality itself,
and attempts by post-Kantian idealists to argue that nature is an organic whole, are unconvincing.
(9) Early modern conceptions of God's 'Creativity' are echoed in Kant's theory of our own
creative power (as loci of 'transcendental subjectivity') vis-à-vis the phenomenal world of
objects, or things insofar as they appear to us mediated by the 'forms' of our own cognitive
faculties (e.g. sensibility, understanding, and reason). Kant imputes a creative power to human
beings vis-à-vis the phenomenal world that mirrors traditional accounts of God's creative power
vis-à-vis things as they are 'in themselves', or apart from our own experience of them. The
'transcendental' function of human cognitive powers (for Kant) or those of God (for earlier
modern natural philosophers) should be re-appropriated in our own time for explanatorily-basic
physical structures, corresponding to causally-basic physical forces. Thus, elemental physical
force is analogous to Kant's 'noumenal reality'; corresponding physical structures, or the fields of
these elemental physical forces, are analogous to Kant's 'pure forms of objective experience'; and
the observable physical phenomena that are causally produced by these elemental physical
forces, and determined within corresponding physical structures, are analogous to Kant's
'phenomena'. Note that this re-formulation involves a basic shift away from metaphysical
idealism. Physical forces are real, mind-independent things. And objective physical phenomena
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are mind-independent things insofar as they are determined with respect to explanatorily-basic
physical structures that encode the impact of real, causally-fundamental physical forces. 
4.3 . Not all medieval or early modern theological traditions emphasized the same
attributes of God to the same degree. Not all theological traditions characterized the same divine
attributes in the same way. And sometimes different traditions disagreed about whether God in
fact has certain traits, like 'immanent' presence in nature as opposed to pure 'transcendence'. As
the historian of religion Eugene M. Klaaren summarizes, for instance, “there was a lively arena
of conflicting theologies of creation in seventeenth-century English thought”86—as one might
well have expected. Theological diversity of this sort cannot be overlooked, in examining the
interplay between early modern natural religion and scientific methodology, let alone its bearing
on our own science. Nevertheless, it is still possible to identify several specific currents in
natural theology that played especially prominent roles in the development of modern science.
One divine attribute that was of central importance for the development of modern
scientific theory and method, including the modern idea of laws of nature, was God's power or
will. While power and will are not synonymous, many early modern thinkers and contemporary
commentators alike treat them in extremely close proximity, for reasons that will become clearer
below. Part of my own effort to render early modern natural theology more directly relevant to
current scientific metaphysics in turn involves teasing apart (realistic, impersonal) Power from
(anthropomorphic) Will. Special focus on God's power or will was characteristic of a voluntarist
tradition in late medieval and early modern theology. Voluntarism is helpfully contrasted against
a distinct intellectualist strain that instead placed greater emphasis on God's intellect or reason.
A wide range of commentators have argued that voluntarist theology placed a critical role
in the development of modern science. Thus, for instance, Klaaren maintains that “hypotheses,
attention, the search for particulars, and laws of nature were all part and parcel of a new
empirical way of knowing indebted to a critical (and carefully constructive) voluntarist theology
of creation.”87 Likewise, E. A. Burtt had earlier concluded in his synoptic study on the
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1925) that “Newton, in common with the whole
voluntaristic British tradition in medieval and modern philosophy, tended to subordinate, in God,
the intellect to the will; above the Creator's wisdom and knowledge is to be stressed his power
86 Klaaren 1977, 46.
87 Klaaren 1977, 123.
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and domination.”88 James E. Force later agreed that “Newton's experimentalism is inextricable
from his theology and his voluntaristic metaphysics.”89 Francis Oakley appeals to “that fruitful
stream of voluntarist natural law thinking, which[...]made its way with profound effect into the
ethical, political and scientific thought of the modern world.”90 Margaret Osler concludes that
“[t]he voluntarist strain underlying Gassendi's thought was the thread that bound his natural
philosophy, theory of knowledge, and ethics into a coherent whole.”91 And even John Henry,
who insists that the voluntarist theological tradition cannot explain the sudden rise to prominence
of the idea of laws of nature in the 17 th century—rather, according to Henry, this is “best seen as
the exploitation of a ready made theological tradition in support of [scientific] innovations, rather
than as an explanation for those innovations”92—even Henry allows that “there can be no doubt
of the relevance of providentialist disputes, and theological voluntarism in the efforts of
Descartes, Boyle, Newton and Leibniz to justify their use of laws of nature.”93 Only a small
minority of historians, saliently including Peter Harrison, are more deeply skeptical of the basic
'voluntarism and science thesis'.94 In short, then, there is a broad consensus among historians that
the founding figures of modern science “depended” on a “voluntarist natural theology.”95
(Of course, Alistair Crombie is also entirely correct that the development of the scientific
88 Burtt 1925, 290.
89 Force 1990a, 89. On voluntarism in Newton, see also Shapin 1981; Snobelin 2001, 176–7 . Cf. Harrison 2004. 
See also Malet 1997 for a discussion of voluntarist theology's influence on Isaac Barrow, Newton's teacher.
90 Oakley 1961a, 438. Oakley (ibid., 449) argues that “the voluntarist conception of natural law” first “attained a 
wide currency in the and seventeenth centuries,” that it was “directly descended from the similar theory hammed 
out by the nominalist theologians in the years after the condemnations of 1277,” and “being the result of a crucial
shift in the direction of the 'simplified view of nature' which was later to be adopted by Galileo, Descartes and 
Newton,” this voluntarist conception of natural law was “eminently compatible with this ['simplified'] view.”
91 Osler 1991, 157. See also Osler 1994.
92 Henry 2004, 91.
93 Henry 2004, 91. However, cf. Klaaren's claim that “[b]oth the 'divine reason' of More and the 'sufficient reason' 
of Leibnitz represented a fundamentally different orientation to creation than the voluntarism of Newton and 
Boyle” (Klaaren 1977, 122). Regarding the question of voluntarism in Descartes' thought, see more below.
94 See Harrison 2002, 2004. Harrison (2002, 64) acknowledges that “there are important insights in the 
[voluntarism and science] thesis.” But he believes that these have been wrongly mapped onto the distinction 
between voluntarist and intellectualist theology. For instance: “The emergence of the idea of a divine legislator 
who directly rules the creation seems to have played an important role in the formation of the notion of ‘laws of 
nature’. However, this idea was not a specifically voluntarist notion, and ironically it was the rationalist 
Descartes who made a major contribution here” (Harrison 2002, 79).
Here it should be noted that John Henry later conceded to Harrison that, “[t]hanks to Professor Harrison’s 
work, we can now see that many of the differences between voluntarists and intellectualists can be understood in 
terms of those who took an Augustinian line, and were pessimistic about humanity’s ability to understand God 
and his creation, and those who rejected the Augustinian emphasis upon the debilitating nature of original sin” 
(Henry 2009, 102). However, Henry insists that it would nevertheless be “a serious mistake to abandon the 
voluntarism and science thesis” (Henry 2009, 104). I agree with Henry on this point. Cf. Harrison 2009.
95 Bossy 2000, 242; also quoted in Harrison 2002, 63.
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idea of natural laws “can obviously not be seen as a consequence simply of a theological concept
of infinite power.”96 He lucidly recounts several other main factors contributing to this process:
By the time of Newton the term laws of nature had come to designate the
object of all scientific inquiry: the principles or axioms to be discovered by
experimental and theoretical exploration, or postulated for experimental
control. By itself the concept of laws of nature could scarcely have been a
guide to how to conduct such an inquiry. What made it scientifically effective
was its amalgamation with two matching concepts. First the analogy of
natural with human art offered an invitation to simulate natural effects with
artifacts made by and therefore understood by man: by discovering how to
control hypothetical models of his own contrivance man could thus gain
insight into the laws controlling nature itself. Secondly the concept of laws of
nature became quantified by association with that of mathematical functions
ex- pressing the quantitative dependence of effect on cause in concomitant
degrees. Thus changes in an effect (as the dependent variable) expressed as
an algebraic function of the conditions necessary and sufficient to produce it
(as the independent variables) could be precisely calculated from those
conditions.[...][I]t was evidently not until the 13th or 14th centuries that the
implied notion of functional dependence between variable quantities was
explicitly recognized in the West. Then it was developed first only in
principle, without the systematic practice of measurement that was necessary
to incorporate it effectively into experimental science. That practice was to
develop first in the technical arts. It was not until the 17th century that
systematic measurement was to be made essential to all physical research. It
was combined then with a rational theory of quantity expressed in linear
scales, replacing the inhibiting Greek conception that the properties of
substances were present and had to be expressed as pairs of opposites, and
with the analytical formulation of functional dependence by means of
increasingly precise and powerful mathematical symbolism.97
The following analysis of voluntarist theology's influence on the rise of modern science,
including ideas of natural law, is entirely compatible with this additional historical complexity.)
Late medieval and early modern voluntarist theology's influence on early modern science
is too broad in scope and too complex to fully address here, even in outline. However, several of
its most salient aspects can be briefly distilled without too much loss of nuance, or misleading
simplification. Many of these central aspects in turn have to do with deep-seated historical and
conceptual conceptions between theological voluntarism and empiricism. A set of studies by
Michael B. Foster from the mid-1930s is often taken as the locus classicus for this thesis of
96 Crombie 1996, 87.
97 Crombie 1996, 86–87.
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interrelation between voluntarism and empiricism.98 Thus, for instance, Peter Harrison suggests
that “[i]n a 1934 issue of Mind, M. B. Foster first proposed a link between the voluntary activity
of God, the contingency of the created order, and the requirement that science be empirically
based.”99 But many subsequent historians have added greatly to our understanding of this link.100 
John Henry condenses the basic motivation for the 'voluntarism and empiricism' thesis:
The whole point of the alleged alliance between voluntarism and
empiricism is that it is not possible to reconstruct a priori God’s thinking
as he decided how to create the world. Kepler clearly thought it was
possible to think God’s thoughts after him, as did Descartes, and Leibniz.
But their assumptions were based on the belief that God was constrained to
create the world in accordance with the same rational processes available
to them.[...]Those who subscribed to a voluntarist theology, however,
denied that God could be second-guessed this way. The only way you
could tell whether God had allowed void space or not was to see if you
could find a vacuum, or failing that, to see if you could make one. This was
the only way you could tell because, according to the voluntarist, God
could have gone either way on the issue. He had a free choice in the matter.
God’s creative power was in this sense arbitrary — nobody, as far as I can
t e l l , ev e r s a id t ha t he c r e a t ed t h i ngs c ap r i c i ous ly and
randomly[...]Similarly, the only way you could tell whether matter could
be active or not was empirically to investigate bodies, or perhaps to try to
isolate an immaterial spirit and to investigate how such an immaterial
entity was able to move matter. Once again, the assumption of the
voluntarist was that there can be nothing in the nature or essence of matter
itself which makes it impossible for God to choose to make it inherently
active.101
Admittedly, Descartes—arguably the first thinker to systematically deploy a modern notion of
laws of nature102—was plausibly both a rationalist and a theological voluntarist.103 But this
occurred within the context of a far broader historical confluence of voluntarism and empiricism,
based in an intuitive conceptual relation between God's radical freedom in exercising creative
power and the impossibility of learning the basic laws of nature through rational introspection, as
98 See Foster 1934, 1935, 1936.
99 Harrison 2002, 63.
100In addition to studies already cited above, see e.g. Oakley 1961b, 1966; McGuire 1972; Heimann 1978; Milton 
1981, 1998; Osler 1985; and Malet 1997.
101Henry 2009, 88.
102Garber (2013, 47) argues that while “earlier thinkers had certainly viewed the world as ordered by laws that 
determined how inanimate nature was to go,” still “no one before Descartes actually proposed specific laws and 
attempted to apply them to understanding nature.” Similarly, Henry (2004, 114) claims that “Descartes was 
effectively responsible for single-handedly introducing the notion of laws of nature into natural philosophy.”
103E.g. see Harrison 2002.
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opposed to via extensive experimental investigation. Peter Harrison takes this example of
Descartes to “break[] the inexorability of the logic of a connection between voluntarism and
empiricism.”104 But here I take John Henry's response to be reasonable, and indeed compelling:
There may be intellectual historians out there who have talked in terms of
the inexorable logic of particular positions, but if there are, I can’t imagine
them holding this position for long. Indeed, I can imagine myself, or other
intellectual historians, using the example of Descartes precisely to show
that there is no necessary connection between voluntarism and empiricism,
there is no inexorable logic which connects them. Nevertheless, I would
want to go on, it remains true to say that the defence of empiricist
approaches was often associated with a theological position that can be
characterized as voluntarist.105 
Incidentally, other scholars have argued that Descartes is better described as an intellectualist.106
And still others, like Henry, insist that it is “wrong to try to reach a determination of this issue—
whether Descartes was a voluntarist or an intellectualist—in absolute or essentialist terms.”107
Klaaren argues that the widespread prominence of voluntarist theology in 17 th-century
England, in particular, reflected basic differences between English Protestantism and continental
European denominations of Christianity. For instance, whereas Lutheran religion “tended to
subsume God's work of creation under His chief work of redemption,” such that “the functions
of law and conscience were to convict the believer of sin, to ready him for the redemptive grace
of forgiveness,” English Protestantism “refused to make God's work of creation a function of his
work of redemption” and instead stressed its independent “integrity and significance.”108
Likewise, although “a distinctively pious interest in God's great handiwork of creation was
manifest in many religious traditions” in the 17th century, nevertheless “the belief that such
attention provided spiritual instruction gained unique strength in English religion,” in a way that
was “powerfully articulated in voluntarist theologies.”109 Klaaren suggests that this distinctive
focus on God's creative power in 17th-century England reflected the mediating influence of a
Calvinist theology of creation, which—along with a distinct counter-scholastic “Spiritualist
104Harrison 2002, 66.
105Henry 2009, 84.





theology of creation” represented in figures like Helmont—reinforced a pre-existing “widespread
religious interest in creation and new creation that marked English culture.”110 Regardless of its
genealogy, at any rate, this wider interest in Creation likely helped to cultivate the especially
strong current of (voluntarist-inflected) empiricism in 17th-century English natural philosophy.
Hence, in short, we may infer that the divine 'Freedom' invoked by early modern natural
philosophers working within a broadly voluntarist tradition can be re-interpreted within our own
secular context as the arationality of whatever 'divine' power produces law-governed natural
order, which renders the laws of nature inaccessible via rational introspection. This may not
seem like a serious gain in our understanding of current science. But it is a secure foundation
upon which to build such deeper understanding. The 'God' of the voluntarist theology that was
crucial to the rise of modern science can be naturalistically re-interpreted as arational power that
produces the law-governed physical order disclosed by modern empirical science.
4.4. To begin to delve somewhat deeper, we may proceed to a subtler theological issue:
voluntarists tended to place particular emphasis on God's transcendence, as opposed to His
immanence in the natural world. Hence, voluntarists not only stressed divine Power or Will, but
also often that the order of nature is imposed from without by an entirely transcendent Lawgiver.
Material objects are not rationally or lawfully ordered through their own nature, in other words,
according to this voluntarist-inflected emphasis on divine transcendence. Thus, Newton insists in
the second edition of the Principia that “[t]his Being governs all things, not as the soul of the
world, but as a Lord over all; and on account of his dominion he is wont to be called Lord
God[...]or Universal Ruler.”111 James Force helpfully elaborates Newton's view on this point:
Matter does not move, as it generally does, in accord with mathematically
precise laws of nature such as those described in the Principia because of
any Neoplatonic overflow of God's being into the world or because of any
Hobbist, Cartesian, or Leibnizian notion of necessary rational order
intrinsically immanent within matter or imposed once and for all long ago
by a deity who long since has absented himself from the daily operations
of creation. Such metaphysical views dilute the total subordination of
matter to the will of God and are the metaphysical equivalent of
theological idolatry. Rather, matter exists and ordinarily operates in accord
with natural law for one reason: God wills it so by divine fiat. Both matter
110Klaaren 1977, 85.
111Quoted in Burtt 1925, 291.
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and natural law originate in the will and power of God. God's dominion is
the fundamental first metaphysical principle underlying Newtonian
mechanics.112
Likewise, whereas for early 17th-century Spiritualists like Helmont divine law was “immanent in
and intrinsic to physical entities,” for the voluntarist Boyle “the divinely imparted and regulated
laws of nature were imposed upon a creation of totally subject atoms.”113 Therefore, in Boyle's
own words, it is “the Creator, who, and not the World, nor the Soul of It, is the True God.”114
This posture amounted to a radical departure from the more 'immanent' rationalism of
neo-Aristotelian scholastics, and (more broadly) conceptions of an all-encompassing natural
hierarchy or 'Great Chain of Being'.115 Rather, for 17th-century voluntarists, all mere natural
objects were reduced to bare equality before a transcendent God. Here an influence from
Calvinism was again arguably operative—e.g. insofar as “Calvin's conviction that all creation
was egalitarian because of its ultimate dependence upon God's power [the 'crucial essence-
existence distinction of Thomas did not function for Calvin', who therefore acknowledged 'no
hierarchy or graded order of essential beings'] further undercut traditional presuppositions of the
hierarchy of being.”116 But so too were earlier strains of voluntarism in late medieval theology,
prominently represented by Ockham. Thus Francis Oakley concludes that whereas for Aquinas
the “natural law” is “the divine reason in which all things, irrational as well as rational,
participate,” Ockham's “abandonment of the theory of natural law as immanent” went “hand in
hand” with “something of a revision” of this Greek-inflected idea of nature as “impregnated with
reason.”117 Likewise, Klaaren: “Since eternal and natural law are ultimate matters of divine
reason for Thomas, the whole universe, but especially man, is governed by rational structure. But
Ockham emphasized that the chief mark of law is obligation rather than a relatively immanent
built-in regularity. Thus law was externally imposed upon a subject creation.”118
This late medieval voluntarist strain reflected a re-orientation towards a Semitic or
112Force 1990a, 84. Likewise, James and Margaret Jacob invoke “Newton's insistence that universal gravitation 
must operate through immaterial forces in the universe and not as a property inherent in matter” (Jacob and 
Jacob 1980, 265). See also Shapin 1981, 195; Oakley 1961a, 436.
113Klaaren 1977, 172. 
114A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Receiv'd Notion of Nature, Sec. IV (Boyle 1686, 120).
115On the 'Great Chain of Being', see e.g. Lovejoy's classic study (Lovejoy 1936). On immanence and 
transcendence in Christianity, with helpful citations and a voluntarist inflection, see also Gilkey 1965, 96–97.
116Klaaren 1977, 41.
117Oakley 1961a, 441–442, 446.
118Klaaren 1977, 37.
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ancient Jewish understanding of imposed laws of nature, which had arguably been largely
subordinated to dominant Greek ideas of immanent law.119 Hence, Boyle saw “the ascribing to
nature,[...]things, that belong but to God” as one “(if not the chief)” of “the grand causes of the
polytheism and idolatry of the gentiles.”120 Likewise, compare Calvin from over a century earlier:
As if the universe, which was founded as a spectacle of God's glory, were
its own creator! For thus the same author has elsewhere followed the view
common to Greeks and Latins alike: 'The bees, some teach, received a
share of mind, Divine, ethereal draught. For God, men say, Pervades all
things, the earth, expanse of seas And heaven's depth. From him the flocks
and herds, Men and beasts of every sort, at birth Draw slender life; yea,
unto him all things Do then return; unmade, are then restored; Death has no
place; but still alive they fly Unto the starry ranks, to heaven's height' [this
is from Virgil's Georgics]. See, of what value to beget and nourish
godliness in men's hearts is that jejune speculation about the universal
mind which animates and quickens the world! This shows itself even more
clearly in the sacrilegious words of the filthy dog Lucretius which have
been deduced from that principle. This is indeed making a shadow deity to
drive away the true God, whom we should fear and adore. I confess, of
course, that it can be said reverently, provided that it proceeds from a
reverent mind, that nature is God; but because it is a harsh and improper
saying, since nature is rather the order prescribed by God, it is harmful in
such weighty matters, in which special devotion is due, to involve God
confusedly in the inferior course of his works. (Calvin, Institutes of the
Christian Religion I:5:5) 
Notably, however, Whitehead argues that Alexandrian theologians fashioned a distinctively
Christian “compromise between the immanence of law and imposed law,” respectively typified
by Jewish monotheism and Greek rationalism; Oakley agrees that the resultant “quasi-immanent
119E.g. “Like the ancient Jewish understanding of law, the voluntarist view [of late medieval theologians like 
Ockham] presupposed God distinct from His creation, which He orders by law” (Klaaren 1977, 36); “[W]hy, 
after so many centuries of almost total submersion in Greek ideas of immanent law, did the Semitic concept of 
imposed laws of nature burst into prominence in seventeenth century scientific thought?” (Oakley 1961a, 437). 
Consider also: “[T]he conception of the governance of the whole world by law seems || to be peculiarly Stoic. 
Most of the thinkers of this school maintained that Zeus (immanent in the world) was nothing else but "koinos 
nomos" (KOLVOs vo0)-Universal law 57 (e.g., Zeno, fl. 320 B.C.; Cleanthes, fl. 240 B.C.; Chrysippus, d. 206 
B.C.; Diogenes, d. 150 B.C.). It seems more than likely that this new and more definite conception was derived 
from Babylonian influences, since we know that about 300 B.C. astrologers and star-clerks from Mesopotamia 
began to spread through the Mediterranean world. Among these one of the most famous was Berossus, a 
Chaldean who settled in the Greek island of Cos in 280 B.C. Zilsel, alert for concomitant social phenomena, 
notes that just as the original Babylonian conceptions of laws of Nature had arisen in a highly centralized oriental
monarchy, so in the time of the Stoics, a period of rising monarchies, it would have been natural to view the 
universe as a great empire, ruled by a divine Logos” (Needham 1951a, 19–20). Compare Zilsel 1941, 1942.
120Boyle, Notion of Nature (quoted in Klaaren 1977, 151).
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view of law[...]continued to flourish in the seventeenth century,” e.g. in Grotius, although it
crucially “did not recommend itself to the scientific virtuosi [e.g. Boyle and Newton].”121 
Of course, the 17th-century voluntarist emphasis on law as externally-imposed 'obligation'
rather than 'immanent regularity' is closely related to the historical and conceptual connection
between voluntarism and empiricism. According to the early modern voluntarist, one cannot
discover the laws of nature simply by reflecting on the nature of created substance, because law-
governed order is imposed on nature from without. (Thus M. B. Foster notes that “[m]odern
science describes natural substances instead of defining them, it discovers their properties by
observation and experiment instead of by 'intuitive induction' and demonstration, it classifies
their species instead of dividing their genera, it establishes between them the relation of cause
and effect instead of the relation of ground and consequent.” By contrast, “[a]ll the peculiarities
of Greek natural science are derived from the assumption that the essence of a natural object is
definable, as the essence of a geometrical object is.”122) Nor—contra intellectualists—can one
apprehend the fundamental laws of nature through pure reflection, given God's total freedom in
exercising His absolute Power and the correlative (apparent) 'arbitrariness' of His creative Work.
4.5. But 17th-century voluntarists' emphasis on God's transcendence also plausibly sheds
light on the relationship between laws of nature, causal powers, and observable phenomena—in
current physics and empirical science more broadly, not just in early modern natural philosophy.
The basic scheme endorsed by a Boyle or Newton is evidently as follows. There are three basic
things: God, the laws of nature, and material objects or physical phenomena. And God is the
cause of law-governed order among material objects. That is, God causes matter to obey natural
laws. Matter does not cause itself, or other matter, to obey the laws of nature. And the laws of
nature do not cause matter to obey themselves. However, recall that the latter is precisely what
the contemporary philosopher of science Tim Maudlin seems to believe, insofar as he claims that
laws of nature “operate to generate or produce” later states of the universe from its initial state.123
Maudlin's view makes far less sense than Boyle's, as laid out in The Christian Virtuoso (1690):





notional thing, according to which, an intelligent and free agent is bound to
regulate its actions. But inanimate bodies are utterly incapable of
understanding what a law is, or what it enjoins, or when they act
conformably or unconformably to it; and therefore the actions of inanimate
bodies, which cannot incite or moderate their own actions, are produced by
real power, not by laws; though the agents, if intelligent, may regulate the
exertions of their power by settled rules.124
As Boyle rightly observes, inanimate objects are not capable of apprehending the laws of nature,
which are purely intelligible structures, insofar as they have no power of intellect. Whereas the
actions of an 'intelligent agent' can be caused by 'notional things'—as when people regulate their
conduct in accordance with moral laws or ideas—the actions of 'inanimate bodies' clearly cannot.
Contra Maudlin, then, 17th-century voluntarists' picture makes far better sense: God (not law)
causes or 'produces' law-governed order among material objects; the laws of nature are Ideas in
God's Mind; and matter does not obey laws by its own nature; matter is only passive, not active.
(Clearly, a secularized metaphysics will have to address the unacceptable anthropomorphism of
the 'God' term in this basic early modern scheme. I will return to this issue below, rest assured.)
Maudlin's claim that the laws of nature 'generate or produce' physical states of affairs
involves a conceptually-confused combination of tropes from Greek rationalism and modern
scientific notions of efficient causation. Whereas a neo-Platonic or neo-Aristotelian rationalist
might claim that purely intelligible Forms non-causally ground physical states of affairs, as these
physical states' real nature or essence, this is not what Maudlin seems to be saying. Rather, he
invokes a (pseudo-)causal notion of 'production' or 'generation'. But 17 th-century voluntarist
natural philosophers rightly saw that the laws of nature are not the kinds of thing that could cause
physical effects. Rather, natural laws are the intelligible Form of physical effects caused by God.
Here a basic analogy is instructive. Colors and other sensory qualities cannot impact
things without faculties of sensory perception. Hence, colors—as sensory qualities—cannot
cause a rock to do anything. Of course, sensory qualities can also be understood as mind-
independent causal powers inherent in external objects. For instance, an object's color depends
upon the spectrum of electromagnetic radiation that it reflects or emits. And this radiation can
causally impact inanimate objects. However, as mind-independent causal powers insofar as they
can produce sensory experiences in perceiving subjects, sensory qualities clearly cannot impact
insensate objects like rocks. Sensory properties like colors are the purely sensible quality of
124Quoted in Crombie 1996, 85
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mind-independent causal powers that can also (non-sensibly) impact insensate objects like rocks.
Likewise, laws of nature are the purely intelligible quality of mind-independent causal
powers ('God') that can also (non-intelligibly) impact insensate objects like rocks. Laws of nature
are the intellectual impact that elemental causal powers ('God') have on us, as intelligent beings.
But the same basic powers causally produce physical effects in inanimate objects like rocks—i.e.
law-governed order or physical structure. In short, the laws of nature are the purely intelligible
quality of the causal impact that basic powers ('God') have on observable phenomena ('matter'),
insofar as these phenomena are ordered into explanatorily-basic physical structures.
Maudlin's flawed scheme also bears meaningful resemblance to deism of the sort that
Newton and other 17th-century voluntarist natural philosophers strongly rejected. One dimension
of this conflict concerned deists' emphasis on natural religion to the total exclusion of revelation
—unlike a deist, for instance, Newton did not reject the authority of Scripture, and he allowed
for the possibility that God could at any moment suspend the laws of nature established by his
ordained (as opposed to absolute) power.125 However, this debate about the status of religious
revelation clearly has no deep ongoing interest from the standpoint of present-day secularized
science. (Modern secularists would presumably side with deists against Newton on this point.)
But other aspects of the conflict between voluntarists like Boyle or Newton and the deists
are more directly relevant to metaphysical analysis of present-day science. For instance, it is
clearly part of both Boyle's and Newton's views that God continually impacts nature. Thus,
whereas the deist claims that “after the first formation of the universe, all things are brought to
pass by the settled laws of nature,” Boyle insists that “the omniscient and almighty author of
things” in fact “constantly maintains” the “laws of motion” that He “established” in first
“fram[ing]” the world.126 In a broadly similar vein, Steve Shapin observes that Newtonians
envisioned a God close enough to the natural world to “sustain its routine operations” and even
(recall) “suspend or alter them as he will.”127 (Shapin notes that this desire for an always- and
125As James E. Force observes, e.g.: “[Newton's] Arian position is definitely unorthodox, even heretical, but it is 
clearly not deistic. Even in his Arianism, Newton takes the Bible seriously” (Force 1990b, 60); “Newton's God 
of dominion causes him to spurn as idolatrous anyone who dilutes the dominion of God whether through deistic 
mockery of God's power or through misguidedly worshipping false images of God or false metaphysical 
conceptions of God. This includes deistic radical Whigs who laugh at the story of Moses and the flood as well as 
moderate low churchmen who subscribe to the Trinitarian heresy and the moderate Whig political establishment 
which supports that false creed” (Force 1990a, 94). On Newton contra deism, see also Popkin 1990, 5; Snobelen 
2001, 176; Jacob and Jacob 1980, 265.
126Quoted in Crombie 1996, 85.
127Shapin 1981, 195.
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everywhere-active God “could without care slide into one of God as 'the soul of the world'—a
notion to which [as we have seen] the Newtonian voluntarist tradition was[...]unremittingly
hostile.”128 Newtonians hence faced a distinctive challenge of reconciling this tension, rooted in
voluntarism. Perhaps more promising than Newton's own attempt at doing so, which involved
invoking absolute space as the 'sensorium' of an omnipresent God, is this alternative scheme:
elemental forces are everywhere directly active without being anywhere directly present in the
'material' world.129) Maudlin's claim that laws of nature 'produce' later physical states of affairs
from earlier ones is fairly close to early modern deists' vision of a 'clockwork' universe that runs
independently after first being 'set up' by an Architect. Of course, Maudlin has no 'Watchmaker'.
But his conception of the laws' productive power vis-à-vis the natural order is nevertheless quite
like early modern deists'. In short, Maudlin's view is arguably a kind of 'deism without God'.
This is another way to view what I earlier described as his 'conceptually-confused combination
of tropes from Greek rationalism and modern scientific notions of efficient causation'.
A secularized version of Newton's or Boyle's anti-deist scheme can be summarized as
follows: 'laws of nature' are the purely intelligible quality of the impact that basic causal powers
('God') have on observable phenomena ('matter'), insofar as these phenomena are ordered into
explanatorily-basic physical structures. Hence, law-governed order is 'constantly maintained' by
'divine' causal power, just as Boyle insists. 'God' is thus never as 'absent' as deists claim. But
'divine' power is also not the 'soul of the world' or the intelligible Form immanent in 'material'
things as their ideal essence, as in neo-Aristotelian scholasticism, Continental rationalism à la
Spinoza, or post-Kantian idealism. Rather, 'divine' causal power is beyond the 'material' order.
How is this appeal to causal power 'beyond' the material order not a kind of mysticism or
supernaturalism? First, one need not construe 'divine' Power as personal. Newton and Boyle still
viewed God as morally benevolent, for instance, as well as omnipotent. Let us abandon this
view, on behalf of modern secularism. Let us also reject Einstein's quasi-secularized appeal to a
cosmic 'intelligence'. And let us reject teleological appeals to cosmic 'purpose' or 'aims'. Hence,
we may view 'divine' causal power as amoral, arational, and atelic—entirely inhuman. Let us
refer to this 'divine' power as elemental physical force. Elemental physical force is not mystical,
insofar as we apprehend it only via the explanatorily-basic structural relations among observable
phenomena that it causally produces. And it is not supernatural, insofar as it is just impersonal
128Shapin 1981, 195.
129I elaborate this slogan below.
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causal power, or (qua 'force' in a stricter sense) the exercise of this power on actual phenomena.
How is elemental physical force 'beyond' the material order? Elemental physical force
'transcends' the material order in the way that any cause 'transcends' its effects. The 'material'
order disclosed by modern science is the order of things insofar as they are causally impacted by
elemental physical forces. Hence, physical force itself is 'beyond' the order of 'material' things.
Objective phenomena are the effects of elemental physical forces. Law-governed order among
the phenomena is caused by elemental physical forces—not by the laws of nature, and not by
'material' phenomena themselves. Elemental physical forces 'transcend' the phenomenal order.
Boyle, Newton, and other 17th-century natural philosophers influenced by the voluntarist
tradition in early modern Christian theology viewed 'divine' Power as coincident with Intellect. It
is not. In fact, the 'arbitrariness' of natural law that voluntarists emphasized—as reflected in the
deep historical and conceptual connections between voluntarism and empiricism—is best
interpreted as evidence that 'God' is not intelligent. 'God' is arational Power. 'God' is arational,
amoral, atelic power insofar as it causally produces law-like order in the phenomena. 'God' is
elemental physical force, which 'transcends' the law-governed phenomenal order in precisely the
way that a strictly unobservable cause 'transcends' its empirical (albeit purely intelligible) effect. A
cause is not the 'nature' or 'essence' of its effect. Nor do effects necessarily 'resemble' their
causes. Sensory impressions of color need not 'resemble' the causal powers that impinge upon
our perceptual organs. Intellectual impressions of the laws of nature need not 'resemble' the basic
physical forces that produce genuinely 'lawful' order in 'material' phenomena. Causes are not
'immanent' in their effects. Elemental physical forces are not 'immanent' in the ordered
phenomena that they produce. But the laws of nature are pure images of this causal interaction:
laws are the intelligible forms of elemental physical forces' impact on observable phenomena.
4.6. Suppose one accepts that laws do not causally produce law-governed physical order.
Still, why then appeal to 'transcendent' physical forces as causes of law-governed order? Why
could it not be that 'immanent' physical entities ('matter') produce law-governed order either in
themselves or in other 'immanent' entities? Indeed, is this not by far the most plausible position?
As a first point of clarification, note that my appeal to 'transcendent' physical forces is
purely aspectual. That is, I take 'transcendent' physical forces and 'immanent' physical objects to
be alternate ways of characterizing the same mind-independent reality. Forces are things insofar
64
as they have impact, whereas objects are things insofar as they are impacted. Here consider by
analogy the Kantian distinction between the 'thing in itself' [Ding an sich] and the object, or
thing insofar as it appears to us mediated by the forms of our own sensible intuition and
understanding (i.e. space, time, and the categories). On the most plausible interpretation of
Kant's view, the 'thing' that merely appears to us as an object or determinate phenomenon is the
same thing as the 'thing' that we cannot know as it is in itself.130 For instance:
[…] the same objects can be considered from two different sides, on the one
side as objects of the senses and the understanding for experience, and on the
other side as objects that are merely thought at most for isolated reason striving
beyond the bounds of experience. (KrV Bxviii–Bxix, note)
[…] the reservation must well be noted that even if we cannot cognize these
same objects as things in themselves, we are at least able to think of them as
things in themselves. (KrV Bxxvi)
Similarly, then, I am claiming that the 'things' we apprehend as forces (insofar as they have
impact) are the same things as the 'things' we apprehend as objects (insofar as they are impacted).
To be clear: I do not claim that there is a one-to-one correspondence between objects and loci of
force. By analogy, I take Kant's view to be naive insofar as he arguably envisions a one-to-one
correspondence between 'phenomena' and 'things in themselves'. Hence, somewhat more
precisely, I claim simply that the same mind-independent reality appears to us as 'transcendent'
power when it presents itself to us as an order of interacting forces, and as 'immanent' physical
objects when we represent it as a field of things with passive qualities or 'intrinsic' properties.
But why bother to make this 'aspectual' distinction? In light of modern secularization,
why not instead simply 're-invest' the active power or force that 17th-century voluntarists like
Boyle and Newton associated with God back into the physical world? Or why not just abandon
the idea that there is any need for 'Power', beyond 'Matter' and 'Laws'? My full response to these
apt questions will require extended argumentation, running through the rest of this dissertation.
As an initial point of response, however, it should be noted that late modern
secularization has not in fact achieved a re-investment of 'transcendent' Power back into nature
as described by modern empirical science. This failure is plausibly the basic cause of the
widespread sense among Romantic and other Counter-Enlightenment critics that the worldview
130See e.g. Allison 1983/2004.
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of modern science is somehow regrettably 'disenchanted'.131 In other words, poetically sensitive
critics in the late modern period correctly perceive that secularized science involves a kind of
evacuation of value or genuine reality from the natural world. And, in turn, I claim that this is
plausibly viewed as the direct 'residue' of the distinctively 'transcendent' notions of God deployed
by 17th-century natural philosophers like Boyle and Newton—who, working within a broader
voluntarist natural theological tradition, laid down the foundations of modern scientific thought.
Thus, less than a century after Newton's death, Goethe bemoaned the mechanistic order
of “matter in motion from all eternity” as a “melancholy, atheistical half-night, in which earth
vanished with all its images, heaven with all its stars.”132 Likewise the German Romantic writer
Jean Paul, a contemporary of Goethe's,133 lamented the modern scientific vision of nature as an
“all-powerful, blind, lonesome machine.”134 So too, in 1860 Emerson decried the way in which
modern science (he believed) always remains 'at arm's length' from its objects:
What a parade we make of our science, and how far off, and at arm's
length, it is from its objects! Our botany is all names, not powers: poets
and romancers talk of herbs of grace and healing; but what does the
botanist know of the virtues of his weeds? The geologist lays bare the
strata, and can tell them all on his fingers: but does he know what effect
passes into the man who builds his house in them? what effect on the race
that inhabits a granite shelf? what on the inhabitants of marl and of
alluvium?[…]The motive of science was the extension of man, on all
sides, into Nature, till his hands should touch the stars, his eyes see
through the earth, his ears understand the language of beast and bird, and
the sense of the wind; and, through his sympathy, heaven and earth
should talk with him. But that is not our science. These geologies,
chemistries, astronomies, seem to make wise, but they leave us where
they found us.135 
And towards the end of the 19th century, in turn, Nietzsche characteristically pulled no punches:
Our whole modern world is caught in the net of Alexandrian culture, and
the highest ideal it knows is theoretical man, equipped with the highest
powers of understanding and working in the service of science, whose
131See also Max Weber's 1917 lecture on 'Science as a Vocation' (Weber 1946).
132Goethe 1848, 425; quoted in Friedrich Albert Lange's History of Materialism (Lange 1880, 149). Goethe is here 
commenting—very critically—on d'Holbach's Système de la Nature.
133On the relationship between the two, see Maurer 1934.
134Jean Pauls samtliche Werke, ed. E. Berend (Weimar, 1935), XI, 84 f.; quoted in Wetzels 1971, 47.
135Emerson 1983, 1099-1100 (from the essay “Beauty” in The Conduct of Life [1860]).
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archetype and progenitor is Socrates. (BT 18)
[T]he waking life of a mythically inspired people [eines mythisch
erregten Volkes]—the ancient Greeks, for instance—more closely
resembles a dream than it does the waking world of a scientifically
disenchanted thinker [wissenschaftlich ernüchterten Denkers]. When
every tree can suddenly speak as a nymph, when a god in the shape of a
bull can drag away maidens, when even the goddess Athena herself is
suddenly seen in the company of Peisastratus driving through the market
place of Athens with a beautiful team of horses -- and this is what the
honest Athenian believed -- then, as in a dream, anything is possible at
each moment, and all of nature swarms around man as if it were nothing
but a masquerade of the gods, who were merely amusing themselves by
deceiving men in all these shapes. (TL 2 [1873])
 [L]et us now picture the abstract man, untutored by myth; abstract
education; abstract morality; abstract law; the abstract state; let us
imagine the lawless roving of the artistic imagination, unchecked by any
native myth; let us think of a culture that has no fixed and sacred
primordial site but is doomed to exhaust all possibilities and to nourish
itself wretchedly on all other cultures—there we have the present age, the
result of that Socratism which is bent on the destruction of myth. And
now the mythless man stands eternally hungry, surrounded by all past
ages, and digs and grubs for roots, even if he has to dig for them among
the remotest antiquities. The tremendous historical need of our
unsatisfied modern culture, the assembling around one of countless other
cultures, the consuming desire for knowledge—what does all this point
to, if not to the loss of myth, the loss of the mythical home, the mythical
maternal womb? Let us ask ourselves whether the feverish and uncanny
excitement of this culture is anything but the greedy seizing and
snatching at food of a hungry man—and who would care to contribute
anything to a culture that cannot be satisfied no matter how much it
devours, and at whose contact the most vigorous and wholesome
nourishment is changed into 'history and criticism'? (BT 23).
In this light, Nietzsche insists that there is a crucial difference between the genuine “Apolline
tendency”—which he associates with prophetic dream-vision, beautiful semblance [Schein],
clearly-delimited boundaries between objects, image-based arts, and 'great and sublime' forms—
and the debased “withdraw[al] into the cocoon of logical schematism” that he associates with the
rise of Socratic rationalism and the corresponding 'death' of Greek tragedy (BT 14). Likewise, he
distinguishes genuine “Apolline contemplation” from mere “cool, paradoxical thoughts” (BT 12).
This is part of Nietzsche's broader critique of the modern 'will to truth': he believes (recall) that
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modern history reveals an ongoing “self-overcoming of morality, out of truthfulness” (EH
“Destiny” 3)136 reflected not only in post-Enlightenment society's growing disillusionment with
attempts to view nature as 'proof of the goodness and governance of a god', or even 'as if' it were
such proof, but also in a concomitant increase in societal “faith in science” (GS 344; GM III:24)
and ensuing collapse into radical “nihilism” (GM P 5 et passim)137 as this secularized form of
“Christian truthfulness” (GM III:27),138 too, ultimately turns against itself. (See Appendix B.)
For scientifically-literate and technically-minded modern readers, it can be tempting to
reject views like these as excessively sentimental, anti-intellectual, or reactionary. However, this
is neither a charitable nor an intellectually deep response. Far better, on my view, is to see them
as fair points of criticism rooted in an acute, if one-sided, understanding of the basic structure of
modern scientific thought. Namely, Romantic and other Counter-Enlightenment critics correctly
perceived the same passive o r inert quality of modern scientific objects that the 17th-century
founders of science related to the imposition of natural law by a transcendent and almighty God.
Goethe, Emerson, and Nietzsche were thus in total agreement with Boyle and Newton that
elemental reality is systematically excluded from the contents of modern scientific representation
—whether they conceived of this elemental reality as the personal God of Christianity (like the
17th-century scientific virtuosi) , or (like Nietzsche) as amoral, arational, vitalistic will to power.
Perhaps they are all correct, here, and the naive modern 'scientific naturalist' is wrong.
Perhaps we are deluding ourselves if we deny that modern scientific representation evacuates
meaning from the world. Perhaps we are deluding ourselves if we insist that modern scientific
representation shows us reality, and not just a field of objective appearances. This is my view. 
Reality is force. To be real is to exercise power, to be a locus of force. A thing that is only
determined by higher forces, as a mere object for their outlet, is unreal—nothing but an
appearance, nothing but an image of underlying reality. Objective reality is the all-encompassing
136Similarly: “The priest too knows[...]that there is no longer any 'God', any 'sinner', any 'Redeemer'—that 'free 
will' and 'moral world order' are lies: seriousness, the profound self-overcoming of the spirit, no longer permits 
anybody not to know about this” (A 38).
137See also KSA 12:7[64], KSA 12:10[42], KSA 13:14[86], KSA 12:10[192], KSA 12:9[35], KSA 13:11[108].
138More fully: “All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming[...]In this way 
Christianity as a dogma was destroyed by its own morality; in the same way Christianity as morality must now 
perish, too: we stand on the threshold of this event. After Christian truthfulness has drawn one inference after 
another, it must end by drawing its most striking inference, its inference against itself'” (GM III:27). Consider 
also: “[...]in us the will to truth becomes conscious of itself as a problem[...]As the will to truth thus gains self-
consciousness[...]morality will gradually perish now” (GM III:27); “It is not the victory of science that 
distinguishes our nineteenth century, but the victory of scientific method over science” (KSA 13:15[51]); “...
[H]istory must itself resolve the problem of history, knowledge must turn its sting against itself” (HL 8).
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field of interacting forces. This basic field is not itself a force. It is an unreal but objectively valid
space, or dimensional structure, that contains all things insofar as they are objects impacted by
force. Objective reality is an unreal but objectively valid representation of nature as an all-
encompassing field-of-effect. Nature is real, however. Nature is the real order of primitive
forces, interacting prior to any containment by embedding spaces or unifying Forms. We directly
apprehend nature in poetry. And we represent nature as objective reality in science. Poetry
presents mind-independent reality as a real order of forces. Science represents the same mind-
independent reality as an all-encompassing field of appearances: impact-images—objects.
Why not simply 're-invest' the Power of 'God' back into the world as described by modern
science, then? Because the result is not genuinely scientific representation. I argue to this effect
at length below, in Chapter IV—in part by showing how one can construct interpretations of
various modern aspects of modern physical theory that are no less empirically adequate or
explanatorily powerful than standard interpretations, yet which fail to be truly scientific. This
failure illuminates the nature and limits of scientific representation, by contrast to poetic thought.
Why not simply reject modern scientific thought, then? Or at least, why not simply
relegate it to the status of a 'useful fiction' that often helps us to navigate our environment, but
which fails to provide any genuine insight into fundamental reality? In short, because scientific
representation is also a genuine way of understanding the 'divine' forces that it systematically
excludes from its contents. Just as 17th-century natural philosophers clearly believed that it was
possible to glorify God by coming to know the basic laws of nature, I claim that it is possible to
apprehend and value elemental physical forces through scientific inquiry. This is not a depictive
or straightforwardly representational mode of knowledge: we do not 'copy' or 'picture' elemental
forces, in modern scientific representation. Rather, we use elemental physical forces to represent
'material' objects—by determining these objects with respect to explanatorily-basic physical
structures that encode these elemental forces' causal impact on observable phenomena. The 'laws
of nature', in an expansive sense of the term that applies even to the non-exact sciences, are the
fields-of-effect of causally-basic forces. In modern empirical science, we use the structure of
basic physical forces' causal impact to 'picture' corresponding fields of objective phenomena.
But modern scientific theory does present us with a range of genuine forces—surely?
What about electromagnetism, and the strong and weak nuclear forces? What about fluid
dynamics, and heat transfer, and stress, and shear, and torsion, and torque, and glaciation, and
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tectonic motion, and galactic formation? What about acidification, and combustion, and mitosis,
and photosynthesis, and respiration, and evolutionary selection? What about theories of social
revolution, and power dynamics, and market pressures, and nuclear strategy? How is this world
not teeming with real forces? How is it a 'disenchanted' world? How is not just the real world?
The relationship between physical phenomena—i.e. the empirical explananda in any field
of modern science or empirically-based systematic humanistic theory—and the physical
structures that (scientifically) explain them is essentially different in kind from the relationship
that obtains between real forces and agonistic or hierarchical structures in which they interact.
Hence, for instance, the relationship between the outcome of a measurement of the spin angular
momentum of an electron in a singlet state and this electron's wavefunction is essentially
different in kind from the relationship that obtains between an aesthetically-impactful color and a
beautiful form of which it is an element. I analyze this difference at some length below, in
Chapters III and IV. But for now, I will conclude this section with a few preliminary remarks on
the relation between the systematicity of scientific thought and non-scientific modes of structure.
4.7. Kant suggests that “systematic unity” is that which “first makes ordinary cognition
into science”—i.e. that which “makes a system out of a mere aggregate of it” (KrV
A832/B860).139 In turn, he relates 'systematic unity' directly to the nature of our power of reason:
[W]hat reason quite uniquely prescribes and seeks to bring about concerning
[the cognitions of our understanding in their entire range] is the systematic
in cognition, i.e., its interconnection based on one principle. This unity of
reason always presupposes an idea, namely that of the form of a whole of
cognition, which precedes the determinate cognition of the parts and
contains the conditions for determining a priori the place of each part and
its relation to the others. Accordingly, this idea postulates complete unity of
the understanding's cognition, through which this cognition comes to be not
merely la contingent aggregate but a system interconnected in accordance
139Hempel makes the related suggestion that “[s]cientific theories are introduced in an effort to bring order into the 
diversity of the phenomena we encounter in our experience” (Hempel and Jeffrey 2000, 75). Likewise, he claims
that “a worthwhile scientific theory explains an empirical law by exhibiting it as one aspect of more 
comprehensive underlying regularities, which have a variety of other testable aspects as well, i.e., which also 
imply various other empirical laws. Such a theory thus provides a systematically unified account of many 
different empirical laws” (Hempel 1965, 444). See also the unificationist accounts of scientific understanding 
developed by Michael Friedman (1974) and Philip Kitcher (1986). Friedman and Kitcher both follow Kant in 
positing a relationship between the systematic unity of scientific theory and its realization of broadly epistemic 
ideals like those of objectivity or theoretical rationality. See Morrison (2000) and Woodward (2003; esp. 362-
367) for discussions of different varieties of scientific unification.
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with necessary laws. (KrV A645/B672)
Unlike an instrumentalist or pragmatist, Kant views “the parsimony of principles” not as “merely
a principle of economy for reason,” but rather as “an inner law of its nature” (KrV A650/B678).
For Kant, reason is “the faculty of deriving the particular from the universal” (KrV A646/B674).
Reason is thus an inferential faculty: we infer from a universal to a particular that is 'determined'
by it, whether in the way that a particular instance of a general kind of 'determined' by this kind,
or in the way that a particular term in a functional sequence is 'determined' by the function itself.
Kant in turn distinguishes between two basic 'uses' of reason (KrV A647/B675). In the
'apodictic' use of reason, the universal is “in itself certain and given,” and we use it to determine
a given particular. In the 'hypothetical' use of reason, by contrast, the universal is “assumed only
problematically” (i.e. as a “mere idea”) and “several particular cases, which are all certain, are
tested by the [universal] rule, to see if they flow from it.” And if the particular cases do seem to
follow from the given 'problematically' assumed 'idea', then “the universality of the rule is
inferred, including all subsequent cases, even those that are not given in themselves.” (Here Kant
is evidently thinking of inductive reasoning, as opposed to 'apodictic' deduction.)
Hence, one might preliminarily characterize the difference between the systematicity of
science and the internal structure of a beautiful object in terms of the distinction between the
('rational') determination of a given particular by a corresponding universal and ('aesthetic')
arrangement in the absence of a universal 'rule'. I elaborate this basic proposal in detail below,
in chapters III and IV, indicating both the continuity and discontinuity of my view with Kant's.
For the time being, suffice it to say that I take Kant to be wrong to try to 'ground' the structure of
scientific cognition in the nature or 'pure form' of our own power of reason. This is precisely
backwards: more objectively, we should leverage an analysis of the kind of explanatorily-basic
systematicity disclosed by modern science to naturalistically understand our own power of
reason. The systematicity of scientific cognition is not grounded in reason. The systematicity of
scientific cognition, and of reason as the basic faculty of our scientific thought, is grounded in
the nature of physical order—or real causal hierarchy of the sort that grounds the systematic
explanatory power of basic physical structures corresponding to causally-basic physical forces.
In this light, consider Pierre Duhem's paean to the 'beauty' of physical theory in The Aim
and Structure of Physical Theory (1914):
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It is impossible to follow the march of one of the great theories of physics,
to see it unroll majestically its regular deductions starting from initial
hypotheses, to see its consequences represent a multitude of experimental
laws down to the smallest detail, without being charmed by the beauty of
such a construction, without feeling keenly that such a creation of the
human mind is truly a work of art.140
Note that, for Duhem, a great physical theory's 'beauty' is evidently grounded in the breadth of
explanatory scope and the fertility of its initial hypotheses—from which the theory in its entirety
'unrolls majestically,' culminating in the recovery of 'a multitude of experimental laws down to
the smallest detail'—rather than in the beauty of these initial hypotheses viewed in isolation from
their explanatory power.141 Hence, in something like the way that Francis Hutcheson relates his
aesthetic appreciation of 18th-century physical science to his broader theory of beauty as
“uniformity amidst variety,”142 Duhem seems to find 'beauty' in systematic explanatory power
140Duhem 1910/1991, 24. More recently, Hempel reports Dirac telling him that he regarded mathematical beauty as
a mark of sound physical theory 'because the world itself is basically beautiful'—and indeed 'God made it so', 
Dirac added in a somewhat more untimely Copernican fashion (Hempel and Jeffrey 2000, 81).
141Note that different domains of scientific inquiry evidently deploy different determinate conceptions of 
explanatory power, such that the specific way in which a given scientific theory 'unrolls majestically' towards 
recovery of its explananda depends on the particular form or forms of explanatory power that it exemplifies. 
Hence, for instance, there is a large qualitative difference between the 'majestic unrolling' of the Copernican 
heliocentric system in its recovery of astronomical observations and the 'majestic unrolling' of a Darwinian 
account of morphological development, let alone that of a Marxist theory of political economy or a Nietzschean 
account of the relationship between modern European secularization and Christian moral conscience. Beyond 
generic aesthetic (or rational) appreciation of explanatory power, then, one might recognize domain-specific 
forms of explanatory power as especially beautiful (or sublime, interesting, etc.).
142“The figures which excite in us the ideas of beauty seem to be those in which there is uniformity admist variety”
(Hutcheson, Inquiry Concerning Beauty Section II Article III); “I. The beauty of theorems, or universal truths 
demonstrated, deserves a distinct consideration, being of a nature pretty different from the former kinds of 
beauty; and yet there is none in which we shall see such an amazing variety with uniformity, and hence arises a 
very great pleasure distinct from prospects of any farther advantage” (Hutcheson, Inquiry Concerning Beauty 
Section III Article I); “There is another beauty is propositions when one theorem contains a great multitude of 
corollaries easily deducible from it. Thus there are some leading or fundamental properties upon which a long 
series of theorems can be naturally built[...]In the search of nature there is the like beauty in the knowledge of 
some great principles or universal forces from which innumerable effects do flow. Such is gravitation in Sir 
Isaac Newton's scheme. What is the aim of our ingenious geometers? A continual enlargement of theorems, or 
making them extensive, showing how what was formerly known of one figure extends to many others, to figures 
very unlike the former in appearance. It is easy to see how men are charmed with the beauty of such knowledge, 
besides its usefulness, and how this sets them upon deducing the properties of each figure from one genesis, and 
demonstrating the mechanic forces from one theorem of the composition of motion, even after they have 
sufficient knowledge and certainty in all these truths from distinct independent demonstrations. And this pleasure
we enjoy even when we have no prospect of obtaining any other advantage from such manner of deduction than 
the immediate pleasure of contemplating the beauty; nor could love of fame excite us to such regular methods of 
deduction, were we not conscious that mankind are pleasured with them immediately, by this internal sense of 
their beauty” (Hutcheson Inquiry Concerning Beauty Section III Article V); “In every part of the world which 
we call beautiful there is a surprising uniformity amidst an almost infinite variety. Many parts of the universe 
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itself. In this respect, Duhem's and Hutcheson's views are arguably a more naive version of
Kant's. Kant would not call the rational 'parsimony of principles' beautiful. But he does clearly
value it in its own right, and indeed views it as a purely ideal endpoint of scientific inquiry.
Thus Kant claims that the “systematic unity of the knowledge of understanding” is
“required by reason” merely in the mode of a “regulative” ideal (i.e. by reason in its merely
'hypothetical' use). This is by direct contrast to Kant's argument that we can have a priori
knowledge of the applicability of space, time, and the pure 'categories' of understanding—i.e.
causality, inherence, subsistence, unity, plurality, existence, possibility, etc.—to the objective
contents of our experience. Thus space, time, and the categories are “constitutive” features of
objective scientific cognition, for Kant, whereas the comprehensive systematicity of scientific
knowledge is a necessary goal of rational inquiry—but one that can never be fully achieved, such
that nature as an interconnected whole is actually directly present to us as an empirical object.
The unity of science is thus “to be regarded not as given in itself, but as a problem only.”143 Note
that Kant's characterization of scientific systematicity as a merely 'regulative' ideal is clearly a
direct 'residue' of 17th-century natural philosophers' appeal to a purely 'transcendent' God.
In his Critique of Judgment (1790), Kant develops this notion of 'regulative' systematicity
seem not at all designed for the use of man; nay, it is but a very small spot with which we have any acquaintance.
The figures and motions of the great bodies are not obvious to our senses, but found out by reasoning and 
reflection, upon many long observations; and yet as far as we can by sense discover, or by reasoning enlarge our 
knowledge and extend our imagination, we generally find their structure, order, and motion agreeable to our 
sense of beauty. Every particular object in nature does not indeed appear beautiful to us; but there is a great 
profusion of beauty over most of the objects which occur either to our senses, or reasonings upon observation. 
For not to mention that apparent situation of the heavenly bodies in the circumference of a great sphere, which is 
wholly occasioned by the imperfection of our sign in discerning distances, the forms of all the great bodies in the
universe are nearly spherical, the orbits of their revolutions generally elliptic, and without great eccentricity, in 
those which continually occur to our observation. Now these are figures of great uniformity, and therefore 
pleasuring to us.[...]Further, to pass by the less obvious uniformity in the proportion of their quantities of matter, 
distances, times of revolving, to each other, what an exhibit a great instance of uniformity amidst variety than the
constant tenour of revolutions in nearly equal times, in each planet around its axis, and the central fire, or sun, 
through all the ages of which we have any records, and in nearly the same orbit? Thus after certain periods all the
same appearances are again renewed. The alternate successions of light and shade, or day and night, constantly 
pursuing each other around each planet, with an agreeable and regular diversity in the times they possess the 
several hemispheres, in the summer, harvest, winter, and spring, and the various phases, aspects, and situations 
of the planets to each other, their conjunctions and oppositions, in which they suddenly darken each other with 
they conic shades in eclipses, are repeated to us at their fixed periods with invariable constancy. These are the 
beauties which charm the astronomer, and make his tedious calculations pleasant” (Hutcheson Inquiry 
Concerning Beauty Section II Article V).
143“The hypothetical employment of reason is regulative only; its sole aims is, so far as may be possible, to bring 
unity into the body of our detailed knowledge, and thereby to approximate the rule to universality. The 
hypothetical employment of reason has, therefore, as its aim the systematic unity of the knowledge of 
understanding, and this unity is the criterion of the truth of its rules. The systematic unity (as a mere idea) is, 
however, only a projected unity, to be regarded not as given in itself, but as a problem only” (KrV A647/B675); 
“the unity required by reason” (KrV A648/B676).
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in a broadly organicist direction. Here he now identifies the concept of the “purposiveness of
nature,”144 through which “nature is represented[...]as if an understanding contained the ground
of the unity of the manifold of its empirical laws,”145 as a “regulative”146 feature of cognition—
i.e. a “heuristic principle”147 for scientific inquiry that we must deploy insofar as we are rational
even though we cannot justifiably impute objective purposiveness to nature, lest “reason [be]
seduced into poetic enthusiasm.”148 But he also now claims that we must treat biological systems
as if they produce, maintain, regenerate, and reproduce themselves by means of a “self-
propagating formative power” that “cannot be explained through the capacity for movement
alone (that is, mechanism).”149 For unlike a mere machine or even a work of art, each part of a
genuinely organic being must be viewed “as if existing for the sake of the others and on account
of the whole.”150 Life is (as if) purposively organized, like an artwork or machine. But whereas
artworks and machines are organized by external rational beings, life as such “organizes
144 “The universal laws of the understanding, which are at the same time laws of nature, are equally as necessary to 
it (though they have originated from spontaneity) as the laws of motion are to matter; and their generation 
presupposes no intention with regard to our faculty of cognition, since only through them do we first obtain a 
concept of what cognition of things (of nature) is, and they necessarily pertain to nature as object of our 
cognition in general. Yet that the order of nature in its particular laws, although its multiplicity and diversity at 
least possibly surpass all our power of comprehension, is yet fitted to it, is, as far as we can see, contingent; and 
its discovery is a task for the understanding, which is aimed at an end that is necessary for it, namely to introduce
into it unity of principles—which purpose must be attributed to nature by the power of judgment, because the 
understanding cannot prescribe to it any law on this matter” (5:186-7).
145“...the principle of the power of judgment in regard to the form of things in nature under empirical laws in 
general is the purposiveness of nature in its multiplicity. I.e., nature is represented through this concept as if an 




149KU 5:374. Compare the notion of Bildungstrieb (formative drive) developed by Johann Friedrich Blumenbach 
(1752-1840): “[T]here exists in all living creatures, from men to maggots and from cedar trees to mold, a 
particular inborn, lifelong active drive [Trieb]. This drive initially bestows on creatures their form, then preserves
it, and, if they become injured, where possible restores their form. This is a drive (or tendency or effort, however 
you wish to call it) that is completely different from the common features of the body generally; it is also 
completely different from the other species forces [Kräften] of organized bodies in particular. It shows itself to 
be one of the first causes of all generation, nutrition, and reproduction. In order to avoid all misunderstanding 
and to distinguish it from all the other nature powers, I give it the name of Bildungstrieb (nisus formativus)” 
(Blumenbach, Über den Bildungstrieb, 1st ed. (1781); quoted in Richards 2002, 218-219)” Kant was aware of 
Blumenbach's work, and indeed mentions him in connection to the Bildungstrieb in the Critique of Judgment 
(5:424).
150KU 5:373-4. As one historian concisely summarizes: “[F]or objects to be constituted 'organisms' or, as Kant also 
refers to them, 'natural purposes,' they have to meet the following criteria: their parts form reciprocal means-ends
relationships; those parts come into existence and achieve a particular form for the sake of one another (through 
growth, maintenance, and reproduction); and the entire system has to be understood as resulting from an idea of 
the whole. No mere mechanism displays all of these features. And thus no natural purposes can be understood by
us in purely mechanistic terms” (Richards 2002, 66).
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itself.”151 Unlike the Newtonian conception of matter in law-governed motion as the creative
product of a transcendent God, in other words, Kant's vision is now explicitly one of individual
biological systems, and ultimately also Nature itself, as if they were producing themselves—as
though the operation of their parts were teleologically oriented towards the realization of an ideal
whole. In short, Kant claims that we are rationally obligated to view nature as if it were an all-
encompassing organic unity. Hence, for Kantian idealists, the unity of a transcendent God is
displaced onto (or re-appropriated as) the unity of a transcendent Rational Subject of Experience.
Kant's account is noteworthy with respect to debates about scientific 'disenchantment'.
His appeal to all-encompassing organic unity is clearly more 'poetic' in spirit than his uptake of
'mechanistic' causation—as he himself recognizes, in insisting that we 'succumb to poetic
enthusiasm' if we view the systematic unity of nature as a constitutive principle of reason. But his
insistence that it always remains merely as if nature were an organic unity is arguably a way of
asserting the same kind of 'transcendence' that Boyle, Newton, and other 17 th-century natural
philosophers working in the voluntarist tradition insisted upon. The unity of ('Divine') Reason is
not immanent in nature as disclosed by scientific cognition, for Kant, but rather always beyond it.
Many post-Kantian theorists attempted to re-assert a more robust principle of immanence.
Hence, for instance, the German Romantics assimilated Kant's fascination with teleological
explanation, its relation to organic unity and aesthetic experience, and its apparent conflict with
the mechanistic explanatory paradigm of Newtonian physical theory. For the Romantics, as for
Kant, nature's organic autopoietic power mediates between the orders of efficient causal
necessity and human freedom, 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity', the 'material' and the 'ideal'. But
largely gone from the Romantic view is Kant's qualification that the purposiveness of nature is a
merely regulative principle. For Schelling, Schlegel, Goethe, and others in their milieu, rather,
nature is objectively purposive: an interconnected whole literally (not merely as if) directed
towards the physical expression of its own limitless creative power, in a continual generation and
unending evolution of natural systems approximating ideal forms or archetypes.152
151KU 5:374.
152“After Kant, and especially because of the influence of Goethe and Schelling, biologists came to hold the 
teleological structure of nature not simply as if but as intrinsic: nature, whether in the individual or at large, 
really was purposively organized. But the Naturphilosophen, unlike the British natural theologians, did not 
appeal to a separate Creator who imposed final order on recalcitrant matter. Rather, they conceived nature in 
Spinozistic fashion—it was Deus sive natura: God and nature were one. This meant that the teleological 
structuring of biological organisms modeled the conceptual structuring of the ideas in terms of which nature was 
understood. This organic conception of nature—given currency by Herder, Goethe, and Schelling—opposed the 
mechanical ideal stemming from Descartes and Newton. Within the tradition of Naturphilosophie, nature ceased 
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The Romantics thus envisioned the world as being quite literally a “work of art which is
eternally fashioning itself”153 in a manner beyond the ken of naively mechanistic physical theory
—and they developed a corresponding ethics and politics. This Romantic ethos prioritized
creative genius, natural passion, artistic expression, continual self- and social development in a
progressive but endless approach toward self-consciously unrealizable ideals, individuality
achieved through organic differentiation and the subordination of personal self-interest to the
needs of an ideally interconnected social whole, (more generally) the overcoming of alienation
by organically unifying opposing forces,154 and a poetized mode of scientific and philosophical
acuity grounded in intuitive receptivity to the beauty of purposive natural forms. Post-Kantian
organicists like Schelling judged “Nature itself”—i.e. the infinitely productive “absolutely
organic”—to be the fundamental “cause of all organization” prior to and “higher than” the sphere
of mechanism, such that “the organic cannot be subordinated to the anorganic.”155 And they
hence deemed mankind to elevate itself insofar as it focalizes Nature's formative power. Life—
the ceaseless, purposive productivity of the organic construed in an expansive metaphysical
sense—thus became not only the shared essence and common cause of physical and biological
phenomena alike, for the Romantics, but also the basic standard of human spiritual achievement.
Romantic theorists attempted to achieve a truly radical synthesis of modern scientific and
poetic vision—and thereby (I claim) to re-assert the immanence of ultimate reality, construed as
life or creative development, in the natural world as it is disclosed by empirical scientific theory.
This attempt at synthesis was never really successful, however. To be sure, various domains of
modern scientific thought (evolutionary theory, embryology, geology, energetics, etc.) have been
positively influenced by broadly Romantic emphasis on creative development [Bildung] as a
to be mere product of the Creator's designs but itself became producer—of itself” (Richards 2002, 10-11); “For 
the Romantics, for Schlegel, Schelling, Goethe, and later Darwin and Haeckel, nature herself would take on the 
form of the divine. She would be thought infinitely creative. This is why Schlegel can also refer to 'the 
unconscious poetry' that 'moves in the plant,' that streams forth in light, that laughs out in the child, that 
shimmers in the bud of youth, that glows in the loving breasts of women.' Nature herself is a Romantic artist 
whose loving creations become our reality—a sentiment that emerges to explicit philosophical expression, as we 
will see, in Schelling's System des transscendentalen Idealismus” (Richards 2002, 111).
153Friedrich Schlegel, Gesprāch über die Poesie,1800; quoted in Lovejoy 1936, 304.
154“While the romantics recognized difference, and indeed celebrated it, they also believed that we should strive to 
reintegrate it within the wider wholes of state, society, and nature” (Beiser 2003a, 3).
155Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature (2004, 116). Beiser nicely summarizes: “It is 
not that there are special organic laws, which are somehow beyond the jurisdiction of mechanism; rather, it is 
that mechanism is subordinate to organicism. The mechanical is simply a limited case of the teleological, 
deriving from a partial perspective that considers only the parts in their immediate conditions; but it does not ask 
for the whys and wherefores of these initial conditions in the first place; instead, it allows the series of causes to 
regress ad infinitum” (Beiser 2003a, 150).
76
fundamental ontological principle.156 But Romantic enthusiasm about nature always remains
somewhat suspicious, from a more truly modern scientific standpoint. These poetic appeals to
'life' and 'creative energy' always seem merely poetic or figurative—as Kant observed. And the
same can be said for other post-Romantic attempts to naturalize early modern notions of divine
Will, in part by 're-inserting' this Will into nature as the purely 'immanent' principle of its reality.
Nietzsche can be placed in this category, e.g., given his vision of universal will to power—as can
post-Nietzschean 'life philosophers' like Max Scheler, along with neo-vitalists like Henri Bergon
or Jakob von Uexküll, and Deleuze as a prominent recent advocate of radical 'immanence'.
The Romantics evidently associated life with genuine reality, and mechanistic causation
with mere appearance. This mapping of the reality-appearance distinction onto the distinction
between organic and mechanical processes is misguided. But the Romantics were still correct in
identifying the same basically inert character of modern scientific objects that I have argued 17th-
century natural philosophers also clearly saw—even though Boyle and Newton (etc.) would have
described it differently, by appeal to the equality of all created things below a transcendent God.
My basic claim is twofold. First, this same 'inertness' can be more accurately characterized in
terms of the difference between objects, or things insofar as they are merely impacted, and the
real forces that impact them. Second, force never shows up in scientific representation as force.
Scientific representation is the representation of real, mind-independent forces as objective
fields-of-effect with respect to which mere objects or phenomena are systematically determined.
4.8. The 'God' of 17th-century voluntarist theology can be naturalistically redescribed as
elemental physical force. We do not see elemental physical forces as such in truly scientific
modes of representation—and this is related to the 'transcendence' of Boyle's or Newton's God.
Rather, we use elemental physical forces t o see objects, or phenomena insofar as they are
156Representatively, e.g.: “The transition from the Newtonian view that the activity of the natural order was to be 
ascribed to the continued sustenance of passive matter by God's will to the theories of nature proposed in the late
eighteenth century by Joseph Priestly and James Hutton which supposed—though in different ways—that 
activity was intrinsic to matter and immanent in the natural order, was associated with the rejection of Newton's 
voluntarist theory of nature which supposed that God's will 'sustains the world in its minutest details.' These 
eighteenth-century natural philosophers emphasized divine omniscience and rejected divine abrogation of the 
laws of nature as impugning divine foresight, rejecting the voluntarist conception of nature which stressed that 
God 'gives order as well as deviation from order,' a view that 'diminishes the gap between the natural and the 
supernatural.'” (Heimann 1978, 272); “Hutton's theory of nature supposed a system of active powers whose self-
sufficiency was not to be abrogated by divine intervention, but in regarding the active powers as immanent in 
nature he did not subsume God's agency under the laws of nature[...]God was transcendent over the order of 
nature, and 'every existence is to be resolved … to that infinite Being and superintending mind.' The active 
powers immanent in the fabric of nature were thus grounded on divine agency” (Heimann 1978, 283)
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determined with respect to corresponding explanatorily-basic physical structures. The 'laws of
nature', in an expansive sense of the term that applies even to the non-exact sciences, are the
fields-of-effect of causally-basic forces. In modern empirical science, we use the structure of
basic physical forces' causal impact to 'picture' corresponding fields of objective phenomena.
5. Primordial Concepts of Force
5.1. Originary concepts of force presumably arose in relation to one or more kinds of
primordial experience. A brief foray into this prehistory, which is plausibly recapitulated to some
extent in the course of every young child's cognitive development, will help to further illuminate
and contextualize two crucial point about what force is (and is not). First: mere effort or
subjective exertion is not force, but rather ideal 'force'. True force has impact. Second: to claim
that all real things exert force is not to claim that everything is alive, or conscious. The claim that
reality is force is not mystical, un-scientific, or even implausible. It is just extremely unalienated:
childlike or 'primitive', in the best sense. It is obvious that all real things exert force.
Several classes of experience are here especially salient, as plausible candidates for the
kinds of primordial experience that are most intimately related to pre-scientific concepts of force:
(i) The experience of actively striving against external or internal sources of resistance—i.e.
the feeling of one's own strength, specifically as energy expended or effort exerted.157
Examples: working to lift or push a heavy object; struggling to continue to climb,
hunt, or fashion tools in spite of one's fear, hunger, or fatigue;
(ii) The experience of actually overcoming resistance or otherwise more conspicuously
manifesting one's strength—i.e. apprehension of oneself as impactful, or of one's own
controlling influence on things, as opposed to the experience of simply expending
energy or exerting effort in the face of potentially overwhelming resistance.
Examples: successfully pushing or lifting a heavy object; cracking open a nut; felling
a tree; taming an animal; leading one's fellow men; mastering one's weaker impulses;
157This first suggestion stems from Max Jammer, Jean Piaget, and Maine de Biran, as discussed below. The other 
three suggestions are my own, although they do seem to stand in interesting (if difficult to precisely specify) 
relation to some of Piaget's findings regarding 'child dynamism', again as discussed below.
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(iii) The experience of being likewise impacted or strongly influenced from without.
Examples: the feeling of the hard stone against which one falls; the current of the
river by which one is borne downstream; the fire by whose heat one is warmed or
burned; the blade or claw or thorn that rends one's flesh; the tactile pressure of
another person's touch; the passion by which one is overborne; the god or spirit by
which one is seized and compelled; the fate by which one is commanded;
(iv) The experience of similar relations of impact or strong influence among external things.
Examples: the tree is scorched and split by the lightning strike; the wildfire consumes
the dry undergrowth; the spear let fly pierces through the beast's ribs; the roof holds
fast against the pouring rain and the howling wind; the flood waters rise and swallow
the earth; the sun warms the rock and rouses the birds at dawn; the branches bend and
the grass bows under the wind's influence; the current draws the leaf downstream.
The first of these primordial experiences has been greatly overemphasized, in several other
analyses of our concepts of force. And this is plausibly due, in part, to idealistic confusion. The
idealist views reality subjectively, through the lens of rational will—as a Mind or Spirit. Effort is
will construed subjectively. Effort is merely subjective striving towards a goal that may not be
realized. Effort is will-power considered apart from its real impact. Effort is merely ideal 'force'.
More broadly, these four types of experience arguably range from more subjective, or
inwardly-focused, to more outwardly-focused o r objective. The first is an experience of one's
own internal feeling of effort, as a willful agent. Here force is the internal-striving-to-become-
external. The second is also an experience of one's own force, but now as one's own concrete
impact or controlling influence on external things. Here force is the internal-actually-
externalized. The third is an experience of force directed toward oneself. Here force is the
internal-determined-by-the-external. And the fourth is an experience of external force directed
toward an external object, or the external-determined-by-the-external. In theory, both the third
and fourth types of experience could be modeled either in terms of external 'effort' or external
'impact'. In reality, though, primordial apprehension of external force often plausibly involves
experience of external things' impact, not experience of (or even as of) their effort or exertion.
By contrast, Max Jammer identifies precisely the experience of effort or exertion, and
only this experience, as originary with respect to the concept of force:
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The idea of force, in the prescientific stage, was formed most probably by the
consciousness of our effort, spent in voluntary actions, as in the immediate
experience of moving our limbs, or by the consciousness of the feeling of a
resistance to be overcome in lifting a heavy object from the ground and carrying it
from one place to another.158
In other words, Jammer suggests that the concept of force was “taken originally in analogy to
human will power, spiritual influence, or muscular effort,” and only thereafter “projected into
inanimate objects as a power dwelling in physical things”:159
The injection of our personal experience into the external environment,
characteristic of the animistic stage in the intellectual growth of mankind, led to a
vast generalization of the concept of force: trees, rivers, clouds, and stones were
endowed with force and were regarded as centers of power. For what is active was
thought to be alive, and an object, animal or material, being alive, was conceived as
having within it the same sort of force that man recognized in himself.160
This basic genealogical narrative of prehistoric self-apprehension and anthropomorphic
projection is “generally accepted,” according to Jammer, although he makes no attempt to
substantiate this claim. Piaget, whom Jammer cites elsewhere nearby, but not with respect to this
specific point, suggests that “[t]he fact that the idea of force owes its existence to inner
experience seems to be beyond dispute.”161 Hence, perhaps Jammer's belief in the 'general
acceptance' of his own speculative genealogy stems from his direct reliance on Piaget's authority,
even if he does not explicitly say so.162 Notably, Piaget himself provides no real evidence for the
claim either, beyond arguing that children's conception of force constitutes “a sort of
158Jammer 1957, 17. “Clearly,” he adds, “'force,' 'strength,' 'effort,' 'power,' and 'work' were synonymous, as they 
still are today in ordinary unsophisticated language” (ibid.)
159Ibid., 7. Note that the experience of 'spiritual influence' in fact arguably goes beyond 'consciousness of our 
effort, spent in voluntary actions' or mere projections of this effort onto the external world—although admittedly,
the notion of a 'spirit' is ambiguous.
160Ibid., 17.
161Piaget 1930, 126.
162Not to press the point too much, but here it should be noted that Jammer also uses—without attribution—the 
phrase “a panpsychism in which every object is endowed with a force sui generis, unacquired and 
untransmissible” (Jammer 1957, 18). This is clearly taken from Piaget, who writes: “In a word, child dynamism 
is a sort of panpsychism or hylozoism.[…]In child dynamics[…] every substance is endowed with a sui generis 
force, unacquired and untransmissible, constituting the very essence of its activity” (Piaget 1930, 118). I mention
this only to provide further evidence that Jammer's claim to the 'general acceptance' of his view probably comes 
from Piaget, likewise without direct attribution.
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panpsychism or hylozoism,”163 and attributing the genealogical hypothesis in question to the
French philosopher Maine de Biran (1766-1824). According to Biran, “the idea of force can
originally only be taken from the consciousness of the subject who is making an effort; and even
when it is abstracted from the fact of consciousness, carried outside and altogether removed from
its natural seat, it still retains the traces of its origin.”164
5.2. But Jammer's account of the origin of the concept of force in a prehistoric 'injection
of our personal experience into the external environment' is misguided, for several reasons:
a. Primordial concepts of force do not have an 'internal' origin. Piaget's developmental
psychological research suggests that among children, at least, force “is first of all discovered in
things, before being felt in the self.”165 This might make Jammer's hypothesized primordial
'projection' of our own effortful striving onto external nature seem straightforwardly untenable.
(To his credit, Jammer acknowledges this apparent tension.166) Piaget's own conclusion is
somewhat more subtle, though. Namely, he accepts Biran's claim that the concept of force
originates in our 'internal' experience of effort and is only thereby 'transposed' or 'transferred'
onto external things. But he insists that this is true only from “the point of view of the objective
construction of the idea,” whereas from “the point of view of conscious experience” this order of
succession is reversed.167
Thus Piaget accepts that the concept of force has its 'objective' origin in the sense of our
own 'muscular effort', while denying that it is produced by induction from this or any other
'internal experience':
163Piaget 1930, 118.
164Quoted in Piaget 1930, 127.
165Piaget 1930, 126.
166“It is tempting to compare these generally accepted ideas on the origin of the concept of force with the 
psychological formation of this concept in the mind of the child. According to leading schools in modern 
psychology, the order of this concept-formation in the mind of the child is the exact reverse of the order outlined 
above. Whereas the idea of force, as explained above, is carried over from the inner experience and 
consciousness of the subject, the child seems to attribute forces to the objects of his external environment before 
he finds in himself the 'ego' as the cause of his own force” (Jammer 1957, 17-18). [Jammer immediately 
proceeds to quote a different but closely related passage from Piaget.]
167Piaget 1930, 126-7. More fully: “The fact that the idea of force owes its existence to inner experience seems to 
be beyond dispute. […] This being so, the thorny problem still remains as to how an inner experience could ever 
lead us to endow external things with forces, for it is far from proven that the child begins by noticing the 
existence of force in himself. It would seem rather that force, while it is the result of a transposition or 
transference, is first of all discovered in things, before being felt in the self. In other words, it may very well be 
that from the point of view of conscious experience, the order of succession in the various moments is the exact 
reverse of what is it from || the point of view of the objective construction of the idea.”
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[The idea of force] is the result of internal experience, but not of an experience
which is felt as internal from the first. Force, then, is not a fact given in direct
intuition since, coming as it does from the sense of effort, it is originally localized
in objects. Further, the idea of force cannot be the result of an induction, since
during the early stages, that is to say, during those which mark its zenith, there is
little or no boundary between the ego and the external world. For there can only be
induction from one term to another in so far as the terms are distinct. What, then, is
this reality due to the feeling of muscular effort and yet situated in external
objects? How are we to explain this objectification of a schema of organic origin,
without falling back upon the convenient but ineffectual ideas of 'projection', of
'introjection', or of 'ejection'?168 
Piaget's answer to these final questions is broadly Kantian—albeit psychologistic in a way that
some rigorous neo-Kantians would find objectionable169—and at least partially indebted to the
French idealist philosopher Léon Brunschvicg.170
According to Piaget, every thought is the product of both 'external contributions' (i.e.
“sensorial elements resulting from the pressure exercised on the organism by its immediate
surrounding”) and 'internal contributions' (i.e. “motor schemas which organize these sensorial
elements into bundles which we call perceptions, ideas, mental experiences”). But these external
and internal 'contributions' to thought are “completely undifferentiated from the point of view of
the subject's consciousness.” That is, while we continually “assimilate” external 'reality' by
means of internal 'motor schemas', nevertheless we cannot consciously apprehend these schemas.
Put differently: external sensory stimuli are always filtered and organized by means of internal
168Piaget 1930, 130.
169Lanier Anderson summarizes the salient schism within the broad category of 'neo-Kantianism': “[Kant] insisted 
that one great advantage of his transcendental idealism was to place limits on our knowledge of nature, and 
indeed on the law-described realm of nature itself, thereby opening up a separate space outside nature where 
normative practices of moral and cognitive judgment could flourish without threat of attack on materialistic or 
deterministic grounds.2 Neo-Kantian followers like Wilhelm Windelband (1907 [1884], esp. 278–354), noting 
that psychology belongs to the domain of natural law, extended Kant’s considerations into an explicit anti-
psychologistic program. At the same time, though, there is another side to the story. The central arguments from 
Kant’s own theory of cognition rely heavily on claims about mental acts of synthesis. Some later neo-Kantians, 
such as F. A. Lange (1902 [1873–5], II, 1–63, 408–31), gave these arguments a straightforwardly psychological 
construal, and as recent work by Patricia Kitcher (1990, 1995) and others has made apparent, they could find a 
good deal of textual support for doing so. In the end, therefore, one can very well wonder what the proper 
‘neoKantian’ stance toward psychologism should be. The case of psychologism thus exposes a split among neo-
Kantians, exemplified in the opposing stances of Windelband and Lange” (Anderson 2005, 288-9).
170Piaget cites Brunschvicg arguing, contra Biran, that “the 'I' is not a fact of experience that can be isolated, it is 
the condition of experience, and can only be reached by experience” (Piaget 1930, 129-130). It is unclear how 
much of Piaget's subsequent discussion is meant to be a paraphrase of Brunschvicg's position, as opposed to an 
original view.
82
cognitive processes; but we cannot directly 'see' or experience these cognitive processes
themselves; rather, we 'see' only the content of the conscious representations that these internal
processes produce. And the concept of force is fundamentally just one among many possible
such “schemas of assimilation” whereby we synthesize the raw sensory 'matter' of experience.
Specifically, the force-schema is one “built up by the accumulated muscular experiences of the
subject, i.e. by the residue of all those of his movements that have been accompanied by a sense
of effort.” From an 'objective' point of view, then, the concept of force has its origin in internal
experience: it is causally grounded in our sense of 'muscular effort'. From a phenomenological
point of view, though, our first conscious experience of force is not in awareness of our own
effort, but rather in apprehending external things that we have represented—i.e. actively
synthesized as objects for ourselves—in part by means of this internally-derived but pre-
conscious force-schema.171
 Of course, it is possible that the concept of force has different 'objective' or 'conscious'
origins for prescientific man than it does for present-day children. Jammer indeed appeals to this
possibility: “[w]hereas the idea of force, as explained above, is carried over from the inner
experience and consciousness of the subject, the child seems to attribute forces to the objects of
his external environment before he finds in himself the 'ego' as the cause of his own force.”172
But this seems fairly unlikely, in fact, especially by comparison to the possibility that Jammer
simply conflates the 'point of view of the objective construction of the idea' and the 'point of
view of conscious experience'.
Regardless, even Piaget's more nuanced view is wrong. For even from the 'objective'
point of view, the concept of force plausibly originates just as much—if not more—in the
experience of external objects. To see this, we must further examine the relationship between
force and effort.
b. Primordial concepts of force are not essentially related to effort. Contra Piaget's sense
of what is 'beyond dispute', his own data seem to show that there is not a basic 'objective' link
between force and effort. Piaget finds that, when children are given the names of various objects
and asked about each in turn whether it is forceful or strong, and then to explain why, their




this complexity: “the child defines material force almost exactly as he defines life;”173 “there is
no movement, however simple, that [for the child] does not call for the intervention of special
forces[...which are] alive (i.e. not only teleological, but efficient through the very fact of their
being teleological);”174 “[i]n a word, child dynamism is a sort of panpsychism or hylozoism,”175
such that for children the world is “filled and animated with intentions,” and “the true cause of a
phenomenon is the moral reason for its happening.”176 Notwithstanding these summary
conclusions, Piaget's data in fact suggest that 'child dynamism' is not accurately characterized 'in
a word' as a form of panpsychism or hylozoism. 
According to the type of answer that Piaget himself acknowledges is “by far the most
common,” force is defined by children as “activity in general and useful activity in particular.”177
Thus:
(Tié, 10 years old) 'Has the sun got force?—Yes, because it gives light.—And
fire?—Yes, because it burns.—And a stick?—Yes, because it can keep a house
up.—And glass?—Yes, because it can cut.—And trees?—Yes, because they
make the fruit grow.—[...]Has grass got any force?—Yes, because it is useful.—
And a spoon?—Yes, because it is used for all sorts of things.—[...]Have clouds
got strength?—No, because they do nothing.—And rain?—Yes, because it
makes the seed go into the earth.'
(Krug, 6 years old) 'Are flowers strong?—No, they are only pretty, but they
can't do anything.—Is a seed strong?—Yes, because it can make things grow for
us.'178
Despite Piaget's emphasis on the seeming anthropocentrism of these children's responses,179 it is
actually not at all clear that they view 'usefulness' in terms of anything like pragmatic or
instrumental value, rather than simply as being able to 'do something'. Does Tié see fire's
burning or glass's cutting as end-directed or pragmatically valuable? Or is he simply saying that
fire does something insofar as it burns, and glass insofar as it cuts? Likewise, when he says that







179“Note to what an extent it is only from our point of view that things are alive and have force [in this sense of 
'activity in general and useful activity in particular']” (Piaget 1930, 123).
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which he insists 'do nothing'? Note that Krug's responses indirectly motivate the latter
interpretation: he recognizes that flowers are pretty, and hence perhaps that they provide him
with a nice experience, yet he still insists that they 'can't do anything'.
In short, it is far from obviously a kind of 'panpsychism' or 'hylozoism', or even a more
banal form of anthropocentrism, to experience many or all things as loci of activity. Again: is the
sun's activity of giving light, or the fire's burning, or the glass's cutting, or the tree's making fruit
grow, intentional or even instrumentally valuable, according to Tié? Perhaps—and admittedly,
of course, children often impute conscious purposes or final causes to natural phenomena where
adults do not. But also perhaps not. Indeed, the answer seems somewhat underdetermined by
Piaget's data. That said, it seems plausible that young children have a basic notion of force as
activity or 'doing something', which in various contexts they elaborate or articulate in
'panpsychic' or 'hylozoic' fashion, yet nevertheless that panpsychism or hylozoism is not a truly
fundamental feature of 'child dynamism'. When children attribute life or intention to inanimate
objects, in other words, this can often plausibly be understood as their way of articulating a
deeper sense that these objects do something. The implicit contrast here is not really things that
are non-conscious or non-living, but rather things that are inert. Here it should also be noted that,
according to Piaget's findings in another study, children's first conception of consciousness is one
whereby “everything that is in any way active is conscious.”180 (“The child in this stage certainly
never says that everything is conscious. He simply says that any object may be the seat of
consciousness at a given moment, that is to say when the object displays a particular measure of
activity or is the seat of some action. Thus a stone may feel nothing, but if it is moved, it will feel
it.”181) So, too, in the first stage of children's conception of life, “everything is regarded as living
which has activity or a function or a use of any sort.”182 Hence even if child dynamism is 'a sort
of panpsychism or hylozoism,' this would arguably be so only with respect to conceptions of
consciousness or life according to which these phenomena, too, basically just involve activity.
Children's indiscriminate attribution of intentionality to inanimate objects does plausibly
amount to a kind of primordial apprehension of their own capacity for intentional action, at least
to a degree. But this does not entail that intentional action, let alone their own intentional action,





the 'objective' order of succession is evidently the reverse. Children have a primordial
understanding of force as doing something, which is objectively grounded—if it is not simply
innate—in pre-conscious impressions of either external loci of impersonal activity or their own
purely instinctual behavior and brute causal impact on things. Children then use this primordial
understanding of force as activity or 'doing something' to make sense of their own nascent
capacity for intentional action, self-movement, or effort. The resultant inchoate sense of self-
understanding is in turn immediately projected, prior to robust ego-formation, back onto the loci
of essentially-impersonal activity from which it objectively derives. This, then, is the
developmental stage at which Piaget's neo-Kantian account of the cognitive synthesis of external
reality by means of a pre-conscious 'force-schema' is plausible. For here we do seem to find an
'objective' succession from internal experiences of effort to the representation of external objects,
even as the child first consciously confronts force in external phenomena. But my point is that
Piaget's account evidently neglects a prior developmental stage, wherein inchoate 'inner
experiences' of effort or innervation183 must be actively related to a pre-existing force-schema
that encodes a distinct pre-conscious understanding of force, simply as activity or generically
doing something. The latter is the truly primordial force-schema, whereas Piaget describes a
merely secondary or derivative one. As the ego consolidates, finally, solidifying the distinction
between 'internal' and 'external' experience, children simply come to learn that many external
forces are not 'doing something' in exactly the same way that they themselves are when they
183The degree to which the feeling of effort is afferent as opposed to efferent is contested. (Roughly speaking, 
afferent neurons carry sensory stimuli from perceptual organs 'inward' to the central nervous system; efferent 
neurons carry signals like motor commands 'outward' from the central nervous system to effector organs like 
muscles.) Insofar as effort is associated with feelings of innervation, it is something like the efferent sensation of 
supplying energy to our own muscle fibers (etc.), i.e. the feeling of our own motor command. Proske (2005, 780)
notes that “[t]he dominant view in the 19th century was that our kinesthetic sense is a consequence of the effort 
we make to move and arises within the central nervous system, providing us with a 'sensation of innervation'” 
(the internal quotation is from Hermann von Helmholtz).
Marcora (2009) in turn argues that this 19th-century view is essentially correct. By contrast, he notes that 
according to various currently popular physiological models, “perceived exertion results from the complex 
integration of different inputs to the central nervous system (CNS),” including “afferent feedback from the 
peripheral organs most active during aerobic exercise (i.e., skeletal muscles, heart, and lungs) and other 
interoceptors, with or without additional inputs from the CNS itself, such as knowledge of the exercise task 
endpoint.” But Marcora reviews evidence suggesting that “perception of effort during dynamic whole body 
exercise is independent of afferent feedback from small-diameter muscle afferents, heart, and lungs.” Hence he 
claims that the sense of effort is in fact a sensation of innervation: “the sense of effort is centrally generated by 
forwarding neural signals, termed corollary discharges or efference copies, from motor to sensory areas of the 
cerebral cortex” (2009, 2060). Somewhat more intuitively: according to Marcora, the sense of effort is not 
produced by afferent feedback from our muscles—thus differentiating effort from feelings of fatigue, stress, 
tension, etc.—but rather by 'feeling' the motor commands issuing from our own brains, insofar as a secondary 
copy of these motor signals is routed directly to sensory areas of the cerebral cortex.
86
exert effort or act intentionally.
In sum, to the extent that children most commonly understand force simply in terms of
activity, their idea of force is likely not grounded either phenomenologically or 'objectively' in
feelings of effort. Rather, this primordial concept of force as activity is either a purely innate
category of understanding, or else is objectively grounded in young children's pre-conscious
exposure to external things impersonally 'doing something' or to their own purely instinctual
behavior and brute causal impact on their environment, as opposed to self-awareness or 'inner
experience' in any anthropomorphic sense.
c. Besides activity, primordial force is tied most directly to movement and to resistance.
Piaget's data also echo the intuitive association between force and movement. He finds that,
according to the second most common type of response, children understand force in terms of the
“capacity for movement.”184 (Likewise, he finds that in the second stage of temporal
development in children's conception of life, it is “defined by movement, all movement being
regarded as in a certain degree spontaneous.”185 So, too, in the second stage of children's
conception of consciousness, it is “henceforth restricted to things that can move, that is to say no
longer to objects, which can for the moment become the seat of a particular movement, but to
those ordinarily in motion or whose special function is to be in motion.”186) One qualifying point
might seem incidental, but will prove increasingly important as we turn to examine the role of
force in modern physical theory: it is not actually clear from Piaget's data that children
understand force as the capacity for movement, rather than something more like movement itself,
and some responses in fact clearly indicate the latter conception. Thus Rö (6 years old):
Is an aeroplane strong?—Rather! It goes fast.—Is an aeroplane standing still,
strong?—No, because it hasn't got a start (élans) yet.—What does that mean?—
That it doesn't go very fast.—What do you mean by having a start?—When you
walk fast.—Have you got a start?—Yes, when I'm running.—What does it do?—It
goes fast.—What is it like? Have you got one now?—No. I make it happen myself.
184Piaget 1930, 121-2. 
185Piaget 1929, 194-5. In the third stage, “the child distinguishes spontaneous movement from movement imposed 
by an outside agent and life is identified with the former;” and in the fourth stage: “life is restricted wither to 
animals or to animals and plants” (Piaget 1929, 195).
186Piaget 1929, 179. Thus in this 2nd stage, “the sun and moon, the stars, clouds, rivers, the wind, carts, fire, etc., are
all regarded as conscious,” while things like benches, walls, stones, and flowers are not (ibid., 179-180). In the 
third stage, consciousness is associated with self-movement (“Things that can move of their own accord are 
conscious” (Piaget 1929, 182); in the fourth stage, consciousness is restricted to animals (ibid., 185 ff.).
87
—How?—When I run.—How do you do it?—I give myself a start.—[...]187
The characteristic “most frequently referred to after activity and movement” in Piaget's
test subjects, finally (for our purposes), is resistance: “those things are strong, have force, which
resist, which do not break.”188 Here again, we find among children a loose but nevertheless
recognizable precursor to distinctively physical notions of force—now inertial force, in
Newtonian terms, as opposed to impressed force understood as the cause or explanatory ground
of accelerative deviations from inertial motion. Interestingly, Piaget notes that force in this last
sense of resistance is “not thought of by the child as passive;” rather, it is “a real activity, closely
akin to life itself.”189 So, for instance, one child insists that the moon has force “because it
couldn't stay up in the air if it hadn't any.”190 In short, as Piaget concludes, children seems to
understand force as resistance in terms of something like an active power of self-preservation.
5.3. Thus, insofar as children understand force in terms of activity or doing something,
'child dynamism' is not in fact 'a sort of panpsychism or hylozoism'—at least not in any
ridiculous, or even implausible, sense. Piaget is incorrect. This argument also extends to
secondary conceptions of force in terms of movement and resistance, at least to an extent. Force
becomes more overtly anthropomorphic or hylozoic insofar as it is associated with, not just
movement, but self-movement—or not just resistance, but a drive to self-preservation. But these
more anthropomorphic or hylozoic notions of force are in fact derivative, both conceptually and
psychologically.
Children and 'prescientific' man alike clearly represent the world in many ways which
modern man—'enlightened' and scientifically literate as he is—knows are factually mistaken.
Whether this is actually to the advantage of adulthood or of modernity depends in large part on
the question of the value of bare truth or factual knowledge. But to their own credit, regardless,
children and prescientific man clearly both understand something that modern scientific man
seems unable to grasp, as viscerally or as deeply—a dictum basic to pagan consciousness and






prescientific man. 'Everything is force,' says Nietzsche.191 'Yes,' says a more truly modern
scientific philosophy of power. Yes, says our own inhumanism. Everything is force.
Force is not effort. Only the subjective or idealistic concept of force stems from the
feeling of one's own effortful exertion in willfully striving against resistance. Effort is merely
ideal 'force': subjective, unreal 'force'. Rocks do not exert effort. Hurricanes do not exert effort.
Nor do celestial bodies, or electrons. Rather, as true loci of force, they have real effect. True
force has real external effect, not internal affect. True force has objective impact. Force is the
objective exercise of power.
6. Force as the Underlying Ground of Life as Nietzschean 'Self-Overcoming'
Even the body within which individuals treat each other as equals[…],
if it is a living and not a dying body, has to do to other bodies what the
individuals within it refrain from doing to each other: it will have to
be an incarnate will to power, it will strive to grow, spread, seize,
become predominant[…] because it is living and because life simply
is will to power. 
-Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §259 
6.1. How does force, as the objective exercise of power, relate to will to power?
Nietzschean will to power is life construed as a drive to self-overcoming, or amoral and self-
expansive vital force. Force itself is metaphysically and ontologically prior to Nietzschean will to
power, therefore. Life is just one mode of force. Vital force is just a special case of force.
Nietzsche's theory of will to power is grounded in a subtle misunderstanding, or a kind of
half-truth. Namely: Force as such has real impact. Hence, all force as such does indeed 'spread
out' or 'extend' beyond itself, in the sense that its real impact or objective field of effect can be
understood as an 'external territory' into which force as such 'grows' or 'expands'. Thus a force's
real impact is its objective externalization or extension. But force is not a drive to impact; force
does not strive or aim towards its own impact. This is the crux of Nietzsche's mistake, then, or
the basic source of his atavistic Romanticism and excessive organicism. Force is not a will to
impact. Force just has impact. Force as such does 'expand' or 'grow', insofar as it renders itself
objective by producing real impact. But force does not try to produce its own impact, or will its
191KSA 10:1[3] [1882].
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own impact into being. Rather, force is just the source or ground of impact.
This misunderstanding also leads Nietzsche to subtly mischaracterize life, arguably,
although I take this point to be far more debatable. Life is not a drive to self-overcoming or the
expansion of power, as Nietzsche claims. Life does not strive or aim towards self-overcoming.
Rather, life as such just is self-overcoming. Life just does overcome itself. Life does not strive or
aim towards the expansion of its own power. Life just does expand its own power. Thus life is
not will to power, or a drive to increasing force. Life is force that just does grow stronger due to
its own impact, without intending to do so. Life's impact rebounds back upon it, and increases its
own strength or intensity. Life is self-amplifying force.
Vital force, thus construed, has a creative aspect. But it is also destructive. Every act of
self-amplification is also an act of self-destruction. Nietzsche understands this point quite well.
He insists, for example, that it is the “law of life,” or the “law of the necessity of 'self-
overcoming' in the nature of life,” that “[a]ll great things bring about their own destruction
through an act of self-overcoming” (G M III:27). For “[t]o have purposes, aims, intentions,
willing in general, is the same thing as willing to be stronger, willing to grow” (KSA 13:11[96]).
According to Nietzsche, that is, every drive is a drive to self-development, insofar as it is an
impulse to grow stronger and in so doing to surpass the old, weaker version of oneself. 
But life is not destructive just in the mode of creative self-surpassing. Life also manifests
as organic decay and degeneration, as senescence and hence even as dying and as death. Some
organic decline is related to reproduction, of course—to the depletion of vital force that gives
rise to new life, hence still to self-overcoming and creative self-surpassing. But not all organic
decay corresponds directly to reproduction and the growth of new life. Life is genuinely also
self-depleting force, as well as self-amplifying force. Life is organic growth and decay alike. Life
is agonistic interplay between self-amplifying and self-depleting force, not just their 'dialectical'
interrelation. Life is force in a positive feedback loop, force in unstable equilibrium.
So understood, life is directly opposed to merely equilibrating or self-regulating force,
i.e. force in the mode of a negative feedback loop or Spinozistic conatus. (Spinoza [Ethics III
P.6] claims that “[e]ach thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being;”
this self-preservative striving is conatus.) This opposition, between forces in positive and
negative feedback loops, is closely related to an opposition that Nietzsche draws between drives
to self-overcoming and to mere self-preservation. But my account is more accurate as well as
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more fundamental, insofar as life or vital force is just one among many real modes of force.
6.2. Again, Nietzsche views life as essentially characterized by a drive to continual self-
overcoming: life “must overcome itself again and again,” and “wants to climb and to overcome
itself climbing” (Z II: “On the Tarantulas”). Thus “every living thing does everything it can not
to preserve itself but to become more” (WP 688 / KSA 13:14[121]), and so too at a finer scale
“[w]hat every smallest part of a living organism wants, is an increase of power” (WP 702 / KSA
13:14[174]).192 The drive of all life towards self-overcoming in turn grounds the fundamentally
tragic character of existence, for Nietzsche: it is the “law of life,” or the “law of the necessity of
'self-overcoming' in the nature of life,” that “[a]ll great things bring about their own destruction
through an act of self-overcoming” (GM III:27).
This essential drive of life to self-overcoming is moreover identical to the Nietzschean
'will to power'. Here note first that Nietzsche often presents will to power as the essential
character or basic principle of (at least)193 life in general. (While some commentators interpret
Nietzsche as attributing a will to power only to things that are alive in an intuitive sense, he at
times apparently endorses a more totalizing form of organicism. Recall, for instance: “[b]eing—
we have no idea of it apart from the idea of 'living.'—How can anything dead 'be'?” (WP 582))194
Hence life, the “really fundamental instinct” of which “aims at the expansion of power” (GS
349), is “the instinct for growth, for durability, for an accumulation of forces, for power” (A 6).
Similarly, the “will of life” is “bent upon power” (GM II:11) and so itself is the will to power
(GS 349). In short, will to power is “the essence of life” (GM II:12), and in this sense “life itself
simply is will to power” (BGE 259).195 The fact that Nietzsche thus presents life as essentially
characterized both by a drive to self-overcoming and a will to power in turn suggests that the will
to power just is a drive to self-overcoming.196 That is, life's essential drive to 'climb and to
192Here consider also: “Even the body within which individuals treat each other as equals[...]if it is a living and not 
a dying body, has to do to other bodies what the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other: it will 
have to be an incarnate will to power, it will strive to grow, spread, seize, become predominant[...]because it is 
living and because life simply is will to power” (BGE 259); “For fundamentally it is the same active force that is 
at work on a grander scale in those artists of violence and organizers who build states, and that here, internally, 
on a smaller and pettier scale, directed backward[...]creates for itself a bad conscience and builds negative 
ideals” (GM II:18).
193Occasionally, Nietzsche suggests that the will to power is literally everywhere. E.g. “[L]ife is merely a special 
case of the will to power” (KSA 13:14[121])). See Richardson, Nietzsche's System, 18 n.4 for further examples.
194Here I echo Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche as an organicist.
195Similarly: “Only where there is life is there also will: not will to life but—thus I teach you—will to power” (Z II:
“On Self-Overcoming); “life itself is will to power” (BGE 13); “There is nothing to life that has value, except the
degree of power—assuming that life itself is the will to power” (KSA 12:5[71].10).
196Walter Kaufmann, John Richardson, and Robert Pippin also emphasize the connection between will to power 
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overcome itself climbing' plausibly just is the “[...]will to power in the organic process by virtue
of which dominant, shaping, commanding forces continually extend the bounds of their power
and continually simplify within these bounds” (WP 644 / KSA 12:7[9]).
When Nietzsche characterizes the theoretical activity of “genuine philosophers” in terms
of “spirit's power to appropriate the foreign” and its drive to “growth[...]or, more precisely, the
feeling of growth, the feeling of increased power,”197 he is thus claiming that 'genuine
philosophy' is expressive of the drive to self-overcoming or will to power that he identifies as the
essential principle of life. The drive to knowledge of 'genuine philosophers' is for Nietzsche
essentially of a kind with the drive to “primitive nourishment” whereby the protoplasm strives to
“overcome, appropriate, assimilate” that which it encounters and thereby to “become stronger”
(WP 702 / KSA 13:14[174]).
The essential drive of life to self-overcoming is helpfully contrasted, in particular, against
a conservative drive to self-preservation or security. Here explicitly positioning himself against
modern evolutionary theory as he understands it, Nietzsche claims that the Darwinian “struggle
for existence” exists only “as an exception,” for “the total appearance of life is not the extremity,
not starvation, but rather riches, profusion, even absurd squandering—and where there is
struggle, it is a struggle for power” (TI “Anti-Darwin”). Furthermore, the result of this struggle
for existence, where in exceptional cases it does occur, is “unfortunately the opposite of what
Darwin's school desires, and of what one might perhaps desire with them—namely, in favor of
the strong, the privileged, the fortunate exceptions”: 
The species do not grow in perfection: the weak prevail over the strong again
and again, for they are the great majority—and they are also more intelligent.
Darwin forgot the spirit (that is English!); the weak have more spirit. One
must need spirit to acquire spirit; one loses it when one no longer needs it.
Whoever has strength dispenses with the spirit ('Let it go!' they think in
Germany today; 'the Reich must still remain to us.'). It will be noted that by
'spirit' I mean care, patience, cunning, simulation, great self-control, and
everything that is mimicry (the latter includes a great deal of so-called
virtue). (TI “Anti-Darwin”)198
and self-overcoming, but their interpretations of self-overcoming vary, and each differs from my own . See 
Pippin, Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy, ch. 6; Kaufmann, Nietzsche, 211 ff.; Richardson, 
Nietzsche's New Darwinism, 62-64; and Richardson, Nietzsche's System, 26-27.
197Beyond Good and Evil sec. 230.
198Note that Nietzsche is obviously not simply critical of 'intelligence' or 'spirit' in this passage, even though he 
associates them directly with 'weakness'. His appeal to the anti-intellectual nationalism of 'the Reich' is obviously
intended at least ambivalently, if not largely critically. (On the other hand, however, it should be noted that 
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Contra the attribution of explanatory priority to reproductive fitness in Darwinian biological
theory, and likewise contra the Spinozistic doctrine of conatus,199 Nietzsche insists that life
fundamentally strives towards increasing power—towards continual growth and the overcoming
of ever-greater amounts of resistance. The 'instinct for self-preservation' is merely a “superfluous
teleological principle[],” for “[a] living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength—life itself
is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results” (BGE
13). In other words, the struggle for existence is a derivative phenomenon arising only where
life's self-expansive impulse is denied in confrontation with a superior power, to which the lesser
can only react or adapt: the drive to self-preservation is the drive to self-overcoming as it
manifests in the comparatively weak. 
The aforementioned “primitive nourishment” is here illustrative. Nietzsche understands
primitive nourishment as a drive to “overcome, appropriate, assimilate” what one encounters and
thereby to “become stronger” (WP 702 / KSA 13:14[174]). Hence, on his view nourishment is
“only derivative” from an original “desire to incorporate everything” (WP 657 / KSA 12:5[64]),
or “only a consequence of insatiable appropriation, of the will to power” (W P 660 / KSA
12:2[76]). 'Hunger' construed as a mere “desire for self-preservation” or “replacing a loss” is in
turn still more derivative, a mere “specialized and later form” of a ruling drive (WP 651 / KSA
13:11[121]) that is displayed only in “complicated organisms” in which “the will to power has
learned to take other roads to its satisfaction,” and so for which the “need to appropriate [is]
reduced to hunger, to the need to replace what has been lost” (WP 652 / KSA 13:14[174]).
In short, to 'succeed' in the Darwinian struggle for existence is to enact a degenerate
condition of life. Vitality is not a talent for self-preservation rooted in adaptiveness, but rather
the drive of all great things to seek out and overcome worthy opponents, to grow by striving
against resistance and thereby to 'bring about their own destruction through an act of self-
Nietzsche's characterization of German nationalism here is far less one-sidedly critical than in many other 
contexts...) And his attitude towards characteristics like 'great self-control' is obviously not simply negative or 
critical. A plausible interpretation is that Nietzsche is deeply ambivalent about intelligence and spirit, for the 
general sorts of reasons that I have been elaborating at length. In this passage, he simply adds—speculatively but
not entirely implausibly—that 'intelligence' and 'spirit' both originate in comparative weakness. Note that this is 
consistent with intelligence and spirit sometimes being genuine and genuinely affirmable manifestations of the 
will to power. So, too, it is consistent with the strong often being wrong to dismiss intelligence out of hand—and
moreover weak insofar as they do so. The bowdlerizing interpretive move, then, would be to infer that Nietzsche 
takes 'intelligence' or 'spirit' to be straightforwardly better than primitive strength. That is humanist dreck, 
though. And it is dubious as Nietzsche interpretation, given the other textual evidence presented here.
199“Each thing, as for as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being” (Spinoza Ethics III P.6).
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overcoming' (G M III:27). The Nietzschean drive to self-overcoming is a fundamentally anti-
conservative impulse towards 'richness, profusion, even absurd squandering'. (“Tell me: how did
gold attain the highest value? Because it is uncommon and useless and gleaming and gentle in its
splendor; it always gives itself[...]Uncommon is the highest virtue and useless; it is gleaming and
gentle in its splendor: a gift-giving virtue is the highest virtue” [Z “On the Gift-Giving Virtue”
1].) The Nietzschean drive to self-overcoming aims not at security or stability, but at the
expansion of power.
Nietzsche does occasionally seem to treat power itself as basic, as when he suggests that
“[w]hat determines rank, sets of rank, is only quanta of power, and nothing else” (WP 855). (A
more ambiguous case: “What is the objective measure of value? Solely the quantum of enhanced
and organized power” (W P 674).) But the interpretive significance of such claims is
compromised by his failure to systematically distinguish between 'power' and 'will to power'.
Relatedly, again, I claim that the expansion of power is not as fundamental as Nietzsche
takes it to be. On my view, life or vital force is indeed self-amplifying force (as well as self-
depleting force). But vital force is not the only, or the most important, mode of force.
Fundamentally, force is just the ground or real source of objective impact. Force hence 'grows' or
'expands' its sphere of influence, in the sense that force taken together with its real impact is
'bigger' than force viewed in itself. Force as such 'expands' onto its objects by impacting them.
But not all force is self-amplifying, i.e. force that becomes stronger over time in a positive
feedback loop. Not all force is vital force, that is. And force in general does not 'strive' towards
or 'will' its own impact. Force just has impact, without 'trying' to do so. Force is the objectively
impactful exercise of power. Force is not 'will to power'. And life is not 'will to power'. Life is
self-amplifying force—one among many possible modes of force.
6.3. Several commentators have suggested that the will to power is something like a
second-order drive, or more broadly that the theory of will to power concerns not what particular
'first-order' drives aim at but rather how they aim at their ends. Thus one might first observe that
Nietzsche characterizes human beings as complexes of warring drives [Triebe]—drives to sex,200
200BGE 189; TI “Skirmishes” 39; KSA 10:24[31]
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appropriation,201 nourishment,202 procreation,203 truth,204 artistic creation,205 beauty,206
knowledge,207 intellectual play,208 care for others,209 revenge,210 punishment,211 worship,212
praise,213 blame,214 and so on, which encounter each other agonistically.215 One might then note
Nietzsche's claims to the effect that all such first-order drives strive “to be master” of “all the
other drives” (BGE 6), and infer that Nietzsche's theory of will to power refers to this common
agonistic character of first-order drives possessing distinct aims, and not to power as these
drives' common underlying aim. 
Thus John Richardson argues that while Nietzsche makes “occasional attempts to explain
the content of the diverse drives as having evolved[...]out of an undifferentiated will to power,”
he “much more common[ly]” appeals to will to power to explain, e.g., not why the sex drive
aims at sex, but rather how the sex drive “tries to raise to a higher level” its “preexisting pattern
of effort,” or the “distinctive character[]” that it “already ha[s]”.216 In other words, on
Richardson's view “[a] drive finds itself already pursuing given ends through a given project,”
and “that it wills power explains not why it has this project but how it now tries to improve what
it has.”217 And in a broadly similar vein, Bernard Reginster (building upon Maudemarie Clark's
work)218 proposes that will to power is a second-order “desire for the overcoming of resistance in
the pursuit of some determinate first-order desire [for something other than power].”219 On
Reginster's model as Richardson's, therefore, “[t]he will to power […] is not the ultimate
201TI “Skirmishes” 39; GS 118
202KSA 13:11[76]. More precisely, hunger [des Hungers] is here referred to as one of 'our drives' [unsrer Triebe].
203TI “Skirmishes” 22
204Kj (GS 110; KSA 12:9[91])
205BT 3. So too the Apollonian and Dionysian are “two interwoven artistic impulses [Kunsttriebe]” (BT 12).
206BT 4.
207BT 17; BGE 6; D 45
208GS 110.
209D 143
210GS 49; KSA 10:24[31]




215Consider in this context D 109, D 119, GS 110, KSA 10:8[23]. For illuminating discussions of Nietzsche's theory
of drives, see Katsafanas, “Philosophical Psychology” and “Value, Affect, Drive.”
216John Richardson, Nietzsche's System, 22-3. Bernard Reginster and Paul Katsafanas agree with Richardson's 
assessment (ibid., 22-24) that will to power concerns how drives want, not what they want—see Reginster, The 
Affirmation of Life, 129; Katsafanas, “Philosophical Psychology,” 304.
217Richardson, Nietzsche's System, 23.
218Clark interprets the will to power as a “second-order desire for the ability to satisfy one's other, or first-order, 
desires” (Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, 211).
219 Reginster, The Affirmation of Life, 132.
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motivation of every drive, the final end for the sake of which it pursues its specific end.”220 
This interpretive strategy renders Nietzsche's metaphysics of will to power more
immediately palatable—or at least less radical—insofar as it suggests that he does not
understand the nature of knowledge, beauty, nourishment, sex, care for others, and the many
other aims of the drives he posits directly in terms of power. But this in turn encourages a false
dichotomization of Nietzschean drives' particularized ends or 'distinctive characters' and the
manner in which these ends are pursued or developed. The distinction between 'what' drives aim
at and 'how' they do so is not authentically Nietzschean, and in fact Nietzsche is precisely
concerned to demonstrate their essential identity. That is, it is integral to Nietzsche's view that
sexual activity, eating, knowing, artistic creation, caring for others, etc. can (he thinks) be shown
to essentially involve the expression of power.
For example, Nietzsche recognizes that eating something is a way of incorporating it into
oneself (KSA 12:5[64]), of appropriating another thing (KSA 12:2[76]) and thereby increasing
one's own strength. In this light, though, power characterizes not only 'how' the drive to
nourishment pursues its aim, but also 'what' this aim really amounts to. Similarly, Nietzsche
maintains that sexual desire “betrays itself most clearly as a lust for possession: the lover desires
unconditional and sole possession of the person for whom he longs; he desires equally
unconditional power over the soul and over the body of the beloved; he alone wants to be loved
and desires to live and rule in the other soul as supreme and supremely desirable” (GS 14).221
Although this passage perhaps fails to present a compelling vision of healthy human sexuality, it
certainly suggests that Nietzsche does not conceive of the aim of sexual desire as neatly
separable from that of the will to power or drive to self-overcoming. Rather, he is evidently
saying that desiring someone sexually is one particular way of manifesting a drive to increasing
power. The underlying drive invoked here is apparently meant to have explanatory primacy over
the corresponding high-level drive in at least two (not necessarily distinct) senses. First, one
experiences sexual desire because one wills power, in much the same way that a person might
bite his nails because he has an oral fixation.222 Second, the sexual drive is essentially a drive to
220 Reginster, The Affirmation of Life, 129 (Reginster is here describing Richardson's view, but evidently endorses 
this aspect of it).
221See also KSA 12:7[9], KSA 12:5[64], KSA 12:2[76], WP 732, WP 776.
222 One could claim that a Nietzschean underlying drive is necessary if not sufficient for the existence of 
corresponding higher-level drives (in this connection see Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, 81-2), but 'necessary' 
might be too strong.
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power, whereas will to power is not essentially a sexual drive—sexual libido is an expression of
will to power, but not vice versa. This asymmetry again maps onto the case of the oral fixation:
intuitively, the nail-biting is an expression of the oral fixation, but not vice versa.223 
Hence despite Richardson's suggestion that for Nietzsche higher-level drives “already
hav[e] distinctive characters of their own, about which they will power,” and therefore that “to
be a will to power, [a higher-level drive] must already want something other than power,”224 a
person need not already want something other than to 'appropriate the foreign' in order to want
'to assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the manifold, and to overlook or repulse whatever is
totally contradictory,' and need not already want something other than 'to become stronger' in
order to want to nourish herself. This is no more mysterious than the fact that a person needn't
already want something other than to put things in his mouth in order to want to chew on a pen.
In short, it is misleading to present will to power as capable of manifesting only given a distinct
drive or desire, since on Nietzsche's view the will to power is an underlying drive that generates
such putatively 'first-order' drives as determinations or “specializ[ations]” of itself.225
 The mistake underlying interpretations of will to power as concerning 'how' drives pursue
their aims but not 'what' these aims are can be further illuminated in the context of Reginster's
insistence that “[s]omething constitutes a resistance only in relation to a determinate end one
desires to realize,” and in particular in relation to the determinate end of a “desire for something
else than power.”226 This claim is misguided even though Reginster's motivation is intuitive—
namely, he observes that it seems not to make sense to talk about a player overcoming resistance
in defeating an opponent (e.g.) unless she has a desire to win, distinct from any second-order
desire to overcome resistance in so doing.227 In fact, though, a competitor need not have such a
neatly distinct desire to win. For her fully general drive to overcome resistance may itself find
expression in her forming a desire to defeat a given opponent, insofar as she can anticipate the
resistance she will face in the process. In this case, her desire to win just is an expression of her
drive to overcome (increasing amounts of) resistance. Naturally, her desire to defeat her
opponent in competition is just one of many possible expressions of her general drive to
overcome resistance, and in this sense her desire to win is distinct from her general drive to
223Nietzsche adopts an essentializing attitude towards valuations as well as high-level drives: “[a]ll valuations are 
only consequences and narrow perspectives in the service of this one will [to power]” (KSA 13:11[96]).
224 Richardson, Nietzsche's System, 23.
225Schacht (Nietzsche, 230) makes a similar suggestion.
226Reginster, The Affirmation Life, 132.
227 The example is Reginster's (The Affirmation of Life, 132).
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overcome resistance. But the essential aim of the competitor's desire to win is not distinct from
the aim of her general drive to overcome resistance: both aim essentially at overcoming
resistance. Similarly, the drive to bite one's nails is not an oral fixation, but perhaps in certain
cases this drive to nail-biting is essentially an expression of an oral fixation, in that the essential
aim of this drive to nail-biting is, like that of the oral fixation, to put something in one's mouth.
More generally, on Nietzsche's view higher-level drives are distinct from corresponding
underlying drives like the will to power, will to truth, and will to nothingness; but the essential
aims of higher-level drives just are those of corresponding underlying drives. Hence higher-level
drives are inessentially distinct from, but essentially identical to, the will to power or universal
drive to self-overcoming. All 'first-order' drives manifest a will to power to the extent that they
strive 'to be master' of 'all the other drives', as commentators like Richardson and Reginster
stress. But Nietzsche evidently views 'power' as an apt description of what first-order drives in
general 'aim' at, not just how they do so.
6.4. Nietzsche's ontology can thus be construed as follows: at the level of fundamental
ontology—i.e. what is 'real', rather than simply what exists—there is only a total will to power
that is identical to an all-encompassing sea of agonistically-interacting individual drives to
power. If one simply thinks in terms of 'how' drives pursue or develop their aims, then 'will to
power' seems to be the universal character of all particular drives. But in fact power is for
Nietzsche also the shared essential aim of all real drives. Hence a particular drive that 'strives to
be master' of all other drives but which does not itself aim essentially at power is a merely
apparent drive. Thus insofar as 'power' seems (at most) to aptly characterize how many familiar
drives pursue their distinctive ends but not what these ends are, a Nietzschean will insist that
many familiar drives are merely apparent—we must reinterpret these familiar drives, for
instance through genealogical analysis, in order to see that in reality power is the essential
character of both 'how' they pursue their ends and 'what' these ends are.
Still, then, the basic question remains: what is power itself, for Nietzsche? Given the
above analysis, we can take his account of what a will or drive is to indicate what he means by
power. That is, insofar as Nietzsche takes 'willing' or 'driving' to indicate how all drives pursue
their aims, and insofar as he takes 'power' to indicate both what all drives ultimately aim at and
how they do so, it follows that what Nietzsche means by 'power' is the same thing he means by
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'driving' or 'willful' activity. (But what is willing, for Nietzsche? And how does it relate to force,
correctly understood? I examine these questions in more detail in the following chapter.)
Nietzschean will to power is a 'will to willful activity', paradoxical though it may sound.
He is subtly wrong about the nature of life, insofar as true vital force is just self-amplifying
force, not a drive or will to the expansion of power. And he is wrong to privilege life or vital
force as the basic mode of force. Life is simply a special case, not of will to power, but of force.
7. Nietzsche Contra Sublimation228
7.1. Many think that it is best for us to sublimate our “crude” passions and “unrefined”
impulses. Here “base” sexual desires and “brute” aggressive drives are paradigmatic. Many take
romantic love to be a higher form of attraction, even if they also see animalistic desire as
acceptable or even valuable. And many believe that aggressive impulses are elevated when
expressed less violently, as in philosophical debate or athletic competition—or even in non-
competitive acts of creativity or aesthetic appreciation, like Homer’s epic depiction of martial
valor in the Iliad, or an audience’s satisfaction in the downfall of a tragic hero. More broadly,
Freud claims that “sublimation of impulse” (Triebsublimierung) is “what makes it possible for
higher psychical activities, scientific, artistic or ideological, to play such an important part in
civilization.”229
But what is sublimation, exactly? And is it in fact better, ethically or psychologically, to
sublimate one’s drives? Can behavioral expressions of a drive ever be excessively sublimated?
Here I will approach these basic moral psychological questions by way of historical analysis,
taking Nietzsche’s account of sublimation—a plausible influence on Freud—as my focal point.230
I conclude that Nietzsche does not favor “culture” over “natural passion,” or vice versa,
generally speaking. Rather, he is fundamentally indifferent to the distinction. However, this
radical Nietzschean stance has been obscured by existing interpretive accounts.231
228Copyright © 2019 Journal of the History of Philosophy. This article is forthcoming in Journal of the History of 
Philosophy. Published by Johns Hopkins University Press.
229Freud 1962, 44. I have substituted ‘impulse’ for Strachey’s ‘instinct,’ as a translation of Trieb. For the German 
text, I have referred to Freud 1930.
230Regarding Nietzsche’s influence on Freud, see, e.g. Waugaman 1973; Lehrer 1995; Chapman and Chapman-
Santana 1995. These discussions are typical in noting the apparent continuity between Nietzsche’s appeals to 
‘sublimation’ and Freud’s, yet without analyzing the notion in detail. For richer accounts, see, e.g. Gasser 1997, 
313–65; and Gemes 2009.
231Luke Phillips may seem to defend the same thesis, but he does not—see Phillips 2012. I elaborate below, but in 
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Many commentators have claimed that Nietzsche views the “sublimation” (Sublimierung)
of impulses or drives (Triebe) as a positive achievement, if not even as a central feature of his
ethical ideal. Thus R. J. Hollingdale claims that “the men [Nietzsche] admired were those whose
will to power was strong but sublimated into creativity.”232 Similarly, Walter Kaufmann argues
that Nietzsche uses ‘sublimation’ to refer to “the actual process of the overcoming of the
impulses and the kind of control [he] had in mind” as an ethical ideal—whereby strong but
immoral individuals like Cesare Borgia might “acquire self-control,” find less brutal modes of
outlet for their impulses, and hence truly “achieve greatness.”233
Even recent commentators who have advanced more resolutely amoral interpretations
tend to imply that Nietzsche takes “sublimation” to be—at least generally speaking—a good
thing. Thus Eckart Goebel suggests, “Sublimation in Nietzsche” is “an increase of power, or
‘great self-control.’”234 On Goebel’s reading, then, “A person who sublimates becomes more
powerful, lives better and more intensely, and the most powerful person is the one who best
understands how to sublimate [der Mächtigste ist der, der am besten zu sublimieren versteht].”235
So too, Rüdiger Safranski associates Nietzschean sublimation with conscious life acting as
“enhancing force,” rather than “inhibiting” force or “anxieties, moral scruples, and
resignation.”236 John Richardson likewise claims that Nietzsche takes drives to reach a “higher or
fuller power” insofar as they achieve “‘sublimation’ [Sublimierung],” which Richardson
construes as “inter-episodic” rather than “intra-episodic” growth. In (mere) “intra-episodic”
growth, a drive repeatedly passes towards a fixed aim in a “cyclical form,” as an “episodic rush
toward its end.” By contrast, on Richardson’s interpretation a drive is sublimated insofar as
“instead of trying just to eat or seduce again and again, it . . . raise[s] its whole pattern of effort
‘to a higher level,’” such that it “break[s] habitual patterns and evolve[s] new forms.”237
Richardson also indirectly relates sublimation to psychic integration, invoking cases where “A
drive is ‘sublimated’ and made to express itself by weaving itself as an ongoing thread in a larger
short: Phillips (2015, 351, 360) claims that Nietzsche “recommend[s] sublimation,” which Phillips takes to involve 
“translation (or transformation) of the drive’s objects into the imaginative and mental,” as a means to a “refined 
immorality.” I deny that Nietzsche ultimately privileges any “refinement” of this sort, whether moral or immoral.
232Hollingdale 1999, 162.
233Kaufmann 1974, 224.





project.”238 In turn, Ken Gemes interprets Nietzschean sublimation directly in terms of a similar
kind of unifying subordination of “weaker” drives to “stronger” or “master” drives. According to
Gemes, that is, “Sublimation is what happens when a drive’s primary aim is substituted for by a
secondary aim that allows for expression of the drive in a manner consonant with the master
drive.”239 Gemes thus argues that Nietzsche takes sublimation to be “the key means” to the
“concerted” expression of drives, and “hence, to overcoming ressentiment.”240
Below I argue that while these accounts of Nietzschean sublimation are in many ways
helpful, nevertheless they are quite problematic. Nietzsche does praise the forms of “inter-
episodic growth” and psychic “integration” that Richardson and Gemes insightfully examine. He
does value the “expansion of power,” which he views as the aim of “the really fundamental
instinct of life” (G S 349).241 And he does speak highly of achieving certain forms of “self-
control.”242 But none of these are what Nietzsche means by the term ‘sublimation’ (Sublimierung)
and its cognates, in many important cases.243 On the dominant if not universal Nietzschean usage,
rather, for a drive to be sublimated is just for it to be figuratively if not literally “vaporized,” as
in the chemical transition from a solid to a gaseous state.244
One (but only one) salient form of psychological “vaporization,” for Nietzsche, is the
“translation” of drives from bodily or sensuous to “imaginative and spiritual [Imaginative und
Seelische]” modes of expression (G M II.7).245 This is loosely related to Freudian accounts of
238Richardson 1996, 120.
239Gemes 2009, 48.
240Gemes 2009, 48. Note that Gemes does not claim that sublimation always yields an “overcoming of 
ressentiment.” See also Schacht 1983, 370–71; and Swenson 2014. Cf. Assoun 2000, 161–62; and Gasser 1997, 
361–64.
241In citations to Nietzsche’s published works and the notes collected in The Will to Power, Arabic numerals 
referring to section numbers follow abbreviations of the title of the work cited. When works are divided into 
volumes, parts, or chapters, across which sections are not numbered consecutively, Roman numerals or 
abbreviations of chapter titles precede section numbers, e.g. GM II.7 is On the Genealogy of Morals, Essay II, 
Section 7; HH “Wanderer,” 181 is Human, All Too Human, “The Wanderer and His Shadow,” Section 181; and TI 
“Skirmishes,” 10 is Twilight of the Idols, “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man,” Section 10. For some notes collected in
The Will to Power, I also indicate the year(s) in which Nietzsche wrote them inside square brackets following the 
section number, e.g. WP 123[1887]. For some notes, I instead cite Nietzsche’s complete works edited by Giorgio 
Colli and Mazzino Montinari (KSA), by volume and fragment number. I follow the Kaufmann and Hollingdale 
translations for all of Nietzsche’s published works and unpublished notes, except where stated otherwise. For the 
German text of all of Nietzsche’s published works and unpublished notes, I have referred to Nietzsche’s complete 
works edited by Colli and Montinari (KSA). 
242E.g. consider his appeal to “the self-control and fascination of strength” (WP 123[1887]).
243Gemes only claims that his account is “in line with many of [Nietzsche’s] uses of that term” (Gemes 2009, 
56n16). Our accounts are thus compatible, insofar as we stress different Nietzschean uses. However, see note 251.
244Below I briefly address the question of whether Nietzsche might intend at least some of his psychological 
extension of this (al)chemical notion of sublimation to be taken literally, rather than figuratively.
245Here I have substituted ‘spiritual’ for ‘psychical,’ as a translation of Seelische.
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sublimation, as drives’ redirection from sexual to non-sexual aims.246 But the present notion is
broader, insofar as sexual desire is just one among many “sensuous” drives. Thus Nietzschean
sublimation also includes phenomena like expressing a “drive to cruelty” aesthetically, by
creating or enjoying tragic drama, rather than physically—which is not to say sexually.247 And
whereas Freud takes sublimation to be crucial to psychic health, Nietzsche is critical of its role
(in certain cases) in attenuating our primal drives. 
Here it is helpful to distinguish two interrelated concepts of sublimation. First,
‘sublimation’ can denote figurative elevation, with connotations of ennoblement. Second,
‘sublimation’ traditionally denoted (al)chemical processes related to “subtilization,” whereby
solid matter is vaporized or dispersed into a airier or finer, hence lighter and often purer,
substance. The first sense is essentially a figurative extension of the second: “vaporized”
substances rise upward, which can be viewed as a metaphor for (or a mark of) their ennoblement.
The central concept underlying most if not all Nietzschean uses of Sublimierung and its
cognates is just a broad psychological analogue of the second, chemical concept: the
vaporization of drives—whether it be merely figurative, or at times perhaps more literal.248 One
(but only one) specification of this broad psychological analogue of the chemical notion of
sublimation, which Nietzsche invokes at times, is the ennobling “elevation” of a drive—for
example, via ritual purification that yields a refined “sublimate” drive. A distinct specification of
the same broad psychological analogue of chemical sublimation, which he also sometimes
invokes, is a drive’s “translation” from bodily or sensuous to “imaginative and spiritual” modes
of expression. In short, then, Nietzsche emphasizes different features or connotations of the same
basic chemical process of sublimation in different rhetorical contexts, as he extends this chemical
notion of “vaporization” to the psychological domain by analogy. Hence, he sometimes (but not
always) uses ‘sublimation’ to refer to what he views as decidedly ignoble processes of psychic
vaporization, especially via drives’ attenuation or otherworldly idealization.
The common belief that imaginative and spiritual expressions of drives are “higher” is
unduly moralistic, Nietzsche thus sometimes claims—even as he also often praises apparently
“refined” forms of artistic and intellectual expression. By working to reconcile this apparent
tension, we can better grasp the complex relationship between Nietzsche’s critique of Judeo-
246E.g. Freud says that sublimation “consists in the instinct directing itself towards an aim other than, and remote 
from, that of sexual satisfaction” (quoted in Gemes 2009, 38). See also Frances Deri 1939.
247Compare BGE 229—although Nietzsche here uses Erhaben for ‘sublime.’ I discuss this issue further below.
248See note 244.
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Christian morality and his own positive vision of spiritual “elevation.” He is often precisely
concerned to show how one kind of sublimation, involving drives’ attenuating vaporization into
the imaginative and spiritual domain, runs counter to higher forms of will to power or self-
overcoming. Basic drives often can manifest in their full force as culture, or as refinement into
culture. But Nietzsche ultimately values basic drives’ powerful expression, without preferring
either that this occur specifically as “higher culture” or as “savage” natural impulse. 
7.2. Before delving more deeply into the chemical analogy underlying most if not all of
Nietzsche’s appeals to psychological ‘sublimation,’ it will be helpful first simply to establish that
he sometimes uses the term to characterize phenomena that he views negatively, in a way that
clearly limits the applicability of common interpretations. We may begin with a remark from
Human, All Too Human (1878): “We know vanity [die Eitelkeit] only in its feeblest
[abgeschwächtesten] forms, in its sublimations and small doses [in ihren Sublimirungen und
kleinen Dosen], because we live in a late and very moderated [sehr gemilderten] state of society”
(HH “Wanderer,” 181).249 Nietzsche’s broader point is that in “primeval conditions
[Urzustände]” of insecurity and hunger, a “powerful person [Mächtige]” who is also “cunning
[listig]” realizes that “when the fear he engenders increases, his power increases,” and so
develops a (vain) drive to “augment belief in his power.” Thus while we now see it only in its
“feeblest forms,” vanity was once “the most useful of all things” to those aiming at power (HH
“Wanderer,” 181).
Here ‘sublimation’ evidently has little to do with “admirable” channeling of will to power
into creativity (contra Hollingdale); nor with “greatness” achieved through “self-control” (contra
Kaufmann); nor with “becoming more powerful” or “living more intensely” (contra Goebel); nor
with “enhancing force” (contra Safranksi); nor with an “inter-episodic growth” of drives which
yields their “fuller or truer power” (contra Richardson);250 nor with psychic “integration”
achieved by weaving a drive into a larger project or subordinating a “weaker” drive to a
“stronger” one, in a way that is a “mark of health” (contra Gemes).251 Rather, Nietzsche here
249I have substituted ‘moderated’ for Hollingdale’s bowdlerizing ‘ameliorated,’ as a translation of gemilderten.
250Richardson 1996, 25.
251Gemes claims that “Nietzsche, like Freud, takes sublimation as a mark of health” (Gemes 2009, 47). To be sure, 
it is not fair to expect Gemes’s account to capture all Nietzschean uses of ‘sublimation,’ and perhaps not even most 
of them—he never claims to do so. However, here it must be noted that Gemes presents no quotations in which 
Nietzsche uses the term ‘sublimation’ in a way that Gemes even claims supports his own interpretation. (Gemes 
does mention GM II.7 and KSA 12:254 in a footnote, but does not maintain that these uses are compatible with his 
103
associates sublimation directly with “small doses” and the moderation or attenuation of a basic
impulse.
One might object that it is not fair to attribute to Gemes the view that Nietzschean
sublimation is essentially a matter of integrating drives into a broader psychic whole; nor the
view that Nietzsche takes sublimation always to serve this end.252 However, note that Gemes
must take Nietzschean sublimation to essentially involve a certain kind of psychic integration or
unity, insofar as he analyzes it directly in terms of a given subordinate drive’s primary aim being
substituted for by a secondary aim that allows this drive to be expressed in a manner consonant
with a corresponding master drive.253 Thus construed, the sublimation of a drive essentially
involves its integration into the activity of a “master” drive to which it is subordinated.254
Clearly, then, Nietzsche does not take sublimation (at least in this sense) to essentially
involve “greater satisfaction for [a given] drive,” as has been suggested by Luke Phillips, a
recent commentator who emphasizes Nietzsche’s occasional associations of ‘sublimation’ with
the “imaginative or mental” expression of drives.255 Phillips does acknowledge Nietzsche’s
appeal to “sublimations and small doses,” and that this use stands in tension with his own
interpretation of Nietzschean sublimation as essentially involving “augmentation of the
[sublimated] drive’s power.”256 But Phillips argues that this is just an “exception” to Nietzsche’s
“later and more developed use” of the term, both on the grounds that it is “a relatively early use
of the word” in Nietzsche’s corpus and because Nietzsche is “seldom careful with his terms and
definitions.”257
However, if another salient interpretive hypothesis readily accommodates passages like
this one, then interpretive charity speaks in favor of avoiding a quick appeal to lack of care or
precision, on Nietzsche’s part. Moreover, his pejorative use of ‘sublimation’ in this passage is
account—indeed, he acknowledges that the second is not [“Freud and Nietzsche on Sublimation,” 56n16]. These are
the only two Nietzschean uses of Sublimierung or its cognates that he mentions.) This is evidently because Gemes is
interested in the contrast between (what he calls) sublimation and repression, not in Nietzsche’s use of certain 
words. This is fair, and Gemes provides an illuminating analysis of Freud, Nietzsche, and their interrelation. But 
Gemes does claim that his account is “in line with many of [Nietzsche’s] uses of that term [Sublimieriung]” (Gemes 
2009, 56n16)—yet he does not textually support this claim.
252I am grateful to an anonymous referee at the Journal of the History of Philosophy for pressing me on this point.
253Gemes 2009, 48.
254Gemes 2009, 48. That said, not all such instances of local psychic integration amount to the holistic psychic 
unity of a coherent subject. I therefore do not mean to impute to Gemes the view that Nietzschean sublimation 
essentially involves or inevitably results in a robustly unified individual, coherent subject etc.




neither an “exception” nor even restricted to his early works. In Beyond Good and Evil (1886),
for instance, he argues that “with the help of a religion which indulged and flattered the most
sublime herd-animal desires [den sublimsten Heerdenthier-Begierden], we have reached the
point where we find even in political and social institutions an ever more visible expression of
this morality: the democratic movement is the heir of the Christian movement” (BGE 202).
Indeed, even the connotations of moderation or attenuation from the earlier passage on
“sublimations and small doses” of vanity are here plausibly retained. In an unpublished note
from 1885, for example, Nietzsche appeals to “the total mollification of the democratic herd
animal [die gänzliche Vergutmüthigung des demokratischen Heerdenthieres]” (WP 125).
 This usage of ‘sublime’ (sublimsten) does not fit any better with Richardson’s or Gemes’s
accounts. Again, Richardson claims that Nietzsche believes that a given drive “should try to raise
its whole pattern of effort ‘to a higher level,’” and “calls this truer, ‘inter-episodic’ growth
‘sublimation’ [Sublimierung].”258 According to Richardson, then, a drive that does not achieve
sublimation therefore “misses a fuller or truer power.”259 Richardson’s use of both the normative
term ‘should’ and the evocative phrase ‘fuller or truer power’ suggest that Nietzsche takes
sublimation to be a positive achievement.260 But this is far from clearly the case in BGE 202. 
 Indeed, Nietzsche evidently does not think that herd-animal desires “should” be
sublimated into democratic politics, or that they thereby achieve a “fuller or truer power.”
Likewise, he clearly does not believe that political impulses should “weave themselves as
ongoing threads” into herd-morality construed a “larger project.” Nor is it plausible that
Nietzsche believes the “Christian movement” should “evolve” into the “democratic movement,”
which he clearly disdains. For instance, he claims that “the advent of democracy” is one of the
“symptoms of declining life” that “always means something is wrong” (GM III.25). He
elaborates elsewhere that “the democratic movement is not only a form of the decay of political
organization but a form of the decay, namely the diminution, of man, making him mediocre and
258Richardson 1996, 25.
259Richardson 1996, 25.
260Further, more or less directly after analyzing ‘sublimation’ in terms of “inter-episodic growth,” Richardson 
claims that “a drive wills power by trying to develop its activity pattern,” where “each such activity pattern wills its 
own ‘self-overcoming’ [Selbstüberwindung]: it wills to rise toward a new and higher level of effort . . . —one that 
will then have to be overcome in turn” (Richardson 1996, 26). In turn, Richardson identifies will to power as 
Nietzsche’s basic standard of value—see, e.g. Richardson 1996, 152. It seems that sublimation is thus (for 
Nietzsche) good, on Richardson’s account, insofar as he takes drives’ willing power or self-overcoming to be good. 
Note that Richardson still need not claim that all instances of sublimation are equally good, however, insofar as he 
allows that there are “degrees of realization of the will to power” (Richardson 1996, 142). See also Richardson 2015.
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lowering his value” (B G E 203).261 To be clear: Nietzsche does plausibly believe that the
“democratic movement” is a “sublimated” form of the “Christian movement.”262 But this
sublimation of Christianity into democratic politics is not something that Nietzsche views as
good—not that he takes the prior “Christian movement” to be any better. Contra Gemes, then, in
this case it is not true that “Nietzsche, like Freud, takes sublimation as a mark of health.”263
Several other textual examples will help to drive this point further home. First, consider
Nietzsche’s rhetorical question about the impact of “European Christianity”: “doesn’t it seem
that a single will dominated Europe for eighteen centuries—to turn man into a sublime
miscarriage [eine sublime Missgeburt]?” (BGE 62). He then proceeds to lament “this almost
deliberate degeneration and atrophy of man represented by the Christian European” (BGE 62).
This is hardly the rousing endorsement of the “sublime” that common interpretations of
Nietzschean Sublimierung might lead one to expect. Indeed, when he refers approvingly to the
“sublime self-conquest [erhabenen Selbst-Bezwingung]” of higher types, later in the same
section, Nietzsche no longer even uses the Latinate root sublim-. Later in Beyond Good and Evil,
likewise, he refers to the “objective man [der objektive Mensch]” as “an instrument, something
of a slave though certainly the most sublime type of slave [die sublimste Art des Sklaven], but in
himself nothing” (BGE 207). Finally, consider Nietzsche’s harsh criticism of a certain kind of
condescending indifference towards religion that he associates with “the great majority of
industrious scholars and the other accessories of the universities”:
On the basis of [a German scholar’s] whole trade . . . he is inclined toward a
superior, almost good-natured amusement in the face of religion, occasionally
mixed with a dash of disdain for the ‘uncleanliness’ of the spirit which he
assumes wherever a church is still acknowledged. . . . The practical indifference
toward religious matters into which he has been born and brought up is
generally sublimated [sublimiren] in him into caution and cleanliness
[Behutsamkeit und Reinlichkeit] that shun contact with religious men and
matters; and it may be precisely the depth of his tolerance and humanity that
bids him dodge the subtle distress involved in tolerance. . . . how much naivete,
venerable, childlike, and boundlessly clumsy naivete lies in the scholar’s faith
in his superiority, in the good conscience of his tolerance, in the unsuspecting
simple certainty with which his instinct treats the religious man as an inferior
261See also BGE 44, 242; TI “Skirmishes,” 38–39; WP 125, 217, 728, 751, and 752.
262This is a natural political analogue of his famous epistemological claim that “Christian conscience” has been 
“translated and sublimated [sublimiert] into a scientific conscience, into intellectual cleanliness at any price” (GS 
357; GM III.27).
263Gemes 2009, 49. See note 251 above.
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and lower type that he has outgrown, leaving it behind, beneath him—him, that
presumptuous little dwarf and rabble man, the assiduous and speedy head- and
handiworker [der kleine anmaassliche Zwerg und Pöbelmann, der fleissig-
flinke Kopf- und Handarbeiter] of ‘ideas,’ of ‘modern ideas’! (BGE 58)
Nietzsche claims that “practical indifference towards religious matters” is often “sublimated”
into a “caution and cleanliness” that actively shuns them. But the result is clearly not “self-
control” or “creativity” in any “admirable” sense (contra Kaufmann and Hollingdale), or the
praiseworthy “evolution” of this sublimated practical indifference (contra Richardson). This
process of sublimation clearly does not yield “overcoming of ressentiment,” on Nietzsche’s
view, nor is it a “mark of health” (contra Gemes).264 Rather, it produces only a “presumptuous
little dwarf and rabble man,” who wrongly believes himself to be superior to the religious man.
Apparently, Nietzsche is here playing on a spatial metaphor commonly associated with
sublimation, namely that of elevation or being raised up. The scholar merely takes himself to
have risen above the religious believer, Nietzsche intimates. This common association of the
sublime with feelings of transcendence or “elevation” in turn reflects the etymology of the term,
in both Longinus’ Greek (hypsos, literally “height,” from húpsi [“aloft,” “on high”]) and the
Latin (sublimis: literally, “up to the limit”). Of course, the German term Sublimierung and its
cognates descend etymologically from the Latin sublimis. Notably, though, German philosophy
standardly deploys the alternative term Erhaben for the modern aesthetic notion of the sublime.
Here philological analysis is instructive. Cohn and Miles report, “The sublime words first
entered French, as they would enter English, through books of alchemy,” and only subsequently
assumed the sense of “that which is placed very high” through an act of “figurative” extension.265
In French, at least, this figurative meaning was first rhetorical, referring to the “grand style,” and
only subsequently given the “emotional-aesthetic” meaning characteristic of modern aesthetic
theory.266 German, by contrast, “did not experience the extension of the (al)chemical meaning of
sublime into figurative uses.”267 Sublim- words were thus reserved for chemical concepts, in
German, whereas “all aesthetic and figurative terminology is translated into native words:
erhaben, erhihen, veredeln,” except in “rare” or “extraordinary” cases.268
This historical “resistance of German to the adoption of the foreign word sublime for any
264See note 251.
265Cohn and Miles 1977, 292.
266Cohn and Miles 1977, 292.
267Cohn and Miles 1977, 293.
268Cohn and Miles 1977, 293.
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but a chemical vocabulary”269 constitutes prima facie evidence in favor of a more chemically-
oriented account of Nietzschean sublimation, and against the applicability of now-intuitive direct
associations of sublimation with ennobling elevation. Here intuitions are easily clouded by
Freudian uses of the term: “sublimation” is clearly a positive achievement, for Freudians. As
Freud’s friend and colleague Ernest Jones defined it, for instance, sublimation is the “deflection
of the energy of a sexual impulse to a non-sexual and socially useful goal” (my emphasis).270
This connotation of positively contributing to individual psychic health via increased sociability
is not obviously part of Nietzsche’s view, though. And the traditional division of labor, whereby
Latinate terms were reserved for more narrowly chemical processes and native German terms for
both aesthetic and other clearly positive notions of “elevation,” suggests that the strong positive
valence of Freudian Sublimierung is unusual—hence, not to be quickly imputed to Nietzsche.
But did I not just claim that Nietzsche is playing on the spatial metaphor of elevation, in
his critical analysis of the scholar’s “sublimated” practical indifference towards religious
matters? And does this not presuppose that Nietzsche takes ‘sublimation’ to mean something like
“elevation,” with connotations of improvement or ennoblement, in order for an apparently ironic
appeal to the scholar’s “sublimated” state to have its intended rhetorical impact? This reading is
limited, however, insofar as it fails to ground “elevation” in a more basic chemical notion of
“vaporization.” In drawing out this chemical notion’s complex network of associations, it will
become apparent that a broad psychological analogue of the traditional chemical sense of
‘sublimation’ is more central than Richardson, Gemes, and others take it to be.271 Indeed, the
chemical concept of sublimation arguably underlies most, if not all, Nietzschean uses of the
term. A proper reading of this chemical analogy thus has important implications for the
interpretation of Nietzsche’s view regarding the relative value of drives’ more and less
“sublimated” expressions.
269Cohn and Miles 1977, 293.
270Quoted in Davies 1947, 9.
271E.g. in a chapter on “Sublimierung” in his study on Nietzsche und Freud, Gasser indicates the traditional 
(al)chemical meaning only in passing, and this to emphasize that he will be dealing with “the psychological and not 
the physical concept [den psychologische und nicht den physikalischen Begriff]” (Gasser 1997,, 314n8). Kaufmann 
notes the chemical concept, but quickly proceeds to focus on Nietzsche’s “new and lasting meaning,” viz. drives 
being “channeled into creative spiritual activity, instead of being fulfilled directly” (Kaufmann 1974, 219–20). 
Phillips likewise notes the basic chemical sense, but then focuses on “the connotation of simultaneous refinement 
and elevation, specifically in the mental or psychological realm where creativity is at its most effective” (Phillips 
2015, 352). However, focus on this connotative nexus obscures various other Nietzschean uses of the term.
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7.3. In modern chemistry, ‘sublimation’ refers to an immediate phase transition from a
solid into a gaseous state. The Grimms’ Deutsches Wörterbuch includes references to nineteenth-
century German uses of the noun sublimat (‘sublimate’) in a similar vein—for instance, from
1824, “chemisch das erzeugnisz jeder verflüchtigung in starrer, fester oder pulveriger gestalt.”272
A sublimate is thus a solid formed by deposition from a gas that is produced through the
sublimation of an original sample. Sublimates are naturally contrasted against sediments.
Sublimates are solids deposited above a given sample when it is vaporized (as the resultant gas
rises and re-solidifies, for instance in the neck of an alembic), whereas sediments are solids that
have settled to the bottom of a liquid mixture.
To grasp the full range of sublimation’s evaluative connotations, in turn, one must note
several things about this chemical process. First, it is often used to purify things: an impure
sample is sublimated into a purified gas, which is then deposited as a pure sublimate of the
original. Insofar as the removal of chemical impurities can in turn be associated with ritual
purification, it carries positive evaluative connotations: purified sublimates can be seen as good,
whereas sediments are often seen as bad—as the dregs or most undesirable part of something.
This positive evaluative connotation, of sublimation as an ennobling or otherwise
valuable form of purification, underlies some of Nietzsche’s uses of the term. For instance:
There have to be fasts of many kinds; and wherever powerful drives and habits
prevail, legislators have to see to it that intercalary days are inserted on which
such a drive is chained and learns again to hunger. Viewed from a higher vantage
point, whole generations and ages that make their appearance, infected with some
moral fanaticism, seem to be such times of constraint and fasting during which a
drive learns to stoop and submit [ducken und niederwerfen], but also to purify
[reinigen] and sharpen [schärfen] itself. . . . This is also a hint for an explanation
of the paradox: why it was precisely during the most Christian period of Europe
and altogether only under the pressure of Christian value judgments that the sex
drive [Geschlechtstrieb] sublimated [sublimirt] itself into love [Liebe] (amour-
passion). (BGE 189)
Here Nietzsche identifies love as a “sublimated” sex drive, and directly associates this process
with ritual fasting that allows a drive to “learn again to hunger [wieder einmal hungern lern].”
Notably, this appeal to askesis does not simply concern the praiseworthy subordination of a
weaker drive to a stronger one—although Nietzsche’s apparently favorable reference to drives
272Grimm and Grimm 1971, art. “sublimat.”
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learning to “stoop and submit” is quite plausibly interpreted in this spirit, apparently in line with
Gemes’s account. Rather, Nietzsche’s central focus seems to be on how “constraint and fasting”
can allow a drive to “learn to purify and sharpen itself [aber auch such reinigen und schärfen
lernt].” Likewise, he appeals elsewhere to the “virtue [Tugend]” of solitude (die Einsamkeit) as a
“sublime bent and urge for cleanliness [ein sublimer Hang und Drang der Reinlichkeit]” (BGE
284), and to the “sublime inclination [sublime Hang] of the seeker after knowledge” who has
“hardened and sharpened [gespitzt] his eye for himself” (BGE 230). My account readily explains
these passages: Nietzsche consistently uses ‘sublimation’ in the sense of the same basic chemical
analogy, and in certain cases specifically emphasizes the link between chemical sublimates and
states of ritual purification.
Notably, this kind of “purification” and “sharpening” evidently need not involve psychic
integration of the sort that Gemes emphasizes directly, and Richardson indirectly highlights.
Psychic integration, in the sense of redirecting a weaker drive to modes of expression that render
its activity more “consonant” with a stronger drive, may be one way to produce a purified
“sublimate.” And it may hence constitute one kind of “sublimation,” for Nietzsche—albeit still
not necessarily the main kind, let alone the only one. But it far from clear that this is truly what
Nietzsche has in mind, in BGE 189. For here it is precisely “powerful [mächtige]” drives, not
weaker ones, that Nietzsche claims must at times be ritually “sublimated.” Evidently, this is
because powerful drives are often not “hungry,” insofar as they are strong enough to “prevail”
and realize their ends. Hence, once must fast to artificially induce “hunger” in a powerful drive,
which presumably allows it to become even stronger or more intensified in concentrated pursuit
of its now-scarce end. It is thus far from clear that Nietzsche envisions the sublimated sex drive
as being redirected towards a secondary end that is more in line with a master drive, as on
Gemes’s account. While Nietzsche does appeal to “legislators” and to the “pressure” exerted on
the sex drive by “Christian value judgments,” it is nevertheless far from clear that he takes the
sex drive to be thereby rendered subservient to these legislators or Christian value judgments, as
Gemes’s account would suggest. Rather, Nietzsche basic point is that love is a purified and
intensified form of the sex drive, produced via ritual askesis, which is hence analogous to a
chemical sublimate refined from an impure original sample.
Second, and for my purposes even more importantly, sublimation transforms substances
from more solid into airier or more ethereal states. This is the relevant sense of the term in
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Milton’s Paradise Lost, for instance, when an angel describes to Adam how “flow’rs and their
fruit, Man’s nourishment,” are “by gradual scale sublimed” into animal and ultimately
intellectual “vital spirits.”273 The angel in turn hopes that “Time may come when . . . from these
corporal nutriments perhaps / Your [viz. humans’] bodies may at last turn all to spirit, / . . . and
winged ascend / Ethereal as we.”274 This second aspect of the chemical analogy in turn has two
evaluatively salient components. Airy substances float, rise, or elevate. And airy substances are
(it is said) more like mental or spiritual substance than like bodily or natural substance.
In cases where Nietzsche emphasizes the former connotation of elevation or loftiness, his
uses of Sublimierung or its cognates unsurprisingly tend to be positive in tone. For instance:
Love one’s enemies? I think this has been learned well: It is done thousands of
times today, in small ways and big ways. Indeed, at times something higher and
more sublime [Höhere und Sublimere] is done: we learn to despise when we love,
and precisely when we love best. (BGE 216)
There is a defiance of oneself of which many forms of asceticism are among the
most sublimated expressions [sublimirtesten Aeusserungen]. . . . Thus a man
climbs on dangerous paths in the highest mountains so as to mock at his fears and
trembling knees. (HH I.137)
The bad conscience is an illness, there is no doubt about that, but an illness as
pregnancy is an illness! Let us seek out the conditions under which this illness has
reached its most terrible and most sublime height [furchtbarsten und sublimsten
Gipfel]. (GM II.19)
The attainment of this goal [viz. “to wed the bad conscience to all the unnatural
inclinations, all those aspirations to the beyond, to that which runs counter to
sense, instinct, nature, animal, in short all ideals hitherto, which are one and all
hostile to life and ideals that slander the world,” and thus to “‘let ourselves go’ like
all the world”] would require a different kind of spirit from that likely to appear in
this present age: spirits strengthened by war and victory, for whom conquest,
adventure, danger, and even pain have become needs; it would require habituation
to the keen air of the heights, to winter journeys, to ice and mountains in every
sense; it would require even a kind of sublime wickedness [sublimer Bosheit], an
ultimate, supremely self-confident mischievousness in knowledge that goes with
great health; it would require, in brief and alas, precisely this great health! (GM
II.24)
This praise of “sublime” elevation or loftiness is in keeping with Nietzsche’s frequent
273Book V, lines 479–90 (Milton 2005, 119).
274Book V, lines 493–99 (Milton 2005, 120).
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celebration of levity and laughter, as well as his corresponding criticism of “gravity” or
ponderousness. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, representatively: “I laugh in your faces with my
laughter of the heights” (Z “On the Tarantulas”). Likewise: “Not by wrath does one kill but by
laughter. Come, let us kill the spirit of gravity! I have learned to walk: ever since, I let myself
run. I have learned to fly: ever since, I do not want to be pushed before moving along. Now I am
light, now I fly, now I see myself beneath myself, now a god dances through me” (Z “On
Reading and Writing”).275
Note that I am not claiming that ‘sublimation’ and ‘sublime’ denote only figurative
elevation or loftiness, in the above passages. But they evidently do have this meaning, among
several others all grounded in the same chemical notion of vaporization, and applied in the
psychological context by analogy. It would be grasping at straws to seek out appeals to psychic
integration, self-control, or creativity in all such passages. Nietzsche’s appeal to men
“tyrannizing over certain parts of their own nature” in HH I.137 does arguably suggest a kind of
psychic integration, as Gemes’s account would suggest. But this is exceptional, not typical.
Nietzsche consistently just has in mind the basic chemical notion of vaporization, and
emphasizes different of its features in different rhetorical contexts. Figurative “elevation” is one
such feature. And psychic integration—in the sense of redirecting weaker drives towards modes
of expression that render their activity consonant with stronger drives—is one way to reach an
“elevated” state, on his view. But it is still just one way to do so. While Nietzsche does value
some kinds of psychic integration, self-control, and creativity, excessive emphasis on these
phenomena obscures his many critical uses of Sublimierung or its cognates, and distorts his
generic praise of spiritual elevation.
Finally, the most significant cases of Nietzschean ‘sublimation,’ for my purposes, are
those in which he emphasizes the second connotation of airiness or ethereality mentioned above:
proximity to the spiritual rather than natural domain, or to mind as opposed to body etc. This is
related to the spatial metaphor: the heavenly domain of “spiritual” beings is often depicted as
located above the merely “natural” world. Here recall Milton’s angel hoping that humans may
one day “turn all to spirit, / . . . and winged ascend / Ethereal as we.” Differences in density or
solidity are salient in this context, insofar as spiritual substance is taken to rise because it is
275See also BGE 193; Z “On the Spirit of Gravity”; Z “On Old and New Tablets,” 2; GS 327, 380. By contrast, 
“Lack of gravity” is by contrast associated with weakness in WP 46; but here “gravity” clearly has connotations of 
cohesion rather than heaviness.
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rarefied or less dense than “coarse” matter. Milton’s usage also echoes that of the earlier English
poet John Davies, who in his Nosce Teipsum (1599) praises how the Mind “turnes Bodies to
spirits,” 
by sublimation strange;
As fire converts to fire the things it burnes,
As we our meats into our nature change.
From their grosse matter she abstracts the formes,
And drawes a kind of quintessence from things;
Which to her proper nature she transformes,
To bear them light on her celestiall wings: 
This doth she, when from things particular,
She doth abstract the universall kinds. (John Davies, Complete Poems, 43)276
Davies thus celebrates sublimation construed as a path to universal essence or intelligible form.
So too, Nietzsche sometimes uses ‘sublimation’ with a broadly similar emphasis on the mental: 
Now, when suffering is always the first of the arguments marshaled against life,
as its most questionable feature, it is salutary to remember the times when people
made the opposite assessment, because they could not do without making people
suffer and saw first-rate magic in it, a veritable seductive lure to life. . . . Perhaps
I can even be allowed to admit the possibility that pleasure in cruelty [Lust an
der Grausamkeit] does not really need to have died out: perhaps, just as pain
today hurts more [heute der Schmerz mehr weh], it needed, in this connection,
some kind of sublimation and subtilization [Sublimierung und Subtilisirung], it
had to be transformed [übersetzt] into the imaginative and spiritual [Imaginative
und Seelische], and adorned with such inoffensive names that they do not arouse
the suspicion of even the most delicate hypocritical conscience (‘tragic pity’ is
one such name, another is ‘les nostalgies de la croix’). (GM II.7)277
One crucial Nietzschean psychological analogue of chemical vaporization, then, is the
“translation” of drives to more “imaginative and spiritual [Imaginative und Seelische]” modes of
expression. Notably, Nietzsche also arguably suggests that “pain today hurts more” not in spite
of the “sublimation and subtilization” of human “joy in cruelty,” but if anything because of it. I
276See also Linden 1996, 93–94.
277For this passage of On the Genealogy of Morality, exclusively, I have followed the translation by Carol Diethe, 
i.e. the 2006 Cambridge University Press entry in the bibliography below. Because this is a singular case, and in 
order to avoid unnecessary confusion, I have still used the abbreviation that refers in every other case to the 
Kaufmann and Hollingdale translation of On the Genealogy of Morals (GM). Again, I follow the Kaufmann and 
Hollingdale translations for all of Nietzsche’s published works and unpublished notes, except where stated 
otherwise. On the point at issue in the passage quoted here, see also BGE 229; WP 312.
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will return to this point shortly below.
In the meantime, and in light of the above analysis, it is reasonable to wonder whether at
least some of Nietzsche’s appeals to ‘sublimation’ might involve literal (or perhaps quasi-literal)
extensions of chemical processes to the psychological domain, rather than merely a chemical
metaphor.278 This is not implausible, prima facie, insofar as attention to real structural analogies
between chemical and psychological processes could be in keeping with broader naturalistic
currents in Nietzsche’s philosophy. In fact, some commentators have argued that Nietzsche’s
appeal to a “chemistry of concepts and sensations [Chemie der Begriffe und Empfindungen]” in
the first section of Human, All Too Human is to be taken quite literally.279 Indeed, Nietzsche
himself insists in this section, “Historical philosophy . . . can no longer be separated from natural
science [der Naturwissenschaft];” he then proceeds to diagnose “unegoistic action” and
“disinterested contemplation” as “only sublimations [Sublimirungen], in which the basic element
seems almost to have dispersed and reveals itself only under the most painstaking observation,”
before more broadly calling for a “chemistry of the moral [eine Chemie der moralischen]” (HH
I.1). I wish to remain agnostic with respect to this further interpretive issue, however. For here I
wish only to establish that the chemical concept underlies most if not all Nietzschean uses of
‘sublimation’—whether his psychological extensions of the chemical notion are meant literally
or figuratively.
Thus in most if not all cases where he uses Sublimierung or its cognates, Nietzsche
apparently has in mind the same basic chemical concept of vaporization, and simply emphasizes
different of its features in different rhetorical contexts. Sometimes he places special emphasis on
the purity of a chemically-refined sublimate. Sometimes he stresses the elevation or lightness of
vapors. Sometimes he emphasizes the ethereality of “vaporized” substances, perhaps especially
in connection to the “translation” of drives into the “imaginative and spiritual” domain. And he
sometimes—but not always—deploys multiple of these analogical associations at once.
While the above discussion has highlighted the variety and nuance of Nietzsche’s appeals
to ‘sublimation,’ a few rough trends in his evaluative attitude towards different features of the
basic psychological analogy to chemical vaporization can perhaps now be distilled. Nietzsche
278I am grateful to an anonymous referee at the Journal of the History of Philosophy for stressing this point.
279E.g. consider Christine Blättler’s claim that “Nietzsche’s references to chemistry cannot be reduced to the British
metaphor of mental or spiritual chemistry [nicht auf die Metapher der mentalen oder geistigen Chemie der Briten 
reduzieren]” (Blättler 2015, 168n72). Here Blättler is approvingly citing Lanfranconi 2000, 107–15. See also 
Assoun 2000, 161. Regarding Nietzsche’s “chemistry of concepts and sensations,” see also Heller 1972.
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often presents drives’ purification positively, especially insofar as it can involve intensification.
And he often presents lightness or elevation positively, while remaining critical of a certain kind
of otherworldly loftiness. Relatedly, as I will now argue, Nietzsche’s appeals to the ethereality or
airiness of “spirit” as opposed to “nature” are quite mixed in tone—because he does not favor
“higher culture” over unrefined “natural passion,” or vice versa, generally speaking.
7.4. On Nietzsche’s view, the common belief that more “imaginative and spiritual” ways
of expressing drives are higher is unduly moralistic—even though Nietzsche himself often
praises apparently “refined” forms of artistic and intellectual expression. This is not a
contradiction on his part, however, insofar as he also praises more “savage” expressions of basic
drives. In short, Nietzsche values basic drives’ powerful expression in one way or another more
than he prefers either that they be sublimated into “culture” or given primal outlet as crude
“animal impulse.” 
Here we may first recall Nietzsche’s claim in GM II.7 that “joy in cruelty” has not really
died out, but rather just been “translated” into “imaginative and spiritual” forms like “tragic
pity.” Notably, Nietzsche does not advocate or recommend that “joy in cruelty” be thus
sublimated. He does not criticize the earlier age in which men were “were unwilling to refrain
from making suffer and saw in it an enchantment of the first order, a genuine seduction to life.”
Nor does he glorify this earlier age above that of sublimated tragic pity. He simply claims that
they both express the same “joy in cruelty”—which evidently allows that they may do so to the
same extent, and with equal value.280
This interpretation of GM II.7 can be reinforced by examining another similar passage:
In late ages that may be proud of their humanity, so much fear remains, so
much superstitious fear of the ‘savage cruel beast’ [wilden grausamen Thiere]
whose conquest is the very pride of these more humane ages, that even
280Insofar as “cruelty” remains the basic underlying aim of both “sublimated” tragic pity and “unsublimated” drives
to “make suffer,” John Richardson is right to insist that “ends are modified, not replaced” in these sorts of processes 
of Nietzschean sublimation (Nietzsche’s System, 25n20). Thus the “basic element [Grundelement]” that is “dispersed
[verflüchtigt]” and so “reveals itself only under the most painstaking observation” in a given process of 
“sublimation” (HH I.1) might well be a drive to cruelty, rather than a fully generic will to power or drive to self-
overcoming. However, my basic account is also compatible with the view that a generic will to power or drive to 
self-overcoming is the ultimate Grundelement of all “sublimation” of drives into the “imaginative and spiritual” 
domain.
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palpable truths remain unspoken for centuries, as if by some agreement,
because they look as if they might reanimate that savage beast one has finally
‘mortified’ [abgetödteten]. . . . We should reconsider cruelty and open our
eyes. We should at long last learn impatience lest such immodest fat errors
keep on strutting about virtuously and saucily, as have been fostered about
tragedy, for example, by philosophers both ancient and modern. Almost
everything we call ‘higher culture’ [höhere Cultur] is based on the
spiritualization of cruelty, on its becoming more profound [der Vergeistigung
und Vertiefung der Grausamkeit]: this is my proposition. That ‘savage animal’
[wilde Thier] has not really been ‘mortified’; it lives and flourishes, it has
merely become—divine [vergöttlicht]. 
What constitutes the painful voluptuousness of tragedy is cruelty; what
seems agreeable in so-called tragic pity [die schmerzliche Wollust der
Tragödie], and at bottom in everything sublime, up to the highest and most
delicate shudders of metaphysics, receives its sweetness solely from the
admixture of cruelty. . . . [E]ven the seeker after knowledge forces his spirit to
recognize things against the inclination of the spirit, and often enough also
against the wishes of his heart . . . and thus acts as an artist and transfigured of
cruelty. (BGE 229)
Nietzsche does not say that he prefers “higher culture” or the “divine” version of the “savage
animal.” Rather, his basic point seems to be that the “savage animal” and “higher culture” alike
express the same underlying drive to cruelty.
Walter Kaufmann is thus wrong to claim that Nietzsche exalts “sublimated” states of self-
control above “unsublimated animal passion.”281 Nietzsche has no problem with “unsublimated
animal passion.” He does not glorify it, insofar as he also values certain forms of “higher
culture.” But he also does not claim that it is worse than “higher culture,” generally speaking.
And he explicitly criticizes “superstitious fear” of the “savage cruel beast.” Here one might also
note Nietzsche’s description of the Dionysian as one of two fundamental art-impulses, even
though it manifests as a drive towards ecstatic identification with “titanic” and “barbaric” forces
of nature (BT 4) that are often overtly “savage.” Nietzsche's Dionysus enjoys all “productive and
destructive force,” evidently without concern for its moral quality (WP 1049 [1885–1886]).282 
Luke Phillips likewise observes that Nietzsche “clearly did admire and praise [ruthless
and violent men like Cesare Borgia and Napoleon] and hold them in far higher esteem than he
did innocent, merely moral, herd-like men who lived blameless lives.”283 Indeed, Kaufmann
281Kaufmann 1974, 225.
282See also WP 1050[1888].
283Phillips 2015, 359. See also Phillips 2015, 358–60; Glenn 2001; and Dombowsky 2004. Cf. Foot 1994.
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himself concedes this point, citing BGE 197: “Nietzsche found it ridiculous to consider a Cesare
Borgia unhealthy in contrast to an emasculated man who is alleged to be healthy.”284 But again,
Kaufmann thinks that Borgia would be better if he achieved “sublimation”: “A man with strong
impulses might be evil because he had not yet learned to sublimate his impulses, but if he should
ever acquire self-control, he might achieve greatness.”285 Phillips is more skeptical that Nietzsche
envisions any moralized form of self-control as an ethical ideal. Here I agree, contra Kaufmann. 
But Phillips is wrong to claim that Nietzsche “recommends sublimation”—which Phillips
takes to essentially involve “translation (or transformation) of the drive’s objects into the
imaginative and mental”286—and the “refined immorality” that it produces.287 Here he cites a
passage in BGE 23, the relevant portion of which is Nietzsche’s claim that “even a doctrine of
the reciprocal dependence of the ‘good’ and the ‘wicked’ drives, causes (as refined immorality
[feinere Immoralität]) distress and aversion in a still hale and hearty conscience—still more so, a
doctrine of the derivation of all good impulses from wicked ones” (BGE 23). But this is simply a
claim about the psychological impact of his own “doctrine of the derivation of all good impulses
from wicked ones”—let alone the weaker “doctrine of the reciprocal dependence of the ‘good’
and ‘wicked’ drives” that he actually explicitly calls ‘refined immorality.’ Nietzsche does not
claim here that his own ethical doctrine is better than “unrefined” forms of will to power. He at
most observes that his own philosophical doctrine is “refined.” And he clearly believes that his
own doctrine is good. But he never claims that it is better than more “unrefined” expressions of
similarly-powerful drives. More broadly, Nietzsche certainly seems to favor Goethe over Borgia.
And this is clearly not because Borgia is more “evil.” But it is also not at all clear that it is
because Goethe is more “refined.” Phillips hence fails to see how radical Nietzsche’s view truly
is. Nietzsche does not “recommend” that drives augment their power specifically via redirection
into the “imaginative and spiritual” domain. He simply recommends will to power.
Nietzsche accepts that drives’ translation into the “imaginative and spiritual” domain can
be valuable, but he also clearly believes that it can be degenerate. For instance, consider his





288For “Genuine philosophers,” Nietzsche claims, “‘knowing’ is creating . . . [and] will to truth is—will to power” 
(BGE 211).
117
They all pose as if they had discovered and reached their real opinions through
the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic . . . while at
bottom it is an assumption, a hunch, indeed a kind of ‘inspiration’—most often a
desire of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract [ein abstrakt
gemachter und durchgesiebter Herzenswunsch]—that they defend with reasons
they have sought after the fact. They are all advocates who resent that name, and
for the most part even wily spokesmen for their prejudices which they baptize
‘truths’—and very far from having the courage of the conscience that admits this,
precisely this, to itself; very far from having the good taste of the courage which
also lets this be known, whether to warn an enemy or friend, or, from exuberance,
to mock itself. (BGE 5)289
Nietzsche here explicitly suggests that philosophical theories are often rooted in “a desire of the
heart that has been filtered and made abstract”—which strongly evokes his aforementioned
appeal to the “sublimation” of primal “joy in cruelty” into “imaginative and spiritual” modes of
expression. But he also claims that this sublimation into philosophical “dialectic” is often
cowardly, hence presumably often worse than unsublimated forms of unapologetic
“advocacy.”290
Many other philosophers and artists take the transformation of “crude” nature into more
“imaginative and spiritual” phenomena to be inherently valuable, of course, which can promote a
corresponding misinterpretation of Nietzsche. This is clearly Milton’s view, for instance. And a
similar sentiment appears in Goethe’s autobiography, Dichtung und Warheit—which Nietzsche
does seem to have read.291 (More generally, Goethe certainly had a strong positive influence on
him.292) Goethe deploys a related metaphor, using hot air balloons instead of chemical vapors:
True poetry announces itself thus, that, as a worldly gospel, it can by internal
cheerfulness and external comfort free us from the earthly burdens which press
upon us. Like an air-balloon, it lifts us, together with the ballast which is attached
to us, into higher regions and lets the confused labyrinths of the earth lie developed
289See also GS 352, where Nietzsche criticizes moralists for trying to make the “profound mediocrity, timidity, and 
boredom” of the “herd animal” seem “nobler” and “more important” by presenting it in a spiritualized mode.
290Compare Assoun’s claim that “from Daybreak to On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche never does anything 
else but try to outwit the process of sublimation [construed as converting the ‘Grundelement’ of ‘instinct as self-
love’ into a ‘mask (of altruism)’]” (Assoun 2000, 161–62). Assoun’s account is limited insofar as he ignores various
other kinds of “vaporization” of drives, including some by “translation” into the “imaginative and spiritual” domain,
which Nietzsche clearly endorses strongly, and also refers to as “sublimation.”
291Brobjer 2008, 78.
292See, e.g. Kaufmann 1974, 154–56, 167–70; Fairley 1934; Martin 2013; Bishop and Stephenson 2005; Del Caro 
2013.
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before us as in a bird’s-eye view. The most lively, as well as the most serious
works, have the same aim of moderating both pleasure and pain by a felicitous
intellectual form.293
Here Goethe links “true poetry” to “intellectual form” that “lifts” us up from “earth” and its
“burdens which press upon us.” Two features of his view are especially noteworthy, in the
present context.
First, Goethe contrasts the domain of “intellectual form” against a lower “earthly” order,
which suggests an elevation of the spiritual-intellectual above the merely natural. And, indeed,
he elsewhere claims that “human feelings and events” could not be brought upon the stage “in
original naturalness [ursprünglicher natürlichkeit],” but rather “must be wrought, prepared,
sublimated [verarbeitet, zubereitet, sublimirt].”294 Thus Goethe contrasts “sublimated” human
feeling, implicitly tied to “true poetry” and “intellectual form,” against states of crude
“naturalness.” Notably, Emerson expresses a similar idea using a chemical analogy in “Nature”
(1836), when he characterizes art as “nature passed through the alembic of man.”295 In particular,
he brings out the aforementioned connotations of purification or refinement, claiming,“The poet,
the painter, the sculptor, the musician, the architect, seek each to concentrate this radiance of the
world on one point.”296 Likewise, in a later essay on “Art,” Emerson notes how good painters
omit “the details, the prose of nature” so as to “give us only the spirit and splendor,” and even
describes man himself as “but a finer and compacter landscape than the horizon figures.”297
Nietzsche holds certain related views, but he nevertheless does not view “higher culture”
as generally superior to “savage” or “wild” states. In the case of “Genuine philosophers,” for
instance, Nietzsche insists that “‘knowing’ is creating . . . [and] will to truth is—will to power”
(BGE 211). In the case of “genuine” philosophers, that is, the impulse “to assimilate the new to
the old, to simplify the manifold, and to overlook or repulse whatever is totally contradictory
[das gänzlich Widersprechende]” is not an unconditional or selfless pursuit of truth. Rather, it
expresses the “spirit’s power to appropriate the foreign” precisely by “retouching and falsifying
293Goethe 1867, 505. See also Goebel 2012, 6.
294Grimm and Grimm 1971. I follow Walter Kaufmann’s translation (Kaufmann 1974, 219). Note that 
Schopenhauer likewise ties ‘sublimation’ to intellectual forms, describing representations (Vorstellungen) being 
“sublimated into abstract concepts [die zu abstracten begriffen sublimirten]” (Grimm and Grimm 1971, art. 
“Sublimierung”).




the whole to suit itself,” its drive to “growth, in a word—or, more precisely, the feeling of
growth, the feeling of increased power” (BGE 230). Thus genuine philosophers’ creative
appropriation of reality in systematically “falsifying” bodies of theory is for Nietzsche a mode of
artistic representation, which “simplifies the manifold” and “overlooks” or “repulses” any
“contradictory” features of the world, as a kind of purification or refinement of “un-falsified”
nature. And here just as elsewhere, presumably, “We possess art lest we perish of the truth” (WP
822).298 Indeed, Nietzsche strikes a similar chord in reflecting on art in another unpublished note
from 1888, where he characterizes “The ugly [Das Häßliche]” as “the contradiction to art [der
Widerspruch zur Kunst]” and “that which is excluded from art [das, was ausgeschlossen wird
von der Kunst]” (WP 809). Like Emerson, then, Nietzsche does seem to view genuine art (and
artistic philosophy or science) as something like “nature passed through the alembic of man.”
But Nietzsche does not view this kind of artistic “distillation” into truly higher forms of
“imaginative and spiritual” culture as being better than “savage” or “wild” nature, per se,
because he allows that there are also higher forms of the purely “savage” or “wild.” For instance,
in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche speaks approvingly of the origin of the tragic chorus in cultic
Dionysus-worshipers raising themselves into a state of ritual frenzy through collective song and
dance. In the resultant state of ecstasy, the “chorus of primitive tragedy” found themselves
“liv[ing] in a religiously acknowledged reality under the sanction of myth and cult,”
experiencing the world as transformed into a “fictitious natural state” and themselves as likewise
“magical[ly] transform[ed]” into a chorus of “satyrs” or “fictitious natural being[s]” (BT 7)
embodying man’s “highest and most intense emotions” and “Nature, as yet unchanged by
knowledge, with the bolts of culture still unbroken” (BT 8). Of course, Nietzsche values many
forms of “higher culture,” including later Attic tragedy insofar as it involves a complex fusion of
“Dionysian” and “Apollonian” tendencies. Nevertheless, he also clearly values certain forms of
“savage” or “wild” nature. And it is far from clear that “high cultural” forms are his favorite
expressions of our basic drives. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche does arguably privilege
tragedy, viewed as the “objectification of a Dionysian state” into its “Apollonian complement”
(BT 8), above either purely Dionysian or Apollonian modes of activity. But Nietzsche later
criticized his own youthful romanticism in this book, and in particular his call for an “art of
metaphysical comfort” (BT 18). The older Nietzsche associates this drive to “metaphysical
298There is no mention of science in this context, so I am quoting quite freely.
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comfort” with romanticism and Christianity, and instead recommends learning “the art of this-
worldly comfort first” (BT “Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” 7). Part of what is at stake here,
evidently, is whether the “primordial contradiction and primordial pain in the heart of the primal
unity” that Nietzsche associates with Dionysian insight into reality (BT 6) needs to be
“redeemed” through “falsifying” Apollonian dream-images. Nietzsche’s mature view is that it
does not: pure Dionysian frenzy or “destruction of individuality” is a fully valuable mode of will
to power in its own right—albeit not the only one.
Translation into the more ethereal, “imaginative and spiritual” domain can involve
valuable forms of purification and intensification, on Nietzsche’s view. But “higher culture” can
also be polluted by “impurities,” and be attenuated or unduly otherworldly. Nietzsche speaks of
sublimation approvingly when he uses the term Sublimierung to refer to intensifying purification.
But he does not map valuable processes of “purification” directly onto the processes of
translation into the “imaginative and spiritual” domain which he also refers to using the term
‘sublimation.’ These are two distinct applications of the same basic chemical analogy—even
though in some cases Nietzsche does view development from “savage” to “high cultural”
expressions of drives as a source of intensifying purification, à la Emerson.
Finally, Goethe specifically praises the intellectual “elevation” afforded by “true poetry”
as a way of “moderating both pleasure and pain.” This evokes Freud’s later account of
sublimation:
Another technique for fending off suffering [Leidabwehr] is the employment of
the displacements of libido [Libidoverschiebungen] which our mental apparatus
permits of and through which its function gains so much in flexibility. The task
here is that of shifting the instinctual aims [Triebziele] in such a way that they
cannot come up against frustration from the external world. In this, sublimation
of the instincts [Sublimierung der Triebe] lends its assistance. One gains the
most if one can sufficiently heighten the yield of pleasure [Lustgewinn] from
the sources of psychical and intellectual [psychischer und intellektueller] work.
When that is so, fate [Das Schicksal] can do little against one. A satisfaction of
this kind, such as an artist’s joy in creating, in giving his phantasies body, or a
scientist’s in solving problems or discovering truths, has a special quality
which we shall certainly one day be able to characterize in metapsychological
terms. At present we can only say figuratively that such satisfactions seem
‘finer and higher’ [feiner und höher]. But their intensity is mild [gedämpft] as
compared with that derived from the sating of crude and primary instinctual
impulses [grober, primärer Triebregungen]; it does not convulse our physical
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being [sie erschüttern nicht unsere Leiblichkeit].299
For Freud as for Goethe, sublimation of natural drives into intellectual or artistic-creative modes
of expression functions to protect us from excessive pain, and is valuable in this respect. For both
thinkers, moreover, sublimation of natural feeling or impulse leads to a moderation of pleasure.
Goethe evidently views this moderating effect as positive. Freud’s characterization is more
ambiguous, but also seems broadly positive: he apparently thinks that it is appropriate or healthy
to avoid the “jarring” impact of “crude and primary impulses.” Here note that Freud’s only direct
criticisms of sublimation, in this broader passage, are that it is “accessible to only a few people,”
and that even to them it “cannot give complete protection from suffering [vollkommenen
Leidensschutz].”300
Goethe’s and Freud’s approving emphasis on the moderating effect of natural feelings’ or
impulses’ translation into the “imaginative and spiritual” domain is almost directly opposed to
Nietzsche’s view, insofar as he takes this particular kind of sublimation to be praiseworthy.
Thus, Nietzsche writes in a note from 1888 that “the effect of works of art is to excite the state
that creates art—intoxication [Rausch; alternately, ‘frenzy’]” (WP 821).301 And, as he clarifies in
another note from 1888, this “condition of pleasure called intoxication” is “precisely an exalted
feeling of power” (WP 800). On Nietzsche’s view, Apollonian and Dionysian art forms therefore
both elicit a state of “intoxication” (T I “Skirmishes,” 10). Although he does associate the
Apollonian with “extreme calm,” he qualifies that Apollonian Rausch still involves “sexuality
and voluptuousness,” and even clarifies that this “extreme calm” is “more strictly” to be viewed
as “the retardation of the feelings of time and space” (WP 799). Thus insofar as Nietzsche takes
some processes of translation into the “imaginative and spiritual” domain to be valuable, it is
clearly not because he thinks that they involve the moderation of our drives. Quite the opposite:
he claims that “All art works tonically, increases strength, inflames desire (i.e. the feeling of
strength), excites all the more subtle recollections of intoxication” (WP 809). Nor does this kind
of artistic intensification of our drives involve moderation of pain or pleasure, on Nietzsche’s
view. Here recall his claim that the translation of our basic “joy in cruelty” into the “imaginative
299Freud 1962, 26–27.
300Freud 1962, 27.
301Nietzsche sometimes uses Rausch in a narrower sense. In The Birth of Tragedy, for example, he maps the 
distinction between Apollonian and Dionysian drives onto “dreams and intoxication [des Traumes und des 
Rausches]” (BT 1).
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and spiritual” domain is directly related to the fact that “pain today hurts more” (GM II.7).
Likewise, in Human, All Too Human he longs for a “utopia” or a “better ordering of society” that
leads “step by step up to him who is most sensitive to the most highly sublimated species of
suffering [die höchsten sublimirtesten Gattungen des Leidens] and who therefore suffers even
when life is alleviated to the greatest degree possible” (HH I.462).
Hence, to the extent that Nietzsche does value some (but not all) processes of translation
into the “imaginative and spiritual” domain, it is precisely insofar as they intensify our basic
drives, as well as associated forms of pain or joy. Correspondingly, where this form of
sublimation has the opposite effect—as in lesser philosophers’ pretense to “cold, pure, divinely
unconcerned dialectic” or the “sublimations and small doses” of vanity in our “late and very
moderated state of society”—Nietzsche evidently sees it as weak, unhealthy, and to be criticized.
Could it not be that Nietzsche most highly esteems “imaginative and spiritual” modes of
outlet for powerful drives, or “high cultural” expressions of strength, vitality etc.—even if he
values “savage” expressions of power above “spiritual” expressions of weakness or sickness?302
In response to this question, which merits extended examination in its own right, I will here
simply conclude with a few fairly modest interpretive points. First, the hypothesis that a
preference for “spiritual” over “natural” forms of activity is a ceteris paribus consideration for
Nietzsche—for example, a “tiebreaking” consideration to be deployed only when given
“spiritual” and “natural” forms of activity reflect the same degree of underlying strength, power,
health etc.—is consistent with my basic claim that Nietzsche is fundamentally indifferent to the
distinction between “nature” and “culture.” The intuitive “nature vs. culture” distinction is at
most a second-order concern for Nietzsche, subordinate to his more basic evaluative emphasis on
drives’ strength or the continual growth of their power.
Second, however, the textual case for even this limited “tiebreaker” account is hardly
conclusive. For instance, as I have argued, Nietzsche uses Sublimierung to refer to a range of
psychological analogues of chemical vaporization, not all of which concern drives’ translation to
the imaginative and spiritual domain. Hence, while Nietzsche’s positive uses of Sublimierung
may appear to be clear evidence that he has a ceteris paribus preference for imaginative and
spiritual outlets of drives, in fact they often are not. Moreover, while he evidently highly values
many “cultural” phenomena, it is also clear that Nietzsche highly values certain purely “natural”
302I am grateful to one anonymous referee at the Journal of the History of Philosophy for pressing me on this point,
and to another for encouraging me to offer further concrete examples of Nietzsche criticizing sublimation.
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things, including “titanic” and “barbaric” forces (BT 4).303 Relatedly, Nietzsche’s narrowly
ethical ideal could involve powerful drives’ imaginative and spiritual outlet even if his more
basic standard of will to power does not.
In this light, finally, one might distinguish between two senses of ‘culture,’ on
Nietzsche’s behalf. On the one hand, culture can be viewed through a radically naturalistic lens,
as including even manifestations of the “titanic” and “barbaric” natural forces which Nietzsche
links to the creative-destructive activity of the “entirely reckless and amoral artist-god” or
“artist’s meaning” that he takes himself to have illuminated in The Birth of Tragedy (BT
“Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” 5). On the other hand, however, culture (and art) can be taken to
be directly opposed to such “merely natural” phenomena. Nietzsche clearly values culture in the
former, more naturalistic sense very highly. But culture in this sense evidently need not involve
drives’ translation to the “imaginative and spiritual” domain, at least in any way that always
“elevates” them up from “savage” and into “refined” modes of expression.
7.5. Existing accounts of Nietzschean sublimation tend to stress only certain of his uses
of the term Sublimierung, and therefore impute a more idiosyncratic concept to him than is truly
warranted. Indeed, some commentators offer little or no direct textual evidence in support of
their interpretations.304 Although I have not discussed all of Nietzsche’s uses of the term, I do
take myself to have presented and explicated a wider range of cases than other commentators.
And I have done so using a flexible interpretive framework that plausibly extends to most if not
all other Nietzschean uses of Sublimierung and its cognates.
The central concept underlying most if not all Nietzschean uses of Sublimierung and its
cognates is just a broad psychological analogue of the traditional (al)chemical concept: the
“vaporization” of drives. Nietzsche emphasizes different features or connotations of chemical
sublimation in different rhetorical contexts, as he extends the notion to the psychological domain
by analogy. Hence, sometimes Nietzschean sublimation yields ennobling elevation, or purity in a
positive sense—the intensified “sublimate” of an unrefined original sample. But Nietzschean
sublimation can also yield drives that are attenuated or otherworldly, in a pejorative sense.
303Consider also Nietzsche’s praise of the world as a “sea of forces flowing and rushing together” (WP 1067). It is 
not clear, in WP 1067, that he takes human creativity to be the “highest” such force. For similar kinds of holism with
strongly naturalistic undertones, see, e.g. TI “What the Germans Lack,” 49; WP 417.
304E.g. regarding Gemes’s account, see note 251.
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If this were merely a terminological issue, it would not be terribly important. But it is not.
Terminological confusion on this point can easily promote conceptual confusion, and obscures
important Nietzschean ideas. In particular, one might be led to seriously misunderstand the
evaluative connotations of Nietzsche’s uses of ‘sublimation’ and its cognates, if one fails to
appreciate that he uses the term in several distinct ways, all stemming from a basic psychological
analogy to the traditional sense of chemical vaporization. More specifically still, one might be
led to seriously misinterpret Nietzsche’s evaluation of drives’ “sublimation” into “imaginative
and spiritual” modes of expression, if one conflates his different uses of the term.
Some other commentators have recognized that Nietzsche is skeptical of at least certain
kinds of “sublimation.”305 And some have indicated the traditional chemical sense of the term in
passing.306 But none have synthesized these lines of analysis by relating a wide array of both
negative and positive Nietzschean uses of Sublimierung to his multivalent application of the
basic chemical analogy, as I have tried to do above—with attention to the chemical notion’s
wider role in modern intellectual history. And none have suggested that the connotative
complexity of the chemical notion may help to explain why it is easy to overstate how much or
how clearly Nietzsche values drives’ redirection into the “imaginative and spiritual” domain.
Indeed, Nietzsche’s often-neglected critical remarks about sublimation help to reveal that
he does not hold sophisticated forms of artistic or intellectual creativity above “coarser”
expressions of our basic drives, per se. Rather, he is often precisely concerned to show how
drives’ “vaporization” into the imaginative and spiritual domain can run counter to higher forms
of will to power or self-overcoming. Basic drives can manifest in their full force as culture, or as
refinement into culture. But Nietzsche ultimately values basic drives’ powerful expression,
without preferring either that this occur in the mode of “higher culture” or as “savage” natural
impulse.
305E.g. Assoun 2000, 161–62 (see note 290); and Gasser 1997, 361–64.
306E.g. Kaufmann, Phillips, and Gasser (see note 271); also Blättler and Assoun (see note 279).
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CHAPTER III
Force as the Ground of Poetic Objectivity
8. Force as Drive:
On Will, Passion, and 'Aesthetic' Freedom from Desire in Nietzsche, Schiller, and Kant
8.1 . The connection between power and willful activity, for Nietzsche, brings his
metaphysical vision of will to power into direct contact with idealistic theories of practical
rationality. For the idealist, as such, willing is striving to satisfy desires. In the modern
philosophical tradition, desires are in turn often divided into sensuous desires and rational
desires, corresponding to the broader metaphysical opposition between body and mind—or, most
fundamentally, between particularity and universality. Influenced in part by mediating figures
like Schiller (despite Schiller's own moralistic and idealistic tendencies), Nietzsche breaks free
from this traditional association between willful activity and desire-satisfaction. Willing is thus
re-conceived as the active expression of internal power or abundance, as opposed to desire-
satisfaction construed as an expression of external need or lack. This in turn corresponds to a
phenomenological distinction, which I elaborate below, between feelings of true passion and
those of mere desire.
Nietzsche's account of willful activity can thus be further illuminated by analyzing its
relationship to earlier notions of will in Kantian and post-Kantian idealisms. To this end, I will
examine Nietzsche's criticism of Kantian aesthetic 'disinterestedness', and its connection to
Schiller. This sudden emphasis on aesthetic theory may seem odd. But it is not at all out of place,
as will quickly become clear.
The basic point of the following analysis is to establish the following: Nietzsche's notion
of willful activity bears strong structural similarities to Schiller's proto-Romantic notion of
impassioned aesthetic 'play', which in turn directly reflects his influence by Kant's account of
'freedom from desire' in experiences of beautiful form. Indeed, the following analysis suggests
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that Schiller is plausibly an important historical influence on Nietzsche, in this regard, both
directly and indirectly. Nietzsche's notion of power thus emerges conceptually (and historically)
from idealistic notions of will, through a process of systematic naturalization. The result, again,
is Nietzsche's quasi-Romantic notion of will to power as amoral and all-pervasive vital force. 
I wish to appropriate many of these Nietzschean conclusions for my own metaphysical
and ontological account of force. Hence, the present analysis further clarifies my notion of force,
as well as its broader intellectual historical context. Ultimately, I will then move further beyond
(what I argue is) Nietzsche's view, by drawing several basic non-Nietzschean distinctions in the
domain of aesthetic experience. Salient among these will be a distinction between passion and
vitality, or the impassioned feeling of life, in particular. Namely, I claim that vitality is a real
structure comprising agonistically-interacting passions. This feeling of life or vitality is elicited,
in the aesthetic domain, by beautiful form as such. In turn, I claim that the ground of beauty is
real agonistic interaction, which appears to us as holistic structures comprising well-matched
sensory forces. To that end, however, it is best now to focus on Nietzsche, Schiller, and Kant.
8.2. Again, Nietzsche is highly critical of Kant's account of aesthetic 'disinterestedness'.
But Nietzsche's criticism of Kantian aesthetic disinterestedness reflects his own commitment to
claims that closely resemble certain Kantian aesthetic principles, specifically as reinterpreted by
Schiller. This positive structural continuity between Kantian aesthetic theory and Nietzsche's
criticism thereof, mediated by Schiller, has not been noted in the literature on the relation of
Schiller's aesthetic theory to Nietzsche's.307 However, the fact that there was such a surprising
line of structural continuity indicates the need to distinguish between two currents of Romantic
aesthetic theory invoking two kinds of disinterestedness: an idealistic current, which emphasizes
the interplay of sensuous and rational faculties; and a dynamistic current, which asserts the
307 For previous analyses of Nietzsche's relationship to Schiller, see Rehder 1976; Bennett 1979; Silk and Stern 
1981 (p. 301-304); Del Caro 1989; Martin 1995 and 1996; Prange 2006; Kalar 2008; and Katsafanas 2011. For 
Nietzsche's relationship to broader traditions of Classicism, see Del Caro 1980; Bishop and Stephenson 2005. Silk 
and Stern (1981, 301) discuss disinterestedness, but simply suggest that Nietzsche “half undo[es]” the “nexus 
between art and disinterestedness” that one finds in Kant and Schiller. In no way do they claim that Nietzsche's view
is positively influenced by Schiller's account of disinterestedness, as I argue.
For example, Came (2009) argues that Nietzsche's aesthetic theory is positively influenced by 
Schopenhauer's conception of disinterestedness. Our accounts are largely compatible. But Came supposes that “the 
Nietzschean aesthetic entails a complete destruction of the subject.” This is only plausible with respect to Dionysian 
(not Apollonian) 'frenzy' [Rausch], however. Moreover, Came observes that “unlike Schopenhauer’s conception of 
disinterestedness, Nietzsche’s notion of Rausch does not exclude the processes of desire.” But he does not explain 
this difference, whereas I do, by appeal to Schiller's notion of disinterest. This example indicates the kind of 
advantages that my account has vis-à-vis salient alternatives.
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aesthetic character of all genuine passion and creative power, even in the mode of animalistic
vitality or physical force. This illuminates post-Kantian aesthetics. And it also indicates a
plausible line of influence, both direct and indirect, by Schiller on Nietzsche, which clarifies a
crucial aspect of the intellectual historical genealogy underlying 'will to power'.
For Kant, the experience of beauty is 'disinterested' in that it involves a kind of pleasure
which is neither based in, nor directly gives rise to, any desires. Hence, he takes pleasure in the
beautiful to be importantly different from 'interested' satisfaction in both the merely 'agreeable'
objects of sensuous desire and the instrumentally or finally 'good' objects of rational desire. In
turn, freedom from desire may be intuitively associated with freedom from the passions. Thus
one might expect that aesthetic theorists directly inspired by Kant's Critique of Judgment (1790)
would characterize the experience of beauty as thoroughly dispassionate.
But the actual uptake of Kantian aesthetic theory was from the outset more complex.
Already in Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795), which he acknowledges
are based “for the most part” in Kantian principles,308 one finds what appears to be a strange
ambivalence towards the passions. On the one hand, Schiller insists that an “impassioned fine
art” is a “contradiction in terms,” because “the inevitable effect of the Beautiful is freedom from
passions [Leidenschaften].”309 On the other hand, though, he also argues that aesthetic freedom
originates in a kind of “physical play” [physische Spiel] manifest in phenomena like 'joyous
movement' and 'high-spirited roaring' which seem paradigmatically impassioned:
Certainly Nature has given even to the creatures without reason more than the bare
necessities of life, and cast a gleam of freedom over the darkness of animal existence.
When the lion is not gnawed by hunger and no beast of prey is challenging him to
battle, his idle energy creates for itself an object; he fills the echoing desert with his
high-spirited roaring, and his exuberant power [üppige Kraft] enjoys itself in
purposeless display [zwecklosem Aufwand]. The insect swarms with joyous life in the
sunbeam; and it is assuredly not the cry of desire [der Begierde] which we hear in the
melodious warbling of the song-bird. Undeniably there is freedom in these
movements, but not freedom from need [Bedürfnis] in general, simply from a definite
external need. The animal works when deprivation [ein Mangel] is the mainspring of
its activity, and it plays when the fullness of its strength is this mainspring, when





Admittedly, in one sense there is simply no tension here. Schiller thinks that unstructured
'physical play' or animalistic 'exuberant power' falls short of aesthetic play until and insofar as it
takes on form—specifically, rational form. The resultant 'reciprocal action' of sensuous and
rational impulses just is what he means by 'freedom from passions.' And this is related, at least,
to Kant's own theory of disinterested pleasure in the 'free play' of imagination and understanding.
However, I argue below that this is an oversimplification. Schiller's account of
disinterestedness in fact involves a simultaneous appeal to two different distinctions: first, the
aforementioned distinction between one-sided determination by either one's 'sense impulse'
[Stofftrieb] or (rational) 'form impulse' [Formtrieb], and states of aesthetic play in which these
two impulses are “at once mutually subordinated and coordinated”;311 second, the distinction
between work and play, or activity rooted in 'desire', 'need', 'deprivation', etc., as opposed to that
which expresses 'exuberant power' or 'superabundant life'. Schiller takes the experience of beauty
to be disinterested in two distinct ways: insofar as sense and reason both function in it as loci of
impassioned play, not desire-driven work; and insofar as it involves aesthetic play, not just
physical play. Notably, no previous commentators seem to have observed this dual account.312 
Schiller's distinction between desire-driven 'work' and impassioned 'play' has strong
echoes in Nietzsche's aesthetic theory (and broader philosophy). Below I examine these deep
structural continuities between Kant and Nietzsche, mediated by Schiller, with particular
attention to the way in which Schiller's generic notion of play—which is influenced by Kant's
claim that aesthetic pleasure is orthogonal to desire-satisfaction—becomes decoupled from his
(further) Kantian view that aesthetic play essentially involves the interaction of reason and sense.
The result, I suggest, is a self-standing opposition between desires and passions, with the latter
understood as feelings of power lacking any necessary connection to reason or objective
judgment. This motivates a recognizably Romantic vision of aesthetic disinterestedness, as
freedom from desire realized in a state of creative determination by passion.
8.3. To understand these lines of conceptual connection and their interrelation, we must
first review some basic features of Kant's and Schiller's accounts. Kant's appeal to disinterested
311Schiller 1795/2014, 54 n. 8.
312Guyer (1993b) examines 'Kant and Schiller on disinterestedness,' for instance, but discusses only the harmony of
sensuous and rational drives, not the contrast between desire-driven activity and power-driven activity. More 
typically, Wilm (1906), Grossman (1968), and Beiser (2005) mention disinterestedness only in passing as they 
examine Schiller's views, without attempting to analyze the notion on his behalf.
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pleasure in beauty reflects his intellectual debt to 18th-century British aesthetic theorists.313 For
our purposes, however, it will prove more helpful to consider his account on its own terms. By
'interest', then, Kant means “[t]he satisfaction that we combine with the representation of the
existence of an object.”314 In turn, according to Kant, interested satisfaction is always grounded
in, or else itself grounds, a desire.315 In cases where a desire is grounded in interested
satisfaction, he refers to the object of this desire as merely agreeable. Intuitively, the agreeable is
that which we want more of—“it excites a desire for objects of the same sort”—simply because
it “gratifies” us in a bodily way.316 Kant presents as paradigmatic agreeable things pleasant
'sensations', e.g. pleasant impressions of objects' color or tone317—hence presumably also their
taste, smell, or tactile quality. As opposed to the agreeable, Kant claims that our satisfaction in
representing the existence of something good is grounded in our rational desire for it.318 Whether
we take an object or action to be good in itself or merely a means to such an end,319 that is, we
take satisfaction in the representation of its existence, and in general do so independently of its
capacity to provide us with immediate sensory gratification. Finally, Kant insists that the sensory
'matter' in our representations of beautiful objects cannot be the ground of disinterested pleasure,
but at most interested pleasure in agreeable things. On Kant's view, we can take disinterested
pleasure only in reflection upon the spatiotemporal “shape or play” of this sensory matter,320 i.e.,
aesthetic form. Kantian disinterested pleasure is thus the feeling of freedom from desire in open-
ended reflection on beautiful aesthetic form: the 'free play'321 or 'harmonious'322 interaction of our
imagination and understanding.
Following Kant, Schiller develops his notion of disinterestedness against the backdrop of
a broader theory of human beings' “sensuous-rational nature,”323 with aesthetic experience
mediating between sensory receptivity and rational spontaneity. Broadly as Kant describes 'free
play' between imagination and understanding, Schiller identifies beauty as the object of a “play
313On 'disinterestedness' in 18th-century British aesthetics, see Stolnitz 1961a, 1961b; Berleant 1986; Guyer 1993a; 
and Rind 2002. For replies to Stolnitz, see also Dickie 1964, 1984. On Kant's relationship to this British context, 
see White 1973, Townsend 1987, and Guyer 1993b. 
314Kritik der Urteilskraft (KrU) 5:204 (Kant 1790/2000, 90).
315KrU 5:208-9 (Kant 1790/2000, 94-5).
316KrU 5:207 (Kant 1790/2000, 92).
317KrU 5:224 (Kant 1790/2000, 108-9).
318KrU 5:207-209 (Kant 1790/2000, 92-4).
319KrU 5:226 (Kant 1790/2000, 111).
320KrU 5:225 (Kant 1790/2000, 110).
321KrU 5:217 (Kant 1790/2000, 103).
322KrU 5:258 (Kant 1790/2000, 142).
323Schiller 1795/2014, 50.
130
impulse” [Spieltrieb] in which both our “sense impulse” and our “form impulse” are
combined.324 Beauty itself is thus “living shape,” where 'life' (“all material being and all that is
immediately present in the senses”) is the object of the 'sense impulse', and 'shape' (“all formal
qualities of things and all their relations to the intellectual faculties”) is the object of the 'form
impulse'.325
In the experience of beauty we avoid both “overpowering sensuousness” and
“overpowering rationality,”326 Schiller suggests, not through attenuation of either the form or
sense impulse, but rather through their “mutual[] subordinat[ion] and coordinat[ion].”327 If the
form impulse totally overpowers the sense impulse ('overpowering rationality'), then there results
a lamentable “rigidity of principles” or the “egoism of our reason.”328 In this state, natural desires
or passions are viewed simply as barriers to moral virtue, ethical principles are upheld only
robotically, and empirical science becomes perverted by dogmatic refusal to revise general
principles in light of contravening observations.329 Man thus becomes a “barbarian” whose
“principles destroy his feelings.”330 On the other hand, if the sense impulse totally overpowers
the form impulse ('overpowering sensuousness'), there results the mere “savage” whose “feelings
rule his principles”:331 a person who is driven entirely by particularistic desire and natural
impulse without regard for universal moral duty or the value of pure theoretical knowledge.
But, Schiller continues, it is also ignoble for the form and sense impulses to be 'mutually
subordinated and coordinated' simply by virtue of being equally weak. Moderation of the sense
impulse by means of a “physical incapacity and a dullness of the perceptions” deserves “nothing
but contempt,” as does moderation of the form impulse by means of an “intellectual incapacity
and a feebleness of thought and will which would degrade humanity.”332 Hence, the ideal
condition of humanity is one of “reciprocal action between the two impulses, of such a kind that
the operation of the one at the same time confirms and limits the operation of the other, and each
one severally reaches its highest manifestation precisely through the activity of the other.”333 On
324Schiller 1795/2014, 59-60.
325Schiller 1795/2014, 60.
326Schiller 1795/2014, 55 n.9.
327Schiller 1795/2014, 54 note 8.
328Schiller 1795/2014, 56 note 9.






Schiller's view, finally, this 'aesthetic condition' is the essential human condition: the “disposition
which comprises in itself the wholeness of humanity,”334 wherein we are “masters in equal
degree of our passive and our active powers.”335 Thus “Man plays only when he is in the full
sense of the word a man, and he is only wholly Man when he is playing.”336 (Likewise, poetry is
“nothing but giving mankind its most complete possible expression.”337)
Schiller's account of aesthetic disinterestedness is informed by this broadly Kantian
notion of open-ended interplay between 'form' and 'sense':
It is neither charm, nor is it dignity, that speaks to us from the superb
countenance of a Juno Ludovici;338 it is neither of them, because it is both at
once. While the womanly god demands our veneration, the godlike woman
kindles our love; but while we allow ourselves to melt in the celestial
loveliness, the celestial self-sufficiency holds us back in awe.[...]Irresistibly
seized and attracted by the one quality, and held at a distance by the other, we
find ourselves at the same time in the condition of utter rest and extreme
movement, and the result is that wonderful emotion for which reason has no
conception and language no name.339
Here Schiller's appeals to 'charm', 'love', and 'attraction' evidently correspond to the Kantian
claim that the objects of sensuous desire are agreeable, and his appeals to 'dignity', 'veneration',
and 'awe' evidently correspond to the Kantian claim that the objects of rational desire are good.
In Kantian terms, that is, Schiller seems to be claiming that the beautiful is at once agreeable
and good, yet in a specific way that mitigates the typically 'interested' character of our pleasure
in either. This can be understood as a fairly intuitive phenomenological claim: it is precisely in
the reciprocal coordination of sensuous and rational modes of necessitation that (Schiller
suggests) we cease to experience either as a burdensome load or alien force of compulsion, and
so first feel radically unencumbered, empowered, and joyful—and in this sense, free. 'Ideas'
make 'actuality' seem “small” by comparison. For instance, self-seeking individualism seems
petty and small by comparison to properly moral concern for the welfare of all people. And




337Schiller 1795-6/1966, 111. 
338I.e., the head of a 1st-century Roman statue of the goddess Juno. One commentator argues that Schiller's choice 
“almost certainly reflects the influence of Goethe,” who saw the sculpture in Rome (MacLeod 1998, 244 n. 64).
339Schiller 1795/2014, 64.
132
appear ethereal and insubstantial, when brought into contact with concrete sensuous 'perception'.
In both directions, then, it is not the attenuation of 'form' and 'sense' impulses but rather their full
reciprocal activation that lifts us out of seriousness into play.340 Schiller's account of aesthetic
disinterestedness apparently differs from Kant's. For Kant, aesthetic experience is purely
contemplative, in that it involves neither rational nor sensuous desires—not a balance of the two,
as Schiller apparently claims. In fact, I argue below, Schiller appeals to a balance of rational and
sensuous passions, not desires. This is still arguably opposed to Kant's view, but less clearly so.
8.4. We may now turn to Nietzsche's critique of Kantian disinterestedness, which will
help to better orient further analysis of his relationship to Schiller. Nietzsche's clearest criticism
of Kantian aesthetic disinterestedness occurs in Essay III, §6 of On the Genealogy of Morals
(1887).341 Here Nietzsche complains that Kant's account unduly privileges the experience of the
artistic 'spectator' [Zuschauer] over “the point of view of the artist (the creator).”342 (In a note
from 1888, Nietzsche likewise insists that “to demand of the artist that he should practice the
perspective of the audience (of the critic—) means to demand that he should impoverish himself
and his creative power—.”343) He also questions Kant's association of beauty with “impersonality
and universality,” which he notes are elsewhere used to dignify knowledge:
This is not the place to inquire whether this [viz., Kant's thinking that he was
honoring art by associating beauty prominently with impersonality and
universality, as predicates which also 'establish the honor of knowledge'] was
essentially a mistake; all I wish to underline is that Kant, like all philosophers,
instead of envisaging the aesthetic problem from the point of view of the artist
(the creator), considered art and the beautiful purely from that of the 'spectator,'
and unconsciously introduced the 'spectator' into the concept 'beautiful.' It
would not have been so bad if this 'spectator' had at least been sufficiently
familiar to the philosophers of beauty—namely, as a great personal fact and
experience, as an abundance of vivid authentic experiences, desires
[Begierden], surprises, and delights in the realm of the beautiful! But I fear that
340Schiller 1795/2014, 62. Schiller elsewhere appeals to 'seriousness' in a distinct and more complimentary sense—
e.g. he praises “the high solemnity of feeling that must underlie all play if it is to be poetic” (Schiller 1795-
6/1966, 123), and argues that “[e]verywhere too little seriousness underlies [Voltaire's] ridicule” (ibid., 124).
341I cite Nietzsche’s texts by section and part number using the standard English abbreviations: A = The Antichrist, 
BGE = Beyond Good and Evil, BT = The Birth of Tragedy, EH = Ecce Homo, GM = On the Genealogy of 
Morals, GS = The Gay Science, NCW = Nietzsche Contra Wagner, TI = Twilight of the Idols, WP = The Will to 
Power, Z = Thus Spoke Zarathustra. I use the Kaufmann and Hollingdale translations. For some notes, I cite 
KSA = Kritische Gesamtausgabe, edited by Colli and Montinari, by volume, fragment and aphorism number.
342GM III, 6. 
343WP 811.
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the reverse has always been the case; and so they have offered us, from the
beginning, definitions in which, as in Kant's famous definition of the beautiful,
a lack of any refined first-hand experience reposes in the shape of a fat worm
of error. 'That is beautiful,' said Kant, 'which gives us pleasure without
interest.'344
Insofar as the 'abundance of vivid authentic experiences, desires, surprises, and delights in the
realm of the beautiful' is a manifestly personal experience, Nietzsche argues that only someone
lacking this sort of 'refined first-hand experience' with beauty could claim that judgments of taste
are rendered from an 'impersonal' point of view. Moreover, he clearly associates 'vivid authentic
experiences, desires, surprises, and delights' with the 'interestedness' of pleasure in beauty.
This link is further clarified by Nietzsche's subsequent interpretation of a passage in
which Stendhal describes the beautiful as 'une promesse de bonheur' ('a promise of happiness').
“[T]o [Stendhal],” Nietzsche suggests, “the fact seems to be precisely that the beautiful arouses
the will ('interestedness') [die Erregung des Willens (des 'Interesses')].”345 Here several threads of
Nietzsche's critique come together. Stendhal is a “genuine 'spectator' and artist,” on Nietzsche's
view, and so naturally understands beauty from this creative perspective as opposed to that of a
creatively inert spectator.346 Part of what Stendahl sees from this creative perspective, in turn, is
that beauty produces 'arousal of the will', which is directly opposed to the 'will-lessness' that
Schopenhauer links to aesthetic experience.347 For Nietzsche, this state of 'arousal' is personal in
that it involves 'an abundance of vivid authentic experiences, desires, surprises, and delights'
with respect to beauty. And he identifies this 'arousal of will' in 'personal' experiences directly
with the 'interestedness' of truly artistic or creative responses to beauty.348
According to Nietzsche, then, the Kantian theory of disinterestedness reflects Kant's
merely spectatorial and so overly passive relationship to beauty. Creative people understand that
344GM III, 6.
345GM III, 6. See Nehamas 2007 for thoughtful reflection upon Stendahl's remark vis-à-vis Nietzsche and Kant.
346GM III, 6.
347Schopenhauer (1819/1966, 219) takes contemplation of beauty to be a “painless state” of temporary “freed[om] 
from the terrible pressure of the will,” in which we “celebrate the Sabbath of the penal servitude of willing.”
348To be in a state of 'aroused will' is plausibly to be willful as opposed to will-less, for Nietzsche. The broader 
subject of the third essay of the Genealogy is the meaning of the 'ascetic ideal' that Nietszche takes to manifest in
a self-abnegating drive to be will-less (GM III, 28). In GM III, 6 Nietzsche is also attacking Schopenhauer, who 
claims that pleasure in beauty arises from self-consciousness “not as an individual, but as pure, will-less subject 
of cognition,” such that “our attention is no longer directed to the motives of willing but instead grasps things 
freed from their relation to the will, and hence considers them without interests, without subjectivity, purely 
objectively” (Schopenhauer 1819/1966, 219). Schopenhauer's Kantianism is mediated by his own pessimistic 
theory of individualized willing as essentially tied to suffering, grounded in alienation from the objects of desire. 
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beauty in fact systematically arouses the will, Nietzsche thinks, precisely because their creative
power itself is such a state of willful 'arousal'. Thus, in Twilight of the Idols (1889), Nietzsche
insists that 'Apollonian' and 'Dionysian' art forms both elicit a state of 'frenzy' or 'intoxication'
[Rausch].349 More explicitly, he writes in a note from 1888 that “the effect of works of art is to
excite the same state that creates art—intoxication.”350 And, as he clarifies in another note from
1888, this “condition of pleasure called intoxication” is “precisely an exalted feeling of
power.”351
Finally, for the purposes of the present analysis, it should be emphasized that Nietzsche
connects creative 'arousal' in states of 'interested' willful engagement with beauty directly to
desire, including even paradigmatically sensuous desires like basic feelings of sexual attraction:
If our aestheticians never weary of asserting in Kant's favor that, under the
spell of beauty, one can even view undraped female statues 'without
interest,' one may laugh a little at their expense: the experiences of artists
on this ticklish point are more 'interesting,' and Pygmalion was in any event
not necessarily an 'unaesthetic man.' Let us think the more highly of the
innocence of our aestheticians which is reflected in such arguments; let us,
for example, credit it to the honor of Kant that he should expatiate on the
peculiar properties of the sense of touch with the naiveté of a country
parson! (GM III, 6)
Here one may also recall Nietzsche's explicit appeal to 'desires' [Begierden] as part of the 'great
personal fact and experience' that a 'genuine “spectator” and artist' would associate with beauty.
8.5. Schiller anticipates Nietzsche's dual emphasis on the point of view of 'creators' rather
than 'spectators' and on the 'arousal of will' in genuinely creative receptivity to beauty, in certain
respects. This is especially noteworthy insofar as Schiller's aesthetic theory is heavily inspired by
his reading of Kant. By no means do I claim that Schiller was Nietzsche's main or only influence
in this context.352 (Nietzsche did read Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man in
349TI “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man,” 10.
350WP 821. Nietzsche does not always use Rausch so expansively. In The Birth of Tragedy, e.g., he maps the 
distinction between Apollonian and Dionysian drives onto dreams and intoxication ['des Traumes und des 
Rausches'] (BT 1). 
351WP 800 [1888].
352Among others, Emerson and Goethe also likely guided Nietzsche's hostility to 'will-less' aesthetic contemplation.
(Nietzsche's view of Goethe was in part mediated by Emerson's account in Representative Men—see Brobjer 
2008, 247.) A broader Romantic tradition also clearly influenced Nietzsche's notion of Dionysian ecstasy, and 
his emphasis on creative-destructive power and nature's 'superabundance'—all of which bears on his assessment 
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1862, studied his Sämtliche Werke and essay On Naive and Sentimental Poetry in 1871, and
returned to the latter again in 1873.353) But Schiller's particularly close theoretical proximity to
Kant, on various points, helps to show how Nietzsche's appeal to 'willful arousal' in creative
responses to beauty echoes accounts of disinterestedness arising within the Kantian tradition.
As we have seen, Schiller evidently understands aesthetic disinterestedness, not as the
absence of interests or desires, but as freedom in the reciprocal coordination of sensuous and
rational drives: “[...]the freedom in which [one] quite rightly place[s] the essence of Beauty is not
lawlessness but harmony of laws, not arbitrariness but the utmost inner necessity.”354 Likewise:
“[e]very exclusive domination of either of [Man’s] two fundamental impulses is for him a
condition of constraint and of force, and freedom consists solely in the co-operation of both his
natures.”355 Clearly, these formulations indicate how to properly interpret Schiller's claim that an
“impassioned fine art” is a “contradiction in terms,” and “no less self-contradictory is a fine
instructive (didactic) or improving (moral) art, for nothing is more at variance with the concept
of Beauty than that it should have a tendentious effect upon the character.”356 For Schiller, beauty
elicits freedom from sensuous 'passions' and avoids 'tendentious' moral-rational effects because it
involves the harmony of sensuous and rational laws, not their absence or attenuation.
Some of Nietzsche's central criticisms of Kantian aesthetic disinterestedness therefore do
not apply to Schiller's account, at least in any straightforward way. Again, Nietzsche insists that
Pygmalion was “not necessarily an 'unaesthetic man'” by virtue of falling in love with the statue
he carves, and so chastises Kant for approaching aesthetics “with the naiveté of a country
parson.” But as we saw above, Schiller explicitly allows that the Juno Ludovici's sensuous aspect
“kindles our love”: we are “irresistibly seized and attracted” by it, as a godlike woman, and “melt
in [its] celestial loveliness.” Schiller simply adds that we are equally held at distance from the
statue insofar as it stimulates our drive to rational form, as a womanly god who “demands our
veneration.” If anything, then, Nietzsche's analysis may appear more naive than Schiller's. For in
his rush to reject the anti-sensualism that he sees in the Kantian notion of aesthetic
disinterestedness, Nietzsche arguably fails to appreciate the extent to which Kant's view
of aesthetic disinterestedness, as I will argue. See Bauemer 1976 for a survey of this Dionysian tradition. See 
also Norman 2002, on Nietzsche's relationship to early Romanticism. These studies of Nietzsche and 






emphasizes the full activation of sensuous and rational powers, in equal measure. This is the crux
of the Kantian notion of 'free play', after all, at least as interpreted by theorists like Schiller.
Here one may object: if Nietzsche reacts to Kantian aesthetic theory with such intense
aversion, surely this indicates that Nietzsche's criticism of aesthetic disinterestedness is not
directly influenced by Schiller, at least insofar as Schiller's view is still broadly Kantian? Here
several points are worth clearly noting. First, Nietzsche's criticism of Kant is at least in part
predicated on his hostility to Schopenhauer's distinctive interpretation of Kantian aesthetic
disinterestedness, in terms of the cessation of 'interested' activity like sexual desire.357 To some
extent, Nietzsche even seems to be aware of the fact that he is at least as much engaged with
Schopenhauer's version of Kantian aesthetic theory, in GM III §6, as he is with Kant himself.358
Thus, insofar as Schopenhauer's interpretation of Kant is far from clearly correct, by comparison
to less ascetic interpretations like Schiller's, Nietzsche may well reject Schopenhauer's
Kantianism in a way that reflects his own positive influence by Schiller's Kantianism. Insofar as
Nietzsche takes Schopenhauer's interpretation of aesthetic disinterestedness to accurately reflect
Kant's view, in turn, Nietzsche himself seems not to clearly apprehend this complex dynamic.
Nor does Schopenhauer's interpretation of Kantian aesthetic disinterestedness have to be
simply wrong, in order for Schiller's alternate interpretation to be at least partly accurate. Rather,
it is most plausible that both Schopenhauer and Schiller here understand something real in, and
critical to, Kant's aesthetic theory. Namely, both clearly perceive that Kant associates pleasure in
beauty with a kind of freedom from desire, and both agree with Kant on this point. Schopenhauer
offers a negative vision of this Kantian state of freedom from desire, in terms of the absence of
desires or willful activity. Correspondingly, he valorizes a drive to 'will-lessness', which
Nietzsche diagnoses as perversely ascetic. Schiller instead offers a positive vision of Kantian
pleasure in freedom from desire, in terms of the 'harmony' of sense- and form-impulses. 
As construed by Schiller, moreover, aesthetic freedom does not clearly preclude 'desire'
or willful 'arousal', in Nietzsche's sense. In fact, I will argue, Schiller's account makes salient a
distinction between desire and passion, which indicates how aesthetic experience could involve
passion but not desire. And there is even good reason to think that Nietzsche would find this
view amenable. Note that my claim here is not that Nietzsche was positively influenced by non-
357Here I am very much in agreement with Came (2009). 
358Compare Janaway's suggestion that “[a]fter the brief discussion of Kant, Nietzsche reverts [in GM III, 6] to his 
more serious target, Schopenhauer” (2007, 191). This is a slightly stronger claim than I take to be warranted, 
given my analysis here. But I agree that Nietzsche is here at least as concerned with Schopenhauer as with Kant.
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Kantian elements in Schiller. Rather, Schiller's view contains two distinct currents of Kantian
influence. First, Schiller's distinction between 'work' and 'play' reflects the direct influence of
Kant's distinction between pleasure in desire-satisfaction and pleasure entirely free from desire.
Second, Schiller's emphasis on 'harmony' between sense- and form-impulses reflects the direct
influence of Kant's appeal to the feeling of 'free play' between imagination and understanding.
Nietzsche is in turn directly influenced by Schiller's work-play distinction, hence indirectly by
one main aspect of Kantian aesthetic theory, even while he moves further away from the other
main aspect of Schiller's Kantianism, concerning the 'harmony' of sensuous and rational activity.
8.6. Schiller views aesthetic disinterestedness not just as freedom in the harmony of
sensuous and rational faculties, but also insofar as the form- and sense-impulses function as
passions or loci of power, rather than lack. Here recall his claim that it is “assuredly not the cry
of desire which we hear in the melodious warbling of the song-bird,” for “[t]he animal works
when deprivation is the mainspring of its activity, and it plays when the fullness of its strength is
this mainspring, when superabundant life is its own stimulus to activity.”359 'Play' is here
associated directly with freedom from desire, which is in turn intuitively tied to Kantian
disinterestedness. In order to analyze this intuitive connection more precisely, however, it will
prove helpful to explicitly distinguish several aspects of Schiller's opposition between 'play' and
'work'.
First, Schiller associates work directly with 'deprivation', which he explicitly contrasts
against play as manifest in 'superabundant life' and 'the fullness of strength'. This bears close
resemblance to a distinction he draws elsewhere, in an epigram on 'Love and Desire' [Liebe und
Begierde]: “[...]One loves what he has, one desires what he has not; / Only the rich soul loves,
only the poor one desires.”360 Schiller associates 'desire' [Begierde] with lack or deprivation in
both contexts. The relationship between the 'love' of a 'rich soul' and the 'play' of a swarming
insect or warbling songbird is arguably less direct. Partly for this reason, I will refer to this
aspect of Schiller's distinction between 'work' and 'play' as the distinction between desire-driven
activity grounded in lack or external need and impassioned activity grounded in power or internal
necessity—or, for short, desire as opposed to passion. Sorrow or joy thus plausibly functions as
359Schiller 1795/2014, 105.
360Dwight 1839, 352. Notably, Emerson draws a similar contrast in 'Self-Reliance': "'What we love that we have, 
but by desire we bereave ourselves of the love'" (Emerson 1983, 273). Indeed, Emerson places this statement in 
quotation marks because he is (mis)quoting Schiller (Arsić 2010, 193).
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a passion, in the present sense, insofar as it feels like a force or locus of motive power by which
one seems to be physically or psychically seized and hence actively compelled from within,
without any goal beyond the exercise of this passion itself. (Thus, perhaps, we can understand
the sense of 'joyous' in Schiller's appeals to 'joyous life' and 'joyous movement'.) Sadness
functions as a desire, by contrast, insofar as it feels like having a void inside of oneself which
one wishes to fill, and happiness functions a feeling of desire-satisfaction or the mere absence of
external needs insofar as it feels like being complete or having nothing missing within oneself.
For Schiller, then, the form-impulse and the sense-impulse both function as loci of passion, not
desire, in aesthetic experience. Aesthetic play is the interplay of rational and sensuous powers.
Drawing this explicit contrast between desire and passion helps to demarcate a specific
aspect of Schiller's opposition between 'work' and 'play', and hence to prevent terminological
confusion in subsequent interpretive analysis. But explicitly appealing to 'passion' also helps to
bring out an otherwise merely implicit, or perhaps merely latent, phenomenological dimension of
Schiller's account: states of 'exuberant power', 'joyous movement', 'superabundant life', and so
on, are intuitively associated with passion. 'Passion' is also arguably preferable to 'love', in this
respect.361 Thus my contrast between 'desire' and 'passion' constitutes a fair compromise between
the goals of (i) deferring to Schiller's own terminology, and (ii) situating his account in a broader
aesthetic theoretical context, in a way that is maximally illuminating and minimally misleading.
Nietzsche's account of will to power is another important aspect of this broader context.
Here first recall his insistence that “the effect of works of art is to excite the same state that
creates art—intoxication,”362 and his elaboration elsewhere that “[t]he condition of pleasure
called intoxication” is “precisely an exalted feeling of power.”363 This is part of Nietzsche's
broader metaphysical vision of life, and arguably all reality, as essentially characterized by a
drive to 'self-overcoming' or the continual expansion of power.364 Life, the “really fundamental
361Here consider that Burke also associates beauty with “love” as opposed to “desire or lust” (Burke 1757/1958, 
91), but sees the 'love' evoked by beautiful things as an “affection and tenderness” (ibid., 51) that is not elicited 
by sublime things, which instead arouse “astonishment” and “terror” in us (ibid., 57-8). Burke understands both 
love and terror as 'passions' (ibid., 57, 91, 136). This is also intuitive, which suggests that an aesthetic theory 
appealing to passion, rather than to love, is more likely to have intuitive purchase on aesthetic experiences of 
both beauty and sublimity. Burke also subsumes “violent and tempestuous passions” under the ambit of 'desire' 
(ibid., 91). Thus his notion of 'passion' is not opposed to 'desire' in the way that Schiller's notion of 'love' is. 
362WP 821. Nietzcshe does not always use 'frenzy' so expansively. In The Birth of Tragedy, for example, he 
describes the distinction between Apollonian and Dionysian drives in terms of that between dreams and 
intoxication ['des Traumes und des Rausches'] (BT 1). 
363WP 800 [1888].
364While some commentators interpret Nietzsche as attributing a will to power only to things that are alive in an 
intuitive sense, he occasionally suggests that the will to power is literally everywhere. E.g. “[L]ife is merely a 
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instinct” of which “aims at the expansion of power” (G S 349), is on Nietzsche's view “the
instinct for growth, for durability, for an accumulation of forces, for power” (A 6). The “will of
life” is “bent upon power” (GM II:11) and so itself is the will to power (GS 349). Will to power
is “the essence of life” (GM II:12), in short, and in this sense “life itself simply is will to power”
(B G E 259).365 This account of will to power in turn underlies the “main distinction” that
Nietzsche draws in the domain of aesthetic value:
Regarding all aesthetic values I now avail myself of this main distinction: I
ask in every instance, “is it hunger or superabundance that has here become
creative?” At first glance, another distinction may seem preferable—it is far
more obvious—namely the question whether the desire to fix, to
immortalize, the desire for being prompted creation, or the desire for
destruction. for change, for future. for becoming. But both of these kinds of
desire are seen to be ambiguous when one considers them more closely; they
can be interpreted in accordance with the first scheme that is, as it seems to
me, preferable. The desire for destruction, change, and becoming can be an
expression of an overflowing energy that is pregnant with future (my term
for this is, as is known, “Dionysian”); but it can also be the hatred of the ill-
constituted, disinherited, and underprivileged, who destroy, must destroy,
because what exists, indeed all existence, all being, outrages and provokes
them. To understand this feeling, consider our anarchists closely. 
The will to immortalize also requires a dual interpretation. It can be
prompted, first, by gratitude and love; art with this origin will always be an
art of apotheoses, perhaps dithyrambic like Rubens, or blissfully mocking
like Hafiz, or bright and gracious like Goethe, spreading a Homeric light and
glory over all things. But it can also be the tyrannic will of one who suffers
deeply, who struggles, is tormented, and would like to turn what is most
personal, singular, and narrow, the real idiosyncrasy of his suffering, into a
binding law and compulsion-one who, as it were, revenges himself on all
things by forcing his own image, the image of his torture, on them, branding
them with it.366 
Nietzsche embraces art grounded in 'superabundance', and spurns art grounded in 'hunger'. This
distinction in turn informs his basic criticism of romanticism: “[a]ll romanticism in art and
insight” reflects the suffering of “those who suffer from the impoverishment of life,” he claims,
special case of the will to power” (KSA 13:14[121])). See Richardson 1996, 18 n.4 for further examples.
365Similarly: “Only where there is life is there also will: not will to life but—thus I teach you—will to power” (Z II:
“On Self-Overcoming); “life itself is will to power” (BGE 13); “There is nothing to life that has value, except the
degree of power—assuming that life itself is the will to power” (KSA 12:5[71].10).
366GS 370. See WP 846 [1885-1886] for a draft version. Compare NCW, “We Antipodes”: “Regarding artists of all 
kinds, I now avail myself of is main distinction: is it the hatred against life or the excess [der Überfluß ] of life 
which has here become creative?”
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rather than from “the over-fullness of life.”367 Likewise, but more broadly: “Points of view for my
values: whether out of abundance [der Fülle] or out of want [dem Verlangen]?[...]—whether sick
from sickness or excessive health?”368 (Compare Goethe's characterization of Romanticism in a
letter to Eckermann from 1829: “The classical I call healthy and the Romantic sick...Most of the
new poetry is not Romantic because it is new, but because it is weak, sickly, and ill, and the old
is not classical because it is old, but because it is strong, fresh, cheerful, and healthy.”369)
 Nietzsche thus takes all good art to induce feelings of power and abundance as opposed
to weakness and deprivation. He diagnoses Schopenhauer as the type of romantic who seeks out
“rest, stillness calm seas, redemption from themselves through art and knowledge” as a symptom
of spiritual 'hunger' and the 'impoverishment of life'.370 Hence, Nietzsche rejects Schopenhauer's
vision of contemplating beautiful form as a 'pure, will-less' subject. But here Nietzsche's view is
still essentially compatible with Schiller's reinterpretation of Kantian aesthetic disinterestedness
in terms of the coordination of sensuous and rational passions, in the absence of all mere desires.
Here one might object that 'passion' (via the Latin passio and Greek pathos) and
'Leidenschaft' both strongly connote suffering and passivity, in a way that seems to run counter
to my proposed distinction between passions and desires. Thus, indeed, Nietzsche is sometimes
explicitly critical of 'passions' [Leidenschaften], as in a section of Thus Spoke Zarathustra on
'[D]en Freuden- und Leidenschaften',371 The term 'Freudenschaften' is an original coinage by
Nietzsche, from Freude ('joy'), which Walter Kaufmann translates aptly as 'passions-enjoyed', by
contrast to Leidenschaften construed as 'passions-suffered'. Nietzsche directly links the suffering
of passions (i.e., Leidenschaften) to a (moralistic) impulse to label these passions as evil [böse].
By contrast, virtues [Tugunden] “grow out of” [wuschen aus] passions insofar as “[y]ou set your
highest goal to [these passions'] heart [Du legtest dein höchstes Ziel diesen Leidenschaften an’s
Herz].”372 In this way, passions-suffered [Leidenschaften] are transformed into “your virtues and
passions you enjoy [deine Tugenden und Freudenschaften].” Moreover, we have seen above that
Nietzsche sometimes draws positive links between 'desire' [Begierde] and aesthetic experience.
But these terminological points do not undermine my view. Quite to the contrary, the
367GS 370. Similarly: “Deepest difference: whether hunger or overabundance [der Überfluß] becomes creative? 
The former generates the ideals of romanticism” (WP 59 [1885-1886]).
368WP 1009 [1887]. 
369Quoted in Richards 2002, 458.
370GS 370.
371Z I, 5. I thank an anonymous referee at Ergo for pressing me on this point.
372Z I, 5.
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essential point is that I am using the term 'passion' to indicate something close to, if not simply
identical to, what Nietzsche means by 'Freudenschaft' as opposed to 'Leidenschaft'. Instead of
coining a new English word, I have simply elected to appropriate the term 'passion' for this
purpose, in part for reasons already indicated above. Thus construed, I distinguish 'passion' from
'desire', to which I relegate all connotations of suffering and passivity, in order to gain conceptual
and interpretive clarity. In this way, I accommodate the fact that Nietzsche's use of the words
'passion' and 'desire' does not always neatly track the conceptual distinction that I am indicating
with these terms, and which clearly structures his view. There is good reason to believe that
Nietzsche's emphasis on the distinction between passion and desire reflects his positive influence
by Schiller, at least in part. And there is good reason to believe that Schiller's emphasis on the
same distinction is at least partly informed by Kant's claim that our pleasure in beauty is
orthogonal to both rational and sensuous modes of desire-satisfaction.
One final terminological point may shed further light on the relationship between my
analysis and other areas of Nietzsche scholarship. Namely, if despite all of the above one were to
still resist my use of the term 'passion' to indicate activity grounded in power or internal
necessity, then one might instead choose to appeal to terms like 'impulse' or 'drive' [Trieb], which
are ubiquitous in Nietzsche's writings, for the same purpose. Hence, one might contrast 'passions'
and 'desires', alike, against genuine 'drives'. One cost of this interpretive decision, however, is
that terms like 'impulse' and 'drive' do not evoke intense affective states in the way that 'passion'
does. In this light, moreover, my use of the term 'passion' could perhaps be leveraged to draw
Nietzsche's 'third-personal' drive-psychological theory into closer relation with a more 'first-
personal' or phenomenological analysis of the kinds of affective states that he—like Schiller—
evidently associates with aesthetic experience.
8.7. Second, Schiller associates play with 'purposeless display', and hence implicitly
associates 'work' with purposive activity. This is informed by Kant's (more complex) claim that
beautiful form displays a “purposiveness without an end [Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck],” and so
is “entirely independent of the representation of the good.”373 The link between this distinction
and the previous one depends on whether purposive activity necessarily stems from 'deprivation'.
Notably, Nietzsche sometimes characterizes the will to power in fairly similar terms. For
373KrU 5:226 (Kant 1790/2000, 111).
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instance, he claims in Twilight of the Idols that the Darwinian “struggle for existence” exists only
“as an exception,” because “the total appearance of life is not the extremity, not starvation, but
rather riches, profusion, even absurd squandering—and where there is struggle, it is a struggle
for power.”374 Life's essential drive to self-overcoming has no extrinsic purpose o r goal, on
Nietzsche's view. Rather, the world viewed as “the will to power—and nothing besides” is his
“'beyond good and evil,' without goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal”:
This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end[...]a sea of forces
flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with
tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms; out of the
simplest forms striving toward the most complex, out of the stillest, most rigid,
coldest forms toward the hottest, most turbulent, most self contradictory, and then
again returning home to the simple out of this abundance, out of the play of
contradictions back to the joy of concord, still affirming itself in this uniformity of
its courses and its years, blessing itself as that which must return eternally, as a
becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness.375
Despite his criticism of Kantian disinterestedness, then, Nietzsche is clearly friendly to Schiller's
claim that 'exuberant power enjoying itself in purposeless display' is aesthetically significant.
And Schiller's view here tracks Kant's account of 'disinterested' pleasure more closely than it
might appear to. When either 'form' or 'sense' acts as a passion, it is evidently 'purposeless':
activity undertaken for its own sake, free from interest in the existence of any objects of desire.
8.8. Third, Schiller associates work with 'external need' [äußern Bedürfniß], which he
implicitly contrasts against 'inner need'. In his Kallias Letters to Gottfried Körner (1793), he
elaborates on this sort of inner need or necessity and its relationship to 'purposeless display':
[Nature in artfulness is] the pure coincidence of the inner essence with form, a
rule, which is at once given and obeyed by the thing. (The beautiful is merely
a symbol of the completed and perfect, because it does not, as does the
purposeful, require anything outside itself, but commands and obeys itself for
the sake of its own law.)376 





determining and self-determined,” such that the thing seems not only to obey or realize its own
essence, but moreover to freely create it. As one commentator puts it, “what seems to be a
constraint never appears beautiful to us,” and so “the law or form of a [beautiful] thing must
appear to derive from it naturally, spontaneously, flowing from its inner energies.”377 Autonomy
by contrast only requires that something determines itself in accordance with its own essence or
form. So an autonomous being may impose its own form upon itself in the mode of a constraint
—e.g., a person may impose rational form on her own behavior merely in the mode of an alien
force of compulsion, yielding genuine autonomy or self-determination, but not heautonomy or
beauty. (Likewise, recall Schiller's caution against 'overpowering rationality'.) Autonomy and
heautonomy are thus two different kinds of freedom, for Schiller.378 And nature construed as
“the inner necessity of form ” [die innere Notwendigkeit der Form], as opposed to form that has
been artificially or otherwise externally imposed onto matter, appears as 'purposeless display'
precisely because it is heautonomous.379
Still, Schiller argues in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (1795-6) that “true nature”
[wahre Natur] must be carefully distinguished from mere “actual nature” [wirkliche Natur]:
Actual nature exists everywhere, but true nature is all the rarer, for to it
belongs an inner necessity of existence [innere Notwendigkeit des
Daseins]. Actual nature is every outburst of passion [Leidenschaft],
however crude; it may even be true nature, but truly human it cannot be, for
this requires some participation of the independent faculties in every
utterance the expression of which is to possess dignity. Actual human
nature includes every moral baseness, but it is to be hoped that true human
nature does not; for the latter cannot be other than noble.380
Rather than the phrase 'inner necessity of form [Form]', as in his explanation of heautonomy,
Schiller here appeals to the 'inner necessity of existence [Daseins]' in 'true' nature. Although this
terminological variation is somewhat obscure, and its significance perhaps easily overstated, it
can arguably be understood in the following terms. 'True nature', in the context of On Naive and
Sentimental Poetry, is nature construed as that of which every poet is properly the “guardian[],”
377Beiser 2005, 67.
378Compare Schiller 1975/2014, 76 n.14. 
379Schiller 1793/2003, 166. Kant also uses the term 'heautonomy', but with a different meaning. For Kant, the 
power of judgment displays heautonomy insofar as it 'prescribes a law' to itself, rather than (as in the case of 
autonomy) to nature. See KrU 5:185-6; 20:225 (Kant 1790/2000, 72-3; 27-8).
380Schiller 1795-6/1966, 158-9.
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whether as a 'naive' poet who “is nature” or a 'sentimental' poet who “seek[s] lost nature”:381 
Nature, considered in this wise, is for us nothing but the voluntary
presence, the subsistence of things on their own, their existence in
accordance with their own immutable laws. … [W]hat could a modest
flower, a stream, a mossy stone, the chirping of birds, the humming of
beeds, etc., possess in themselves so pleasing to us? … It is not these
objects, it is an idea represented by them which we love in them. We love
in them the tacitly creative life, the serene spontaneity of their activity,
existence in accordance with their own laws, the inner necessity, the eternal
unity with themselves … Yet their perfection is not to their credit, beause it
is not the product of their choice. They accord us, then, with the quite
unique delight of being our example without putting us to shame … We are
free, they are necessary; we change, they remain a unity. But only if both
are joined one with the other—if the will freely obeys the law of necessity,
and reason asserts its rule through all the flux of imagination, does the ideal
or the divine come to the fore.382
Many aspects of 'true' nature thus arguably fail to be heautonomous insofar as their 'inner
necessity,' or 'existence in accordance with their own laws,' is 'not the product of their choice.'
Whereas a heautonomous thing's form is 'self-determining and self-determined', the modest
flower or mossy stone's form cannot literally flow freely from within itself, because only rational
beings are literally capable of freedom. Inhuman nature displays only the “choiceless but calm
necessity of the irrational.”383 Hence, Schiller arguably associates heautonomy in a strict sense
only with true human nature, i.e. aesthetic play or freedom, not with true nature more generally.
This helps to explain why, as Schiller is drawing the distinction between 'actual' and 'true' nature,
he acknowledges that 'every outburst of passion, however crude…may even be true nature' (my
emphasis). 'Crude' passion simply cannot be “truly human”384—nor (hence) truly beautiful.
Schiller is a fairly strict Kantian, in this respect, whereas Nietzsche embraces a far more
radical aesthetic amoralism. In The Birth of Tragedy, for example, Nietzsche describes the
Dionysian as one of two fundamental art-impulses, even thought it manifests as a drive towards
ecstatic identification with 'titanic' and 'barbaric' forces of nature.385 The Nietzschean Dionysus






enjoys all “productive and destructive force,” evidently without regard for its moral quality.386
More broadly, Nietzsche's theory of a universal will to power, incorporating both Dionysian and
Apollonian aspects, is his vision of an “entirely reckless and amoral artist-god,” who in “creating
worlds, frees himself from the distress of fullness and overfullness”:387 an impassioned god.
For Kant, on the other hand, taste is “at bottom a faculty for the judging of the sensible
rendering of moral ideas.”388 He understands the feeling of harmonious free play as a special
kind of 'reflecting judgment', which aims not at subsuming a given beautiful intuitive form under
the concept of a determinate kind of object of possible experience (as in the standard 'objective'
use of the reflecting power of judgment), but rather at relating this beautiful form to the non-
objective concept of the universal subjective conditions of possibility of objective (reflecting)
judgment itself.389 Roughly speaking, Kant claims that finding something beautiful essentially
involves synthesizing the manifold of sensations it elicits by means of the universal subjective
concept of a generic theoretically rational subject who perceives objects in space and time, as
opposed to the concept of a specific kind of object. In short, one can roughly understand Kant to
be claiming that things are beautiful insofar as they sensuously represent the generic structure of
human cognition, or the intuitive 'shape' of a generic sensuous-rational subject like us.
Schiller's claim that we “believe ourselves to perceive form immediately” in the
experience of beauty must be understood in this context.390 Broadly as Kant claims that taste is 'a
faculty for the judging of the sensible rendering of moral ideas,' Schiller claims that the objective
correlate to the aesthetic play impulse is beautiful “living shape,” which can be understood in
Kantian terms as the 'sensible rendering' of human freedom.391 Here 'objective' should be
understood in the sense of an objective secondary quality like the greenness of a meadow: this
greenness inheres in the meadow itself, in a sense, even though it only appears in relation to
perceiving subjects. Thus the meadow's greenness can be described as its objectively-grounded
power to affect subjects like us in a certain way. Likewise, then, Schiller posits 'living shape' as
386WP 1049 [1885-1886]. See also WP 1050 [1888].
387BT “Attempt at a Self-Criticism” §5. Compare Friedrich Schlegel's remark that “the sacred plays of art are only a
remote imitation of the infinite play of the universe, the work of art which eternally creates itself anew” 
(Schlegel 1968, 89). See also Norman 2002.
388KrU 5:356 [Kant 1790/2000, 230].
389For Kant, to judge that a given object is beautiful is to claim that the spatiotemporal form of a corresponding 
intuitive representation of the object is 'subjectively purposive', or “purposive for the reflecting power of 




beautiful things' objectively-grounded power to elicit a broadly Kantian state of 'play'. This state
of 'aesthetic play' is the most fully human state, on his view, as we have seen. Hence, 'living
shape' is the sensuous expression of essential human powers, for Schiller. For Nietzsche, by
contrast, good art can express entirely amoral forms of power, including that of inhuman nature.
8 .9 . Nietzsche's radical amoralism is arguably facilitated by views like Schiller's,
however. Schiller's emphasis on 'true nature' that is neither mere 'actual nature' nor 'true human
nature' motivates (latently) amoral standards of value that become fundamental for theorists like
Nietzsche. While these more indirect forms of conceptual interrelation may seem tenuous, my
primary intention in the present section is simply to show how what appears to be especially
tenuous or indirect evidence in fact reveals deep structural continuities, running from Kant to
Schiller to Nietzsche, that cannot otherwise be easily or fully appreciated. Note that these
structural continuities are philosophically significant even if one insists that they do not amount
to Schiller's direct or indirect historical influence on Nietzsche. However, it is also probable that
Nietzsche was in fact positively influenced by Schiller in this regard, both directly (through his
own reading of Schiller, as established above) and indirectly (through the mediating influence of
figures like Emerson who, as indicated above, were themselves directly influenced by
Schiller).392 The more indirect evidence adduced in this section would not, in itself, be sufficient
grounds for claiming Schiller's historical influence on Nietzsche. But it does provide some
support for the intellectual historical hypothesis that Nietzsche was so influenced. And my
primary intention is not to defend this claim of historical influence, but to use Schiller to reveal
surprising deep structural continuities between Kantian aesthetic theory and Nietzsche's criticism
of Kant. The significance of these continuities grounds the importance of a bare claim of
392See notes 352, 353, and 360, as well as associated main text. Indeed, it is even plausible that Nietzsche's account
of the interplay of Dionysian and Apollonian drives in Attic tragedy is influenced in part by Schiller's account of 
the interplay between sensuous and rational powers in aesthetic experience, which is of course directly 
influenced by Kant's aesthetic theory. To sustain any such interpretive hypothesis would require far more 
analysis than I can here provide, however. For instance, Rehder (1976, 159) claims in a superficially similar vein
that “[b]ehind the Apollinian and the Dionysian there still glow the well discussed polarities of the Classical and 
the Romantic or, mutatis mutandis, those of Antiquity and Christianity;” but that this is an oversimplification is 
immediately apparent from the fact that Nietzsche contrasts both the Apolline and the Dionysian against the 
Socratic, which in turn he clearly associates with Christian moralism. Likewise, Baeumer (1976, 181) claims that
“[t]he well-known argument 'Classical-Romantic' ends in the controversy 'Classical-Dionysian,'” and that 
“Nietzsche stands on the side of the Romantics.” But this clearly cannot be correct if the 'Classical' is associated 
directly with the Apollonian (given that Nietzsche approves of Apollonian and Dionysian drives alike). 
Baeumer's claim is plausible, rather, only insofar as 'Classical' is interpreted in terms of the notion of Greek 
'cheerfulness' that Nietzsche situates himself against polemically in The Birth of Tragedy (for instance).
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historical influence.
That Nietzsche's amoralism is plausibly facilitated by Kantian principles interpreted as by
Schiller can be appreciated more fully by returning to Schiller's notion of 'physical play':
Even in mindless Nature there is revealed a similar luxury of powers [Luxus
der Kräfte] and a laxity of determination [Bestimmung] which in that natural
context might well be called play. The tree puts forth innumerable buds
which perish without developing, and stretches out for nourishment many
more roots, branches and leaves than are used for the maintenance of itself
and its species. What the tree returns from its lavish profusion
[verschwenderischen Fülle] unused and unenjoyed to the kingdom of the
elements, the living creature may squander in joyous movements. So Nature
gives us even in her material realm a prelude to the infinite, and even here
partly removes the chains which she casts away entirely in the realm of
form. From the compulsion of needs [Zwang des Bedürfnisses], or physical
seriousness [physischen Ernste], she makes her way through the compulsion
of superabundance [Zwang des Überflusses], or physical play [physische
Spiel], to aesthetic play; and before she soars in the lofty freedom of the
Beautiful above the fetters of every purposed end [Zweck], she is already
approaching this independence, at least from a distance, in the free
movement which is itself end and means [Zweck und Mittel].393
In terms of the aforementioned distinctions, 'physical seriousness' ('the compulsion of needs') is
evidently closest to mere 'actual nature'. 'Physical play' ('the compulsion of superabundance')
then evokes 'true nature' that is not yet 'truly human'. Physical play encompasses 'free movement
which is itself end and means,' and thus resembles the heautonomous or beautiful thing that 'does
not require anything outside itself.' But the physical play of the roaring lion, swarming insect,
and warbling bird is not truly free play, as it is still grounded in 'compulsion'—albeit the internal
compulsion of passion or their own superabundant power, not the external compulsion of desire
or deprivation. So, like the modest flower or mossy stone, presumably, physically playful things
have a 'perfection' that is yet 'not to their credit, because it is not a product of choice.' 
'Physical play' is thus arguably a state of purely sensuous passion or superabundant
sensuous power, for Schiller, whereas 'physical seriousness' is a state of purely sensuous desire
o r sensuous deprivation. 'Aesthetic play' is then an interplay between sensuous and rational
powers, which manifest affectively as reciprocally-coordinated sensuous and rational passions.
Note that 'play' in the generic sense that encompasses both physical play and aesthetic
393Schiller 1795/2014, 105.
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play seemingly cannot be the same thing as 'play' construed as the object of the 'play impulse', in
which sense and form impulses are “combined.”394 For when Schiller says things like “Man
plays only when he is in the full sense of the word a man, and he is only wholly Man when he is
playing,”395 he is clearly referring to 'aesthetic play' and not to 'physical play'. Apparently, then,
Schiller uses the term 'play' in two different senses. In the narrower sense, 'play' only refers to
the free (inter)play of the form and sense impulses, as in Kant's account of aesthetic experience.
In the broader sense, 'play' is any self-expressive, autotelic display of internal powers (as
opposed to external needs), encompassing both 'physical play' and 'aesthetic play'.
Schiller arguably uses the term 'play' in both senses, not simply due to confusion or lack
of concern for precision, but because he views play fundamentally in terms freedom. Physical
play is more free than physical seriousness, and aesthetic play is freer still. Hence, aesthetic
freedom is in some sense the only true form of play, for Schiller, as is reflected in his
characterization of the 'play impulse' as that in which the form and sense impulses are
'combined.' But the 'compulsion of superabundance' is closer to true play than the 'compulsion of
needs' is, so the former is aptly termed 'physical play', even if only in an approximate or
analogical sense. The qualifier 'physical' thus serves not simply to differentiate physical and
aesthetic play, as two different modes of play, but also to qualify the degree to which 'physical
play' is genuine play. Physical play only approximates genuine play, which must be truly free.
One can arrive at a more radically amoral aesthetic theory, in the vein of Nietzsche's, by
emphasizing that 'play' in the narrower sense is simply a special case of 'play' in the broader
sense: it is the autotelic, coordinated, self-expressive display of essential human powers. 'Play' in
the broader sense manifests 'superabundance' or 'exuberant power' in even arational natural
phenomena. Hence, one might come to view human freedom as valuable because it is a form of
play, rather than viewing physical play as valuable because it foreshadows human freedom.
Again, this is not Schiller's view: he consistently exalts human freedom as evaluatively
fundamental. This is further evidenced by the moralistic denouement of his letters on aesthetic
education: “aesthetic freedom” is ultimately just an “intermediate condition,” he claims, or “the
necessary condition by which alone” it is possible to “make the sensuous man rational,” where in





power of Nature alone; he shakes off this power in the aesthetic; and he controls it in the moral
condition.”397 This moralism is perhaps surprising, given Schiller's claim that Man “is only
wholly Man when he is playing,”398 which is to say when he is experiencing beauty. But any
apparent tension here is only superficial. Schiller's considered view is that the 'moral condition'
i s a condition of aesthetic freedom, and indeed the highest one.399 He differentiates this moral
condition from the 'intermediate condition' of aesthetic freedom in certain contexts only in order
to highlight the existence of a pre-moral form of aesthetic freedom, which (he argues) must
precede the highest aesthetic condition of complete reciprocal coordination between moral
principle and feeling. Nevertheless, Schiller's account of physical play indicates how more
amoral theorists may revalue human freedom, as one among many kinds of impassioned activity.
8.10. Two points remain to examine more explicitly: Schiller's anticipation of Nietzsche's
emphasis on the perspective of artists, and the relation between passion and will. Regarding the
former, it is helpful to consider Schiller's account of a teleological progression from “crude
taste” to authentically felt respect for moral law in a truly “aesthetic state”.400 The stages in this
progression explicitly involve creative activity, not just reflection or contemplation. 'Crude taste'
“fashions grotesque shapes,” for instance, and calls beautiful that which “gives [Man] material
for possible shaping.”401 Man then passes onward to more sophisticated taste in outward form:
[Now what Man possesses, what he produces, must] reflect the genial intellect
which conceived it, the loving hand which executed it, the serene and free spirit
which chose and established it. Now the ancient German goes in search of
glossier animals' skins, statelier antlers, more elegant drinking horns, and the
Caledonian selects the choicest shells for his festivals.[...]Man adorns himself.402
Here again, Schiller clearly emphasizes creative expression, not the reflective activity of passive
aesthetic 'spectators'. This stage in turn evolves into more sophisticated taste in inward form:





401Schiller 1795/2014, 107. For Bilden, I replace Snell's 'fashioning' with 'shaping', to emphasize the link to form.
402Schiller 1795/2014, 107.
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harmonious miming speech; the confused noises of perception unfold
themselves, begin to obey a rhythm and weld themselves into song. While the
Trojan host with shrill cries storms like a flight of cranes across the battlefield,
the Greek army approaches quietly, with noble tread. There we see only the
arrogance of blind strength, here the triumph of form and the simply majesty of
law.403
And humanity thereby ultimately achieves authentically felt respect for universal moral law:
A lovelier necessity now links the sexes together, and the sympathy of hearts
helps to maintain the bond which was knitted only capriciously and inconstantly
by desire. Released from its sullen chains, the quieter eye apprehends form, soul
gazes into soul, and out of a selfish exchange of lust there grows a generous
interplay of affection.404
Schiller thus interprets the 'moral condition' as a state of creative expression, arising from
'cruder' expressions of the same “aesthetic creative impulse.”405 The result is a vision of creative
'harmony' between form and sense impulses, which is rightly contrasted against Kant's more
contemplative theory of 'free play'. Schiller thus anticipates Nietzsche's emphasis on 'creators', in
texts that Nietzsche actively engaged with. Moreover, Schiller's account shows how this
emphasis is compatible with an otherwise broadly Kantian theory of aesthetic disinterestedness.
8.11. Finally, we may return to the relationship between disinterestedness and 'will-
lessness'. Although Nietzsche objects to (what he sees as) Schopenhauer's nihilistic drive to self-
abnegation, Nietzsche himself embraces a certain kind of de-individuation, i.e., dissolution of
individualized subjectivity. This is especially pronounced in The Birth of Tragedy, where
Nietzsche is still heavily influenced by the Schopenhauerian metaphysics of 'will and
representation'. But it persists even through his later writings. This is not a contradiction on
Nietzsche's part, however, insofar as the 'arousal of will' that he associates directly with
'interestedness' in the Genealogy is compatible with an impassioned mode of de-individuation. In
other words, there is no tension in Nietzsche's view insofar as the Dionysian drive to de-
individuation is not romantic, in his sense of 'romanticism'.





Tragedy was first published in 1872, and his view in in the mid- to late-1880s, when he
published a revised edition of The Birth of Tragedy with a prefatory 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism'
(1886) and the Genealogy (1887). In the new 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism', Nietzsche criticizes
his own youthful romanticism, and in particular his earlier call for an 'art of metaphysical
comfort'.406 The older Nietzsche associates the drive to 'metaphysical comfort' with romanticism
and Christianity, and instead recommends learning “the art of this-worldly comfort first.”407
Nevertheless, Nietzsche does not abandon his earlier appeal to Dionysian processes of
de-individuation. In Twilight of the Idols (written in 1888), he 'baptizes' with the name Dionysus
“the faith that only the particular is loathsome, and that all is redeemed and affirmed in the
whole,” which he calls “the highest of all possible faiths.”408 Likewise, in an unpublished note
from 1888 he explains that the word 'Dionysian' means to him:
 … an urge to unity, a reaching out beyond personality, the everyday, society,
reality, across the abyss of transitoriness: a passionate-painful overflowing
into darker, fuller, more floating states; an ecstatic affirmation of the total
character of life as that which remains the same, just as powerful, just as
blissful, through all change; the great pantheistic sharing of joy and sorrow
that sanctifies and calls good even the most terrible and questionable qualities
of life; the eternal will to procreation, to fruitfulness, to recurrence; the feeling
of the necessary unity of creation and destruction. (WP 1050 [1888])
By contrast, 'Apollonian' means “the urge to perfect self-sufficiency, to the typical 'individual,' to
all that simplifies, distinguishes, makes strong, clear, unambiguous, typical; freedom under the
law.”409 Hence, for Nietzsche in the late 1880s, the Dionysian is clearly aligned with de-
individuation and identification with nature, and the Apollonian with heroic individuality. This is
largely in the spirit of Nietzsche's view in the first edition of The Birth of Tragedy, where he
suggests that Dionysian frenzy involves ecstatic identification with a “universal will” or “world-
will” [Weltwillens],410 which he also identifies as “nature”411 or “primordial being” [Urwesen],412
and so yields insight into “vast universality and absoluteness.”413 This is to be contrasted against
406BT §18.
407BT “Attempt at a Self-Criticism” §7.
408TI “What the Germans Lack” §49; Kaufmann p. 554.
409WP 1050.
410BT 17, 21.




the Apollonian “rhapsodist who does not become fused with his images but, like a painter, sees
them outside himself as objects of contemplation” (BT 8).
Dionysian de-individuation is distinct from Schopenhauerian 'will-lessness' insofar as
Nietzsche stipulates—particularly in the 1880s—that it must be grounded in an “excess of
force.”414 The Dionysian is will to power in the mode a drive to “[e]ternal life, the eternal return
of life[...]the triumphant Yes to life beyond all death and change; true life as the over-all
continuation of life through procreation, through the mysteries of sexuality.”415 Thus Dionysian
processes are willful, but not essentially individualized. They reflect the activity of holistic and
hence impersonal modes of will to power, as opposed to 'Apollonian' heroic individuality.
Insofar as Nietzsche embraces both the Apollonian and Dionysian as 'art-impulses', he
clearly does not insist that all genuine aesthetic experience involves de-individuation. But he also
clearly believes that genuine aesthetic experience is compatible with de-individuation, as long as
it is 'Dionysian' and not 'romantic'. Hence, Nietzsche's appeal to 'great personal fact and
experience[...]in the realm of the beautiful' is evidently meant to be consistent with the existence
of some (but not all) genuine aesthetic experiences that involve radical de-individuation.
Dionysian de-individuation is an impassioned state, clearly. But in Dionysian frenzy, the
passions by which one is compelled will evidently seem to have been 'channeled' from without.
They will be objective passions, that is, which are (at least as if) localized in 'nature', 'eternal
life', or other transpersonal phenomena, not just within individual human subjects. Schiller's
contrast between 'internal' and 'external' compulsion thus loses clarity in the context of
Dionysian de-individuation. Hence, on Nietzsche's account aesthetic experience is no longer
essentially tied to human self-expression, individually or collectively. For in Dionysian frenzy
humanity may be impassioned from without, or determined by the amoral power of nature.
8.12. Schiller is by no means the only important conceptual influence—or the only
plausible historical influence—on Nietzsche's aesthetic theory. And Schiller is not a strict
Kantian in all respects. But Schiller does play an important mediating role between Kant and
Nietzsche: Schiller's distinctive interpretation of Kantian aesthetic principles illuminates how
Nietzsche's critique of aesthetic 'disinterestedness' reflects commitments that are far closer to
Kantian than they appear to be. None of this is to say that Nietzsche's view is derivative upon
414TI “What I Owe to the Ancients,” 4. Compare NCW, “We Antipodes.”
415TI “What I Owe to the Ancients,” 4.
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Schiller's, let alone Kant's. Nietzsche is an amoralist in a way that Schiller is not. Schiller treats
human freedom as fundamental, and hence values states like 'physical play' as partial realizations
or symbolic prefigurations of 'true human nature'. But by characterizing Kantian 'free play' in
terms of the interaction of form and sense insofar as they function as loci of internal power rather
than external need, Schiller paves the way for a more radical naturalism that emphasizes power,
not human freedom, as aesthetically fundamental.
The present analysis demonstrates the utility—for the history of post-Kantian aesthetic
theory, but plausibly also for 19th-century intellectual history more broadly, and arguably even
for normative aesthetics—of a distinction between two modes of Romantic aesthetic theory,
invoking two kinds of disinterestedness. On the one hand, there is a broadly idealistic current of
Romanticism, which emphasizes the interplay of sensuous and rational faculties. On the other
hand, there is a dynamistic current, which asserts the aesthetic character of all genuine passion
and 'abundant' power, even in the form of arational natural force. Radical amoralists like
Nietzsche emphasize this dynamism, and reject the idealistic tendency as 'romantic', in a
pejorative sense. But both currents are arguably basic to Schiller's aesthetic theory. And it is
perhaps to Schiller's credit that he struggles to fully recontain this dynamistic impulse under the
purview of his idealistic emphasis on human freedom. In the core of Schiller's thought, rather, a
moral drive to human freedom and an amoral drive to 'superabundant life' enter into dynamic
relation, as natural powers or agonistically-interacting passions in their own right.
8.13. In part through Schiller's mediating influence, then, Nietzsche arrives at a
naturalized notion of willing as impassioned activity: the autotelic expression of arational power
or internal abundance. So understood, willing is to be contrasted against rational or sensuous
desiring, insofar as the latter is essentially a manifestation of weakness, lack, or need.
The phenomenological association between Nietzschean power and feelings of passion,
described above, equally holds for my own account of force. On my view, that is, a passion just
is an affective force. Passions are thus a species of drive, or the objectively-impactful exercise of
will-power, more broadly. Passions can impact mind-independent objects, e.g. via actions
performed by impassioned agents. But passions can also interact with each other, within a given
individual. Indeed, a genuine subject of affective experience is a real structure—a holistically-
forceful structural form—comprising agonistically- and hierarchically-interacting passions.
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9. Force Beyond 'Nature' and 'Culture'
Nietzsche's healthy turn towards the perspective of the artistic 'creator', as opposed to that
of the Kantian aesthetic 'spectator', does not only involve his embrace of passion or affective
power. It also crucially involves his reinterpretation of human cultural products, like art, as
manifestations of their creators' will to power. Thus Nietzsche is concerned not just with the
experience of true creative expression as one of impassioned freedom from desire, but also with
the products of creative expression as external manifestations of creators' superabundant power.
This aspect of Nietzsche's view bears directly on his account of philosophy and scientific
theories, as well as artworks. Nietzsche sees theoretical systems as manifestations or objective
expressions of theorists' basic drives. In this sense, theories are ultimately just expressions of
theorists' will to power. This does not mean that all theories are equally good, on Nietzsche's
view, any more than his metaphysics entails that all forms of will to power are equally strong or
healthy. But it does suggest that knowledge is not the transparent 'window' into mind-
independent reality that some take it to be. Rather, according to Nietzsche, theoretical
descriptions of the world are essentially expressive of theorists' drives, and only inessentially
more or less accurate 'copies' of reality. What if the 'drive' in question, for a given theorist, is a
drive to truth?, one might object. But even in this case, the Nietzschean epistemologist is more
deeply interested in the drive to truth than in truth abstracted from this drive. (See Appendix B.)
I wish to adopt many central features of Nietzsche's view for my own accounts of
scientific knowledge and human understanding more broadly. By analogy to Nietzsche's claim
that scientific theory and philosophy are (like art) expressive of their creators' basic drives, I
conceive of objective scientific and philosophical theories as, ultimately, manifestations of
elemental forces. My view is less psychological and less subjectively-oriented than Nietzsche's,
however. Here the distinction between force, as I understand it, and Nietzschean drives or will to
power is again crucial. Force does not strive towards or aim at any 'ends' or 'goals'. Force is just
the objective exercise of power. Force is just the real ground of impact. I agree with Nietzsche
that art, philosophy, and science can often be plausibly interpreted as objective expressions of
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their human creators' basic psychological drives. But I insist that, at least with respect to the
highest forms of human cultural production, this is not a fundamental level of analysis. Nietzsche
himself recognizes this, to an extent, insofar as he offers robustly metaphysical characterizations
of will to power—an all-encompassing drive-'psychological' ontology that is more an organicist
theory of all-pervasive vital force than a theory of human or animal psychology, per se. Hence, at
least in his most metaphysical moods, Nietzsche himself recognizes that human cultural products
are essentially just expressions of life, construed as the the same will to power or drive to self-
overcoming that he takes to be evident in all living things, prior to any 'psychology' in the more
standard sense. In this light, I seek to further develop Nietzsche's naturalistic vision of human
culture, by reinterpreting human culture as a manifestation of force, not of vital force or will to
power. This raises a fundamental question: What exactly does it mean for a scientific theory,
artwork, or any other cultural form to be a 'manifestation' of force, and how is this diagnosis to
be justified?
I address this question at length below, in developing interrelated accounts of natural art
and natural science. For now, though, let me return to the other point of difference indicated
directly above: whereas Nietzsche's account presents human cultural products as expressions of
human creators' basic drives or will to power, I am fundamentally concerned with the possibility
of cultural forms that are aptly characterized as manifestations of higher and often entirely
impersonal natural forces. This is the possibility of objective, rather than subjective, culture.
Human beings are clearly still centrally involved in the production of objective cultural
forms, to the extent that they exist. Moreover, the production of objective culture also centrally
involves human creativity—this creativity just requires receptivity to external reality in a way
that modern 'expressive' theorists like Nietzsche tend to ignore, or at least under-emphasize.
Nietzsche does at times highlight the possibility of receptivity to higher power, particularly in his
account of 'Dionysian' de-individuation as a kind of ecstatic frenzy that dissolves the boundaries
between individualized subjects and correspondingly affords primal insight into 'universal will'.
But for Nietzsche this Dionysian mode of receptivity to higher power is directly opposed to the
'Apollonian' drive towards beautiful 'semblance' [Schein] that he associates with the plastic arts,
heroic individuality, distinction between objects, and higher forms of theoretical contemplation.
This leads Nietzsche to associate the 'artistic' knowledge of 'genuine philosophers' with illusion,
error, falsification, and so forth, in a way that renders his account overly subjective and
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epistemologically unsatisfactory. To pursue this point further would be a distraction, however.
At present, I simply wish to note another basic point of continuity between Nietzsche's
account and my own. Namely, as we have seen, Nietzsche believes that our basic drives can
manifest both in the form of 'higher culture' and as 'savage' natural impulse. Will to power is
ontologically and evaluatively prior to the distinction between 'nature' and 'culture'. Likewise, I
take force to be ontologically and evaluatively prior to the nature-culture opposition. Force does
not 'aim' to manifest in the form of 'higher culture' as opposed to 'savage' impulse. Nor are 'high-
cultural' manifestations of force better than 'unrefined' ones, generally speaking. Rather, the
relative value of 'refined' and 'coarse' phenomena, just like anything else, is ultimately
determined by the relative degree or intensity of force that they manifest. Again, I say this
directly by analogy to Nietzsche's claim that “[w]hat determines rank, sets of rank, is only quanta
of power, and nothing else” (WP 855), and that the “objective measure of value” is “[s]olely the
quantum of enhanced and organized power” (WP 674).
Objective scientific knowledge is a formal manifestation of fundamental natural forces, in
and through human beings. This raises several important questions: What exactly does it mean
for an objective scientific theory or explanation to be a 'formal manifestation' of a basic natural
force? What are specific examples of the kinds of 'basic natural forces' in question? And what is
the value of human beings' objective scientific receptivity to elemental forces? For instance, does
objective science have any value beyond or apart from that of the forces of which it is a formal
manifestation? This relates to broader questions about the value of human beings, in a
dynamistic worldview that locates ultimate value in higher forces that have no 'need' for us.
In order to address these questions, several phenomena must be further clarified. First, we
must gain a deeper understanding of objectivity—of poetic objectivity, of scientific objectivity,
and of their interrelation. Second, we must gain a deeper understanding of what makes a given
force elemental or fundamental, both in general and in the empirical scientific context. Third, we
must gain a deeper understanding of what scientific theories and explanations are. Fourth, we
must gain a deeper understanding of how a given theory or explanation can be more or less aptly
characterized as a manifestation of an elemental natural force. Here I will ultimately argue that
objective scientific theories are objectively valid fields of elemental forces. Empirical scientific
explanation is a structural manifestation of natural forces distinguished by virtue of their impact
on observable phenomena. Physical scientific explanation is a species of scientific explanation,
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which involves formally manifesting strictly intelligible forces with empirical impact—i.e.
physical forces without sensory qualities or spatiotemporal properties, which produce observable
phenomena ordered into strictly intelligible physical structures constituted by mathematical
relations among measurable physical properties. 
Again, it is a crucial conclusion of my argumentation that the higher forces 'expressed' in
objective scientific theories need not be part of these theories' representational content. Rather,
they dictate what these theories represent, and how. The 'expression' of higher natural forces thus
grounds objective scientific representation, without necessarily being part of its objective
contents. One cannot understand science without seeing that its grounds lie beyond its contents.
This is perhaps related to the sense of 'disenchantment' [Entzauberung] that Max Weber
famously linked to modernity. The contents of modern science are 'disenchanted' in a sense,
insofar as science subordinates 'sense' to 'intellect' by treating sensory properties and observable
phenomena as 'matter' to be extrinsically 'formed'. This bears on the difference between scientific
cognition and aesthetic experience, as I elaborate further below. But the deeper grounds of
modern science need not be disenchanted. Objective science provides a non-depictive way to
apprehend elemental forces—by using them to explain, not by beholding them.
In light of this analysis, finally, I will return to the problem of creativity in human beings'
objective scientific receptivity to fundamental natural forces, in the context of questioning the
value of science. Again, an intuitive worry here at issue is that if we are only 'channeling' or
'canalizing' elemental natural forces in objective scientific inquiry, then this exercise may seem
pointless—given that these forces already exist and have causal impact regardless of what we do.
Here one must confront the anthropocentrism and hyper-individualism of modern liberal society
head on. Notwithstanding the lip service that we pay to the importance of community, many of
us in modern societies evidently cannot appreciate that our deeper value often derives from our
participation in forms of collective life and social organization that are fundamentally indifferent
to our status as 'autonomous individuals'. Likewise, notwithstanding the lip service that we pay
to the importance of the broader natural world, many of us cannot appreciate that our deepest
value might actually derive from our participation in totally impersonal phenomena—whether it
be the ebb and flood of diurnal, seasonal, and epochal change; the growth and decay of all life;
the incursion of vital force into inorganic nature; or the 'cold' order and precision of physical law.
All that said, insofar as we are real beings, we are forceful beings and not merely objects
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for the outlet of impersonal forces. Some people are genuine personalities who influence the
form of collective life, even if many more are only ever really objects for the outlet of pre-
existing cultural forces. Of course, genuine personae, too, are bearers of culture and history—are
socially determined. But they nevertheless also contend with the cultural forces by which they
are impacted, and thus emerge as loci of force in their own right. Looking at humanity in broader
context, likewise, we are objects for elemental natural forces' outlet or expression. We are
objective appearances of underlying reality. We are beings in and through which elemental
forces objectively appear. Humans are objects for higher force. And our higher forms of
scientific activity are thus objective appearances of basic natural forces. But we are also loci of
force in our own right. We are beings for whom elemental forces appear, whether directly (as in
poetry) or indirectly (as in science). We are subjects for the appearance of elemental forces (in
poetry), or at least (in science) the appearance of their objective impact. Hence, as humans we
are not essentially self-conscious beings. Rather, we are beings with objective experience.
With this in mind, I develop an account of science as involving a creative distillation or
intensifying simplification of empirical phenomena. I contrast this kind of objective abstraction
against the sort of rationalistic abstraction that I take idealists to prioritize. I argue that objective
abstraction is valuable as a human mode of force, despite yielding objects that have no mind-
independent reality—such as the empirical contents of scientific representation. In objective
scientific inquiry we thus focalize elemental forces in a way that they are not focalized apart
from us. This abstractive act literally is elemental natural force, manifesting in and through us.
But it is also a genuinely distinct and essentially human mode of outlet for these higher forces.
My analysis of science thus bears noteworthy resemblance to Hippolyte Taine's account of art:
In nature the character is only dominant; the concern in art is to make it dominating.
This character forms the real object; but it does not form it completely. In its
effectiveness it is inhibited by the appearance of other causes. It is unable to stamp
itself upon the object in a perfectly clear and visible imprint. Man senses this gap—
and in filling it he invents art.416
Here one might also recall Emerson's claim that art is “nature passed through the alembic of
man,”417 as well as similar formulations in Goethe and Nietzsche. Although characterizations like
416Philosophie de l'art. Quoted in Cassirer 2000, 84. The translation is Cassirer's.
417Emerson 1983, 18–19. Regarding the depth of Emerson's impact on Nietzsche, see e.g. Brobjer 2008, 23.
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this are often associated with philosophical idealism, I believe that they can be naturalized. The
'dominant character' that Taine notes need not be an ideal or rational form. Rather, it is more
plausibly viewed as a field of higher forces that do exist naturally, but always only alongside the
weaker forces that ground less fundamental things' reality. By scientifically representing nature
in the image of explanatorily basic structures, we artificially amplify natural causal hierarchies
and thereby exert cognitive force on inessential objects.
10. Aesthetic Objectivity as a Sensuous Presentation of the Elemental
Aesthetic objectivity is a direct experience of elemental reality in the mode of sensory
force. Two basic loci of sensory force especially familiar from aesthetic theory are the beautiful
and the sublime. Sensory force manifests through beauty as the direct appearance of agonistic
form, and in experiences of the sublime as the overwhelming impact of higher force. Beauty and
sublimity correspond roughly to the two basic modes of interaction discussed above, agon and
hierarchy, insofar as both can involve the impact of sensory forces on perceiving subjects. (In
analyzing scientific objectivity in Chapter IV, I will turn at length to modes of force that are
strictly intelligible, in the sense of having no sensory qualities or other imaginatively 'picturable'
modes of impact.) Beauty involves the sensory appearance of agon, i.e. the aesthetic impact of
dynamic relations among relatively well-matched loci of sensory force. And sublimity involves
the overwhelming aesthetic impact of radically-intensified sensory force, i.e. subjects' radical
determination by elemental sensory force. I will elaborate both of these claims below, of course.
For now, it should be noted that these initial characterizations of beauty and sublimity are
quite narrowly focused on sensory perception. This is intentional, in part insofar as I wish to
distinguish properly aesthetic phenomena—i.e. those related to aesthesis or sensory perception—
from other ways of apprehending force which simply appear to be aesthetic, given the triumph
of moralized standards of evaluation. That is, given the pervasive influence of moralism on
modern conceptions of ethical and political value, any genuine affirmation of amoral force,
including amoral sensory force, is now likely to be diagnosed as merely 'aesthetic'—if it is not
simply dismissed as evil. Amoral value judgments often seem 'safe' when relegated to the
aesthetic domain, even to people who are unwilling to frankly value amoral force in the ethical
or political domain. Nietzsche also recognized this, I believe. At least in his mature works, then,
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he was not truly the 'aestheticist' that some claim he was.418 But he did know that aesthetics
remains an intuitive inroad into appreciating the value of amoral power. Again, this is not
because all affirmation of force, or all feelings of one's own power, are truly aesthetic. It is
simply because aesthetic value is one (but only one) genuine way of valuing force, which
remains intuitive even to modern people who view aesthetic value as ethically and politically
inert, or at least as always subordinate to morality.
Even given this fairly strict focus on sensory force, however, I certainly also allow that
objective aesthetic experience sometimes involves feelings of affective force o r passion, and
perhaps even always does so. Thus, whereas beauty elicits focused feelings of love, sublimity
gives rise to feelings of all-consuming infatuation and godlike indifference. As against the
prophetic clarity of Cassandra's sadness, the sublime manifests in totalizing despair. To Helen's
radiant beauty and the noble restraint of the Achaean army, the sublime opposes Caspar David
Friedrich's monk on a barren shore beneath endless gray sky, staring out onto the dark sea—but
also the Maenads' bacchanalian frenzy, the unbridled excess of Achilles' rage, and the Trojans'
advance with “clamor and battle-shout,” like a flight of cranes “bearing slaughter and fate” with
the beat of their wings,419 that maelstrom of fury, awe, primal terror, sexual power, and ecstatic
joy borne of identification with the ebb, flood, endless chaos, and eternal order of titanic forces.
Moreover, truly objective aesthetic experiences of sensory force always have a mind-
independent ground. Sensory force is not just a 'sensory impression' or 'mental state'. Sensory
force is also the external ground of conscious experiences of sensory quality. Hence, we may
distinguish between mind-independent loci of sensory force and mind-dependent aesthetic force
construed as the sensory impact of mind-independent sensory forces on perceiving subjects. This
distinction can also be referred to as that between objective and subjective sensory force. For
instance, imagine experiencing the visceral massiveness or heaviness of stone in the ruins of an
ancient Greek temple. The stone itself functions a locus of objective sensory force: the force of
its massiveness and heaviness, construed as mind-independent powers. But insofar as we
apprehend this massiveness, it also functions as a purely aesthetic or subjective sensory force.
418E.g. see Nehamas 1985. Cf. Leiter 1992.
419The Illiad Book III. Schiller appeals to this example in a related context, but with a very different reading, in his 
Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man: “[...]The lawless leap of joy becomes a dance, the shapeless gesture a
graceful and harmonious miming speech; the confused noises of perception unfold themselves, begin to obey a 
rhythm and weld themselves into song. While the Trojan host with shrill cries storms like a flight of cranes 
across the battlefield, the Greek army approaches quietly, with noble tread. There we see only the arrogance of 
blind strength, here the triumph of form and the simply majesty of law” (Letter 27; Schiller 2014, 107-108).
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The fact that objective aesthetic experience is of external things, and not just one's own
feelings or any other mental states, does not mean that it is possible to 'prove' that something is
beautiful (etc.) simply by pointing to certain determinate features that it has. As Kant says,
beauty involves a 'freedom from concepts' that makes 'proofs' of this sort impossible. (The same
goes for the sublime, and for every other locus of genuinely aesthetic value.) Nevertheless, in
working to ground our aesthetic judgments objectively and not merely subjectively, we must
describe a given object's aesthetically-salient features, and not just the way that it makes us feel.
Note that this sort of aesthetic objectivity does not entail the universal validity of judgments of
beauty or any other kind of aesthetic value. Objective validity is not universal validity.
The following discussion of aesthetic objectivity should help to further clarify the
categories of agon and hierarchy introduced above. Hence, this aesthetic discussion will help to
further motivate and clarify my basic dynamistic thesis that the natural world is just an order of
interacting forces—including interacting sensory forces. This will evince the explanatory power
of the dynamistic ontology here on offer, insofar as I show that aesthetic experience, as one
among several basic dimensions of human experience more broadly, can be plausibly and
fruitfully analyzed in terms of a basic metaphysics and ontology of force. The discussion below
will also provide further intellectual historical context for my own notion of force, based in a
deeper examination of Kantian and post-Kantian aesthetic theory. I will demonstrate meaningful
continuity, as well as discontinuity, between broadly Kantian theories of 'free play' and my own
notion of agon. Likewise, I will indicate conceptual connections and disjuncture between my
notion of hierarchy and various aspects of modern aesthetic theory.
Finally, this discussion of aesthetic experience contributes to the overall contrast that I am
working to establish, between poetic and scientific modes of objectivity. I take aesthetic
objectivity to be a species of poetic objectivity, along with other phenomena like objective
artistic creativity and religious experience. Over the course of this chapter, I will proceed from
focus on the purely sensory aspect of aesthetic experience, to a broader account of other modes
of mental and affective activity involved in objective aesthetic experience, to a more 'creator-
side' emphasis on objectivity in artistic activity, and ultimately (in the final section) to a still-
broader account of poetic objectivity. Again, my basic contention is that poetic objectivity and
scientific objectivity are perspectival duals. Both involve outwardness, in the sense of receptivity
to elemental reality. But in objective poetic understanding we achieve this outwardness through
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direct experiences of elemental reality, from the standpoint of lesser orders of being. In objective
scientific understanding, by contrast, we achieve outwardness through direct experiences of
objective phenomena, from the standpoint of elemental reality or higher force. In the spirit of
poetic objectivity we may thus directly behold the gods or their impact on the natural world, and
even consciously act under their influence as conduits for divine power. Or, in aesthetic
experience, we may behold the elemental in a more abstract mode—as pure sensory force, which
drives us into true passion and affective force, if not into artistic creativity.
Theories of aesthetic experience vary widely, of course, as we have already seen above.
Base hedonists claim that beautiful things, as such, produce pleasant feelings. Schopenhauerian
ascetics insist that aesthetic contemplation provides momentary release from the endless
suffering of will, construed in terms of essential lack or inescapable alienation from the objects
of one's desire. Kantians distinguish sharply between (on the one hand) 'interested' pleasure in
both merely 'agreeable' sensations and rationally-desirable goods and (on the other)
'disinterested' pleasure in open-ended reflection upon beautiful 'form'. Kantian theoretical
rationalists in turn insist that this open-ended 'free play' of cognitive faculties embodies the
reciprocal relationship between powers of sensible 'receptivity' and rational 'spontaneity' that
grounds the possibility of theoretical 'cognition in general'. Broadly Kantian autonomists like
Schiller emphasize the connection between aesthetic experience and practical reason, claiming
that Kantian free play between sensory and rational faculties is a state of freedom wherein we
first spiritualize our merely animal needs by subsuming them under universal laws (of beauty),
thus preparing ourselves for higher rational self-determination in accordance with universal laws
of morality. Nietzsche claims that good art elicits a state of frenzy o r intoxication [Rausch]
opposed to both petty melodramatic affect and rationalistic 'disinterest', and suggests that this
frenzy or intoxication is also the state that gives rise to artistic creation.
Here one cannot remain neutral, muddy though the waters may appear. Perhaps it is
unclear, in particular, how one can arbitrate between competing theories of aesthetic experience
that are all so clearly informed by their authors' distinctive tastes and corresponding conceptions
of paradigmatic aesthetic phenomenology. But this 'personal' influence is consistent with all but
the most ham-handedly rationalistic approaches to aesthetic inquiry. Like artistic practice itself,
aesthetic theory is and should be permeated by style. This entails neither that all aesthetic
sensibilities are equally good nor that all theories of aesthetic experience are equally plausible. It
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does suggest, however, that the aesthetic theorist inevitably takes a stand poetically and not just
analytically—a stand not merely in the name of truth about beauty and sublimity, that is, but also
in the name of beauty and sublimity themselves. There are no 'aesthetically neutral' facts about
the nature of beauty, sublimity, or aesthetic value. There is only objective aesthetic insight—the
theorist's creative determination by elemental sensory force, manifesting as his aesthetic theory.
11. Sensory Force, Sublime Impact, and Beautiful Form420
11.1. Can a basic sensory property like a bare color or tone be beautiful? Some say no.
For instance, Kant claims that experiences of beauty are always elicited by the spatiotemporal
“shape or play” of sensations like colors or tones—by sensible 'form', as he says, never by the
sensory 'matter' it comprises.421 Kant's brand of aesthetic formalism hence involves a structuralist
analysis of beauty. This is somewhat atypical: aesthetic or artistic 'formalism' now more often
refers to the view that only properties available via sensory perception, or things' appearances,
bear directly on judgments of aesthetic or artistic value. Colors and tones are 'formal' features, in
this sense. Thus 'form' is often opposed to cognitive or expressive 'content', not sensory matter.422
The stark contrast that Kant draws between beautiful form and sensory matter may seem
implausible. Indeed, Heidegger suggests that it is precisely in art that “metals come to flitter and
shimmer, colors to glow, tones to sing, the word to speak.”423 Likewise, the stone of the Greek
temple first “comes to bear and rest and so first becomes rock” in its incorporation into the
'temple-work'.424 Hence, the rock in the temple is set forth—not just used up, as it is in fashioning
a mere stone tool.425 “To be sure,” Heidegger allows, “the painter also uses pigment, but in such a
420The following section is a draft of an article that has been accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in
the British Journal of Aesthetics, reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press: https://global.oup.com/ . 
This is the un-refereed Author's Original Version (AOV).
421Kritik der Urteilskraft (KU) 5:224–5. I use the Guyer and Matthews translation (Kant 2000). Kant qualifies that 
the 'purity' of a 'simple color' can be taken as a formal property ('uniformity'); hence, he allows that a 'simple 
color' can be beautiful qua formal.
422For instances of this more standard 'formalism', see e.g. Bell 1913 (but see note 438 below); Fry1918; Hanslick 
1986; Kivy 1990 and 1993. Cf. Walton 1970; Binkley 1970; Ekman 1970; Danto 1981, 1986, 1997; and Carroll 
2001. For formalism about nature, not art, see e.g. Zangwill 2001, 2005. Cf. Carlson 1979; Parsons 2004; 
Parsons and Carlson 2004. For a 'moderate' formalism, see Zangwill 2001, ch. 4–8. See also Thomson-Jones' 
(2005) argument that aesthetic cognitivism is compatible with the 'inseparability' of artistic form and content.
423Heidegger 1971, 46.
424Heidegger 1971, 46.
425Heidegger uses the term 'equipment' [das Zeug]. For its broader context in his thought, see Dreyfus 1992.
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way that color is not used up but rather only now comes to shine forth.”426 In Heidegger's theory
of art, then, 'colors' and 'tones' take on a very different quality than they do for Kant. Contra
Kant, moreover, it is hard to deny the intuitive plausibility of Heidegger's descriptions. Sensuous
'material' is evidently elevated to newfound dignity and splendor through its incorporation into
great artworks. Thus, Kant's structuralist analysis of beauty may seem to be radically misguided.
But, I argue below, a loosely Kantian association of beauty with structural form can be
productively synthesized with a broadly Heideggerian vision of 'glowing' colors and 'singing'
tones as loci of inherent aesthetic value. The resultant view depends upon clearly distinguishing
beauty from other kinds of aesthetic value, and is surprisingly plausible: Pure 'glowing' colors
and 'singing' tones are never beautiful, in themselves. But they are sensory forces—not mere
'matter'—with real aesthetic impact. The simplest sensory experience of sublimity is just the
overwhelming impact of radically intensified sensory forces, similar in kind if not degree to the
individual 'singing' tones in a beautiful melody. In turn, sensible beauty is plausibly restricted to
structures of sensory force. More specifically, I argue that purely sensible beauty is just the
holistic impact of agonistic interactions among sensory forces. By 'agon', I mean tension among
well-matched forces. Real friendship and real enmity are both forms of agon, for instance, as is
healthy romantic love. I provide artistic examples of agon, below. And I show how my emphasis
on aesthetic agon is related to Kant's theory of 'free play', yet without relying on Kant's
traditionalistic theory of humans as essentially 'sensuous-rational' beings.
Agon among sensory forces is to be contrasted against aesthetic hierarchy, or dynamic
interaction between loci of relatively unequal aesthetic impact. For instance, consider the
subsumption of some musical elements under others, as mere accompaniment to a dominant
melody or lead voice. I argue that hierarchically-interacting sensory forces elicit experiences that
are more similar—in quality if not necessarily in degree—to the sublime impact of radically
intensified but 'formless' sensory force, than to the experience of beauty.
Hence, I propose a novel model of the relationship between beauty and sublimity. Note
that I am not denying the potential relevance of affective states or 'expressive' content to
aesthetic experience. Genuinely aesthetic experiences plausibly vary in the degree to which they
involve less purely 'sensory' modes of activity, whether this be imaginative, affective, or
narrowly 'cognitive'. For instance, the sound of nails scraping on a chalkboard may be distasteful
426Heidegger 1971, 47.
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apart from any imaginative associations it elicits. Correspondingly, the saturated red or orange of
the sky during a sunset may be aesthetically impactful apart from any 'ideas' it invokes—even if
some experiences of the sublime do involve the “sensible rendering of moral ideas,” as Kant
claims.427 Thus I simply aim to describe a purely sensory aspect of aesthetic experience. My
basic goal is to elaborate, historically contextualize, and demonstrate the explanatory power of
this novel account of the relationship between beauty and sublimity, mediated by sensory force.
11.2. It will be helpful to situate my view in relation to more standard varieties of
aesthetic or artistic 'formalism'. But to that end, in this section I will first briefly elaborate some
of my central claims about sensory force, vis-à-vis beauty and sublimity, and provide concrete
artistic examples that I take to provide intuitive phenomenological motivation for these claims.
In the next section, I will then contrast my account against more standard kinds of 'formalism'. In
so doing, I will also explain how several different senses of the term 'form' are interrelated.
Finally, I will elaborate the relationship between my account and the deeper systematic
motivation for Kant's formalism about beauty, which concerns his fairly traditionalistic theory of
human nature.
At present, I will proceed by way of response to a basic question: If my appeal to
'aesthetic impact' is specifically intended to encompass the effect of sensory forces like
Heidegger's 'glowing' colors and 'singing' tones, then why do I not just allow that aesthetic
impact is a kind of beauty? First, note that beauty is not the only aesthetic value. Hence, even if a
thing like a 'singing' tone clearly has aesthetic value, this does not provide evidence that it is
beautiful. Likewise, if one is told that a given thing is an animal, this does not provide evidence
that it is a human, rather than a dog or a lizard. Beauty is just one species of aesthetic value.
Second, consider that although 'glowing' colors (etc.) can evidently be aesthetically-
significant aspects of beautiful things, it does not follow that these sensory forces are beautiful in
themselves. For instance, the chemical bonds between individual molecules in a liquid are
directly relevant to the liquidity of the ensemble; but none of the individual molecules is liquid,
in itself. Liquidity is thus an emergent property of the collection of molecules, as some
metaphysicians and philosophers of science put it.428 Likewise, I claim that purely sensible
beauty is an emergent property of an ensemble of sensory forces, grounded in their interactions
427KU 5:356. See also KU 5:257.
428On emergence, see e.g. Kim 1999; cf. Shoemaker 2002.
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with one another. Here it is helpful to compare John Dewey's account of “the intimacy of the
relations that hold the parts together,” which he calls “[t]he characteristic of artistic design”: “[a]
work of art is poor in the degree in which [these relations] exist in separation, as in a novel
wherein plot—the design—is felt to be superimposed upon incidents and characters instead of
being their dynamic relations to one another.”429 This is how I envision the relation between
sensory force and beauty: a purely sensible beautiful form just is a dynamic interaction among
the sensory forces it comprises. Indeed, this is one reason why these constitutive parts are aptly
termed sensory forces: 'glowing' colors and 'singing' tones are essentially characterized both by
their power to impact perceiving subjects, and by their power to interact with other sensory
forces.
Third, I claim that artworks involving nothing but 'glowing colors', 'clanging tones', and
so forth, are not beautiful. Note that one need not necessarily agree that a particular work is or is
not beautiful, in order to find this abstract point plausible. For instance, consider Olafur
Eliasson's Your rainbow panorama (2006-2011), a large, elevated circular track of about 50
meters in diameter, encased on all sides in intensely color-saturated monochromatic glass, which
gradually changes in hue along the circumference—such that a viewer walking around the track
passes first through a region in which everything appears intensely red (e.g.), then orange, then
yellow, green, etc. The view from any given point inside this structure is thus surreally
monochromatic, imbuing the world with an aesthetically-forceful 'glow' if ever there was one.
And yet the world thus viewed, as a formless sea of a singular 'glowing color', is plausibly less
beautiful than sublime. Or, more precisely, perhaps it is simply aesthetically impactful—an
intensified version of the experience of being impacted by a 'glowing' color in a painting, for
instance, even if it does not rise to the level of the sublime. Likewise, imagine a musical work
consisting in a single prolonged blast on a giant horn. Such a pure 'singing' (or 'blaring') tone
may certainly be aesthetically striking, rousing, or awesome. But I contend that it would
nevertheless be far from plausibly beautiful. So too, finally, consider that around sunset refracted
reddish or purple hues in the sky sometimes induce a similar color in vast swaths of the
landscape. But the resulting experience as of an all-encompassing color or hue—aptly termed a
'formless' sensory force—is more plausibly related to feelings of the sublime, than to beauty.
Respecting this intuitive phenomenological distinction, therefore, I am referring to the
429Dewey 1934/1980, 121.
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effect of 'glowing' colors, 'singing' tones, etc. as the feeling of aesthetic impact. This in turn
plausibly becomes a feeling of the overwhelming aesthetic impact of the sublime, when it is
radically intensified. (There may well be other grounds of the sublime besides this one.) And
both must be distinguished from the distinctive feeling elicited by beauty, although I claim that
purely sensory beauty is an emergent property of dynamic interactions among sensory forces.
Thus, on my view, the simplest purely sensory experience of the sublime is just an intensified
version of the same kind of aesthetic impact that is elicited by the individual 'glowing' colors or
'singing' tones in a beautiful painting or song.
Sublimity is not essentially related to structure, in the way that beauty is. The sublimity of
a 'formless' field of intense light or sound evidences this point. In this context, it also helps to
observe the phenomenological relation between feelings of the sublime and the feeling elicited
by musical drones, or by certain kinds of abstract art that privilege 'glowing' colors and
impenetrably-simple geometrical shapes—i.e. shapes that do not impact us as internally-complex
forms. The latter two phenomena are arguably exemplified in some Abstract Expressionist
paintings, like Mark Rothko's No. 14, 1960, as well as in Minimalist sculptures like Tony Smith's
Die (1962). Note that some internally-complex forms may (as such) elicit true experiences of
sublimity—e.g. consider looking out at endless perfectly-straight rows of plants on a huge
industrial farm—even if sublimity is not essentially related to internal structure. 
Recall that not all structural configurations of sensory force are beautiful, on my view.
Rather, sensible beauty is grounded in agonistic interaction among sensory forces—i.e., in
tension between well-matched sensory forces, which we experience as beautiful form. This is by
contrast to hierarchical interactions among unequal sensory forces, which elicit feelings of what
I will call aesthetic order. A set of musical examples will help to illustrate this point.
Harmony vs. Counterpoint: Music structured by contrapuntal motion has strongly
independent, individually self-standing melodic lines that nevertheless seem to 'play' back and
forth off of one another to create a coherent aesthetic whole. Canonically, for example, consider
the relationship between lower and higher voices in Bach's Art of Fugue. Similarly, one may
think of the dynamic tension between drums, bass, piano, and 'lead' horn instrument in much
post-bop jazz, as in Miles Davis's 'Agitation' (1965). This style of music is of course heavily
driven by improvisational soloing, which hence naturally situates the solo voice as a focal point
for collective melodic and rhythmic development. But in the best small-combo jazz, the soloist
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nevertheless remains continually and intensely responsive to the rhythmic, melodic, and
harmonic figurations of his fellow musicians, who are themselves constantly improvising and
stepping alternately to the fore and to the back of the collective performance even within the
context of their 'accompanying' role. In this sense, then, the internal dynamic tension of an elite
jazz combo can be meaningfully subsumed along with the contrapuntal motion of classical
fugues under a broader category of counterpoint. And counterpoint thus construed is related to
agonistic form: the interacting voices are relatively equal in power of aesthetic impact.
By contrast, harmony functions as a locus of aesthetic order insofar as it involves the
radical subsumption of some musical elements under others in the mode of genuine
accompaniment to a sonically-dominant melody or lead voice. Here consider the 'harmonious'
relationship between dominant lead voice and rhythmic accompaniment during John Coltrane's
initial melodic articulation in 'Naima', a ballad dedicated to his first wife. Notably, the fact that
small-combo jazz performance is often driven more by collective improvisation over fixed chord
progressions, than by pre-planned performance of melodic themes, helps to explain why the
relation between solo instrument and rhythm section in this music is more contrapuntal than is
the relation between solo and accompaniment in many classical compositional forms.
Yet 'harmony' is also intuitively related, not to hierarchy or unilateral determination, but
rather precisely to balance, equality, and symmetry. In the musical context, harmony is therefore
opposed not only to counterpoint, but also to dissonance and to sonic imbalance. Furthermore,
musical harmony is naively thought to be beautiful, by contrast to 'ugly' sonic dissonance. This
apparently stands in tension with the association I have drawn above, between harmony and
hierarchical aesthetic order, as opposed to beautiful agonistic form. But this tension is merely
apparent, grounded in equivocation between 'harmony' as opposed to counterpoint, and
'harmony' as opposed to dissonance. Harmony as opposed to dissonance does indeed involve a
mode of beautiful agonistic form. Yet dissonance, too, can be a locus of beautiful agonistic form.
Of course, uncontrolled dissonance is not beautiful. But when properly deployed, dissonant
harmonic relations may certainly constitute agonistic forms. Indeed, my notion of an agonistic
form, or system of agonistic relations among forces that itself functions as a coherent locus of
force, captures the aesthetic unity of harmony and dissonance. Both harmony and dissonance,
insofar as they are beautiful, involve systems of dynamic tension among well-matched-sensory
forces, which collectively function as coherent loci of aesthetic impact. The relation between
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beautiful harmony and beautiful dissonance is thus at root that between (harmonious) static
equilibria and (dissonant) dynamic equilibria among well-matched forces.
This account also helps to explain why the aesthetic impact of hierarchically-interacting
loci of sensory force is qualitatively (not necessarily quantitatively) similar to the overwhelming
impact of the sublime. Both essentially involve aesthetic hierarchy. In experiences of sublimity
grounded in radically-intensified but 'formless' sensory force, a perceiving subject first-
personally experiences his own hierarchical determination by sensory force. In the case of
hierarchy within a given aesthetic object (e.g. the subordination of rhythmic accompaniment to a
lead melodic voice), a subject instead third-personally apprehends hierarchical determination of
sensory force by sensory force. In either case, then, the subject apprehends sensory force in the
mode of asymmetrical impact. This is not to say that experiences of the sublime are the same as
experiences of hierarchical aesthetic order within a given artwork or natural phenomenon. But it
does help to explain their phenomenological proximity.
Finally, note that the distinctions between aesthetic agon, aesthetic order, and 'formless'
sensory force drawn above should not be taken as rigid. Rather, they are contrasting analytical
categories that can often be fruitfully applied in many distinct ways to a given artwork or natural
phenomenon. Here consider by analogy Nietzsche's opposition between 'Apolline' and
'Dionysian' art-impulses [Kunsttriebe].430 In The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche posits as the
fundamental level of reality a “universal will” or “world-will” [Weltwillens] (BT 17, 21), which
he also identifies as “nature” (B T 2, 4, 8) or “primordial being” [Urwesen] (BT 17). Here his
view is evidently influenced by the Schopenhauerian distinction between 'will' and
'representation'—which itself descends from the Kantian opposition between 'noumenal' and
'phenomenal' reality, or 'things in themselves' as they are opposed to mere 'appearances' or
'objects' of experience. In turn, on Nietzsche's view this universal will is the subject or locus of
two basic 'artistic' drives: a drive towards individuation and beautiful semblance [Schein] that he
associates with Apollo as a god of light, prophecy, the “helping and healing powers of nature in
sleep and dream,” clarity of form, and the “wise calm” [weisheitsvolle Ruhe] and “freedom from
wilder impulses” characteristic of all “image-making energies” [bildnerischen Kräfte] (B T 1);
and a drive towards de-individuation and ecstatic identification with 'titanic' and 'barbaric' forces
430Nietzsche calls the Apolline and Dionysian “two interwoven artistic impulses [Kunsttriebe]” (BT 12). Regarding 
the former, he uses the German 'apollinische', which Walter Kaufmann translates as 'Apollinian', and other 
translators commonly translate as 'Apolline'.
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of nature (BT 4)431 whereby universal will “seeks to destroy the individual and redeem him by a
mystic feeling of oneness” (B T 2), which Nietzsche associates with Dionysus as a god of
drunken revelry, fertility, ritual madness, and unrestrained sensuality. The Apolline drive to
beautiful semblance manifests in broadly 'image'-based modes of artistic creation, which are
loosely 'objective' in the sense that the Apolline artist both orients herself towards clarity of form
and remains external to the crystalline appearances that she hence lays out for her own or others'
aesthetic contemplation—“that calm, unmoved contemplation which sees the images before its
wide-open eyes” (BT 12). Sculpture (BT 1), the plastic arts more broadly (BT 16), and Homeric
poetry—given “the clarity and firmness of epic form” (B T 8)—are thus quintessentially
Apolline;432 while “imageless” (BT 1) arts like those of music, dance, acting, and lyric poetry are
quintessentially Dionysian.433 Here Nietzsche invokes the “dramatic proto-phenomenon” of
“see[ing] oneself transformed before one's own eyes and [beginning] to act as if one had actually
entered into another body” (BT 8). This sort of Dionysian “magic transformation” (BT 7) is to be
directly contrasted against the Apolline “rhapsodist who does not become fused with his images
but, like a painter, sees them outside himself as objects of contemplation” (BT 8).434
However, Nietzsche does not flatfootedly identify particular artistic media as univocally
'Apolline' or 'Dionysian'. For instance, he allows that music can be an “Apolline art” insofar as it
is known “only as the wave beat of rhythm,” as opposed to “the emotional power of the tone, the
431“Apollo, as ethical deity, exacts measure of his disciples, and, to be able to attain it, he requires self-knowledge. 
And so, side by side with the aesthetic necessity for beauty, there occur the demands 'know thyself' and 'nothing 
in excess'; consequently overweening pride and excess are regarded as the truly hostile demons of the non-
Apolline sphere, hence as characteristics of the pre-Apolline age—that of the Titans; and of the extra-Apolline 
world—that of the barbarians. Because of his titanic love for man, Prometheus must be torn to pieces by 
vultures; because of his excessive wisdom, which could solve the riddle of the Sphinx, Oedipus must be plunged 
into a bewildering vortex of crime. Thus did the Delphic god interpret the Greek past. The effects wrought by the
Dionysian also seemed 'titanic' and 'barbaric' to the Apolline Greek; while at the same time he could not conceal 
from himself that hem too, was inwardly related to these overthrown Titans and heroes” (BT 4).
432“The Apolline frenzy [Rausch] excites the eye above all, so that it gains the power of vision. The painter, the 
sculptor, the epic poet are visionaries par excellence” (TI “Skirmishes” 10).
433These art forms are all discussed in The Birth of Tragedy, and explicitly characterized as Dionysian. And in this 
light: “The actor, the mime, the dancer, the musician, and the lyric poet are basically related in the instincts and, 
at bottom, one—but gradually they have become specialized and separated from each other, even to the point of 
mutual opposition. The lyric poet remained united with the musician for the longest me; the actor, with the 
dancer” (TI “Skirmishes” 11).
434Similarly: “The dithyramb is thus essentially different from all other choral odes. The virgins who proceed 
solemnly to the temple of Apollo, laurel branches in their hands, singing a processional hymn, remain what they 
are and retain their civic names: the dithyrambic chorus is a chorus of transformed characters whose civic past 
and social status have been totally forgotten: they have become timeless servants of their god who live outside 
the spheres of society. All the other choral lyric poetry of the Hellenes is merely a tremendous intensification of 
the Apolline solo singer, while in the dithyramb we confront a community of unconscious actors who consider 
themselves and one another transformed” (BT 8).
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uniform flow of the melody, and the utterly incomparable world of harmony” (BT 2).435 And at a
still higher level of interpretive sophistication, he presents lyric poetry436 as an Apolline
“symbolic dream image” of “pure primordial pain and its primordial re-echoing [in the activity of
the Dionysian musician]” (B T 5). Lyric poetry is in other words “the imitative fulguration
[Effulguration] of music in images and concepts,” or the appearance of “all nature, and himself
in it, as willing, as desiring, as eternal longing” (B T 6). In this way, the lyric poet offers a
premonition of the hybrid “Dionysian-Apolline genius and its art product” (BT 5) that Nietzsche
takes to reach its apotheosis in Attic tragedy (BT 5).437
Like Nietzsche's opposition between the Dionysian and the Apolline, then, my categories
of 'formless force', 'agon', and 'hierarchy' are most helpfully viewed as relational rather than
absolute. That is, in the same way that Nietzsche identifies music broadly speaking as Dionysian
and the plastic arts as Apolline, but then still differentiates melody and rhythm as distinctively
Dionysian and Apolline aspects within music itself, so too I insist that my own categories are
best deployed as tools for unearthing and distilling aesthetically salient characteristics or
tendencies within a given artwork, genre, medium, natural phenomenon, etc. Hence, that the
agon-hierarchy distinction can be deployed in different ways with respect to a given aesthetic
object, and then reapplied in a loosely 'fractal' manner within each of the oppositional pairings it
makes salient, should be viewed as a virtue or strength of my account, not a flaw or limitation.
In this light, for instance, Nietzsche's association of melody with the Dionysian and
rhythm with the Apolline makes perfect sense, and I would endorse a parallel association of
melody with 'formless' force and rhythm with 'dynamic form'. Here consider that in many cases
melody seems to 'flow' in time as an indivisible unity, whereas rhythm is more conspicuously
constituted by the configuration of discrete 'units' or elements in time. Correlatively, melody
construed as a 'flowing' indivisible unity or simple entity is rightly seen as a 'formless' force,
which we do not behold as an 'image' but rather feel immediately as pure impact. However,
pursuant to the above point about the 'relational' or contextual character of these categories, it
435More fully: “If music, as it would seem, had been known previously as an Apolline art, it was so, strictly 
speaking, only as the wave beat of thythm, whose formative power was developed for the representation of 
Apolline states. The music of Apollo was Doric architectonics in tones, but in tones that were merely suggestive,
such as those of the cithara. The very element which forms the essence of Dionysian music (and hence of music 
in general) is carefully excluded as un-Apolline—namely, the emotional power of the tone, the uniform flow of 
the melody, and the utterly incomparable world of harmony” (BT 2).
436Nietzsche takes Archilochus (c. 680-645 BC) as his exemplary lyric poet.
437“[...]image sparks, lyrical poems, which in their highest development are called tragedies and dramatic 
dithyrambs” (BT 5).
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should be noted that rhythm can also function as 'formless' force, and melody as dynamic form.
To the former point, consider a driving drum beat that one again does not behold as an 'image',
but rather viscerally feels as a force or immediately-impactful motive power. To the point that
melody can also function as dynamic form, consider melody not as it is opposed either to rhythm
or to accompaniment, but rather to the pure tone or pitch. Here, obviously, melody emerges as a
formal structure: a configuration of tones or pitches in time, or of pure timbre in both time and
'frequency- or pitch-space'. In the case of playing a piano, for example, one must choose both
which keys to press and when to do so; melody, in turn, evidently arises from the combination of
both sorts of choices. Thus the paradigmatic aesthetic function of melody in relation to rhythm is
that of 'formless' force, whereas in relation to tone it is that of dynamic form. Yet note, finally,
that certain musical compositions highlight one or the other of these aesthetic functions of
melody. That is, the melodic character of a given musical work may be relatively 'formal'—here
think, for example, of a jarring and fragmented piece of modernist music like Anton Webern's
Variations for piano, op. 27 (1936) or Schönberg's Five Pieces for Piano, op. 27 (1920-23). But
other compositions deploy melody in a more 'forceful' way—as a Nietzschean example of such
relatively 'formless' melodic force, consider Wagner's operatic cycle, Der Ring des Nibelungen.
11.3. With this intuitive motivation in tow, it now bears further elaborating that the
broadly Kantian notion of 'form' as relational structure, which I emphasize, is not the only
salient notion of 'form' in aesthetics.438 The English form shares a common set of denotations
with the Latin forma and the Greek morphe and eidos: all denote (1) appearance, especially in
the sense of outward o r sensible appearance—hence, the traditional association between form
and aesthetics construed as episteme aisthetike or the science of aesthesis (perception, and
especially sensory perception);439 (2) shape, configuration, or structure; (3) kind or type; and (4)
shapeliness or beauty itself.440 I am placing primary emphasis on (2), and secondary emphasis on
(1): I claim that purely sensible beauty only inheres in intuitable relational structure among
438Note that Clive Bell defines 'Significant Form' as “[t]hese relations and combinations of lines and colours, these 
aesthetically moving forms” (Bell 1913, 8). This suggests an opposition between form and sensory matter, not 
'content'. However, Bell's appeal to 'lines' (qua spatiotemporal structures) complicates this analysis. Both the 
'form-matter' and 'form-content' distinctions are plausibly salient, for Bell. This combination of distinctions is 
typical of many post-Kantian theories of art emphasizing 'expressive form'—e.g. see Langer 1953, 1957.
439See Baumgarten 1954, 78; Heidegger 1991, 77–8; and Adorno 2018, 18.
440'Beauty' is given as an archaic definition of 'form' in the Collins English and Merriam-Webster Dictionaries. For 
the Latin and Greek, see Lewis and Short 1879; Liddell and Scott 1889, 1940, and Cunliffe 1924.
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sensory forces.441 
This is atypical. More commonly, again, 'formalists' are those who claim that beauty—or,
more broadly, aesthetic or artistic value—is solely a property of things' appearance, and
especially their sensible characteristics or style. For instance, 'form', in this sense, encompasses
both the color and shape of a sculpture; the pacing and cinematographic technique displayed in a
given film; the use of ekphrasis or specific metrical structures in a given lyric poem; and the
stream-of-consciousness narratorial voice deployed in a given modernist novel. An aesthetic
object's 'form', thus construed, is opposed to its content, not to its sensory matter. 'Content' here
typically includes several distinct things. First, it typically includes representational content, e.g.
the fact that a given painting depicts a landscape or a Dutch aristocrat, or that a particular
melodic figure resembles the cadence of human speech. Second, 'content' typically includes
expressive content, e.g. that a certain dance seems to express human feeling—without
necessarily depicting it.442 Third, 'content' typically includes moral content, e.g. that Leni
Riefenstahl's Triumph of the Will presents a glorified and hence morally abhorrent vision of the
Nazi party. Finally, 'content' typically includes truth content, e.g. that Turgenev's Fathers and
Sons (1862) accurately depicts certain real features of mid-19th-century Russian provincial
society.
Further distinctions can be helpfully drawn within the broad category of artistic or
aesthetic 'formalism', in this standard sense. For instance, radical formalists insist that one can
legitimately consider only an artwork's form, and so not its content, when assessing its artistic or
aesthetic value. By contrast, more moderate formalists that artistic or aesthetic evaluation may
properly involve consideration of both an artwork's form and its content, but still insist that the
latter has artistic or aesthetic significance only in the context of evaluating the relationship
between content and form. Specifically, a typical moderate formalist might insist that artistic or
aesthetic evaluation of a given artwork can properly include consideration of its form, but also
whether this form coheres with or functions to effectively express its content.443
I am neither a radical nor a moderate 'formalist', in this standard sense. I do take beauty to
441I elaborate the relevant sense of 'intuitable' below.
442On expression vs. representation, see see e.g. Collingwood 1938, Wollheim 1987. For criticism, see e.g. van 
Gerwen 2001.
443Mary Devereaux (1998, 244) characterizes a closely related view that she calls 'sophisticated formalism', 
according to which “[a]rtistic success consists in expressing a particular message in an effective way.” But the 
'moderate formalism' characterized here is less restrictive: it allows that artistic success or aesthetic value can 
consist in the realization of purely formal—i.e. entirely 'content'-independent—aesthetic or artistic virtues.
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depend upon sensible (or, more precisely, intuitable) appearance. Things cannot be beautiful
just by virtue of their 'content', on my view. But I do not claim that any 'content' can sensibly
appear as beautiful form. For instance, I am happy to allow that it might be impossible to
produce truly beautiful artistic expressions of ethically-abhorrent or politically-heinous attitudes.
Thus my view differs from standard 'formalism': my analysis of sensory aspects of aesthetic
experience is entirely compatible with the possibility that 'content' might also have intrinsic
bearing on aesthetic value—although if it does not, then my account clearly allows for that, too.
Although the formalist thesis that beauty inheres exclusively in sensible appearance is
already highly controversial, the claim that beauty inheres exclusively in shape or configuration
would likely be only still more widely contested. Form construed as shape is typically opposed
not to content, in the above sense, but rather to matter. Thus, a sculpture's shape is distinguished
from the clay or bronze out of which it is formed. Likewise, aesthetic matter construed as
sensation, i.e. pure color, tone, scent, taste, or tactile impression, may be differentiated from
aesthetic form construed as the relational structure of sensations in the representation of a given
object. Kant appeals to a variant of aesthetic form in this sense. Namely, Kant views aesthetic
form as the conceptually indeterminate spatiotemporal 'shape or play' of sensations in our
intuitive representations of things—for reasons that I elaborate below.
Extrapolating somewhat from Kant's evidently restrictive view, one might identify
aesthetic form with not only the spatiotemporal configuration of sensations, but also their 'shape'
or configuration with respect to more abstract relational structures like color spaces and their
analogues for non-visual sensory modalities. In a color space, for example, variable chromatic
properties like shade, tint, tone, and hue can function as dimensions along which to 'locate'
particular visual sensations, hence providing abstract metrical structures in which to
conceptualize or intuitively represent aesthetically significant chromatic 'shapes' or
configurations in the manifold of visual sensations elicited by a given object. Properties like the
additive and subtractive relations between particular colors might also be treated as features of
aesthetic form so construed as the intuitable 'shape' or configuration of sensory 'matter'. It is
helpful to view this conception of intuitable form as a synthesis of Kantian and standard
formalist notions of aesthetic 'form'. Like the Kantian and unlike the standard formalist, the
advocate of the present view understands 'form' as shape or structure inhering in sensory 'matter',
and so denies that 'material' sensory properties like bare color or tone are features of aesthetic
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form. But like the standard formalist and unlike the Kantian, she does not restrict her attention to
spatiotemporal relations. And like both the standard formalist and the Kantian, she denies that
representational, ethical, or epistemic 'content' is a legitimate component of aesthetic form. So,
for instance, an advocate of the present view would deny the 'formal' relevance of any non-
relational properties of the particular visual sensations she has upon looking at a given painting
—e.g. that she sees pleasing shades of blue, green, and brown, considered apart from the
relations in which these colors stand to one another. But she would also distinguish from
aesthetic form things like whether this sensory matter has a collective 'shape' that is somehow
expressive of a particular conception of ethical virtue, whether the given painting depicts
anything at all, and if so whether the things that it depicts are morally good, actually exist, or are
physically possible. I wholly endorse this notion of aesthetic form, insofar as it bears on a purely
sensory aspect of aesthetic experience: beauty only inheres in this kind of relational structure
among loci of sensory force, on my view, even if it also depends in some way on 'content'. To be
aesthetically relevant, 'content' must sensuously appear in intuitable form, in the present sense.
Finally, generalizing still further, one might insist that 'formal' features encompass not
only spatiotemporal and other intuitable configurations of sensory 'matter', but also
conceptualized relations among sensations, like those dismissed above as aspects of 'content'.
And in this broadest notion of relational structure, one arguably recovers the notion of form as
kind or type mentioned at the outset of this section. Here consider that every determinate kind or
type evidently corresponds to a concept, and in turn that on the view of some theorists—saliently
including Kant—a concept is essentially a rule or a law-like relational structure through which
collections of discrete particulars or manifolds of sensory 'matter' can be rationally synthesized
into objective wholes, or taken up in acts of objective judgment.
In this way, the denotation of form as kind or type can be subsumed under the ambit of a
broad structural notion of form construed as relational unity, or the way that a collection of
things are interrelated as parts of a whole. So understood, form has often been associated,
directly or indirectly, with rationality or our capacity for objective judgment and knowledge—
e.g. by Kant, as we will see. By contrast, the basic purely aesthetic notion of form, as sensible
appearance, is arguably rooted in the classical distinction between the beautiful (as the highest
aim of perception, the domain of aesthetics), the true (as the highest aim of judgment, the domain
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of logic), and the good (as the highest aim of action, the domain of ethics).444 In sum, when I
claim that sensible beauty inheres only in intuitable structures of sensory force, I mean to include
both spatiotemporal and other singular relations (e.g. of chromatic contrast) among sensory
forces. But I do not mean to include generic relations among sensory forces: I agree with Kant
that we cannot prove a thing's beauty just by indicating its conceptually-determinate features.
11.4. My account of sensible beauty, as grounded in agonistic interactions among sensory
forces, is in certain respects related to Kant's theory of 'free play' between imagination and
understanding in experiences of beautiful form. But my account does not presuppose the theory
of human nature that undergirds Kant's account. To appreciate this, we must first review Kant's
account of aesthetic 'disinterestedness', and then relate it to his theory of cognition.
Kant understands 'interest' as “[t]he satisfaction that we combine with the representation
of the existence of an object.”445 In turn, he claims that interested satisfaction is always grounded
in, or else itself grounds, a desire.446 When a desire is grounded in interested satisfaction, Kant
refers to the object of this desire as merely agreeable. The agreeable is that which we want more
of, simply because it “gratifies” us bodily.447 Kant presents as paradigmatic agreeable things
pleasant 'sensations', e.g. impressions of objects' color or tone448—hence presumably also their
taste, smell, or tactile quality.449 By contrast, when our pleasure in representing the existence of
something is grounded in our rational desire for it, Kant characterizes this thing as good.450 On
Kant's view, then, disinterested pleasure is the feeling of freedom from desire in open-ended
reflection upon beautiful aesthetic form: the 'free play' [freien Spiele] of our imagination and
understanding.451
In turn, Kant views this 'free play' of faculties as embodying the reciprocal relationship





449Here Kant's account reflects his debt to 18th-century British theorists. E.g. Shaftesbury “excludes the sensory 
from the realm of the aesthetic” because he identifies beauty with harmony and argues that “harmony can never 
be apprehended by the senses;” correspondingly, the “objects of sense” only satisfy “lower,” “material” desire 
(Stolnitz 196ab, 109–110). Compare Shaftesbury 2000, 321–2. On 'disinterestedness' in 18th-century British 
aesthetics, see also Stolnitz 1961a; Rind 2002; Berleant 1986. On Kant's relationship to this British context, see 




between powers of sensible 'receptivity' (here broadly associated with imagination) and rational
'spontaneity' (here associated with understanding) that he claims grounds the possibility of
“cognition in general.”452 Kant's aesthetic formalism is thus bound up with a traditionalistic
theory of human nature, according to which we are sensuous-rational beings. While this theory
of human nature might not seem inherently objectionable, that Kant's theory of beauty
presupposes it is perhaps grounds for suspicion. For should we accept that colors and tones
cannot be beautiful, just because they do not speak directly to our rational nature? (Thus, Kant
was arguably unable to recognize the aesthetic value of sensory force for the same reason that he
was unable to recognize the ethical significance of inclination, not just moral principle.)
To deepen this criticism, it is helpful to note how Kant's 'formalism' is grounded in a
deeper expressive theory of beauty, related to his basic vision of taste as “at bottom a faculty for
the judging of the sensible rendering of moral ideas.”453 Here note, first, that Kant's notion of
aesthetic form approaches the boundary of conceptual representation from the side of intuition.
Like intuitive representations, judgments of beauty are singular.454 This corresponds directly to
Kant's view that judgments of taste are subjectively rather than objectively grounded, or
'aesthetic' rather than 'logical', and likewise to his view that “there can[...]be no rule in
accordance with which someone could be compelled to acknowledge something as beautiful.”455
Insofar as judgments of beauty are justified by appeal to the feeling of free play rather than by
pointing to objective features of beautiful things, Kant believes, it is impossible to prove to
someone that a given thing is beautiful simply by describing it in generic terms. Rather, when it
comes to judgments of beauty one always has to “submit the object to his own eyes”456 in order
to see whether its immediate sensory impact indeed initiates the harmonious free play of
imagination and understanding. Aesthetic form, in turn, is for Kant evidently the 'form' into
which the sensory 'matter' of an empirical intuition is composed. By thus dissociating aesthetic
form from the raw 'matter' of sensation, Kant explicitly seeks to insulate judgments of beauty
from idiosyncratic individual responses to (merely 'agreeable' or 'gratifying') sensory qualities.
And by identifying aesthetic form with the relational structure of sensations, he in turn seeks to







appreciate this point, given traditional associations between universality and rationality, is to
recognize that for Kant the representation of aesthetic form necessarily involves 'a formal
determination of the unity of a manifold of [sensations]',457 and so always already involves
activation of the subject's capacity for rational spontaneity, even though the beautiful
'pleases[...]without a concept'.458
In brief, this is possible (Kant claims) because he understands judgments of beauty as
aesthetic reflecting judgments: to judge that a given object is beautiful is to claim that the
spatiotemporal form of a corresponding intuitive representation of the object is 'subjectively
purposive', or “purposive for the reflecting power of judgment by itself, i.e., in the mere intuition
without any concept.”459 Kant thus understands the feeling of 'free play' between imagination and
understanding to constitute a special kind of judgment, which aims not at subsuming a given
beautiful intuitive form under the concept of a determinate kind of object of possible experience,
but rather at relating this beautiful form to the concept of the universal subjective conditions of
possibility of objective (reflecting) judgment itself. So, whereas in the standard 'objective' use of
reflecting judgment a given empirical intuition might be subsumed under the concept [dog], in
judgments of beauty a given empirical intuition is subsumed under the concept [subjective
purposiveness for the objective use of reflecting judgment in general].
Roughly speaking, then, one can understand Kant to be claiming that finding something
beautiful essentially involves 'holding it together' (i.e. synthesizing the manifold of sensations it
elicits) by means of the concept of a generic rational subject who perceives objects in space and
time, as opposed to the concept of a specific kind of object. In other words, Kant roughly claims
that objects are beautiful insofar as they represent the generic 'sensuous-rational' structure of
human cognition in empirical intuition. Spatiotemporal 'form' is suited to perform this
representational role because (Kant thinks) it directly involves both our faculties of sensory
'receptivity' and rational 'spontaneity', whereas raw sensory 'matter' involves only the sensuous
aspect of our nature. This is why Kant is a 'formalist' about beauty.
11.5. However, broadly Kantian formalism about beauty need not be tied in this way to a





these positions is to acknowledge that what Kant degrades as mere sensory 'matter' can in fact be
a locus of aesthetic value in its own right—while insisting that it is never beautiful, per se, apart
from its structural form. This is where sensory force and aesthetic agon are useful notions.
On my view, intuitable form is not essentially linked to beauty because it mediates
between 'rational spontaneity' and 'sensory receptivity', as spatiotemporal form does for Kant.
Rather, intuitable form is the proper focal point for several other reasons: (i) It matches the
phenomenological data, in the sense that 'formless' sensory force just doesn't seem to be
beautiful—here recall section 2 above. (ii) Emphasis on intuitable form still allows for the kind
of 'freedom from concepts' that is an attractive feature of Kant's account. Like Kant, that is, I
claim that valid judgments of beauty are justified by appeal to a feeling, not by pointing to
objective features of beautiful things.460 And one crucial aspect of this feeling, at least, is
aesthetic agon: the impact of agonistic interactions among loci of sensory force, like
contrapuntally-interacting melodies. Kant is right that in judgments of beauty one always has to
“submit the object to his own eyes”;461 and my account retains this feature. (iii) My account is
more flexible than Kant's, however, insofar as I do not restrict intuitable form to spatiotemporal
relations, but also allow that beautiful form's 'structure' might consist in purely intuitive relations
like those of dynamic contrast between instruments.
My emphasis on agonistic interactions, specifically, adds several further advantages: (iv)
Again, this matches the phenomenological data: things like harmony and dissonance can both be
beautiful; but extreme imbalance, even insofar as it is aesthetically effective—e.g. an
overwhelming solo voice that overpowers all accompanying parts in an attractive way—tends
rather towards the sublime or just intensely impactful, rather than towards beauty. One natural
explanation of this is that beauty is tied to tension among sensory forces with similar intensities.
(v) Pointing to agonistic interactions within beautiful things provides an objective ground for the
distinctively open-ended character of experiences of beauty. As Alexander Nehamas observes in
a broadly Kantian spirit, beauty apparently concerns “attractions that exceed our ability to
articulate them in terms that we already understand, and promise to reveal to us something never
seen before.”462 It is arguably this “promise of more,” of more valuable experience to come, that
makes something beautiful.463 And I claim that dynamic tension among well-matched sensory
460Compare also Schopenhauer 1966, 409.
461KU 5:216.
462Nehamas 2007, 86.
463Nehamas 2007, 76. Nehamas considers 'beauty' the “collective name” of “the values of aesthetics” (ibid. 86).
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forces would naturally elicit a purely sensory feeling of open-endedness, in this vein.
Does this mean that sublimity does not elicit this same 'promise of more', on my account?
Here we must distinguish two kinds of open-endedness. First, agonistic interaction elicits a kind
of open-endedness: unresolvable tension among well-matched forces. In this respect, 'formless'
sublime force does not elicit feelings of open-endedness. Second, however, the impact of all
sensory force involves another kind of open-endedness related to the freedom from concepts
described above. Beauty and sublimity alike involve this second experience of open-endedness.
Here my view also bears meaningful resemblance to Heidegger's fuller account of things like
'glowing' colors. Let me briefly explain:
According to Heidegger, the totality of 'glowing' colors, 'singing' tones, and so on—i.e.
the sensuous materiality of the artwork as “[t]hat into which the work sets itself back and which
it causes to come forth in this setting back of itself”—is the 'earth'.464 The earth is 'set forth' in the
stone of the temple or the sculpture of the god within, as this stone “presses downward and
manifests its heaviness.” We can precisely determine the weight of the stone by placing it on a
balance, Heidegger claims, but in so doing “the weight's burden has escaped us.” Indeed,
according to Heidegger we can only “lay hold of the stone's heaviness” in the work of art, where
this heaviness yet “remains undisclosed and unexplained.”465 Thus on Heidegger's view the “self-
secluding” earth is 'set forth' precisely insofar as the work “sets itself back into” its poetically-
not-scientifically-apprehended material aspect. In short, 'earth' is the way that reality resists
incorporation into coherent 'worlds' of human intelligibility or meaning. I do not endorse all
aspects of Heidegger's account (which is too complex to explain further here).466 But in a loosely
Heideggerian spirit, I claim that all sensory forces elicit experiences as of butting up against
something real that cannot be fully captured in acts of objective judgment. And, in this sense,
every sensory force evokes a 'promise of more'. This suggests a helpful way to view the contrast
between Kantian sensory matter and my notion of sensory force: Kantian sensory matter is the
sensuous aspect of reality insofar as it can be determined by reason in acts of objective
representation or judgment; whereas sensory force is the sensuous aspect of reality insofar as it
resists our power of reason and exerts power in its own right. Any cognitive activity involved in
aesthetic experience may thus be the effect of 'sense' acting on 'reason', rather than vice versa.
464Heidegger 1971, 46.
465Heidegger 1971, 46-7.
466For further explication, see Thomson 2011; Young 2001.
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11.6. Kant is plausibly right that colors and tones are never beautiful. But contra Kant,
they can be sensory forces with real aesthetic impact—like Heidegger's 'glowing' colors and
'singing' tones. Purely sensible beauty, in turn, is the impact of agonistically-interacting sensory
forces.
Beauty does not inhere in the spatiotemporal 'form' of sensory 'matter' because of its
distinctive mediating role between sensible receptivity and rational spontaneity, as Kant claims.
But a broadly Kantian structuralist analysis of beauty can be decoupled from the theory of
'rational-sensuous' human nature that undergirds Kant's account. The feeling of internal tension
that Kant characterizes in terms of 'free play' between imagination and understanding is in fact
often just an experience of agonistically-interacting sensory forces.
Sensory force has aesthetic impact. When sensory forces interact agonistically, they have
holistic impact as beautiful form. When sensory force is radically intensified, it becomes
sublime. When sensory forces interact hierarchically, their collective impact is close to sublime,
in quality if not degree. The simplest sensory experience of the sublime is just the overwhelming
impact of radically intensified sensory force, essentially similar in kind (not degree) to the
individual 'glowing' colors or 'singing' tones in a beautiful painting or melody. The relationship
between beauty and sublimity is mediated by an elemental category of sensory force.
12. On the 'Pathetic Fallacy' and Artistic Objectivity
12.1. Overuse of figurative language can reflect a writer's self-conscious effort to 'be
poetic', in a way prone to awkwardly backfiring. However, John Ruskin, the Victorian art critic,
offers a slightly more charitable explanation by appeal to what he calls the pathetic fallacy:467
“violent feelings” can produce a “falseness in all our impressions of external things.”468 A bad
writer's overreliance on figurative expression—like poetic personifications of natural objects—
467 Logan (1940, 187) argues that “the essentials of Ruskin's famous essay had already been enunciated by 
[Wordsworth],” observing moreover that “Ruskin was familiar with Wordsworth's critical essays.”
468Ruskin 1856/2004, 71. Ruskin is perhaps now better known for his fraught relationship with Effie Gray. 
Nevertheless, Peter Garratt (2009, 53) judges that he was “the most influential mid-Victorian aesthetician.” For a
defense of Ruskin's ongoing relevance to aesthetics, see e.g. Landow 1971; cf. Bell 1963, 21. For other helpful 
studies, see also Hewison 1976; Wihl 1985.
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need not be affected, then, as it can also indicate a perfectly authentic sensitivity to passionate
feelings and their 'falsifying' effect (says Ruskin) on perception.469 This kind of sensitive writer
may be further inclined to project feelings onto nature under the influence of a broadly Romantic
ethos, of the sort that Wordsworth articulates in describing his own poem, 'The White Doe of
Rylstone':
Throughout, objects . . . derive their influence not from properties inherent in
them, not from what they are actually in themselves, but from such as are
bestowed upon them by the minds of those who are conversant with or affected by
those objects. Thus the Poetry, if there be any in the work, proceeds whence it
ought to do, from the soul of Man, communicating its creative energies to the
images of the external world.470
Ruskin prefers accurate description of objects to any such 'communication' of one's own 'energy'.
Hence, he praises as “preëminently human” the “feeling” that “loves a stone for a stone's
sake.”471
But deeper than Ruskin's basic criticism of the pathetic fallacy is his further claim that it
can be justified, in a way, when 'false' perceptions stem from 'true' feelings with 'strong' causes:
An inspired writer, in full impetuosity of passion, may speak wisely and truly of
'raging waves of the sea, foaming out their own shame' [Jude 1:13]; but it is only
the basest writer who cannot speak of the sea without talking of 'raging waves,'
'remorseless floods', 'ravenous billows' etc.; and it is one of the signs of the highest
power in a writer to check all such habits of thought, and to keep his eyes fixed
firmly on the pure fact, out of which if any feeling comes to him or his reader, he
knows it must be a true one.472
Hence, Ruskin outlines a hierarchical order of “four classes.”473 First and lowest, there are totally
un-poetic people who “feel nothing, and therefore see truly.” Next, a “second order of poets”
comprises those who “feel strongly, think weakly, and see untruly.” In turn, “first order” poets
“feel strongly, think strongly, and see truly.” Last and highest, there are people “who, strong as
human creatures can be, are yet submitted to influences stronger than they, and see in a sort
469Ruskin (1856/2004, 77) also suggests that the “mere affection of [feeling],” which on his view is not a real 
pathetic fallacy at all, is “beyond all other ignobleness.”
470Quoted in Miles 1965, 6.




untruly, because what they see is inconceivably above them,” as in “prophetic inspiration.”  But
even accounting for this kind of inspiration, Ruskin insists that “so far as [the pathetic fallacy] is
a fallacy, it is always the sign of a morbid state of mind, and comparatively of a weak one.”474
 Below, I argue that Ruskin's account of the pathetic fallacy indirectly motivates a
defensible notion of artistic objectivity. Ruskin is wrong to claim that pathetic fallacies always
reflect a degree of 'weakness' or 'morbidity'. And, relatedly, it is fair to be skeptical of the 'reason
vs. emotion' opposition that appears to inform his distinction between 'truth' in 'feeling' and in
'sight'. (Thus, he describes the pathetic fallacy in terms of “an excited state of the feelings,
making us[...]more or less irrational”; and claims that “so long as we see that the feeling is true,
we pardon, or are even pleased by, the confessed fallacy of sight which it induces.”475) But one
can isolate a more artistically salient notion of objectivity than Ruskin's by more closely
examining the relation between great poets like Homer who 'see truly' and inspired prophets who
declaim with 'false sight' but 'true feeling' under the sway of 'higher' powers.
Namely, I suggest that both 'first order poets' and inspired 'prophets' look outward to
'strong' external causes for 'true' inspiration. They are not trying to express themselves or reach
self-knowledge through their creative acts. And they are calm or unsentimental in the way that
mountains are calm and hurricanes are unsentimental: driven from within by vast reserves of
power, and so immovable or unstoppable except by still more 'divine' forces. This is one way to
take Ruskin's advice to 'keep eyes fixed firmly on the pure fact'. Another way more closely tracks
certain of his remarks: 'Err on the side of purely literal description.'476 But this is a far less
compelling ideal. The contrast between figurative and literal uses of language is less artistically
salient, and narrower in scope, than the contrast between an ideal of individual or collective self-
expression and an outwardly-oriented ideal of creative receptivity to basic features of the world.
The ideal of creative receptivity to basic features of reality is what I will here call 'artistic
objectivity'. I elaborate this notion of objectivity below. And I contextualize it by contrast to
ideals of creative self-expression in the post-Kantian Romantic tradition that Ruskin targets for
criticism. More positively, I build upon Josephine Miles' analysis of how Ruskin's critique of the
474Ruskin 1856/2004, 79. Similarly: “Even in the most inspired prophet it is a sign of the incapacity of his human 
sight or thought to bear what has been revealed to it” (Ruskin 1856/2004, 79); “[The pathetic fallacy] is right or 
wrong according to the genuineness of the emotion from which it springs; always, however, implying necessarily
some degree of weakness in the character” (Ruskin 1856/2004, 79).
475Ruskin 1856/2004, 75.
476Compare Josephine Miles' claim that Ruskin “worked toward” the “end” of “less fallacy and more minute 
observation of objects' qualities and structures” (Miles 1944, 216).
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pathetic fallacy fits into a wider Victorian shift towards attention to natural objects 'for their own
sake', which paved the way for certain currents of Modernist poetics, including Imagists' stress
on 'exteriority' and depicting 'things as they really are'.477 I aim to reconstruct part of this
tradition's early stages and then to further advance it, by first analyzing Ruskin's view and its
philosophical context; then noting continuity between Romantic hyper-sensitivity to nature and
putatively 'objective' modes of post-Romantic indulgence in close description of mundane
objects; and finally arguing for a more selective ideal of artistic receptivity to things 'as they
really are', via a critique of Ruskin's overly moralized notions of 'strong' cause and 'true' feeling.
12.2. It will prove helpful to begin by examining Ruskin's criticism of the term
'objectivity'. Isolating the strengths and weaknesses of his analysis will motivate my own notion
of artistic objectivity. To these ends, though, a few brief notes about the pathetic fallacy are first
in order.
The term 'pathetic fallacy' is now often used to refer to any case of personification used as
a poetic technique, regardless of its cause. This usage is apparent in (if not also derived from)
popular interpretations of Ruskin, as in Josephine Miles' claim that he views the pathetic fallacy
as “the attribution of human aspects and emotions to natural objects.”478 But Bernard F. Dick's
summary is more precise: on his reading, Ruskin uses the term 'pathetic fallacy' to indicate “a
weakness in subjective poets who were unable to see reality as it was and instead projected their
own feelings onto it.”479 Below, I will develop a distinction between feelings only projected onto
nature and feelings that are immanent in nature in some truer sense. The possibility of inhuman
passions, in the latter sense, bears directly on my notion of artistic objectivity. And while this
distinction is not part of Ruskin's view, I will explain how it resonates with certain of his points.
Ruskin begins his discussion in “Of the Pathetic Fallacy” (1856) by criticizing the terms
'Objective' and 'Subjective' as “two of the most objectionable words ever coined by the
troublesomeness of metaphysicians.”480 He notes that “certain philosophers” take subjective
qualities to be those which “depend upon our perception of them” or “upon our human nature as
affected by them,” like the blueness of gentian flowers or the sky.481 By contrast, objective
477On 'exteriority', see e.g. Lowell 1920. On 'things as they really are', see e.g. Hulme 1960.





qualities are those “which [things] always have, irrespective of any other nature,” like roundness
or squareness.482 Ruskin seems to be writing against post-Kantian philosophers, in particular. (In
a footnote, he writes several joke sentences using 'subject' and 'object' repeatedly, as a way of
ironically “meet[ing] our German friends in their own style.” He then adds that “in a pure
German sentence of the highest style there is often [no meaning] whatsoever.”483) This contrast
also evokes earlier modern distinctions between 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities in the British
tradition, however.484 And it evokes certain more recent accounts of objectivity. For instance,
Thomas Nagel claims that “[t]he wider the range of subjective types to which a form of
understanding is accessible—the less it depends on specific subjective capacities [i.e. 'the
specifics of the individual's makeup and position in the world, or on the character of the
particular type of creature he is']—the more objective it is.”485
Ruskin suggests abandoning the “tiresome and absurd” words 'objective' and 'subjective',
and instead focusing on the distinction between the “ordinary, proper, and true appearances of
things to us” and the “extraordinary, or false appearances, when we are under the influence of
emotion, or contemplative fancy.”486 Hence, he observes that a gentian flower “has always the
power” to produce sensations of blueness, and concludes that “the gentian and the sky are always
verily blue, whatever philosophy may say to the contrary.”487 Ruskin thus spurns emphasis on the
'objective' properties of things 'in themselves', and de-emphasizes the distinction between
primary and secondary qualities that concerns thinkers like Locke.488 Notably, Locke agrees that
blueness is 'in' the sky, even in the absence of any perceiving beings.489 But Ruskin's remarks
482Ruskin 1856/2004, 68.
483Ruskin, Modern Painters III, Pt. IV, Ch. xii, §3, note (Ruskin 1858c, 158).
484E.g. Galileo claims that tastes, colors, etc., are “nothing but mere names for something which resides exclusively
in our sensitive body,” such that “if the perceiving creatures were removed, all these qualities would be 
annihilated and banished from existence” (Matthews 1989, 57). Cf. Locke's claim that both 'primary' qualities 
like shape and 'secondary' qualities like color are “in bodies” (“Ideas in the mind, qualities in bodies” [Locke, An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Chapter VIII, Section 7])—although he takes secondary qualities to 
be 'in bodies' simply as “powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities” (Locke, An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, Chapter VIII, Section 10). E.g. “what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea is but 
the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the inseparable parts in the bodies themselves which we call so” (Locke, 




488Ruskin did read Locke while at Oxford, along with Bacon, Dugald Stewart, and Thomas Stewart (Collingwood 
1971, 4). Hence, there is at least some reason to believe that he would have been familiar with this distinction.
489Ruskin claims that while “a gentian does not produce the sensation of blueness, if you don't look at it,” still “it 
has always the power of doing so; its particles being everlastingly so arranged by its Maker,” such that a gentian 
is “always verily blue” (Ruskin 1856/2004, 69). This is similar to Locke's view that porphyry stones are red and 
white even in the dark (i.e. when nobody can see them), and more broadly that secondary qualities are “in 
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suggest that he would still also judge Locke's distinction between primary and secondary
qualities to be aesthetically irrelevant. Color may be neither an 'objective' nor a 'primary' quality;
but for Ruskin this clearly does not preclude a color's 'true' description by 'first order' poets.
However, Ruskin's appeal to the 'ordinary, proper, and true appearances of things to us'
evinces his own commitment to epistemological ideals related to the ideals of 'objectivity' that he
rejects as mere philosophical jargon—albeit not identical to them. Here note first that Ruskin
characterizes “false appearances,” in the sense relevant to the 'pathetic fallacy', as those which
are “entirely unconnected with any real power or character in the object, and only imputed to it
by us.”490 The sky's blueness is not a 'false appearance', then, insofar as it is connected to a real
power 'in the object': the sky's power to produce sensations of blueness in subjects like us. By
contrast, when the poet Charles Kingsley writes of “[t]he cruel, crawling foam” of the sea,
Ruskin objects that “[t]he foam is not cruel, neither does it crawl.”491 Presumably, then, Ruskin
would deny that Kingsley's metaphor reflects any 'real power or character' located 'in' the ocean.
Branka Arsić is thus wrong to claim that Ruskin initially “formulate[s] an ontology in
which the difference between subjects and objects, or persons and things, is rejected as itself
erroneous, thus canceling the divide on which the 'emotional falseness' [he] goes on to formulate
relies in the first place.”492 Arsić's thought is that Ruskin divides things into “doers and
nondoers” rather than subjects and objects, and takes a gentian's 'power' to produce sensations of
blueness as paradigmatic of 'doers', or “generative forces, both active[...]and activating,”493 which
are thus neither 'subjects' nor 'objects'. Arsić's analysis is unconvincing, however. She stresses
that for Ruskin “everything owns its secondary qualities, everything has the power to generate
sensations of itself,” and evidently takes this to support her claim that Ruskin 'rejects' the
ontology of subjects and objects.494 But Locke also understands secondary qualities as real
'powers' located 'in' objects. Thus Arsić would either have to insist that Locke also rejects the
“mainstream” ontological division between subjects and objects,495 which clearly threatens to
bodies”, despite being “nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their 
primary qualities” (Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Chapter VIII, Section 10). By contrast, 




493Arsić 2017, 125. Likewise: “Ruskin opens his chapter by insisting on the annulment of the taxonomy that 




make her account of Ruskin's 'radical' ontological break over-generalize; or else explain how
Ruskin's view differs from Locke's in this respect, which she does not attempt to do—indeed, she
does not mention Locke (whom Ruskin did read).496 Arsić conflates Ruskin's commitment to
what seems to be a broadly Lockean account of secondary qualities as real powers located in
objects (e.g. by contrast to Galilean accounts of secondary qualities as located only in the minds
of subjects) with a more radical rejection of the basic distinction between subjects and objects.497
Ruskin manifestly does not reject the ontology of subjects and objects. Indeed, his whole
discussion of the pathetic fallacy is predicated on a robust, if not even a quite naive, distinction
between subjects and objects. Thus, Ruskin evidently takes any and all ascriptions of 'subject'-
like qualities to 'objects' to be false. Arsić herself alludes to this by calling the subject-object or
person-thing opposition “the divide on which the 'emotional falseness' Ruskin goes on to
formulate relies in the first place.”498 This is true. Arsić is just wrong to claim that Ruskin's
criticism of the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' somehow 'cancels' this (distinct) person-thing
divide. Indeed, contra Arsić, it would make little sense for Ruskin to “cancel” the distinction on
which his main discussion then “relies.” If Ruskin actually believed in “generative forces” and
inert “nondoers” instead of “people” and “things,” as Arsić suggests, then he would not think
that every attribution of active forces like cruelty to impersonal natural objects is “false”—which
is precisely his view, however. The internal tension that Arsić purports to identify is illusory.
Thus, again, Ruskin evidently denies that Kingsley's appeal to the 'cruel, crawling foam'
reflects any 'real power or character' located 'in' the foaming sea. Yet it is far from clear that
Ruskin is right about this. After all, could the ocean not have a perfectly 'real power' to elicit a
figurative description of 'cruel foam', in poets like Kingsley? Could cruelness not be located 'in'
the ocean foam just as much as blueness is 'in' the sky? More broadly, might it not be that at least
496Collingwood summarizes Ruskin's philosophical studies: “at Oxford he read the old-fashioned logic, and 
disliked it; some Aristotle, partly with great admiration and partly with equal annoyance; some Plato; and some 
of the moderns—Bacon, Locke, Dugald Stewart and Thomas Brown[...]he never tackled the greater German 
idealists, except for one dubious attempt—instigated no doubt by Carlyle—to read Fichte, out of whom he got 
nothing. Plato alone he read and re-read, loved and revered, to the end of his life” (Collingwood 1971, 4). 
497Compare Arsić's claim that the “three errors Ruskin ascribes to German idealism and its English version” are 
“predicated on an ontology that nominates psyches as the only powers capable of generating sensations, 
perceptions, and thoughts as forces singularly capable of manufacturing secondary qualities, from colors and 
sounds to warmth and odors (“no such sensation is produced by the object when nobody looks at it, therefore the 
thing, when it is not looked at, is not blue. ... To be sweet, a thing must have a taster’”) (Arsić 2017, 125). Arsić 
(ibid.) concludes that “[s]uch a mainstream ontological way of relating to the world is 'troublesome' to Ruskin, 
the trouble being its confusing the site of perception’s existence with the power to produce it, as well as its 
ascribing both to humanized psyches.”
498Arsić 2017, 123.
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some 'pathetic fallacies' reflect the impact of real causal powers, located 'in' objects just as much
as their colors are 'in' them, on Ruskin's view?
Here we should tease apart several threads of Ruskin's appeal to 'the ordinary, proper, and
true appearances of things to us,' on his behalf. First, he could deny that the ocean has any 'real
power' to produce affective feelings (or thoughts, intuitive representations, etc.) of cruelness in
Kingsley, broadly as the sky produces sensations of blueness in us. This is deeply implausible,
though. Interpretive charity hence speaks strongly against imputing this naive claim to Ruskin.
Second, Ruskin might distinguish the inter-subjective validity of our sensations of
blueness when looking at the sky from the personal or idiosyncratic quality of Kingsley's poetic
response to the foaming ocean. There are some textual cues to this effect, although of course
Ruskin would not use terms like 'inter-subjective', given his hostility to the words 'objective' and
'subjective'. For instance, he claims that if one replaces the technical phrases 'It is subjectively so'
and 'It is objectively so' with the “plain old English” phrases 'It does so' and 'It is so', then “if you
find that a thing which generally 'does so' to other people (as a gentian looks blue to most men),
does not so to you, on any particular occasion, you will not fall into the impertinence of saying,
that the thing is not so,[...]but you will say simply[...]that something is the matter with you.”499
Ruskin then considers the skeptical worry that a given thing might elicit different sensations in
different people, e.g. such that the qualities that two people both call the 'sweetness' of sugar are
in fact distinct. But he responds simply that “[t]he sugar's power to produce these two sensations,
which we suppose to be, and which are, in all probability, very nearly the same in both of us,
and, on the whole, in the human race, is its sweetness.”500
Here Ruskin's direct or indirect influence by British 'commonsense' empiricism—which
likely also informs his view that terms like 'objective' are jargon best discarded in favor of 'plain
old English'—is conspicuous. He encourages us to forgo concern with 'things in themselves' and
instead to just focus on the 'ordinary appearances' of things to 'us'.501 Who is 'us'? Ruskin never
says. But he simply seems to have in mind typical, normally-functioning human beings.502 
499Ruskin 1856/2004, 69.
500Ruskin 1856/2004, 69 n. 1.
501Ruskin 1856/2004, 70.
502Collingwood argues that Ruskin was a “whole-hearted adherent” of a “historical movement” in thought that 
prioritizes individual facts (not laws), explains them by appeal to other facts (not laws), suppleness of mind, 
freedom, and variety (not uniform and unquestioning adherence to fixed principle) (Collingwood 1971, 11–14). 
Collingwood calls this Ruskin's “Hegelism” (ibid., 16), by contrast to 17th- and 18th-century “logicism” (ibid., 9). 
While I agree with some of Collingwood's characterizations of Ruskin (e.g. that he is more 'supple' than 'rigid', 
and more historically-minded than 'abstract'), I take a direct mapping of these onto 'Hegelism' to be unjustified. 
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In this context, one might also observe the contrast between traditionalistic conceptions
of objectivity in terms of a 'view from nowhere'—i.e. a globally or universally valid perspective
on the world, beyond all local reference-frames and particular subjects' idiosyncratic points of
view—and broadly Kantian conceptions of objectivity in terms of inter-subjectively valid
representations of external things. Kantians insist that we cannot achieve 'unconditioned' vision
of things as they are 'in themselves', rather than just as they appear to specific kinds of subjects.
According to Kant and his followers, rather, we can only experience things as as they appear to
us mediated by the basic 'forms' of our own cognitive powers—e.g. space and time construed as
forms of our sensible intuition; or the pure 'categorical' forms of understanding, like causality
and substance.503 But Kant claims that while these 'forms' block our access to reality 'in itself',
they at least transcend cultural and historical boundaries. Hence, Kant views space, time, and the
categories as 'objectively valid' in the sense of being universally and necessarily applicable to the
experience of external objects by all (but only) beings with our cognitive powers of
understanding and sensibility.504 Empirical concepts and intuitions are in turn objectively valid
insofar as they refer immediately (like intuitions) or mediately (like concepts) to actual or
possible objects of generic human experience. Notably, Kant takes judgments of beauty to
possess “subjective universal validity,” hence to be inter-subjectively valid but not objective.505
For Kant, judgments of taste are 'subjectively' valid because they are grounded in a feeling (of
'free play'), albeit one properly elicited in all subjects by beautiful objects. Kantian 'objectivity'
thus concerns inter-subjectively valid representations of external objects and their qualities (e.g.
Ruskin's hostility to Romantic poetry—which was strongly influenced by post-Kantian idealism—is here telling.
Collingwood contrasts Coleridge, as a 'Kantian', against Carlyle as a “follower of Fichte” (Collingwood 1971, 
30). He concludes that “[i]n some ways Fichte is nearer to Ruskin than to the Kantians whom they both detested”
(Collingwood 1971, 30). But while the latter may well be true, it is consistent with English Romantic poetry also 
being strongly influenced by post-Kantian idealism of the sort that Collingwood calls 'Hegelism'. Regarding 
Coleridge's influence by post-Kantian idealism, e.g., see Engell 1990, Burwick 1990, Jasper 1986. E.g. Coleridge
writes in 1804, “In the Preface of my Metaphys. Works I should say—Once & all read Tetens, Kant, Fichte, &c
—& there you will trace or if you are on the hunt track me” (quoted in Engell 1990, 156).
503A third class of Kantian 'form' comprises ideas, or pure concepts of reason, that can never show up as real 
empirical objects or features thereof, but which nevertheless provide rationally-necessitated 'regulative ideals' for
our practices: God, human freedom, and the systematic unity of nature.
504See e.g. KrV A26/B42 – A27/B43. Kant clearly does not reduce objectivity to inter-subjective validity, e.g. 
given that takes judgments of beauty to possess “subjective universal validity” (KU 5:215), hence to be inter-
subjectively valid but not objectively valid. For Kant, judgments of taste are 'subjectively' valid because they are 
grounded in a feeling (of 'free play'), albeit one properly elicited in all subjects by beautiful objects. Kantian 
objectivity thus concerns inter-subjectively valid representations of external objects, rather than internal feelings.
505KU 5:215.
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the greenness of grass),506 not those of internal feelings.507 Ruskin's claim that the sky's blueness
is a 'true appearance' could therefore also be viewed in terms of a broadly Kantian account of the
objective validity of judgments about external objects insofar as they appear to a generic 'us'.
A serious problem with invoking inter-subjective validity in this context, however, is that
the highest poetic experiences of expressive qualities in nature are not 'ordinary', and arguably
are not available even in principle to all normally-functioning people, in the way that the sky's
blueness is. Not everyone is a great poet, after all. One might object that a poetic description of
expressive qualities in nature is as inter-subjectively valid (or not) as any aesthetic judgment, or
at least any claim about the aptness of a given metaphor. And people can evidently evaluate the
aptness of a given metaphor without having the creative capacity to produce it. But here it is
helpful to distinguish between (1) 'real powers' in impersonal natural entities to elicit figurative
descriptions in poets and (2) 'real powers' in these figurative descriptions to elicit aesthetic
experiences in audiences who read or hear them. Even supposing that aesthetic judgments (or
claims about the aptness of a given metaphor, etc.) are universally valid, then, their inter-
subjective validity is presumably related to the second kind of 'real power', not the first. But one
should arguably focus on the first 'power', not the second, when considering whether or not a
given 'pathetic fallacy' constitutes a 'true appearance'. Hence, one might hope that Ruskin has a
better reason for viewing 'pathetic fallacies' as 'fallacies'.
Third, Ruskin explicitly distinguishes between fire itself being “ravenous and pitiless”
and there being “something in this fire” that “rages.” He relates this 'something' to Greek gods:
It seems to me that the Greek had exactly the same instinctive feeling about the
elements that we have ourselves; that to Homer, as much as to Casimir de la Vigne,
fire seemed ravenous and pitiless; to Homer, as much as to Keats, the sea-wave
appeared wayward or idle, or whatever else it may be to the poetical passion. But
then the Greek reasoned upon this sensation, saying to himself: “I can light the fire,
and put it out; I can dry this water up, or drink it. It cannot be the fire or the water
that rages, or that is wayward. But it must be something in this fire and in the water,
which I cannot destroy by extinguishing the one, or evaporating the other, any more
than I destroy myself by cutting off my finger; I was in my finger,—something of me
506“The green color of the meadows belongs to objective sensation, as perception of an object of sense; but its 
agreeableness belongs to subjective sensation, through which no object is represented, i.e., to feeling, through 
which the object is considered as an object of satisfaction (which is not a cognition of it)” (KU 5:206).
507Apropos the discussion of Victorian poetry below, consider Browning's comparison of his view of poetry with 
Tennyson's: “Here is an Idyll about a knight being untrue to his friend. . . . I should judge the conflict in the 
knight's soul the proper subject to describe: Tennyson thinks he should describe the castle, and effect of the 
moon on its towers, and anything but the soul” (quoted in Miles 1965, 81).
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at least was; I had a power over it and felt pain in it, though I am still as much myself
when it is gone. So there may be a power in the water which is not water, but to
which the water is as a body;—which can strike with it, move in it, suffer in it, yet
not be destroyed with it. This something, this Great Water Spirit, I must not confuse
with the waves, which are only its body. They may flow hither and thither, increase
or diminish. That must be indivisible—imperishable—a god.508
Ruskin then analyzes the mythical account of Diana, the goddess of the hunt, the Moon, and the
woods. He concludes that “[t]here is not the smallest inconsistency or unspirituality” in it:509 
And when Diana is said to hunt with her nymphs in the woods, it does not
mean merely, as Wordsworth puts it, that the poet or shepherd saw the moon
and the stars glancing between the branches of the trees, and wishes to say so
figuratively. It means that there is a living spirit, to which the light of the
moon is a body; which takes delight in the glancing between the clouds and
following the wild beasts as they wander through the night; and that this
spirit sometimes assumes a perfect human form, and in this form, with real
arrows, pursues and slays the wild beats, which with its mere arrows of
moonlight it could not slay; retaining, nevertheless, all the while, its power
and being in the moonlight, and in all else that it rules.510
Paganism is still blasphemous for Ruskin, a pious Christian. However, it is “not the materialism,
but the vice, which degrades the [Greek] conception [of deities],” on his view, because “[t]here is
always some sense of exaltation in the spiritual and immortal body,” such that “the materialism
itself is never positive, or complete.”511 Ruskin hence sees Greek myths as quite deeply true,
albeit not entirely so. The implication, of course, is that Christian metaphysics is entirely true.
Hence, while Ruskin views certain kinds of claims stemming from 'prophetic inspiration'
as “fallacies”—e.g. a Biblical invocation of mountains singing and trees clapping before God
still involves a pathetic fallacy, albeit a 'noble' one grounded in a 'true' feeling—his view is not
narrowly scientistic. His sense of what is literally true is far broader than that of a typical
present-day secular humanist. And part of what he sees as literal truth is that there are real
powers in natural objects, like the sea, which exceeds the bounds of narrowly empirical
description. Ruskin simply insists that these real 'divine' powers—which, qua Christian, he






objects. Hence, ascribing these powers to natural objects directly, for instance via pathetic
fallacies, departs from 'pure fact'. On Ruskin's view, then, it seems that the god of the sea may
literally be cruel, but the foaming water itself cannot be, as a mere object. Powers like blueness
are 'in' the sea qua natural object; but powers like cruelty are 'in' the sea only in the way that the
'Great Water Spirit' is 'in' the sea—namely, as a “spirit” occupies its mere “body.”512
Finally, and relatedly, Ruskin might insist that Kingsley's account of the 'cruel, crawling
foam' is at least more so a description of a feeling than a description of an object. Indeed, Ruskin
claims that Kingsley's lines are “pleasing,” “not because they fallaciously describe foam, but
because they faithfully describe sorrow.”513 Hence, even if there is some 'real power' in the sea
that elicits a poetic response from Kingsley, his lines are perhaps more so the product of the 'real
power' of 'grief'.514 The 'cruel foam' might thus be a 'true appearance' of a feeling, but a 'false
appearance' of the ocean. (Note that this distinction between 'feelings' and 'things' is closely
related to the 'person-thing' divide that Arsić takes Ruskin to 'cancel'—but which the present
analysis suggests he is in fact heavily reliant upon, without any internal tension or contradiction.)
In this light, Ruskin's insistence that “only the second order of poets” take “much delight”
in “this kind of falseness,”515 along with his broader claim that the pathetic fallacy is “always the
sign of a morbid state of mind, and comparatively of a weak one,”516 implies that he takes the
accurate artistic representation of objects to be better than the accurate artistic representation of
feelings by way of inaccurate representations of objects. This flies in the face of certain modern
expressive theories of art, and may seem deeply misguided. But Ruskin's view can be leveraged
into a more compelling account by parsing this contrast, between accurately describing external
objects and accurately describing feelings via 'expressive' descriptions of external objects, into
several finer-grained distinctions, between (i) figurative and self-expressive uses of language, (ii)
empirical description and aesthetic perception, and (iii) expressive and non-expressive qualities.
'Feeling' may be intuitively associated with internal states, and hence with self-expression
—especially by those who, like Ruskin, believe that descriptions of expressive qualities in
impersonal nature are always 'false', merely figurative, etc. But note that this last claim is far
512Compare Ruskin 1858c, 176.
513Ruskin 1856/2004, 75.
514“The state of mind which attributes to [the foam] these characters of a living creature is one in which the reason 




from clearly true. Many modern theories of expressiveness in art entail that impersonal natural
phenomena can (like artworks) literally possess expressive qualities, despite not being created by
or for feeling beings (like artworks are), let alone being capable of feeling anything themselves.
For instance, even if Susanne Langer is right that works of art are “expressive forms,”517 or
“images of feeling” which “mak[e] it visible or audible or in some way perceivable,”518 this alone
would not distinguish art from all natural beauty or sublimity. Of course, howling winds are not
“created for our perception,” as Langer takes artworks to be.519 But the wind clearly need not be
made by or for us, let alone be capable of feeling anything itself, in order to be able to make
passions or other feelings perceivable or sensibly apparent to a certain kind of receptive listener.
Ruskin partly acknowledges this, in his aforementioned remarks about the Greek gods. But his
refusal to simply identify 'divine' powers with natural entities is arguably misguided. It likely
reflects his own distinctively 'spiritual' conception of God, based in his Christian religious faith.
For many present-day readers, more immanent notions of divinity may seem far more plausible.
Ruskin's view that it is better to accurately depict external objects than feelings is thus
more plausibly reframed in different terms: focus on the broader world, not on yourself. In this
light, it matters whether a given quality is really 'in' an object, as opposed to projected onto it in
the name of one's own feelings. But it does not matter whether one describes an object in terms
of expressive as opposed to non-expressive qualities—partly because, again, some inanimate
objects may literally be expressive, at least given an aesthetically relevant sense of 'expressive'.
Of course, empirical science will not be able to dictate whether or not the ocean foam is
really 'cruel', or more broadly whether or not an expressive quality is 'in' a given natural entity.
But this is in no way a problem for the present account. Claims about passions in inhuman nature
(e.g.) are simply amenable to aesthetic, not empirical, modes of justification—again, with the
further qualification that the justification of artists' aesthetic perceptions of nature is distinct
from the justification of spectators' aesthetic responses to artworks.520 This is not at all
surprising, however. Poetic claims about expressive qualities in nature may well involve precise
and accurate aesthetic perception, despite going beyond the limits of mere empirical description.
517Langer 1957, 15. See also Langer 1953.
518Langer 1957, 25. Langer (ibid., 24 ) contrasts the symbolic character of artistic expression against the 
symptomatic character of non-artistic modes of expression, like an infant's (highly self-expressive) screaming.
519Langer 1957, 15.
520Compare Nietzsche's claim that philosophers have “instead of envisaging the aesthetic problem from the point of
view of the artist (the creator), considered art and the beautiful purely from that of the ‘spectator,’ and 
unconsciously introduced the ‘spectator’ into the concept ‘beautiful’” (GM III, 6).
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Notably, the basic advice to 'focus on the broader world, not on yourself' is also closely
related to part of the “fundamental idea” that Thomas Nagel associates with both the value and
limits of objectivity: “we are small creatures in a big world of which we have only very partial
understanding, and [] how things seem to us depends both on the world and on our
constitution.”521 This is all certainly true. However, it does not directly motivate or support
Nagel's own account of objectivity as a 'view from nowhere' or universally-valid perspective.
Rather, Nagel's point has two clear implications. First, it would be good to better
understand the 'big world' out there, relative to which we are 'small creatures'. This motivates an
account of objectivity directly in terms of outwardness, as the drive and capacity to understand
the broader world. Second, the fact that our own 'constitution' affects how things appear to us can
make it harder for us to achieve this broader understanding. This can be interpreted as the claim
that we must account for the impact of our 'constitution' on our perception of things in order to
better understand the broader world, i.e., as a means to objectivity construed as outwardness. Or,
this second point can be taken as an endorsement of objectivity construed directly in terms of
universality—i.e. as implying that a more objective representation just is one that depends less
on how things appear to a given subject in light of its particular 'constitution'. But the connection
between objectivity and outwardness is arguably even more intuitive than the putative
connection between objectivity and universality, if not also genealogically prior to it.522
At any rate, an ideal of artistic objectivity, construed directly in terms of creative
receptivity to the broader world, helps to capture the strengths of Ruskin's critique of the pathetic
fallacy, while also avoiding his view's pitfalls. 'Keeping one's eye fixed firmly on the pure fact' is
best interpreted in terms of directing one's attention outwards, rather than in terms of avoiding
figurative description or ascribing expressive qualities to the natural environment. An ideal of
artistic outwardness avoids Ruskin's dubious hostility towards all 'feeling'-induced figurative
description, by highlighting the crucial difference between figurative and self-expressive uses of
language. But in rejecting the common ideal of creative self-expression, the advocate of artistic
outwardness also indicates a deep kernel of truth in Ruskin's criticism of 'pathetic fallacies'. A
second-rank poet's appeal to 'raging waves' or 'laughing flowers' is often all too self-expressive.
521Nagel 1986, 5.
522Hence, whether conceived in terms of a 'view from nowhere' or inter-subjective validity, standard accounts of 
objectivity are plausibly predicated (at least implicitly) on the belief that a broader perspective on the world, in 
the relevant sense, just is a more universal perspective. But this is by no means obvious. 
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12.3. In order to add more substance this basic account of artistic objectivity as
receptivity to the broader world, it is necessary to elaborate what the 'broader world' is, and what
'receptivity' to it involves. To this end, I will again use Ruskin's analysis as a source of positive
as well as negative inspiration. In so doing, I will also begin to situate both Ruskin's view and
my own account of artistic objectivity in broader historical context, partly by examining their
relation to the post-Kantian Romantic tradition in poetry and aesthetics which Ruskin is directly
criticizing.
Ruskin's discussion makes salient two senses of the 'broader world'. First, one might view
the broader world to which outwardly-oriented artists are receptive as comprising everything
beyond the horizons of one's own limited experience or personal concerns. Second, one might
view the broader world to which more outwardly-oriented artists are receptive as comprising
only especially 'strong' external forces. As an interpretive matter, Ruskin arguably intimates both
notions, to an extent. As a normative matter, I will then argue that the more restrictive notion of
the 'broader world', with 'strength' construed amorally, grounds a more compelling creative ideal.
The former notion of the 'broader world', as comprising everything beyond the horizon's
of one's own limited experience and personal concerns, jibes with Ruskin's characterization of
“the difference between the great and less man” in terms of the great man's lesser “alterability”:
[The great man] knows too much, and perceives and feels too much of the past
and future, and of all things beside and around that which immediately affects
him, to be in any wise shaken by it. His mind is made up; his thoughts have an
accustomed current; his ways are steadfast; it is not this or that new sight which
will at once unbalance him. He is tender to impression at the surface, like a rock
with deep moss upon it; but there is too much mass of him to be moved. The
smaller man, with the same degree of sensibility, is at once carried off his feet; he
wants to do something he did not want to do before; he views all the universe in a
new light through his tears; he is gay or enthusiastic, melancholy or passionate, as
things come and go to him. Therefore the high creative poet might even be
thought, to a great extent, impassive (as shallow people think Dante stern),
receiving indeed all feelings to the full, but having a great centre of reflection and
knowledge in which he stands serene, and watches the feeling, as it were, from
afar off.523
Note Ruskin's claim that the great man is not “in any wise shaken” by “that which immediately
affects him.” This appeal to 'immediacy' suggests the kind of idiosyncrasy or self-centeredness
523Ruskin 1856/2004, 74–75.
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that I referred to above as “the horizons of one's own limited experience or personal concerns.”
Note also that the contrast class, for Ruskin, is “the past and future, and[...]all things beside and
around” that which immediately affects oneself. The phrase 'all things beside and around that
which immediately affects him' suggests a quite traditional notion of objectivity—as a Nagel-
style 'view from nowhere' or universally-valid standpoint, independent of subjects' idiosyncratic
capacities or personal experiences. Ruskin's appeal to 'the past and future' can be taken in a
similar way, insofar as focus on the present can be a kind of bias towards one's own perspective.
Ruskin's claim that the great poet “watches the feeling [he receives], as it were, from afar
off” makes salient a distinction between two kinds of artistic expression. On the one hand, an
artist might creatively express an emotion that she actually feels. On the other hand, an artist
might creatively express an emotion without herself feeling it—although she may contemplate it.
Here one might recall Susanne Langer's claim artworks are essentially “expressive forms,”524 or
“images of feeling” which “mak[e] it visible or audible or in some way perceivable.”525 Notably,
Langer later claims that “[a]n artist working on a tragedy need not be in personal despair or
violent upheaval.”526 More broadly, many modern aesthetic theorists who emphasize the
expressive character of art now disassociate it from self-expressive acts by artists, in a way that
more traditional 'expression theories' of art did not.527 For instance, according to an 'arousal
theory' of musical expressiveness, the emotional expressiveness of a musical work or passage
consists in its power to arouse corresponding emotion(s) in a receptive listener.528 Hence, an
arousal theorist could (in principle) agree with Ruskin's claim that great poets 'watch' their
feelings as if 'from afar off', even if their audiences do not. Likewise, an advocate of a modern
'resemblance' or 'contour' theory, who claims that music's expressiveness consists in relations of
resemblance between the contour of a given melody (e.g.) and the contour of typical behavioral
manifestations or phenomenological characteristics of a corresponding emotion, could allow that
even the most highly expressive musical works are created by 'impassive' artists.529 In short, then,
524Langer 1957, 15. See also Langer 1953.
525Langer 1957, 25. Langer (ibid., 24 ) contrasts the symbolic character of artistic expression against the 
symptomatic character of non-artistic modes of expression, like an infant's (highly self-expressive) screaming.
526Langer 1957, 25.
527See e.g. Tolstoy 1898; Dewey 1934, Collingwood 1938. For recent defenses of Collingwood's theory of 
expression, see e.g. Ridley 1998; Robinson 2005, 244–250; and Hopkins 2017. Cf. Hospers 1954–1955; Tormey 
1971.
528See e.g. Matravers 1998.
529For defenses of 'resemblance', 'contour', or 'appearance' theories in this spirit, see e.g. Kivy 1989; Budd 1995; 
and Davies 1994, 2006. Cf. Levinson 1996, 2006. For other major treatments of emotional expressiveness in 
music, see e.g. Kivy 1980, 1999; Meyer 1956; Budd 1985, 2011; Davies 2011; Levinson 1982; Robinson 1994, 
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Ruskin's positive vision of the 'serenity' of great poets is consistent with many modern theories
of artistic expressiveness, even if it stands in tension with classical 'expression theories' of art.
Nor do artistic 'images of feeling' have to be images of emotion, per se, according to
many modern aesthetic theorists. For instance, Langer takes 'feeling' to include “everything that
can be felt, from physical sensation, pain and comfort, excitement and repose, to the most
complex emotions, intellectual tensions, or the steady feeling-tones of a conscious human life.”530
With this broad notion in mind, one might recall Ruskin's characterization of pathetic fallacies as
involving “extraordinary, or false appearances, when we are under the influence of emotion, or
contemplative fancy.”531 Note that Ruskin lists both 'emotion' and 'contemplative fancy', in a way
that suggests he views them as two distinct kinds of 'feeling' that can induce pathetic fallacies.
In this connection, Ruskin's view is also helpfully compared to Kant's claim that taste is
“at bottom a faculty for the judging of the sensible rendering of moral ideas.”532 While 'moral
ideas' are not emotions, perhaps we are nevertheless capable of feeling and not merely thinking
them, at least in the context of aesthetic experience. Indeed, the sensuous presentation of ideas,
whether in artworks or in beautiful natural phenomena, is arguably a salient way of allowing us
to feel ideas, in this sense. Hegel's claim that “the sensuous in the work of art is itself something
ideal, but which, not being ideal as thought is ideal, is still at the same time there externally as a
thing” is productively interpreted in this light, as broadly Kantian.533 So too, one should interpret
Schiller's less famous but earlier suggestion that “[i]n our pleasure in Beauty[...]reflection is so
completely intermingled with feeling that we believe ourselves to perceive form immediately.”534
If 'feeling' is interpreted broadly enough to encompass ideas (at least qua sensuously
presented in artworks, beautiful nature, etc.) as well as emotions, then Ruskin's preference for
artistic depiction of objects over feelings could involve a whole-sale rejection of broadly Kantian
views.535 Alternatively, though, one might contrast the true 'sensuous presentation' of ideas,
emotions, etc., against the mere projection of human feelings onto artworks or natural objects.





533Hegel 1975, v. I, 38.
534Schiller 1794–95/2014, 96–97. 
535I do not claim that Ruskin in fact has this broad sense of 'feeling' in mind; just that his allusion to 'contemplative 
fancy' suggests something like it, i.e. a notion of 'feeling' somewhat wider than a narrowly emotional sense.
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hostility towards the pathetic fallacy. And, indeed, when Ruskin elsewhere divides beauty into
two classes, 'Typical' and 'Vital', he defines the latter as “the appearance of felicitous fulfillment
of function in living things more especially of the joyful and right exertion of perfect life in
man.”536 This aspect of his view is broadly compatible, at least, with Kant's appeal to the
'sensible rendering of moral ideas'. Likewise, in his famous essay on “The Nature of Gothic,”
Ruskin praises as “the noblest art” an “exact unison of the abstract value, with the imitative
power, of forms and colours,” or the “noblest composition, used to express the noblest facts.”537
This, too, is clearly consistent with a broadly Kantian view of art as a 'sensuous presentation of
ideal form'.
Ruskin's appeal to the apparently “impassive” or “stern” nature of a “high creative poet”
who “watches the feeling [he receives], as it were, from afar off” also arguably evokes earlier
theorists' accounts of disinterested pleasure in the beautiful. On Kant's view, for example, the
experience of beauty is ‘disinterested’ in that it involves a kind of pleasure which is neither based
in, nor directly gives rise to, any desires.538 He thus sees pleasure in the beautiful as involving
neither 'interested' satisfaction the merely ‘agreeable’ objects of sensuous desire nor 'interested'
satisfaction in the instrumentally or finally ‘good’ objects of rational desire.539 Hence, for Kant,
the experience of beauty is purely contemplative, or entirely removed from both action rationally
directed towards the good and 'mere' animal behavior driven by physical impulse. The relative
'impassivity' of 'high creative poets', for Ruskin, is thus arguably conceptually connected to a
broadly Kantian notion of aesthetic disinterestedness, if not influenced by it. Of course, Kant’s
position reflects his own influence by 18th-century British aesthetic theorists.540 Kant's account is
therefore clearly not the only relevant conceptual antecedent of Ruskin's view, in this respect.
Schiller is here arguably more salient than Kant, for instance. In his Letters on the
Aesthetic Education of Man, Schiller insists that an “impassioned fine art” is a “contradiction in
terms,” because “the inevitable effect of the Beautiful is freedom from passions
536Quoted in Bell 1963, 21.
537Ruskin 1853/2004, 58.
538Kant views 'interest' as “[t]he satisfaction that we combine with the representation of the existence of an object” 
(KU 5:204). In turn, he sees interested satisfaction always grounded in, or else itself grounding, a desire (KU 
5:208–209).
539KU 5:207–209.
540On ‘disinterestedness’ in 18th-century British aesthetics, see Stolnitz (1961a; 1961b), Berleant (1986), Guyer 
(1993a), and Rind (2002). For replies to Stolnitz, see also Dickie (1964; 1984). On Kant’s relationship to this 
British context, see White (1973), Townsend (1987), and Guyer (1993b). 
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[Leidenschaften].”541 Moreover, “no less self-contradictory,” on Schiller's view, is “a fine
instructive (didactic) or improving (moral) art,” because “nothing is more at variance with the
concept of Beauty than that it should have a tendentious effect upon the character.”542 This
freedom from both passions and didacticism echoes Kant's claim that reflection on beautiful
form involves freedom both from sensuous desires (mirrored in Schiller's 'passions') and from
rational desires for the good (mirrored in Schiller's 'instructive or improving art'). For Schiller,
beauty elicits freedom from sensuous ‘passions’ and avoids ‘tendentious’ moral-rational effects
because it involves the harmony of sensuous and rational laws, not their absence or attenuation.
And this reflects his direct influence by Kant's theory of the 'free play' between imagination and
understanding in experiences of beauty. Indeed, Schiller acknowledges that his aesthetic theory
is based “for the most part” in Kantian principles.543 But whereas Kant stresses spectators'
contemplative experience of disinterestedness, Schiller is equally attentive to artists' experience
of disinterestedness, as he takes it to inform higher modes of creative activity.544 In this respect,
Schiller's account of aesthetic disinterestedness is clearly closer than Kant's to Ruskin's positive
view of the 'impassivity' or 'sternness' of poets like Dante, by contrast to British Romantic poets.
Schiller's influence on Friedrich Schlegel's intellectual development, and more broadly on
the rise of German Romanticism, is also noteworthy in the present context.545 In the first
instance, this is because Schiller seems to have indirectly influenced English Romanticism, via
Coleridge's influence by Schlegel. René Wellek notes that “personal and epistolary contacts”
between the English Romantics (Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byron, Shelley, and Keats) and
early or late German Romantics, narrowly construed—i.e. Friedrich and August Schlegel,
Wackenroder, Tieck, and Novalis; followed by Arnim and Brentano—were “meager.”546 Still,
Coleridge especially was “importantly influenced by German romantic aesthetics and criticism,”




544E.g. see Schiller 1794–95/2014, 107–110. Cf. Nietzsche's claim that philosophers have “instead of envisaging 
the aesthetic problem from the point of view of the artist (the creator), considered art and the beautiful purely 
from that of the ‘spectator,’ and unconsciously introduced the ‘spectator’ into the concept ‘beautiful’ (GM III, 6).
Nietzsche imputes this tendency to “all philosophers,” before elaborating (what he takes to be) its specific 
manifestation in Kant's theory of 'disinterested' pleasure in beauty (GM III, 6). Nietzsche's criticism is far more 
plausibly applicable to Kant than to Schiller.
545For Schiller's influence on Schlegel and the development of German Romanticism, see e.g. Lovejoy 1920; 
Wessell, Jr. 1971; and Beiser 2005, 116ff.
546Wellek 1964, 39.
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romantic-classical, organic-mechanical contrast is derived from Schlegel.”547 Hence, when
Ruskin criticizes English Romantic poetry, we should be attentive to the possibility that this
might involve an indirect critique of German Romantic views, insofar as they influenced the
British poets whom Ruskin is directly criticizing, if not also an indirect critique of Schiller as a
direct influence on the rise of a Romantic ethos across Europe.548
With respect to Ruskin's critique of the pathetic fallacy, Schiller's shift from classicism to
an ultimate embrace of modern 'sentimental' [sentimentalische] poetry is of crucial
significance.549 In the early 1790s, Schiller—like Schlegel—endorsed an aesthetic doctrine
“characterized by an insistence upon 'objective' aesthetic standards, by a conviction of the
priority of 'form' over 'content,' of unity over expressiveness, in art, and by a belief in the
superiority of ancient art, as the most adequate realization of these standards.”550 But Schiller—
like Schlegel—later came to reject his youthful classicism as a kind of one-sided rationalism
which privileged universal law or intelligible form over truly aesthetic 'play', or states in which
the ‘sense impulse’ [Stofftrieb] and (rational) ‘form impulse’ [Formtrieb] are “at once mutually
subordinated and coordinated.”551 On Schiller's mature view, then, the experience of beauty, or
'aesthetic play', is an ideal condition of “reciprocal action between the two impulses [viz., the
sense- and form-impulses], of such a kind that the operation of the one at the same time confirms
and limits the operation of the other, and each one severally reaches its highest manifestation
precisely through the activity of the other” (AE: 58). This proto-dialectical vision of reciprocal
interdependence between 'sense' and 'reason' marks a departure from Kant's more one-sidedly
intellectualist account. (Of course, Kant also saw human beings as essentially constituted by both
'sensuous' and 'rational' powers. But Schiller's stress on the historical process whereby humanity
develops authentically felt respect for universal moral principles (e.g.) is still a real, proto-
Hegelian departure from Kant.)
Ruskin's criticism of Romantic pathetic fallacies may thus seem to involve his return to a
more 'one-sided' intellectualism of the sort that informed Schiller's early classicism, or much of
18th-century classicism more broadly. But in fact, to the extent that there are classicizing, or at
least anti-modern, strains in Ruskin's thought, these seem to be decoupled from intellectualism in
547Wellek 1964, 39. See also Orsini 1964.





a way that earlier classicisms often were not. To see this, we must examine Ruskin's attitude
towards the 'classical' somewhat more closely.
The basic reading of Ruskin as a kind of classicist receives some support from his
remark, in the next chapter of Modern Painters, “Of Classical Landscape,” that his “reason for
asking the reader to give so much of his time to the examination of the pathetic fallacy was, that,
whether in literature or in art, he will find it eminently characteristic of the modern mind.”552
Likewise, “the modern painter” approaches landscape in a spirit of “endeavoring to express
something which he, as a living creature, imagines in the lifeless object.” By contrast, “the
classical and mediæval painters were content with expressing the unimaginary and actual
qualities of the object itself.”553 Here Ruskin again contrasts English Romantic poetry (using
Keats as an example) against Homer, whose characterizations of landscape he praises at
length.554 Ruskin's grouping of classical and medieval art, both by contrast to the modern,
indicates that he is not an advocate for the 'classical' in the sense of Renaissance classicism,
insofar as it is opposed to the medieval. Here consider, for instance, his claim that “the
blundering, pseudo-picturesque, pseudo-classical minds of Claude and the Renaissance
landscape-painters” are “wholly missing Homer's practical common sense, and equally incapable
of feeling the quiet natural grace and sweetness of his asphodel meadows, tender aspen poplars,
or running vines.”555 Ruskin's famous praise of Gothic architecture, and his associated criticism
of Renaissance classicism, also reinforces this basic point.
Ruskin's dismissive attitude towards Renaissance classicism and Enlightenment
neoclassicism is consistent, however, with a distinct kind of affinity for classical Greek culture.
That Ruskin does indeed have such an affinity for classical antiquity, notwithstanding his
critique of Renaissance architecture, should already be apparent from his discussion of the Greek
gods, quoted above. Ruskin's extensive praise of Homer, along with his admiration for Dante and
Shakespeare, all also arguably indicates his preference for certain kinds of paradigmatically
classical art and classicist currents in earlier modern art.556 Shakespeare is an ambiguous case in
552Ruskin 1858c, 173.
553Ruskin 1858c, 173.
554Ruskin claims that “the spirit of classical landscape has hardly been expressed in any other way than by words” 
(Ruskin 1858c, 173).
555Ruskin 1858c, 192.
556Shakespeare is a more ambiguous case, admittedly. Indeed, Shakespeare and Dante are treated as paradigms of 
“das Wesentlich-Moderne,” whom the “history of romantic poetry [die Geschichte der romantischen Poesie]” 
would discuss, by Friedrich Schlegel (see e.g. Lovejoy 1916, 393); and Schiller contrasts Shakespeare against 
Homer, as paradigmatic of modern 'sentimental' and classical 'naive' poetry, respectively (see Schiller 1966). 
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this respect, admittedly.557 Indeed, Shakespeare and Dante are treated as paradigms of “das
Wesentlich-Moderne,” whom the “history of romantic poetry [die Geschichte der romantischen
Poesie]” would discuss, by Friedrich Schlegel.558 Thus, to the extent that he embraces a kind of
classicism, as part of his broader critical response to 'modern' Romantic art and philosophy,
Ruskin's sense of the 'classical' nevertheless clearly diverges from earlier accounts of the
'romantic-classical' antithesis. This is also apparent from his claim that “[t]he Greek lived, in all
things, a healthy, and, in a certain degree, a perfect life.”559 In one respect, this is quite like
broadly Romantic characterizations of classical antiquity, as a 'naive' or 'childlike' state of
primitive 'unity' with nature. But whereas the typical Romantic then argues that it is ultimately
nobler to recover a 'higher' sense of unity with the divine through a process of alienation from
nature and 'synthetic' recovery of it in continual progression towards a purely ideal end state (e.g.
Schiller's 'moral condition'), this is not Ruskin's approach. Rather, it is precisely this Romantic
ethos—this sentimental but somewhat disingenuous nostalgia for classical Greek paganism as a
kind of blissful ignorance or Edenic reverie—that Ruskin harshly criticizes. Hence, for example,
Ruskin disdains the “sorrow” that he takes to inflect all modern, but not classical, experience:
They [viz., the Greeks] had indeed their sorrows, true and deep, but still, more like
children's sorrows than ours, whether bursting into open cry of pain, or hid with
shuddering under the veil, still passing over the soul as clouds do over heaven, not
sullying it, not mingling with it;—darkening it perhaps long or utterly, but still not
becoming one with it, and for the most part passing away in dashing rain of tears, and
leaving the man unchanged: in nowise affecting, as our sorrow does, the whole tone
of his thought and imagination thenceforward.
How far our melancholy may be deeper and wider than theirs in its roots and view,
and therefore nobler, we shall consider presently; but at all events, they had the
advantage of us in being entirely free from all those dim and feverish sensations
which result from unhealthy state of the body. I believe that a large amount of the
dreamy and sentimental sadness, tendency to reverie, and general patheticalness of
modern life results merely from derangement of stomach; holding to the Greek life
the same relation that the feverish night of an adult does to a child's sleep.560
Ruskin's nostalgia for the 'childlike' state of Greek antiquity is not Romantic. It is related to
Ruskin's aesthetic categories thus cannot be reduced to pre-existing accounts of the 'romantic-classical' contrast.
557For a mid 20th-century summary of critical perspectives on Shakespeare's knowledge of and attitude towards 





Romanticism, conceptually if not also by way of historical influence. But Ruskin does not view
the 'classical' or 'naive' as the first stage (or 'moment') in a process of ('dialectical') development
towards a 'higher' mode of 'romantic' or 'sentimental' culture. Rather, he sees Homer as far closer
than even the best modern Romantic or 'sentimental' artist to genuine 'high poetical truth'.
In this respect, the mature Schiller's conception of 'naive' poetry is still canonically
Romantic. Notably, however, Schiller characterizes Shakespeare as a paradigm of the 'naive'
poetic temperament that he also associates with Greek classical antiquity. Schiller thus describes
his initial reaction to reading Shakespeare in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry:
When, at a very early age I first made the acquaintance of [Shakespeare], I was
incensed by his coldness, the insensitivity which permitted him to jest in the midst
of the highest pathos, to interrupt the heartrending scenes in Hamlet, in King Lear,
in Macbeth, etc., with a Fool; restraining himself now where my sympathies rushed
on, then coldbloodedly tearing himself away where my heart would have gladly
lingered. Misled by acquaintance with more recent poets into looking first for the
poet in his work, to find his heart, to reflect in unison with him on his subject
matter, in short, to observe the object in the subject, it was intolerable to me that
here there was no way to lay hold of the poet, and nowhere to confront him.561
Moreover, Schiller argues that Shakespeare and Homer are “one in precisely this [naive as
opposed to sentimental] trait of character”:
The same occurred to me with Homer also, whom I learned to know only at a
later period. I recall now the curious point in the sixth book of the Iliad where
Glaucus and Diomedes come face to face in the battle and, having recognized
one another as guest-friends, afterwards exchange gifts. This touching depiction
of the piety with which the rules of hospitality were observed even in battle can
be compared with an account of the knightly sense of nobility in Ariosto, when
two knights and rivals, Ferraù and Rinaldo, the latter a Christian, the former a
Saracen, covered with wounds after a violent duel, make peace and in order to
561Schiller 1966, 106–107.
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overtake the feeling Angelica, mount the same horse. Both examples, as
different as they may be otherwise, are almost alike in their effect upon our
hearts, bcause both depict the beautiful victory of morals over passion and touch
us by the naivety of their attitudes. But how differently the poets react in
describing these similar actions. Ariosto, the citizen of a later world which had
fallen from simplicity of manners, cannot, in recounting the occurrence, conceal
his own wonderment and emotion. The feeling of the distance between those
morals and those which characterized his own age overwhelms him. [ . . . ] And
now old Homer! Scarcely has Diomedes learned from the narrative of Glaucus,
his antagonist, that the latter's fathers were guest-friends of his deme, than he
thrusts his lance into the ground, speaks in a friendly tone with him and agrees
with him that in future they will avoid one another in battle. [...]It would hardly
be possible for a modern poet […] to have waited even this long before
expressing his pleasure at this action. We would forgive him this all the more
readily because, even in reading, our hearts pause, and gladly detach themselves
from the object in order to look within. But of all this, not a trace in Homer; as
though he had reported something quite everyday; indeed, as though he
possessed no heart in his bosom, he continues in his dry truthfulness [. . . ]562
Schiller's 'naive' poet is therefore “severe and modest like virginal Diana in her forests,” such
that “without intimacy he flees the heart that seeks his, flees the desire that would embrace him,”
and “the dry truth with which he deals with the objects seems not infrequently like insensitivity.”
But in fact, it is simply that “[t]he object possesses him entirely.”563 This dimension of Schiller's
conception of the 'naive' strongly anticipates central features of Ruskin's notion of the 'classical'.
Notably, any implicit ideal of the 'classical' in Ruskin also anticipates certain currents in
Modernist poetics, conceptually if not historically. Hence, for example, T. E. Hulme suggests
that “if you call Shakespeare romantic, you are using a different definition to the one I give”:
I know quite well that when people think of classical and romantic in verse, the




mean this; the dividing line that I intend is here misplaced a little from the true
middle. That Racine is on the extreme classical side I agree, but if you call
Shakespeare romantic, you are using a different definition to the one I give. You are
thinking of the difference between classic and romantic as being merely one between
restraint and exuberance. I should say with Nietzsche that there are two kinds of
classicism, the static and the dynamic. Shakespeare is the classic of motion.564
Hulme elaborates that what he means by “classical in verse” is “play” in the “early” and
“imperfect” stages of development of a given artistic tradition or medium.565 By contrast, then, he
takes the “romantic” to be related to states of cultural “exhaustion.”566 Hence, Hulme associates
the romantic conception of man as “a well, a reservoir full of possibilities” that points towards
the “infinite” with decadence.567 And, by contrast, Hulme associates the classical conception of
man as “a very finite and fixed creature”568—not a crass materialist, but a grounded being who as
such never (like the Romantic) “flies away into the circumambient gas”; a telluric being who
“may jump, but[...]always returns back”569—with cultural vitality or freshness.570
Especially given Hulme's explicit mention of Nietzsche, it is also here worth noting that
Nietzsche suggests, in The Birth of Tragedy, that Shakespeare is a modern bearer of Dionysian
insight into 'universal will' or 'nature'. (At this early point in his intellectual development,
Nietzsche's notion of the Dionysian is still strongly informed by his attraction to Wagner,
Schopenhauer, and other recognizably Romantic thinkers. However, his mature view is that both
the Dionysian and the Apollonian are opposed to the 'romantic'.) Although Nietzsche's contrast
between Apollonian and Dionysian art impulses may seem to be a direct development of the
'classical-romantic' contrast, in fact Nietzsche's deeper point is that the Weltanschauung of
classical antiquity involved both the Apollonian drive to beautiful form, great self-control, etc.,
and the Dionysian drive to frenzied de-individuation and identification with impersonal natural
forces. Nietzsche opposes both the Apollonian and Dionysian to Socratic rationalism, which he
takes to have caused the death (or 'suicide') of classical Greek tragedy, and more broadly
initiated a world-historical process of cultural degradation, culminating in the decadence and







570On what he takes to be the “ambiguity” of Hulme's anti-Romanticism, see also Krieger 1953.
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Dante against both the Romantics and Enlightenment poets like Alexander Pope anticipates
broad groupings of taste, if not analytic categories, characteristic of certain currents of Modernist
poetics—and perhaps especially those that have a strong Nietzschean influence. This is not to
make any claim about Ruskin's historical influence on Nietzsche. It is to observe a meaningful
conceptual connection between Ruskin's aesthetic and Nietzsche's, which plausibly explains
deep-structural connections between overtly Nietzschean currents of Modernist poetics and more
empiricist- or Protestant-inflected currents of anti-Romanticism in Victorian aesthetic theory—
and less Nietzschean emphases on 'objectivity' or 'exteriority' in Modernism. Distinct but
conceptually interrelated counter-Romantic currents thus developed in parallel within 19 th-
century England and Germany, before partly converging in the early 20th-century.571
Ruskin's classicizing tendencies are thus arguably more like Hulme's than like the early
Schiller's. Ruskin sees the Greeks as youthful, vital, directly experiencing nature, and free from
both otherworldly dreaminess and excessive sentimentality. They are not bearers of 'reason' or
'intellect' or (ideal) 'form' as opposed to 'mere' sensuous 'matter'. Nor, for Ruskin, are Greek
pagans the bearers of a 'naive' or 'childlike' materialism to be overcome, following a 'fall' from
Edenic reverie and ensuing period of 'alienation', in the historical development of a 'higher' and
genuinely modern 'aesthetic' state in which 'ideal' and 'material' orders are realized as
reciprocally interdependent aspects of the Absolute—as the Greeks had become for the elder
Schiller and many other broadly Romantics thinkers. On Ruskin's view, the exemplars of such a
distinctively modern artistic ethos were not genuinely 'enlightened' or attuned to the 'infinite'.
Rather, they were “unhealthy”: the “dreamy and sentimental sadness, tendency to reverie, and
general patheticalness of modern life” is largely the sign of a modern “derangement of stomach.”
Ruskin's classicizing tendencies, in this sense, merit serious consideration. Vitality, unalienated
religious experience, and creativity manifest in directness, clarity, and intensity of description are
all artistic ideals worth taking seriously; as are his hostility to self-expression and sentimentality.
Regarding self-expression, however, it should be noted that Ruskin does approvingly
write that the Greeks exalted as “more glorious than any of this wild loveliness” of nature “the
beauty of the human countenance and form.”572 In this respect, he is more of a humanist—i.e. he
571In a broader discussion of Ruskin vis-à-vis Pound and Eliot, Nicholls (2001, 171) likewise suggests—citing 
(Ball 1971, 48–102)—that “[i]t is likely that, indirectly, Ruskin’s attention to the object shaped both Lewis’s and
Pound’s respective claims for forms of ‘objectivity’.” See also Cerutti 2000. On Ruskin's affinities with Bergson
—who in turn directly influenced T. E. Hulme, among many others—see also Gally 1933 and Delattre 1947.
572Ruskin 1858c, 183.
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places humanity more at the center of reality, closer to the apex of a basic hierarchy of value—
than I. And, in this respect, Ruskin is more like the Romantic poets whom he directly criticizes.
The post-Kantian idealism that indirectly influenced English Romanticism shares this
humanist bent. For Schiller, as for Kant, the state of 'play' or aesthetic 'freedom' in experiences of
beauty is thus ultimately one of collective human self-expression. On Schiller’s mature view, the
‘aesthetic condition’ is the essential human condition, or the “disposition which comprises in
itself the wholeness of humanity,” wherein we are “masters in equal degree of our passive and
our active powers.”573 Hence, “Man plays only when he is in the full sense of the word a man,
and he is only wholly Man when he is playing.”574 Namely, 'aesthetic play' is for Schiller the
coordinated display of the basic human powers of 'sense' and (rational) 'form'. Likewise, Kant
claims that finding something beautiful involves synthesizing the manifold of sensations it elicits
by means of the universal subjective concept of a generic theoretically rational subject who
perceives objects in space and time, as opposed to the concept of a specific kind of object.
Hence, Kant claims (roughly) that things are beautiful insofar as they sensuously represent the
generic structure of human cognition, or the intuitive ‘shape’ of a generic sensuous-rational
subject like us. This is critical historical context for Schiller’s aforementioned claim that we
“believe ourselves to perceive form immediately” in the experience of beauty. For Schiller,
beauty is ‘living shape,’ or the sensuous expression of an essentially human relation of reciprocal
interdependence between sensuous 'life' and rational 'form'. And for Hegel, in a basically similar
vein, beauty is the sensuous presentation of the freedom of 'Spirit'.
The idea that artistic creation or aesthetic experience essentially involves self-expression
can encourage use of the pathetic fallacy, as a way of appropriating the natural world in the name
of artists' passions, or human powers of feeling more broadly. By contrast, describing nature
without using pathetic fallacies can be a way to demonstrate one's refusal to value nature only
under the sign of human qualities or capacities. Of course, it also can be a way of valuing human
intellect, or a distinctively human power of contemplation—whether theoretical or perceptual—
over our equally basic capacity for emotion. Ruskin's criticism of the pathetic fallacy arguably
involves a degree of contemplative bias, or preference for thought and sensory perception over
emotion. And his approving appeal to Greek idealizations of “human countenance and form”
suggests an elevation of human 'spirit' over 'nature' that I take to be ethically and aesthetically
573Schiller 2014, 81–82. 
574Schiller 2014, 63.
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implausible. But Ruskin's affinity for 'true' poetic descriptions of objects like the sea, over true
descriptions of feelings by way of 'falsely' describing objects, also plausibly involves a broader
kind of receptivity to the value of impersonal natural phenomena, viewed 'on their own terms,'
not ours. This is a less crudely anti-emotive reading of Ruskin's stress on “real power[s]” that are
“in the object” rather than “only imputed to it by us,”575 which suggests a more compelling
artistic ideal.
This slightly subtler reading of Ruskin also better jibes with his sympathetic account of
the Greek gods, according to which 'divine' powers, including divine passions, really do exist—
just without being 'in' natural objects in the same way that blueness is 'in' the sky. On my own
view, this contrast is better explained in terms of the contrast between real powers 'in' natural
objects to elicit responses in humans generally speaking (e.g. blueness), and real powers 'in'
natural objects to elicit responses in great artists. 'Divine' powers are not features of empirical
reality, insofar as they are not amenable to 'inter-subjectively valid' experience. But 'divine'
powers may nevertheless be perfectly real, causally basic forces that impact great artists more so
than other people. This is not a 'mystical' or 'supernatural' view of art. It is just anti-scientistic.
12.4. Finally, Ruskin's appeal to the apparently “impassive” nature of a “high creative
poet” like Dante also illuminates the more specifically art critical context of his account. Ruskin
is siding with Dante—who, even in his “most intense moods” has “entire command of himself,”
and “can look around calmly”—against “Keats and Tennyson, and the poets of the second
order,” who are “generally themselves subdued by the feelings under which they write, or, at
least, write as choosing to be so.”576 Likewise, Ruskin earlier contrasts Shakespeare, Homer, and
Dante, as paradigmatic “creative” poets, against “Reflective or Perceptive” poets like
Wordsworth, Keats, and Tennyson.577 This appeal to the 'creativity' of poets who commit fewer
pathetic fallacies, and the 'perceptiveness' of Romantic poets whom Ruskin evidently takes to
indulge in the pathetic fallacy to excess, may seem to undermine my claim that Ruskin's view
indirectly motivates my own account of artistic objectivity as receptivity to the broader world.
But in fact it does not. Ruskin also clearly celebrates the perceptiveness of poets like Homer, as




578Ruskin 1856/2004, 77; see also Ruskin 1856/2004, 72.
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“receiving all feelings to the full,” despite not being easily overwhelmed by them. Ruskin does
allow that there is “some beauty” in a pathetic fallacy in Coleridge, and speaks fairly favorably
of others in Wordsworth.579 Still, his overall attitude is clearly that the 'high poetical truth' of
Homer and Dante is better than even the most 'pleasing' pathetic fallacies in the work of English
Romantics and their Victorian descendants like Tennyson.580
Ruskin is thus broadly hostile to Romanticism—as well as to what he claims is the more
disingenuous sentimentality of 18th-century poets like Pope.581 He looks down upon 'pathetic
fallacies', and especially far down upon those used as tropes, like 'raging waves', 'remorseless
floods', and 'ravenous billows'.582 In this light, Josephine Miles offers a helpful report of the kind
and frequency of “attribut[ions] of human feeling to nature” which were common in the works of
“eighteenth-century ['Pre-Romantic'] poets like Collins, Gray, Beattie, Cowper, Burns, and
[Romantic] poets of the next generations like Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley, [and] Keats”:
Laughing flowers, angry deep, smiling land, proud steed, mournful scene, were the
phrases they used, and many more like them with little deviation. The frequency of
use, too, they had in common: about one attribution in every forty to sixty lines, or
about once in every two pages[...]The poetic phenomenon of the fallacy was part
of a larger poetic phenomenon, the density of stated emotion of all kinds. The
“pathetic,” the emotion, if not applied to nature, was applied to the human body
where it was felt, in “fiery passionate blood” and so on. Or the emotion was
personified or abstracted. One way or another it managed to be stated about once
in every six lines of Romantic poetry, a good solid amount.583
Miles in turn argues that while the pathetic fallacy “thus thrived through the years of Keats and
Shelley,” it was “suddenly and immediately” modified at “about 1840, just when Ruskin named
and condemned the artificiality of the device,” and “remained so decreased, with some
exceptions,” throughout the rest of the 19th century. And “[i]n quality too it changed,” during the
same period, “diminishing the emphasis on the pathetic and the sympathetic within itself as it
grew increasingly involved with qualitative factors.” Thus, “[w]hereas the eighteenth-century
fallacy attributed feelings which fitted an outward show of correspondence, the lark gay, the
stormy sea angry, the fields smiling, and so on, the nineteenth-century fallacy in its decline gave
579Ruskin 1856/2004, 72–73, 78–80.
580On Tennyson's relationship to the Romantics, see e.g. Ball 1963, Tucker 1988, and Perry 2008.
581For Ruskin's harsh criticism of Pope, see Ruskin 1854/2004, 78.
582Ruskin 1856/2004, 75.
583Miles 1944, 210–11. Compare Miles 1965, 10–31.
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nature many inward causes for feeling, apart from aspect of sympathy and type
representation.”584 Hence, “emotion itself became less abundantly stated” in the 1840's, with
Tennyson, “as grey, as bright, as sweet acquired the ability to state them by indirection.”585 Pre-
Raphaelites like Rossetti then followed Tennyson in treating this “fallacy of quality” as the rule,
not the exception, with lines such as “Yearned loud the iron-bosomed sea” and “Oh the wind is
sad in the iron chill.”586 
By 'type representation', Miles mean representations generically applicable to a given sort
of object or universal kind, for instance via conventional association—i.e. what she calls
“standards of kind,” such as “the lark gay” or “the field smiling.”587 (Elsewhere, Miles elaborates
that “[b]asic to [such standards'] significance was a concept of 'essential' or 'representative'
quality, a single major quality, and the correspondence of this to the essential quality of the
expressed form of an emotion.”588) Hence, Miles claims that Victorian uses of the pathetic fallacy
shifted away from the “named noun” or “[e]ighteenth-century outward aspect,” towards “what
[the poet Gerard Manley] Hopkins called 'inscape,' the qualities and inner structure of the thing
itself.”589 In Victorians like Hopkins, the pathetic fallacy thus became a way to isolate “the
qualifying and discriminating adjective.”590 In an earlier phase of this shift, for example,
Tennyson's use of the pathetic fallacy makes the relationship between man and nature “a sensed
physical likeness and bond,” such that more narrowly affective terms like 'sympathy' give way to
more physical terms like 'incorporate'.591 (Here Miles cites an address to a yew tree—a symbol of
mourning—in Tennyson's “In Memoriam”, containing the line, “Sick for thy stubborn
hardihood, / I seem to fail from out my blood / And grow incorporate into thee.”)
With respect to this increasingly physical characterization of feeling, Miles also points to
584Miles 1944, 212–13. However, Miles acknowledges that Victorians who were responsible for the transitions still
also used some of the same old standard eighteenth-century representative pathetic fallacies—e.g., in Tennyson, 
happy morn, joyful dawn, merry bird, doleful wind, sighing winds, merry bells, cheerful day, blissful clime, glad 
year, happy shoes, happy stars, weeping rose, moaning rose, and smiling Nature (Miles 1965, 40). Still, for 
Tennyson the “adjectival emotion [e.g. 'odorous sighs', 'the silver year should cease to mourn and sigh'] is not the
exception of his predecessors, but the rule” (Miles 1965, 34).
585Miles 1965, 37. For examples in Tennyson and Rossetti, see Miles 1965, 34–37 and 41–43.
586Miles 1965, 41. See also Miles 1965, 42–49.
587Miles 1944, 212. See also Miles 1965, 18.
588Miles 1965, 33.
589Miles 1944, 213.
590Miles 1944, 213. Compare Miles' appeal elsewhere to an “increasingly precise way of seeing natural objects” as 
characteristic of 19th-century poetics, and more broadly to “a progress toward closer and closer discr4imination 
of quality” over the course of “the past two centuries” (Miles 1965, 101). (Miles published this remark in 1942.)
591Miles 1965, 36.
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the metaphor of “pulse” in Tennyson and Rossetti. Miles argues that this pulse “take[s] the place
of the eighteenth-century face of nature and the Wordsworthian breath,” such that “[t]he living
motion which was for Wordsworth a motion of spirit is now more organic” and also “sets nature
more strongly apart as its own organism intrinsic to its own spirit.”592 Feeling thus became
increasingly objective, in the sense of being more object-like, within the counter-Romantic
tradition of Victorian poetry that is aligned with Ruskin's positive view. Subsequent Modernist
emphasis on describing objects' sensory qualities, without pathos, hence emerged partly through
late Romantic and Victorian developments and extensions of the pathetic fallacy. As it came to
be applied to a wider variety of finely individuated objects, and 'feeling' rendered more physical
than narrowly affective, the pathetic fallacy became nearer to the kind of close sensory depiction
of things 'in themselves' that many Modernists celebrated in opposition to explicit sentimentality.
Increasingly physical—i.e. dynamic rather than spiritual—characterizations of feeling set nature
further apart from the human domain. But this need not constitute a 'withdrawal' of nature from
man, in any pejorative sense associated with 'modernity-critique'. Rather, it may also (at least in
part) amount to a de-idealization of nature, or a counter-Romantic recovery of inhuman force. At
least, this is the broader context in which I suggest Miles' analysis is most fruitfully situated.
In this light, we may more productively return to Miles' remark about “sympathy.” By
'sympathy', she evidently has in mind common feeling, and specifically emotions (as if) shared
between humans and “natural objects” like flowers. (Elsewhere, she stresses how Pre-Romantics
like Gray and Collins take “Fancy” to “fit[] not only mourning to cloud, but also cloud to
mourning.”593 And in Blake, too, there are abundant “shared emotions,” although now “[s]tream,
hill, meadows, grasshopper, birds, all laugh . . . not to suit the scene or the sympathizer, but from
their own true pleasure as expressed in human terms.”594) Thus Miles claims that Victorian uses
of the pathetic fallacy shifted away from simple appeal to emotions shared between people and
generic natural objects, and (again) towards a broader “new emphasis on color, atmosphere,
texture, 'the thing in itself' with its adjectival discriminations.”595 On Miles' telling, this shift was
also mediated by younger Romantics like Keats and Shelley, for whom the “world feels apart
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qualities like “[s]hape, hue, odour, and sweet sound” become the “new agents of feeling.”596 In
turn, this new Victorian emphasis on “objectivity” construed as close attention to the individual
“thing in itself,” using “the qualifying and discriminating adjective,” positively influenced
currents of Modernist poetics stressing “[t]he quality of the thing, not our feeling about it.”597 
In particular, Miles highlights Imagism's call to “interest in the object 'for its own sake,'”
or “stress on the object's own perceivable qualities and textures.”598 Here the Imagist poet Amy
Lowell's own account of the distinctively “modern” poetic virtue of “Externality” is noteworthy:
I do not call it “objectivity” advisedly. I do not mean that this [modern] poetry is
objective rather than subjective. I mean that it concerns itself with man in his proper
relation to the universe, rather than as the lord and master of it. It is this attitude which
leads to so many poems on nature, on effects of trees and sky and water, by
themselves, with no hint of the “pathetic fallacy” to heighten interest.599
“[B]y 'externality',” Lowell elaborates elsewhere, “I mean the attitude of being interested in
things for themselves and not because of the effect they have upon oneself.”600 This notion is
helpfully compared to Lowell's description of “exteriority” as “the characteristic modern touch”:
“Interiority” was the fashion; a poet examined his mental processes under a
microscope. . . . Such a state of things was really utterly insupportable. Musset drank
himself to death; Verlaine and Huysmans fell exhausted into the arms of the Church;
Rimbaud took refuge in the Orient, married a native wife, and wrote no more poems;
and the greater number undoubtedly learned to enjoy their little pleasures and comforts
with agreeable calm, although they continued to write as though suicide were just
round the corner.
Somehow, that fashion worked itself out, and “exteriority,” as I have called the
characteristic modern touch, came in. By this extremely awkward word, “exteriority,”
I mean an interest in the world apart from oneself, a contemplation of nature
unencumbered by the “pathetic fallacy.” It is the reason of the picture-making of the
modern poet. Picture-making these other men gave us, but the Modern gives us
596Miles 1965, 29. Likewise: “Keats, with Shelley in this respect, however great their differences in others, marked 
the pathetic fallacy with the notion: that which is sweet, soft, cool, feels. Tennyson half transformed the fallacy 
by his early and full acceptance of this notion” (Miles 1965, 38); “[The Romantics] were working toward the 
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picture-making without comment.601
Lowell only meant to be “labeling” and “not condemning” the “internality” or “subjectivity” of
“the poets of the late Victorian epoch”—as she saw them, contra Miles' more subtle analysis.602
For Lowell, that is, “in the world of the arts [egoism] is perfectly permissible,” and indeed
“makes very good and very interesting poetry.” It is just “not the manner of to-day [1916].”603 
Clearly, Lowell's notion of “Externality” is closely related both to my own account of
artistic objectivity as receptivity to the broader world and to Ruskin's criticism of the pathetic
fallacy. This is no accident: I mean to be refining and creatively extending a counter-Romantic
tradition that spans at least a period from the early Victorian era to mid 20 th-century Modernist
poetics. Broadly in keeping with Ruskin, I am also happy to be more judgmental than Lowell:
externality is a poetic virtue, and internality or egoism is a poetic vice. Romantic poetry, and
Wordsworthian currents in Victorian poetry, may well have other virtues; but this is a weakness.
Part of my original contribution to this tradition concerns my analysis of the relevant
notion of the “universe” to which man should (Lowell suggests) stand in “proper relation.” Does
the “universe” comprise everything? Or everything natural, rather than artificial? Or everything
holy? Or everything powerful? As I have indicated above in this section, certain of Ruskin's
remarks suggest something close to the first, most expansive notion of the 'universe'. He claims
that the “great” person is less sensitive to alteration by “that which immediately affect him,” due
to being more highly attuned to “the past and future, and[...]all things beside and around” his
immediate environment. This emphasis on global perspective in turn evokes fairly traditionalistic
notions of objectivity, as a 'view from nowhere' that affords universally-valid representations.
But it is far from clear that this is the best way to construe the 'universe' to which more
outwardly-oriented artists are more receptive. Receptivity to everything beyond one's immediate
environment is indiscriminate, if not also unduly self-effacing. Qua indiscriminate, receptivity to
everything beyond one's immediate environment is also essentially similar to the Romantic poet's
hyper-sensitivity to any and all features of his more immediate natural environment—such that
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light, Miles' appeal to “physical consciousness of a universally infused emotion” in both Blake
and Erasmus Darwin,605 then echoed and even intensified in the second-generation Romantics
like Keats and Shelley.606 A similar attitude is also on full display in Emerson's “Nature” (1836):
A leaf, a sun-beam, a landscape, the ocean, make an analogous impression on the
mind. What is common to them all,—that perfectness and harmony, is beauty. The
standard of beauty is the entire circuit of natural forms,—the totality of
nature[...]Nothing is quite beautiful alone: nothing but is beautiful in the whole. A
single object is only so far beautiful as it suggests this universal grace. The poet, the
painter, the sculptor, the musicians, the architect, seek each to concentrate this
radiance of the world on one point, and each in his several work to satisfy the love
of beauty which stimulates him to produce. Thus is Art, a nature passed through the
alembic of man. Thus in art, does nature work through the will of a man filled with
the beauty of her first works.607
This indiscriminate enthusiasm for all of nature is characteristic of a broad Romantic ethos fully
developed in the early part of the nineteenth century. On Miles' telling, moreover, the Victorian
shift in the use of the pathetic fallacy developed out of an earlier transition in Keats and Shelley
(i.e. the second generation of Romantics), who began to use the pathetic fallacy to describe
“likenesses in [more] delicate degrees” rather than “in the large,” as well as “an inclusion of
increasingly small objects: of animals and more birds and then, increasingly, of modest flowers.”
Hence, for Keats and Shelley, “even the smallest natural objects participated in the universal
spirit,” and “the artist's discrimination and sensitivity was supposed to be increasingly fine,” so
that he is sensitive to 'universal feeling' in all things.608
But this Romantic form of nature-enthusiasm also has a less overtly sentimental correlate
in indiscriminate applications of the kind of 'objective' close attention to the individual “thing in
itself,” using “the qualifying and discriminating adjective,” which Miles associates with both the
Victorians' shifting usage of the pathetic fallacy and the Imagists' later emphasis on 'Externality'.
Here consider Miles' suggestion that Ruskin and Tennyson both “worked toward” the “end” of
“less fallacy and more minute observation of objects' qualities and structures.”609 Hopkins'
605Miles 1965, 17.
606Miles 1965, 27–28. E.G. “[B]oth [Keats and Shelley] work with the thought of physical feeling strong in mind, 




609Miles 1944, 216. Compare Miles' claim that “[w]e think, contrary to Peter Bell and Wordsworth his critics, both,
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account of a bluebell's beauty as a pathway to apprehending 'our Lord' is also here noteworthy:
I do not think I have ever seen anything more beautiful than the bluebell I have
been looking at. I know the beauty of our Lord by it. It(s inscape) is (mixed of)
strength and grace, like an ash (tree). The head is strongly drawn over (backwards)
and arched down like a cutwater (drawing itself back from the line of the keel). The
lines of the bells strike and overlie this, rayed but not symmetrically, some lie
parallel. They look steely against (the) paper, the shades lying between the bells
and behind the cockled petal-ends and nursing up the precision of their
distinctness, the petal-ends themselves being delicately lit.610
Compare Ruskin recounting of a religious experience in the woods:
The woods, which I had only looked on as wilderness, fulfilled I then saw, in their
beauty, the same laws which guided the clouds, divided the light, and balanced the
wave. 'He hath made everything beautiful in his time,' became for me
thenceforward the interpretation of the bond between the human mind and all
visible things.611
To the extent that Ruskin thus believes that natural objects are all beautiful, and all signs of the
'same laws' that govern nature as a systematic whole, his view differs from mine. I am somewhat
more sympathetic to his remark in the third volume of Modern Painters that choice of subject
(peasant, noble, field, court, etc.) matters less than approaching a given subject “with a thirst for
beauty, and a hatred of meanness and vice.”612 It is more plausible—even if incorrect—that all
natural entities have beautiful aspects, which may well be 'outweighed' by ugliness in other
respects, than that all natural entities are truly beautiful. Ruskin arguably holds only this weaker
view. Hence, for instance, he maintains that “when we come to the colours of flowers and
animals, some of these are entirely pure and heavenly . . . but many animals and flowers are
stained with vulgar, vicious and discordant colors.”613 In this light, one might also consider
that the yellowness of the primrose by the river's brim is pretty important in itself and that the flower is important
in itself” (Miles 1965, 2). I am happy to grant that some flowers can be 'important', even qua yellow. But Miles' 
appeal to the 'importance' of the primrose's yellowness arguably suggests a far broader claim than this.
610Quoted in Miles 1965, 89.
611Miles 1965, 61.
612Ruskin 1858c, 23. More fully: “[T]he difference between great and mean art lies, not in definable methods of 
handling, or styles of representation, or choices of subject, but wholly in the nobleness of the end to which the 
effort of the painter is addressed. . . . And it does not matter whether he seeks for his subject among peasants or 
nobles, among the heroic or the simple, in courts or in fields, so long only that he beholds all things with a thirst 
for beauty, and a hatred of meanness and vice.”
613Quoted in Bell 1963, 36–37.
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Collingwood's appeal to Ruskin's “frequent assertion that the only value a work of art possesses
is that it should be an accurate record of a worthy subject—his lack of interest in works of art
which did not represent a subject that pleased him.”614 Likewise, Quentin Bell claims that Ruskin
prefers “the heroic subject.”615 Bell complains that this obscures “Rembrandt's flayed ox,
Bruegel's clown's, Chardin's domesticities.”616 But—contra Bell—this is plausibly for the good.
'Minute observation' of ignoble features of objects is no more valuable than is 'minute
observation' of ignoble feelings, on my view. Ruskin evidently agrees, and his talent for close
description of art and nature should thus be viewed in this light. He is right to value only “detail
referred to a great end,” not “detail sought for its own sake.”617 (E.g. “the master [painter] does
not aim at the particular color of individual blossoms; he seizes the type of all, and gives it with
the utmost purity and simplicity of which colour is capable.”618) If Romantic hyper-sensitivity to
nature involves a basic failure of objectivity, then so too does later Victorian and Modernist
indulgence in the 'minute observation' of even relatively insignificant natural objects or artifacts.
The latter kind of indiscriminate 'objective depiction' often just highlights human powers
of perception or attention, rather than yielding any deep insight into objects. Further, it suggests a
notion of reality as 'everything that is the case' which is arguably just a materialistic correlate to
the Romantic vision of nature as an all-encompassing organic unity or ideal form. Both wrongly
present reality as totality. Both ideals of indiscriminate creative receptivity to 'total reality' are
misguided. A more compelling artistic ideal would stress receptivity only to fundamental things.
Artistic attention or enthusiasm should not be distributed in equal measure to all things. Artists
must discriminate between the beautiful and ugly, the sacred and the profane, the potent and the
inert. The idea that all of nature is beautiful—say, because every natural phenomenon bears the
mark of the Power, Intellect, and Goodness of God (for the religious believer)—is anathema to
real artistic objectivity, or creative receptivity directed differentially towards fundamental reality.
12.5. There are some indications that Ruskin endorsed this more restrictive notion of
poetic receptivity, even beyond the passages considered above. That is, the broader world need
614Collingwood 1971, 33.
615Bell 1963, 36.
616Bell 1963, 36. Miles, in a related but more pragmatic vein, argues that Ruskin “wavered between a love for all 




not be interpreted, on Ruskin's behalf, in terms of totality or the entire universe. More deeply, he
arguably views the broader world to which the best artists are more receptive as comprising only
especially 'strong' powers, like God. Hence, for instance, Ruskin associates the painter John
Constable's “morbid preference of subjects of a low order” directly with “want of veneration.”619
Here recall also Ruskin's aforementioned appeal to people who, “strong as human creatures can
be, are yet submitted to influences stronger than they, and see in a sort untruly, because what
they see is inconceivably above them,” as in “prophetic inspiration.”620 'Strength' may be divided
into physical power (on the one hand) and (on the other) moral or ethical value. Note that the
latter moralized notion of 'strength' retains connotations of universality, infinitude, etc. Ruskin
arguably appeals to both notions of 'strength', although his dominant emphasis seems to be on the
latter, more moralized notion. On my own view, an amoral notion of strength is more viable.
Ruskin suggests that “by how much this feeling is noble when it is justified by the
strength of its cause, by so much it is ignoble when there is not cause enough for it,” which may
seem to suggest a broadly physical notion of 'strength'. However, this remark directly follows
Ruskin's quotation of two Biblical passages from the Book of Isaiah, as examples of the “point
beyond which it would be inhuman and monstrous if [a poet] pushes this government [of his
passion], and, therefore, a point at which all feverish and wild fancy becomes just and true.”621
The second of these Biblical passages is Isaiah 55:12: “The mountains and the hills shall break
forth before you into singing, and all the trees of the field shall clap their hands.” Insofar as the
Christian God is morally beneficent as well as omnipotent, then, it is unclear whether Ruskin
means that God is a 'strong' cause of poetic amazement in the sense of being physically
compelling, morally compelling, or (perhaps most likely) both.
The moral dimension of Ruskin's notion of 'strength' is also apparent in his later
discussion of a pathetic fallacy from the poet Edward Young, describing (in Ruskin's words) “the
character of a truly good and holy man”:
'Where shall I find him? Angels, tell me where.
You know him; he is near you; point him out.
Shall I see glories beaming from his brow,
Or trace his footsteps by the rising flowers?'




Notably, it is not clear whether this passage contains one pathetic fallacy or two, according to
Ruskin. The image of flowers 'rising' to 'trace' the footsteps of a holy man involves the kind of
personification emphasized in popular definitions of the pathetic fallacy. But 'glories beaming
from his brow' also suggests a kind of 'false' impression, on the poet's part, caused by strong
moral feeling. This is also arguably a pathetic fallacy, then, in Ruskin's sense of the term, even
though it does not involve personification. At any rate, Ruskin insists that “[t]his emotion [viz.,
Young's] has a worthy cause, and is thus true and right.”622 Here 'strong' has thus been supplanted
by 'worthy'. In conjunction with his appeal to the 'truly good and holy' character of the man
whom Young is describing, this suggests that Ruskin may intend a 'strong' cause to be a morally
worthy cause, at least more so than a physically strong cause.
A final example is more ambiguous, but ultimately consistent with the above analysis.
Ruskin invokes a passage from Wordsworth, describing a lover who has lost his mistress:
'Three years had Barbara in her grave been laid,
When thus his moan he made:—
“Oh, move, thou cottage, from behind yon oak,
 Or let the ancient tree uprooted lie,
That in some other way yon smoke,
 May mount into the sky.
If still behind yon pine-tree's ragged bough,
 Headlong, the waterfall must come,
 Oh, let it, then, be dumb—
Be anything, sweet stream, but that which thou art now.”
Ruskin characterizes the narrator's pathetic fallacy in this passage in the following terms:
Here is a cottage to be moved, if not a mountain, and a waterfall to be silent, if it is
not to hang listening: but with what different relation to the mind that
contemplates them! Here, in the extremity of its agony, the soul cries out wildly
for relief, which that the same moment it partly knows to be impossible, but partly
believes possible, in a vague impression that a miracle might be wrought to give
relief even to a less sore distress,—that nature is kind, and God is kind, and that
grief is strong: it knows not well what i s possible to such grief. To silence a
stream, to move a cottage wall,—one might think it could do as much as that!
622Ruskin 1856/2004, 78.
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Here there are arguably suggestions of both the physical or psychic strength of a passion ('grief')
and the moral power of God and nature. In this light, however, it is quite possible that Ruskin
(on Wordsworth's behalf) also means to be indicating that grief at a lover's death has a strong
positive moral valence—namely, insofar as romantic love has often been viewed as a morally
elevated correlate of sexual desire, if not even a sublimated version of it.623
Contra this aspect of Ruskin's thought, it is not aesthetically, metaphysically, or ethically
appropriate to interpret the 'strength' of causes that produce 'true' poetic feeling directly in terms
of moral value. Nature can be kind, and grief can be strong. But nature is not kind, as a rule. The
divine powers located 'in' the ocean or the flame are neither moral nor immoral. They are amoral.
Ruskin himself comes close to acknowledging this, when he describes the Greek gods. But he
loses clarity on this point in moments where his Christianity more strongly reasserts itself.
To truly 'love a stone for a stone's sake', as Ruskin claims to advocate, is in part to frankly
acknowledge that a stone's values are not human values. But morality is arguably a distinctively
human mode of valuing. To value morally is to treat humanity as an end in itself, to be what
Marx called a 'species being' or 'universal' being. Hence, to read moral values into nature, even
as its purely transcendent cause or ground, is essentially to project ourselves onto nature—or else
to wrap nature around ourselves as a garment, to make all of nature our own “inorganic body.”624
This is anathema to artistic objectivity, construed as creative receptivity to basic features
of reality. We are not the focal point of reality. Artists who treat us as if we were the center of
reality inevitably fail to present us with nature 'as it really is' or 'for its own sake'. They only ever
present us back to ourselves. Like Wordsworth, that is, they show us only “the soul of Man,
communicating its creative energies to the images of the external world.625 Ruskin claims to
reject this Romantic ideal of creative self-expression. But the moral dimension of his analysis
threatens to reintroduce it, under the auspice of clear-eyed receptivity to 'strong' causes.
12.6. Ruskin's critique of the pathetic fallacy fits into a wider Victorian shift towards
attention to natural objects 'for their own sake', which paved the way for certain currents of
623E.g. consider part of Schiller's characterization of the highest 'aesthetic state' of society, in his Letters on the 
Aesthetic Education of Man: “A lovelier necessity now links the sexes together, and the sympathy of hearts helps
to maintain the bond which was knitted only capriciously and inconstantly by desire. Released from its sullen 
chains, the quieter eye apprehends form, soul gazes into soul, and out of a selfish exchange of lust there grows a 
generous interplay of affection” (Schiller 1794–95/2014, 107–108).
624Marx 1978, 75.
625Quoted in Miles 1965, 6.
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Modernist poetics, including Imagists' stress on 'exteriority' and depicting 'things as they really
are'.626 Partly through close analysis of Ruskin's text, partly through elaboration of its
philosophical context, and partly through a development of Josephine Miles' illuminating
examination of the pathetic fallacy, I have attempted to reconstruct part of this tradition's early
stages, and then to further advance it. I argued that putatively 'objective' modes of post-Romantic
indulgence in close description of mundane objects are in certain respects essentially continuous
with Romantic hyper-sensitivity to nature. And I briefly argued for a more selective ideal of
artistic receptivity to things 'as they really are', via a critique of Ruskin's overly moralized
notions of 'strong' cause and 'true' feeling.
Ruskin is closer to correct when he keeps his own eye fixed firmly on the pure fact. Not
the pure empirical fact, but the pure poetic fact—the fact that includes “something in this fire and
in the water” which may rage or be wayward, even if the fire and water cannot be possessed of
any such 'feelings', as mere empirical objects. Again, Ruskin complains that it is “not the
materialism, but the vice, which degrades the [Greek] conception [of deities].”627 But the reality
of the Greek gods—their naturalness, their more-than-mere-ideality—is predicated precisely on
this 'vice'. A moral God is a purely ideal 'Being'. The ravenousness and pitiless of the wildfire is
not an idea. Nor is the gentleness of the breeze, however, or the life-giving power of the earth.
Ruskin shows signs of recognizing this, in his best moments. It is the spirit in which he
praises Homer's description of Helen, looking out over the Achaean host from the Trojan gate:628
'I see all the other dark-eyed Greeks; but two I cannot see,—Castor and Pollux,—
whom one mother bore with me. Have they not followed from fair Lacedaemon, or
have they indeed come in their sea-wandering ships, but now will not enter into the
battle of men, fearing the shame and the scorn that is in Me?'
Then Homer himself:
'So she spoke. But them, already, the life-giving earth possessed, there is
Lacedaemon, in the dear fatherland.'
Ruskin calls this “high poetic truth carried to the extreme”:




The poet has to speak of the earth in sadness, but he will not let that sadness affect
or change his thoughts of it. No; though Castor and Pollux be dead, yet the earth is
our mother still, fruitful, life-giving. These are the facts of the thing. I see nothing
else than these. Make what you will of them . . .
Indeed, these are the facts of the thing—even if they are not empirical, but purely poetical, facts.
To 'keep eyes fixed firmly' on these pure facts is not to err on the side of narrowly literal
description, as a naive reading of Ruskin might suggest. Ruskin does remain beholden to a fairly
flatfooted distinction between 'people' and 'things', which makes him view a wide range of poetic
uses of personification as indicating a poet's 'false' perceptions. This aspect of his analysis may
well be untenable, especially in light of modern theories of artistic expressiveness. But the
contrast between figurative and literal uses of language is anyways less artistically salient, and
narrower in scope, than is the contrast between an ideal of individual or collective self-
expression and an outwardly-oriented ideal of creative receptivity to basic features of the world.
Poetical facts are grounded in real powers located 'in' objects. But unlike the blueness of the sky,
the real powers that elicit the highest artistic acts may affect great poets but not 'typical' people.
To acknowledge the existence of such powers, and their real interactions with great artists, is not
mysticism or supernaturalism. It is to reject scientism, and to view art as a natural phenomenon.
The greatest artists look outward to strong external causes for true inspiration. They are
not trying to express themselves or reach self-knowledge through their art. And they are calm or
unsentimental in the way that mountains are calm and hurricanes are unsentimental: driven from
within by vast reserves of power, and so immovable or unstoppable except by the divine forces
which they channel in their highest acts of creative 'expression'. This is the artist's objectivity.
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CHAPTER IV
Force as the Ground of Scientific Objectivity
13. Scientific Objectivity as a View from Explanatory Power
13.1. Many view the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity as essentially related
to that between universality and particularity. Hence, many relate objectivity to an ideal of
knowing things 'in themselves', or under universally-valid modes of description, rather than
merely as they appear to particular sorts of subjects. Or, at least, many relate objectivity to an
ideal of representations valid 'inter-subjectively' rather than just for particular individuals. These
are both mistakes, however. Objective representations may well offer us accurate knowledge of
mind-independent things, or inter-subjectively valid empirical facts. But this is not the basis of
their objectivity.
Objectivity is essentially related to outwardness: the drive and ability to understand
elemental reality—the world beyond ourselves, and in particular its most fundamental aspects.
We achieve this exteriority in part by understanding ourselves in terms of the arational social and
broader natural forces that ground our own essential character, individually or collectively. But
self-understanding of this sort is only one aspect of objectivity. Objectivity is a systematic
orientation away from inwardness or interiority, including myopic focus on bare truth or factual
knowledge, outwards towards the elemental. 
Scientific objectivity calls us to the 'standpoint' of explanatorily-basic aspects of the
world. This is why objective scientific representation appears 'detached' or 'disinterested': not
because it is a 'view from nowhere', but because it is a view from impersonal power.
In objective scientific representation, things are reduced to 'objects' appearing for
'subjects'. But these need not be human, or even rational, subjects. Early modern natural
philosophers misunderstood scientific objectivity in terms of Christian theology, taking God to
be the basic subject for whom natural phenomena appear as mere objects: material things ordered
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by Laws of Nature construed literally as divinely-imposed rational forms. Kantians in turn
substitute human subjectivity for divine Mind, taking the objects of experience to be essentially
determined by the pure 'forms' of human cognitive powers. In either case, God or Man is treated
as explanatorily fundamental vis-à-vis the natural order. These visions of scientific objectivity
are correct in abstract form, but mistaken in their identification of its subject. Scientific
objectivity treats explanatorily-fundamental aspects of the natural world as the 'subjects' for
which observable things appear as 'objects'. The 'transcendental' forms of scientific objectivity
are neither rational laws (as if) imposed by an intelligent God nor generic structuring principles
of human cognition. They are mind-independent and explanatorily-basic physical structures,
which are intelligible but not essentially rational, any more than the slope of a mountain or the
rotation of a hurricane is rational. They are natural forms, and in particular dynamic structures—
the arational shapes of impersonal natural forces' empirical impact.
This account of scientific objectivity yields not only a novel and explanatorily powerful
interpretation of several central currents in the modern history of philosophy, but also a unique
synthesis of two ordinarily-opposed views. It is compatible with the cross-cultural and trans-
historical validity of much of our best empirical scientific knowledge. But it is also responsive
to, and creatively extends, post-Enlightenment critiques of excessive rationalism in the modern
scientific ethos. While science does have impressive epistemic credentials, its deeper value and
distinctive mode of objectivity is rooted not in its relation to truth, confirmation, or reason, but in
the way that it systematically grounds factual knowledge in the 'standpoint' of arational power. 
13.2. Although my focus here is on objectivity in the empirical sciences, I will arrive at
more detailed engagement with prominent views in 20th- and 21st-century philosophy of science
(in sub-sections 6 and thereafter) by way of broader epistemological and metaphysical analysis.
This abstract approach will provide crucial context and motivation for my view of objectivity,
which will in turn clarify its relationship to science, as well my ontological appeal to 'natural
forms'.
The opposition between subjectivity and objectivity mirrors the ontological distinction
between mere appearance and the reality that underlies it. But the real is not the universal or the
purely intelligible, and the merely apparent is not the particular or the sensuous, despite the long
tradition of metaphysical rationalism from Parmenides to Plato and onwards. At least, one need
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not presuppose this ontology in order to analyze objectivity in full generality.629 Commentators
identify objectivity directly with a 'view from nowhere' because they (implicitly) treat Mind as
most real, such that a disembodied 'Mind's-eye view' seems primary. I elaborate on this below.
A maximally scientifically objective perspective is not a view from nowhere, but a view
from fundamental reality. Depending on one's ontological commitments, then, scientific
objectivity will seem to be grounded in different sorts of 'really real' things, whether it be ideal
Forms, first principles,630 natural kinds, 'natural classifications',631 laws of nature, substances,632
'perfectly natural properties',633 or 'the' causal structure of the world.634 Objective scientific
representation is not at root that of 'really real' things, but from the standpoint of that which is
more or most real. Platonic idealists thus take objectivity to involve representing sensible things
as particulars, i.e., inessentially distinct instantiations of ideal Forms. But I deny the basic
ontological status of universals and particulars. I endorse an alternative account of the basic
ontology that grounds maximally objective scientific knowledge, again as an order of arational
dynamic forms corresponding to causally basic modes of natural force. Here I motivate that
alternative ontology only indirectly, however, as my primary goal is simply to argue that
scientific objectivity is a view from 'really real', explanatorily central things—not a view from
nowhere, or a viewpoint onto everything that is the case.
13.3. Discussions of objectivity often conflate two distinct ideals. First, there is the
traditional ideal of the 'view from nowhere', a perspective independent of all particular subjective
capacities and local frames of reference, which is hence globally or universally valid. Even
weaker accounts of a 'view from humanity' or 'view from universal moral subjectivity' often still
629If the 'really real' were in fact universals, then objective vision would be a 'view from universals', for this reason.
630E.g. Aristotle takes scientific inquiry to culminate in state of theoria, or contemplation of “unchanging, eternal, 
and divine objects” (Nightingale 2004, 208), understood in terms of “'clear comprehension' of first principles 
[archai] and the recognition of the theorems entailed by those first principles and the manner in which they 
follow from them” (White 1980, 261), and, ultimately, intellectual apprehension of God, the 'unmoved mover' 
(Metaphysics 1072a) and fundamental 'first principle' [archē] (Metaphysics 1072b14). See also (Loux 1991, 16.)
631Duhem 1906/1991.
632A. L. Hammond remarks that “in all its many general-use meanings [the word 'substance'] has kept the core of 
reality, of the relatively more real, and the natural as the existent: hence the independent, the enduring, the more 
than subjective, the nonartificial, the effective, the affected, the important, what is there” (1969, 9). Hammond 
rightly notes that the latter are all “'good' notions,” i.e. have positive valence (ibid.). Regarding the link between 
reality and value, W. T. Stace (1952, 127) argues that “there exists in the human mind an ineradicable tendency 
to identify value with reality—that is, if value is here understood as the supreme value of divine blessedness.”
633See Lewis 1983.
634E.g. see Wesley Salmon's Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (1984), or French 2014.
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exist within the horizon of the same basic interpretation of objective vision as universal vision.
Proponents of objectivity as inter-subjective validity often simply identify the relevant form of
universality as that possessed by a species or type vis-à-vis its particular instances, or the
demands of universal moral equality635 vis-à-vis the particularistic desires of self-seeking
individuality.636 Hence, judgments that are inter-subjectively valid for all (but only) people can
be understood as those valid from the 'universal personal' perspective of a person who is no-
person-in-particular.637 Objectivity is thus pervasively construed in terms of universality.
Second, though, it is also natural to interpret objectivity in terms of a distinct ideal of
outwardness: the drive and real ability to understand the vast world beyond ourselves, and in
many respects greater than us, or to better understand our own nature directly in terms of the
basic features of this broader world. Objectivity in this sense is opposed to subjectivity construed
as inwardness or interiority, not particularity. I endorse this ideal of objectivity as outwardness
—with the qualification that I take its ultimate object to be the elemental or fundamentally real,
rather than just anything external to ourselves—and I reject the universalitic alternative.
It is hard for some to recognize outwardness as a real or a genuinely distinct account of
objectivity, however. This is in part because of the common tendency to conflate outwardness
and universality. Here it helps to consider part of the “fundamental idea” that Thomas Nagel
associates with both the value and limits of objectivity: “we are small creatures in a big world of
which we have only very partial understanding, and [] how things seem to us depends both on
the world and on our constitution.”638 While that is all certainly true, this does not directly
legitimate Nagel's universalistic account of objectivity as a 'view from nowhere'. 
But two basic implications are clear enough. First, it would be good to have a fuller
635The demands of morality are demands on all moral subjects, of course—but only on genuine moral subjects. A 
tornado is not morally obligated to avoid destroying innocent people's houses; nor is it being selfish in doing so.
636Or, one might add, the relationship between a social collective and its individual members. But this relation is 
arguably different in kind. For instance, Émile Durkheim consistently distinguishes between abstract or 
universal representations, on the one hand, and collective representations, on the other—although his sociology 
of knowledge becomes more radical over time as he identifies more (and more fundamental) representations as 
collective, including highly abstract or 'universal' ones. In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912), 
Durkheim characterizes concepts as “collective representations” (1912/2008, 330)—i.e. as “impersonal” or 
social representations, rather than abstract or universal ones (ibid., 329). Hence, he suggests that “[t]o think 
conceptually is not simply to isolate and group together qualities common to a certain number of objects; it is to 
subsume the variable to the permanent, the individual to the social” (ibid. 334).
637Compare Rawls' claim that 'principles of justice' must be chosen from a hypothetical 'original position' in which 
people do not know (among other things) their class, social status, natural abilities, or even their own conception 
of the good. This ignorance purportedly “nullif[ies] the effects of specific contingencies” which might “put men 
at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage” (Rawls 1971, §24).
638Nagel 1986, 5.
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understanding of the 'big world' out there, relative to which we are 'small creatures'. This in fact
directly motivates an account of objectivity in terms of outwardness—fundamentally, that is, a
drive and capacity to understand elemental reality. Second, the fact that our own 'constitution'
affects how things appear to us makes it harder for us to achieve this broader understanding of
the world. This can be interpreted as the claim that we must account for the impact of our
'constitution' on our perception of things in order to better understand the broader world, i.e., as a
means to objectivity construed as outwardness. Or, this second point can be taken as an
endorsement of objectivity construed directly in terms of universality—i.e., as implying that a
more objective representation just is one that depends less on how things appear to a given
subject in light of its particular 'constitution'.
The connection between objectivity and outwardness is more intuitive than, and likely
genealogically prior to, the putative connection between objectivity and universality. Whether
articulated in terms of a 'view from nowhere' or 'inter-subjective validity', standard accounts of
objectivity are implicitly predicated on the belief that a broader perspective on the world, in the
relevant sense, just is a more universal perspective. But this is by no means obvious. And the
scientific ethos suggests a clear alternative: a broader perspective is an explanatorily deeper one.
13.4. The modern assault on objectivity has been heavily influenced by the Kantian
'transcendental' turn in metaphysics and epistemology (to repeat a point made above in the
Introduction to Chapter I.) For objective representation has been widely construed in terms of
seeing things as they are 'in themselves'. And Kantians insist that we cannot achieve this sort of
'unconditioned' vision. According to Kant, we can only experience things as as they appear to us
mediated by the basic 'forms' of our own cognitive powers. Modern critics amenable to the idea
of 'transcendental' contributions made by subjects to their own experience, yet who still conceive
of objectivity as direct insight into a domain of 'things-in-themselves', therefore conclude that
objectivity is impossible. The result has been the rise of self-alienated 'critical' epistemologists,
who on the one hand see knowledge as a valuable form of historically- and culturally-specific
collective self-expression, yet who on the other hand implicitly recognize this cultural specificity
as a systematic failure of objectivity. Again, this is opposed to Kant's own intent in arguing that
subjects actively impose generic cognitive 'forms' on all the possible objects of their experience.
But modern critics who view concepts or representation in general as an insuperable epistemic
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barrier between us and reality 'in itself', in a way that (they claim) precludes the possibility of
knowledge valid for all human beings, are likely now the most influential inheritors of Kant's
'Copernican' insight that 'objects must conform to our cognition.'
Two strategies for avoiding this descent into inescapable subjectivity naturally suggest
themselves. First, one can adopt a different conception of objectivity, compatible with the
influence of universal human cognitive 'forms', or even culturally-specific representations, on our
experience of external objects. This is Kant's and neo-Kantians' approach, as well as that of most
contemporary 'critical' epistemologists, social constructivists, and standpoint theorists. Second,
one can retain a traditional notion of objective vision as a 'view from nowhere', while arguing
contra Kant that we really can achieve this 'unconditioned' perspective. Both strategies are
unacceptable. I have already critiqued the second strategy above, in Chapter I, Section 1.5.
Hence, let me turn immediately to the first:
13.5. The broadly Kantian strategy for rescuing the possibility of objectivity faces serious
difficulties. Roughly speaking, Kant interprets objective validity as inter-subjective validity.639
Hence, he views space, time, and the categories as objective in the sense of being universally and
necessarily applicable to the experience of all (but only) beings with our cognitive powers of
understanding and sensible intuition.640 Empirical concepts and intuitions are in turn objectively
valid insofar as they refer immediately (like intuitions) or mediately (like concepts) to actual or
possible objects of human experience—i.e. spatiotemporally located objects, with determinate
639This is an oversimplification, for instance insofar as Kant takes judgments of beauty to possess “subjective 
universal validity” (KrU 5:215), hence to be inter-subjectively valid but not objectively valid. (For Kant, 
judgments of taste are 'subjectively' valid because they are grounded in a feeling, albeit one properly elicited in 
all subjects by beautiful objects: the 'free play' of imagination and understanding). Still, Kant is often associated 
with the view that objective validity is inter-subjective validity, in a way that grounds part of this view's 
historical influence. And this view of objectivity does have some truly Kantian roots, which I indicate below.
640E.g. “We can accordingly speak of space, extended beings, and so on, only from the human standpoint. If we 
depart om the subjective condition under which alone we can acquire outer intuition, namely that through which 
we may be affected by objects, then the representation of space signifies nothing at all. This predicate is 
attributed to things only insofar as they appear to us, i.e., are objects of sensibility. The constant form of this 
receptivity, which we call sensibility, is a necessary condition of all the relations within which objects can be 
intuited as outside us, and, if one abstracts from these objects, it is a pure intuition, which bears the name of 
space. Since we cannot make the special conditions of sensibility into conditions of the possibility of things, but 
only of their appearances, we can well say that space comprehends all things that may appear to us externally, 
but not all things in themselves, whether they be intuited or not, or by whatever subject they may be intuited. For
we cannot judge at all whether the intuitions of other thinking beings are bound to the same conditions that limit 
our intuition and that are universally valid for us. If we add the limitation of a judgment to the concept of the 
subject, then the judgment is unconditionally valid” (KrV A26/B42 – A27/B43).
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quantity, quality, relation, and modality.641 Kant's view entails that space, time, and the
categories really do 'apply' to all possible objects of experience, since he takes these to be things
insofar as they appear to us. Because we are conscious of appearances and not things-in-
themselves, that is, (Kant thinks) we can know a priori that every empirical object we come
across will conform to the laws of (Euclidean) geometry, the principle that every event has a
cause, and so on.
Yet the fact that we cannot know things as they are in themselves clearly remains
problematic, for Kant, as I argued above in the Introduction to Chapter I. Again, while Kantians
and latter-day 'critical' epistemologists insist that 'unconditioned' knowledge is impossible, that
is, they often still implicitly treat it as desirable—an unrealizable ideal. Hence, the claim that
objectivity requires only inter-subjective validity is often made in bad faith, at least to some
extent. It would take me too far afield to fully justify this claim here. But two basic point are here
salient. First, and again to repeat a point made above in the Introduction to Chapter I, Kant
allows that a purely rational being with a non-sensible power of 'intellectual intuition' could have
objective knowledge of things insofar as they are immediately given to them in purely
conceptual form. This is what he means by 'transcendent' knowledge of things qua noumena
rather than empirical knowledge of sensible phenomena (KrV A248-250 / B305). And Kant
describes God's knowledge as intellectual intuition (KrV B72). At least implicitly, then, Kant
treats our intersubjectively-valid knowledge as less valuable than God's unconditioned
knowledge of noumenal reality.
Second, and with respect to contemporary 'critical' epistemology, note that some (not all)
modern 'standpoint theory' is aptly characterized as follows: theorists insist that the pursuit of
truth is always 'interested'; hence, they criticize advocates of the positivistic ideal of value-free
science for smuggling in extra-epistemic value judgments under a veneer of 'disinterestedly
pursuing of the truth'; but the same critics then try to show that the moral or political values
which they believe should guide inquiry are epistemically privileged, in a sense that everyone
should find significant simply insofar as they are committed to the pursuit of truth. Some
standpoint theorists thus seem to be saying, 'Science isn't just about truth; it's inherently
political...But our politics is also epistemically better than other politics, including the sham
“apoliticism” of positivism, and this is why our politics should be accepted even by our political
641KrV A80 / B106.
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opponents as a guiding framework for scientific inquiry.' Hence, some standpoint theorists
apparently claim that marginalized social positions' epistemic privilege is a fact visible from
'nowhere'. A weaker form of standpoint theory, which I find more plausible (although by no
means obviously correct), simply involves claiming that 'starting off thought' from standpoints
grounded in marginalized social positions provides privileged insight into “certain features of
reality”642 that are especially ethically or politically significant (at least, by standpoint theorists'
lights).
But many standpoint theorists, including Jaggar, make expansive epistemological claims
that clearly go beyond assertions of privileged insight into 'certain features' of reality that are
noteworthy simply for their disproportionate ethical or political significance.643 On my view,
these more radical standpoint theorists either (i) in fact endorse the 'view from nowhere' (or at
least the 'view from universal humanity') that they purport to reject, as the standard with respect
to which their claims about epistemic privilege are implicitly meant to be justified; (ii) are just
substituting ethical or political value judgments for judgments of epistemic or explanatory value;
or else (iii) should accept my account of scientific objectivity as a view from explanatory
fundaments, and hence simply try to defend the empirical scientific claim that marginalized
social standpoints are explanatorily central—without insisting that their (often contested) moral
or political salience is (any less controversially) direct evidence of this explanatory centrality. 
These internal tensions are all already bad enough. But Kantians, standpoint theorists,
social constructivists, and so on are also right to be dissatisfied (insofar as they are) with the
forms of inter-subjective validity that they do take to be available to us. Kant's notion of inter-
subjective validity is grossly anthropocentric. We are human beings, of course, and so in a
tautological sense we must view things from a human standpoint. But we can and should
nevertheless aim to rise above petty self-aggrandizement and collective solipsism. It would be
642Jaggar 2004, 60.
643Thus on Jaggar's view “the socialist feminist concept of women's standpoint” is a “valuable epistemological 
device for identifying certain necessary conditions of theoretical adequacy,” and provides a “theoretically 
illuminating interpretation of such generally acknowledged conditions as impartiality, objectivity, 
comprehensiveness, verifiability, and usefulness” (Jaggar 2004, 61, emphasis added). Likewise, Sandra Harding 
insists that “[s]tarting off research from women's lives will generate less partial and distorted accounts not only 
of women's lives but also of men's lives and of the whole social order” (Harding 1993, 56, emphases added), and 
similarly that “[d]emocracy-advancing values have systematically generated less partial and distorted beliefs 
than others” (Harding 1993, 71) So too, in suggesting that “it is precisely in the politics and epistemology of 
partial perspectives that the possibility of sustained, rational, objective enquiry rests,” Donna Haraway evidently 
makes a fully general claim about genuine knowledge: “partiality and not universality” is on her view “the 
condition of being heard to make rational knowledge claims” (Haraway 1988, 584, 587-590).
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bad if everything we knew about the world were twisted into the image of our own interests and
powers as human beings—unless, of course, humanity were actually the focal point of all reality.
But humanity is not the central axis of reality, and a theory of objectivity should not present us as
such. This criticism applies even more so to contemporary social constructivism and standpoint
theory. It would be bad if everything we knew about the world were essentially an expression of
the structure and values of historically- and culturally-specific social formations. And it would be
even worse if everything we knew about the world were inevitably twisted into the image of our
own positions in systems of social hierarchy—if our view of everything in reality were
essentially just a more or less direct expression of our social identities as oppressive exploiters,
or oppressed subalterns, or men, or women, let alone finer-grained categories of all kinds.
Leftist critical epistemologists and standpoint theorists tend to criticize Kantian accounts
of objectivity on totally different grounds. Namely, many critics simply deny that there is a
singular form of experience valid for all human beings, across all cultures and all of history.
Hence, many critics are dissatisfied even with 'procedural' characterizations of objectivity as a
form of epistemic legitimacy that judgments possess insofar as they are (i) available in principle
for inter-subjective criticism by any and all people, or else (ii) actually subjected to such
criticism. Briefly surveying the theoretical landscape here will allow me to offer several more
targeted points of critique, which will in turn clarify the relationship between my view and
standard objections to excessive universalism in Enlightenment accounts of objectivity. 
The first of these two accounts of procedural objectivity, i.e. availability merely in
principle for inter-subjective criticism by any and all people, clearly informs Karl Popper's
falsificationism. And in this respect, Popper's view is explicitly Kantian.644 But the ideal of in-
principle availability for inter-subjective criticism also implicitly informs all empiricists' basic
premise that synthetic judgments can be justified only insofar as they are grounded in
'observable' phenomena. Whether this 'empirical basis' is characterized as by classical empiricists
in terms of mental impressions, or as by modern 'constructive' empiricists in terms of external
phenomena like trees, rocks, and the movement of needles on dials in laboratories, we may ask:
b y whom are 'empirical' phenomena 'observable'? Empiricists' essentially liberal-universalistic
644“My use of the terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ is not unlike Kant’s. He uses the word ‘objective’ to indicate 
that scientific knowledge should be justifiable, independently of anybody’s whim: a justification is ‘objective’ if 
in principle it can be tested and understood by anybody.[...][n. I have since generalized this formulation; for 
inter-subjective testing is merely a very important aspect of the more general idea of inter-subjective criticism, or
in other words, of the idea of mutual rational control by critical discussion]” (Popper 1935/2002, 22).
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response has always been clear: 'Empirical phenomena are those that can be directly perceived
by everyone, or by any normal person, at least in principle.' Hence, the conception of objectivity
as in-principle availability for inter-subjective criticism by all human beings also underlies early
logical positivists' insistence that empirically significant claims must be translatable into a pure
'observation language', and modern constructive empiricists' belief that the 'aim' of science is not
comprehensive truth but just adequacy to observable phenomena.645
Modern objectivity-critics are quick to raise skeptical doubts about the putative neutrality
of direct 'experience' or 'observation'. They often insist with Kuhn, Hanson, Feyerabend, and
others that observation is always 'theory-laden',646 and hence argue that different phenomena are
presumably 'observable' to people in different social contexts, informed by different background
knowledge and assumptions. Partly on this basis, critics may add that 'observation' is often if not
always value-laden. Here, objectivity-critics' worries are only amplified by the many concessions
that modern philosophers of science have made to fallibilism and pragmatism. For instance,
Popper admits that scientists' designation of certain claims as observably-true 'basic statements'
is at root pragmatic: observable claims are at root just those “about whose acceptance or
rejection [] various investigators are likely to reach agreement.”647 But then different phenomena
would evidently be 'observable' for different groups of inquirers. And Popper offers no strategy
for justifiably privileging some groups' essentially-pragmatic designations of observability (i.e.,
the 'basicness' of certain statements) over others'.
One could stipulate on Popper's behalf that judgments of 'likely agreement' should be
indexed to a universal human community of inquirers. But modern critics of objectivity will
inevitably remain skeptical on several fronts: first, that any such 'universal epistemic community'
exists; relatedly, that people universally agree about much at all, especially when it comes to
'observations' concerning ethically- or politically-loaded issues; and finally, that there is any
good reason to privilege the 'likely agreement' of an imaginary universal human epistemic
community over that of real, smaller groups of inquirers embedded in specific social contexts
that systematically inform their powers of observation. 
The second point might sound glib, but in fact is a serious and widely-noted concern. For
example, Galileo 'observed' mountains on the Moon only under the background assumption that
645Van Fraassen 1980, 198.
646See Kuhn 1962, Hanson 1958, and Feyerabend 1958.
647Popper 1935/2002, 86. See also Lakatos 1970, 105ff.
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he had a correct understanding of the optical theory underlying his telescope, and that the pattern
of light and dark he saw on the Moon was best explained by the presence of mountains. And in
fact, Aristotelians in the 17th century contested both of these auxiliary hypotheses. (Roger Ariew
argues that telescopic observations played a lesser role in this controversy, whereas Galileo's
interpretation of lunar spots as mountains presupposed that lunar light is reflected sunlight,
which many scholastics denied. Hence, Ariew concludes that “Galileo’s observation of
mountains on the moon[...]cannot succeed in destroying the medieval lunar theory; it can only be
an independent account of the moon and lunar light based on radically different premises.”648)
More generally, examples like this suggest that uncontested 'observation' statements are harder to
come by than those unfamiliar with science might suppose. Scientists are also often quite good at
accommodating uncontroversial observation statements by means of auxiliary hypotheses. Both
of these facts imply that the explanatory criterion of empirical adequacy has a somewhat weaker
effect on scientific theory choice than one might naively imagine. As Duhem and Quine both
noted, in short, apparent empirical inadequacy or inaccuracy is often better described as
inconsistency between a given theory under investigation, a set of observational data whose
status as uncontroversial is in principle up for debate, and a set of auxiliary hypotheses by means
of which these data are brought into contact with the theory under investigation.649
The pragmatic character of 'observability' also threatens to undermine the inter-subjective
validity of science as construed by Bas van Fraassen's 'constructive' empiricism. Van Fraassen
accepts that language cannot be neatly divided into 'observable' and 'theoretical' parts, as was
attempted by early logical empiricists and positivists. Thus, he voices his “total agreement” with
648Ariew 1984, 223. Notably, Ariew argues that the telescope “merely gives some new details concerning the shape
of the spots on the lunar disk,” and “[a] slightly impoverished form of the same argument could have been given 
after naked eye observations of the spots on the lunar surface (the man on the moon)”—naked eye observations 
which had already been made prior to Galileo (ibid., 214-215). Cf. Fred Wilson's argument to the effect that 
“observations of the moon made by the telescope did play a crucial role in refuting the traditional theory” 
(Wilson 2001, 14). See Ariew 2001 for a response to Wilson.
649See Duhem 1906/1991 (esp. Part II, Chapter VI) and Quine 1951. See also Lakatos 1970, 97-103. As a 
descriptive matter, it seems clear that scientists in fact reject a naive falsificationist commitment to preserving 
the truth of 'observation' statements at all costs. As Hempel says, “science offers various examples [where] a 
conflict between a highly-confirmed theory and an occasional recalcitrant experiential sentence may well be 
resolved by revoking the latter rather than sacrificing the former” (quoted in Lakatos 1970, 113). Lakatos agrees 
with Hempel on this point, and articulates a more sophisticated version of methodological falsificationism that 
accommodates it, grounded in an explanatory norm of increasing 'empirical' content. Normatively speaking, 
however, I cannot see why conventionalism about singular—i.e. 'observational' statements—is, as Lakatos 
claims, “more objective and more rigourous” than a methodology that also allows for some degree of 
conventionalism regarding universal ('theoretical') statements, à la Poincaré and Duhem.
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Wilfred Sellars and Paul Feyerabend that “language is thoroughly theory-infected.”650 But van
Fraassen still insists that the distinction between observable and unobservable phenomena is
“theory-independent.”651 Namely, he claims that facts about observability follow from ('theory-
independent') facts about human physiology, psychology, and so forth—e.g., because our eyes
and brains work thus-and-so, we can see dogs and red light but not quarks or infrared radiation.
Hence, constructive empiricism is rooted in a self-avowedly “anthropocentric” notion of
observability,652 which is nevertheless evidently meant to apply across diverse social contexts.
For example, human beings 20,000 years ago presumably lacked anything exactly like our
concept [dog], since dogs had yet to be domesticated; but van Fraassen would evidently insist
that dogs could have been observed by people at that time, had they been around, in a way that
quarks could not have been. Of course, if a modern dog were transported to an ancient society, it
might well be classified differently by the members of this society—e.g. they might perceive it
as a wolf or coyote. Regardless, these ancient humans would surely still be able to directly
perceive the given animal, without the aid of any external instruments like microscopes or
spectrographs. So a constructive empiricist would insist that dogs are not only observable now,
but were also observable before human beings formed the concept [dog], and indeed were
observable even before any dogs or people actually existed.653
But critics should not be satisfied with this. Insofar as constructive empiricists intend to
ground the inter-subjective validity of scientific representation in its relation to observable
phenomena, i.e. those directly perceivable by human beings in general, they face an insuperable
problem. Even if facts about observability are 'theory-independent', nevertheless our best
judgments about observability are theory-dependent. Thus, van Fraassen himself believes that
our best understanding of what is observable depends on our best scientific theories of 'us qua
650van Fraassen 1980, 14. See also van Fraassen 2008, 144. Cf., paradigmatically, Carnap 1928/2003.
651van Fraassen 1980, 14. 
652van Fraassen 1980, 59. Likewise, in a response to critics van Fraassen (1985, 254) clarifies that “[he] always 
assume[s] that we (the epistemic community) are all humans, and no one of us is really a person from Krypton.” 
But he then proceeds to allow that “[s]ignificant encounters with dolphins, extraterrestrials, or the products of 
our own genetic engineering may lead us to widen the epistemic community,” and in cases where we have 
accepted such entities “as persons, as members of our epistemic community,[...]we have already broadened the 
extension of us, and what is observable to them is observable” (ibid.).
653Constructive empiricists' view on this point bears some similarity to common objections against Bruno Latour's 
brand of 'social constructivism'. Latour (in)famously insists that Ramses II (d. 1213 BC) could not have died of 
tuberculosis, because (he asks) “How could he pass away due to a bacillus discovered by Robert Koch in 1882?” 
(Latour 2000, 248). Paul Boghossian suggests that Latour here simply decides to “bite the bullet” by denying the 
intuitive view that “[t]he world did not begin with us humans; many facts about it obtained before we did” 
(Boghossian 2006, 26). I agree with Boghossian that this is a mistake on Latour's part. Cf. Latour 1999, 2000.
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organisms in the world.' But he also believes that scientists' acceptance of theories—presumably
including theories about 'us qua organisms in the world'—is properly determined by these
theories' (i) empirical adequacy and (ii) realization of super-empirical aims like “simplicity,
informativeness, predictive power, [and] explanation.”654 And he believes that the latter, super-
empirical aims are essentially pragmatic in character.655 So if our best judgments of observability
are those grounded in our best scientific theories of human physiology and psychology, and if
our acceptance of the latter theories is grounded partly in pragmatic considerations, then our best
judgments of observability will always be conditioned by these same pragmatic appraisals of 'use
and usefulness'—which evidently depend upon cultural and historical context. Thus constructive
empiricists aiming to defend the validity of scientific knowledge for all human beings are hoist
on the petard of their own anti-realism. Van Fraassen's own account of how pragmatic
considerations inform theory choice suggests that objective scientific representations are not
actually valid for all human beings, given that 'use and usefulness' can vary across contexts.
This threat of relativism grounded in epistemological pragmatism also affects Ernst
Mach's scientific 'instrumentalism'. Mach takes super-empirical theoretical virtues like simplicity
and scope to reflect our essentially pragmatic preference for systematicity in the organization of
experimental laws and data. (Duhem is sometimes grouped with Mach in this context, but this is
an interpretive mistake.656) It is obviously useful to us to be able to predict and control various
features of our environment, and instrumentalists argue that a preference for systematic theories
helps us to order the information at our disposal into cognitively manageable and readily
communicable forms. Hence, super-empirical virtues are justified pragmatically, not
epistemically, with an eye towards realizing an “exquisite economy of thought.”657
It is hard to see how scientific judgments about unobservable entities could possess equal
validity for all human beings, given this view. For this to be possible, pragmatic appraisals of
654Van Fraassen 1980, 9. Van Fraassen invokes virtues like logical consistency as aspects of theories' 'internal 
structure', and differentiates these structural features from both empirical adequacy and pragamtic virtues.
655“In so far as they go beyond consistency, empirical adequacy, and empirical strength, [theoretical virtues] do not
concern the relation between the theory and the world, but rather the use and usefulness of the theory; they 
provide reasons to prefer the theory independently of questions of truth” (van Fraassen 1980, 88).
656Systematicity is also an aesthetic virtue, on Duhem's view—see. e.g. Duhem 1906/1991, 24). More importantly, 
Duhem notes intuitive links between superempirical theoretical virtues and truth, claims that we cannot justify 
these intuitive links, and yet retains a place for them as necessary 'acts of faith' (Duhem 1906/1991, 26-7). 
Representatively: “Without being able to explain our conviction, but also without being able to get rid of it, we 
see in the exact ordering of this system the mark by which a natural classification is recognized. Without 
claiming to explain the reality hiding under the phenomena whose laws we group, we feel that the groupings 
established by our theory correspond to real affinities among the things themselves” (Duhem 1906/1991, 26).
657Mach 1882/1895, 198.
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'intellectual economy' would need to be valid for all human beings. But that is difficult to accept.
More importantly, though, even if they were valid universally, pragmatic value
judgments would not be an appropriate basis for appraisals of objectivity. To treat the quest for
objectivity as an exercise in pragmatics is to degrade the ideal of objective vision, to wallow
inwardly in anthropocentric self-regard. Scientific theories display the pragmatic virtue of
intellectual economy because they make contact with an underlying reality that systematically
explains appearances. The pragmatic benefit of intellectual economy is a subjective result of the
drive towards objective reality, not its fundamental goal.
13.6. My own view is that observation is indeed 'theory-laden', but that this does not
seriously undermine the inter-subjective validity of genuine empirical science. However,
scientific representations are not objectively valid because they are thus inter-subjectively valid.
Observability in the sense relevant to empirical science is a joint pragmatic-psychological
designation, grounded in a liberal-universalistic appeal to the amenability of certain natural
phenomena to direct sensory perception by more or less anyone. Only sensible objects, i.e. things
with sensory qualities, can be 'observed' or 'directly perceived', in the sense relevant to empirical
science. But direct sensory perception that a given thing is a certain kind of observable object
also requires the pre-conscious use of a corresponding concept. To directly perceive that
something is a tree, for instance, one must immediately experience i t as a tree. This notion of
'immediate experience' can perhaps be effectively analyzed via psychology. But its actual use in
empirical science is essentially phenomenological: there is a qualitative difference between
perceiving a given thing as a tree, or as a person, or as moving, and merely perceiving something
that is in fact a tree, or a person, or moving. This distinction is properly incorporated into the
basic meaning of scientific 'observation'. That is, to observe a dog, in the sense relevant to
science, is to observe something as a dog. To 'observe' a dog without perceiving it as a dog is
really just to observe another conceptually-determinate kind of thing or else a purely
indeterminate something, from which the existence of a dog can at most be indirectly inferred.
Genuine empirical scientific observations and facts about observability are 'theory-laden',
then, in the weak sense of being mediated by specific conceptual frameworks for parsing
observable phenomena. It matters to scientific epistemology whether one observes the mountains
on the Moon through the telescope as the mountains on the Moon, or just 'observes' them as a
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pattern of light and dark in the telescope lens itself. Hence, what we are and are not able to
directly perceive does indeed vary as our theoretical understanding of the world changes.
Feyerabend is right that “the interpretation of an observation-language is determined by the
theories which we use to explain what we observe, and it changes as soon as those theories
change.”658 But humans in fact have enough stable folk-theoretical common ground that science
can still be empirically progressive or accumulative at the level of observable facts—which it
uncontroversially is. Genuine empirical scientific observations are laden with theoretical schema
that already inform most human beings' immediate sensory perception, or which at least can be
uncontroversially resorted to in most cases of contested observation. For instance, even someone
who directly perceives or immediately apprehends the Moon through a telescope can easily be
made to resort to an alternate mode of perception that instead makes the pattern of light and dark
in the telescope lens the object of his immediate perception. Different people and cultures
inevitably bring different theoretical background assumptions to empirical inquiry, which can in
principle seriously compromise scientists' ability to reach universal agreement about which
claims are observably true. But this abstract possibility is often not actually borne out in
scientific practice, as is clearly evidenced by the existence of robust and ever-expanding bodies
of uncontroversial factual claims generated by modern science. This is not especially surprising,
moreover, given that we are all members of the same biological species, with many shared
physiological features, psychological faculties, and even sociocultural practices (e.g. language
use, generically speaking, or the social salience of direct kinship relations). To the extent that
uncontested observation does at times prove impossible in a way that genuinely precludes
empirically progressive inquiry, finally, this is evidently more common in the humanities and
social sciences than in the biological or physical sciences.
Still, in true empirical science every statement of observable fact is fallible, and in
principle open to debate. Galileo's observation of mountains on the Moon could have turned out
to involve his misinterpretation of more immediate observations of images in a telescope lens.
Reported measurements of the position of a needle on a dial during a laboratory experiment may
have been compromised by human error, or by a malfunctioning measurement device. And so
on. Hence, it can never be infallibly guaranteed that a purported observation is a genuine
observation, rather than a 'hypothetical' or 'theoretical' claim masquerading as an observation.
658Feyerabend 1958, 163. See also Feyerabend 1993, 211-212.
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But confirmation in empirical science is ultimately predicated on the a priori assumption that
genuine observations, of phenomena that would plausibly be directly perceived by more or less
any competent human being, are veridical. To see this, note that if you are given a set of made-
up 'empirical data' or falsified 'observations' and attempt to explain them, the theories you
produce will not describe real unobservable things, just the unobservable ontology of a fictional
world. At root, then, in empirical science we know that unobservable things exist because they
successfully explain observable things that we know to exist by simple common sense. Empirical
science is thus essentially liberal-universalistic, or epistemologically mass-democratic.
Genuine observation in the scientific sense is often possible, although not always. And
genuine observation has as good a claim to factual truth as anything we know about the external
world. But the factuality or inter-subjective validity of obvious empirical truths is not directly
responsible for the objectivity of science. This is one way in which my view differs from
empiricism. Objective reality is not mere existence or facticity, even for empirical scientific
understanding—let alone for non-scientific modes of understanding like aesthetic experience.
Observable things are objective appearances, for empirical science. And they become objective
appearances for science only insofar as they are explained by appeal to unobservable reality. 
This last point is the crucial one, in terms of understanding the objectivity of science. The
'empirical basis' functions in science as the paradigm of that which truly exists or actually
happens. No scientific advancement could undermine our confidence that rocks, tables, and
human beings exist. This is undeniable to all but Cartesian skeptics, who are trapped inside their
own minds in a way that is plainly pathological—and indeed subjective, in the sense of being
unduly interior or inwardly-focused.659 But a plainly observable phenomenon like the position of
a needle on a dial in a laboratory has no inherent scientific significance. Neither observable nor
unobservable things are scientifically intelligible in themselves. Scientific understanding takes
obviously-existent, inter-subjectively real observable phenomena and constitutes them as
objectively real by relating them to explanatorily-fundamental aspects of the unobservable world.
This is not to claim that genuine scientific explanation must 'bottom out' in strictly
unobservable things. It is conceivable that explanatory-fundamental things have sensible
659Cartesian skepticism is predicated on a misguided demand for an answer to the question, 'Is the external world 
really real?' Only someone already fallen prey to hypertrophied subjectivity—to excessive interiority and 
inadequate receptivity to broader reality—could find this question fully intelligible, let alone urgent. Compare 
Werner Heisenberg's argument (1958, 88) that natural science is possible without any sort of commitment to 
“metaphysical realism,” or attention to the correlative “disagreeable question whether 'the things really exist.'”
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qualities like colors or smells. But our distinctively scientific knowledge of them would still be
inferential, via apprehension of their explanatory power, not immediate sensory perception. Thus
science presents underlying reality qua imperceptible, even if it also has sensory qualities. The
basic objects of modern physics, in particular, do however seem to be strictly unobservable.
13.7. The second broadly Kantian account of procedural objectivity mentioned above, i.e.
inter-subjective validity grounded in actively subjecting claims to public critical scrutiny, is often
even more explicitly related to liberal-democratic idealizations of science. This procedural notion
of objectivity clearly informs Imre Lakatos' refined Popperian 'methodology of scientific
research programmes.'660 But it also underlies more overtly politicized accounts, like Jürgen
Habermas' theory of 'communicative rationality' realized through 'rational-critical' debate in a
universally-accessible 'public sphere',661 or Helen Longino's theory of objectivity as a social
process involving knowledge-claims' subjection to critical scrutiny by communities in which “all
relevant perspectives are represented.”662 Leftist critics object that these sort of liberal views,
whether about scientific objectivity or objectivity in our collective epistemic practices more
broadly, are naively utopian and politically counterproductive insofar as they idealize “universal
access” to the sphere of 'public reason'.663 In the real world, leftists chide, access to the 'public
sphere' is always restricted, in ways that reflect and reinforce broader patterns of social
discrimination and unjust hierarchy. The 'public sphere' is not just contingently exclusionary,
but essentially exclusionary! Thus Nancy Fraser insists that “[w]e can no longer assume that the
bourgeois [] public sphere was simply an unrealized utopian ideal; it was also a masculinist
ideological notion that functioned to legitimate an emergent form of class rule.”664
660See Lakatos 1978.
661Habermas 1981, 1991.
662Longino 1996, 40. (Longino explains that “This criterion is meant to impose duties of inclusion; it does not 
require that each individual, no matter what their past record or state of training, should be granted equal 
authority on every matter” (ibid.).) 
663E.g. Habermas (1991, 85) claims that “[t]he public sphere of civil society stood or fell with the principle of 
universal access.”
664Fraser 1989, 116. Fraser argues that Habermas' (1991) account of the bourgeois public sphere incorporates 
several “dubious assumptions,” including (1) the assumption that it is possible for all members of the public 
sphere to “bracket status differentials and to deliberate as if they were social equals,” and thus that the bourgeois 
public sphere is universally accessible; and (2) the assumption that a “single, comprehensive public sphere is 
always preferable to a nexus of multiple publics” (Fraser 1989, 117). Regarding (2), however, Fraser is herself 
committed to the desirability and possibility of a grand public sphere, predicated on conditions of social equality,
in which rational-critical debate between diverse “publics” (as opposed to individuals) can occur. She advocates 
“a society of many different publics, including at least one public in which participants can deliberate as peers 
across lines of difference about policy that concerns them all” (ibid., 127).
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Notably, however, Habermas agrees with his critics that the bourgeois public sphere's
claim to include all “human beings pure and simple” was a historical “fiction.” He suggests,
plausibly, that this fiction persisted in part because the bourgeois public sphere's universalistic
rhetoric really did function, for a certain period of historical development, to undermine pre-
bourgeois structures of political and economic hierarchy.665 But the same universalizing tendency
in the bourgeois conception of the public sphere ultimately contributed to the dissolution of the
bourgeois public sphere itself. It, too, was built upon systems of social domination, including the
hierarchical structure of the “patriarchal conjugal family,” and so conspicuously failed to realize
its own universalistic ideals.666 Nevertheless, Habermas holds out hope for the creation of a truly
universal public sphere. Indeed, he optimistically claims that we have a better chance of
producing true 'critical publicity' now, in the modern social-welfare state, than people did in the
context of the “bourgeois public sphere during the period of its liberal development.”667 
Illiberal critics of 'public reason' have good reason to be less optimistic. Habermas rightly
insists that public debate cannot be “rational-critical” unless all parties involved share some
common ground,668 i.e., a “general interest” with a genuine “possibility of mutual satisfaction,”
as opposed to the “antagonistic edge” characteristic of 'haggling' driven by mere “competing
needs.”669 For otherwise 'public debate' will be reduced to raw power-jockeying, even if this is
masked by a veneer of critically-impotent faux 'arguments'670—as is all too true of America
665Habermas 1991, 55-6.
666“[T]he dependence of the wife and children on the male head of the family; private autonomy in the [economic] 
realm was transformed into authority in the [domestic] and made any pretended freedom of individuals illusory” 
(Habermas 1991, 47); “On the basis of the continuing domination of one class over another, the dominant 
[bourgeois] class nevertheless developed political institutions which credibly embodied as their objective 
meaning the idea of their own abolition” (ibid., 88); “[T]he contradiction of the public sphere that was 
institutionalized in the bourgeois constitutional state came to the fore. With the help of its principle, which 
according to its own idea was opposed to all domination, a political order was founded whose social basis did not
make domination superfluous after all” (ibid., 88).
667Habermas 1991, 235. Here Habermas characterizes the dynamics of the social-welfare state as the “conclusion” 
of the dialectic of the bourgeois idea of publicity, which had been mere “ideology” in “its liberal development.”
668“[T]he criteria of rationality are completely lacking in a consensus created by sophisticated opinion-molding 
services under the aegis of a sham public interest. Intelligent criticism of publicly discussed affairs gives way 
before a mood of conformity with publicly presented persons or personifications” (Habermas 1991, 195).
669Habermas 1991, 234.
670“[A]s soon as private interests, collectively organized, were compelled to assume political form, the public 
sphere necessarily became an arena in which conflicts also had to be settled that transformed the structure of 
political compromise from the ground up. The public sphere was burdened with the tasks of settling conflicts of 
interest that could not be accommodated within the classical forms of parliamentary consensus and agreement; 
their settlements bore the marks of their origins in the sphere of the market. Compromise literally had to be 
haggled out, produced temporarily through pressure and counterpressure and supported directly only through the 
unstable equilibrium of a power constellation between state apparatus and interest groups.[...]Admittedly, on the 
one hand the forum of the public sphere had been expanded. But on the other hand, because the balancing of 
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today. However, mass-democracy arguably precludes the possibility of a true general interest
common to all its citizens. Habermas himself observes that the modern degradation of public
discourse has been systematically intertwined with the rise of mass-democratic politics:
“[Political] parties were now confronted with the job of 'integrating' the mass of the citizenry (no
longer really 'bourgeois'), with the help of new methods, for the purpose of getting their votes.
The gathering of voters for the sake of bringing the local delegate to account had to make room
for systematic propaganda[...][The parties are not] in the hands of the public but in the hands of
those who control the party apparatus.”671 Hence, in late modernity, “[p]ublicity loses its critical
function in favor of a staged display; even arguments are transmuted into symbols to which again
one can not respond by arguing but only by identifying with them.”672
But Habermas fails to draw the obvious conclusion. It is not plausible that “[t]he outcome
of the struggle between a critical publicity and one that is merely staged for manipulative
purposes remains open,” as he claims.673 Rather, his own historical analysis if anything suggests
a starkly illiberal lesson. Namely, the very same mass-democratizing processes that have
produced increasingly universal access to the public sphere in modernity, have also progressively
dissolved the general interest and thereby degraded public discourse into the mere 'haggling out
of compromises' between competing interest-groups.674 In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, it is also fair to infer that this causal link still holds.
In short, Habermas fails to carry his own argument through to its natural conclusion. A
genuine liberal public sphere must be universally accessible. But in heterogeneous mass-
democratic societies, which are recommended by the same moralistic ethos underlying this ideal
of universal accessibility, guaranteeing democratic access to the public sphere predictably comes
at the expense of depleting the stock of substantive interests shared by all its participants. This in
turn precludes true 'rational-critical' discourse, as opposed to haggling driven by competing
private interests. Hence, procedural objectivity based in liberal-democratic notions of public
interests continued to be linked to the liberal claim of this public sphere (which is to say, to legitimation in terms 
of the common welfare) without being able to fulfill it or to evade it entirely, the haggling out of compromises 




674Lest I be misunderstood: the push towards equal social recognition and political rights for racial, religious, and 
sexual minorities, women, working-class and poor people, etc., has obviously produced many real advances. My 
argument does not imply anything to the contrary. I am just suggesting that some of these real advances have 
come at the expense of creating or exacerbating some equally real problems, for perfectly understandable and 
apparently systematic reasons.
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reason is an unrealistic if not impossible goal, constituted by mutually incompatible ideals of a
universal public sphere and a general interest strong enough to forestall partisan haggling.
The procedural ideal of critical publicity reflects an overly anthropocentric interpretation
of objectivity. A well-functioning Habermasian public sphere would fail to be objective insofar
as its participants remained collectively trapped in an order of inter-subjective appearances, that
is, collectively inattentive to fundamental reality. But the Habermasian ideal of rational-critical
discourse is also impossible to realize in practice, at least in a public sphere operating at the scale
of universal accessibility that this ideal itself recommends. In both respects, the underlying
problem with Habermas' view, as with any broadly Kantian theory of procedural objectivity
achieved through rational-critical discourse, is its moralism. People are not all essentially equal
epistemic agents (read: rational souls), nor is this a worthy political ideal. The utopia Habermas
envisions is in fact an anthropocentric dystopia, in which the drive to apprehend and affirm
objective reality has been supplanted by a moralistic quest for universal rational consensus.
Habermas might object that critical publicity is intended as a merely regulative ideal—
impossible to realize in practice, perhaps, but still necessarily posited as an ideal horizon that
provides normative orientation to our shared epistemic practices.675 The same point could also be
made by those like Karl Popper, Helen Longino, Philip Kitcher, or Heather Douglas, who
emphasize democratic accountability in science, specifically.676 But the Habermasian ideal is still
criticizable for relying on a false and moralistic conception of humans. It still matters that, as
Raymond Geuss observes, one cannot plausibly impute to most people in real societies past or
present Habermas' notion that beliefs are true if they would be the objects of universal rational
consensus.677 There are and have been many genuine epistemic agents who do not implicitly rely
on the liberal-democratic ideal of universal rational consensus. Other ideals can also orient our
shared epistemic life, but can do so more objectively, and without producing the same internal
tension or falsifying human nature—saliently, the ideal of collectively understanding reality.
13.8. The full universalistic 'view from nowhere' and the semi-universalistic Kantian
'view from inter-subjectivity' are both overly inward. The 'view from nowhere' either just reports
facts indiscriminately, or else promises unmediated access to reality conceived in the image of
675For a helpful summary, see Geuss 1981, 66.
676See Popper 1945; Longino 1990; Kitcher 2001, 2011; and Douglas 2009. See also Bronowski 1965.
677Geuss 1981, 66-7. Geuss refers to “universal consensus under ideal conditions,” understood as the 'ideal speech 
situation' of “absolutely uncoerced and unlimited discussion between completely free and equal human agents.”
242
our own rationality. Hence, the 'real' becomes that which appears to an infinite disembodied
Mind—the universal form of things, the rational principles underlying natural flux, the
essentially intelligible Laws of Nature, the domain of ideal Forms, the self-knowledge of
Spirit.678 This is excessive inwardness and hypertrophied subjectivity. Kant implicitly retains and
valorizes this Mind's-eye-view by positing the thing-in-itself. But on top of this, he also
superimposes a domain of objects—things as they appear mediated by distinctively human
cognitive powers of understanding and sensible intuition, as opposed to these (same) things as
they are in themselves. To the God's-eye or Mind's-eye view, Kant thus appends an Embodied-
Mind's-eye view. Hence, the 'real' becomes the 'object' that appears to a generic sensuous-
rational being like ourselves. This, too, is excessive inwardness and hypertrophied subjectivity.
In turn, social constructivists and standpoint theorists insist that there is no 'universal human'
form of experience, only diverse forms of experience specific to local cultural contexts, or even
to particular social positions therein—social positions that become increasingly esoteric and
hyper-individualized as this analysis proceeds over time. Hence, the 'real' ultimately becomes
pure, unabashed appearance for particular subjects. This, too, is excessive inwardness and
hypertrophied subjectivity.
Understood correctly in terms of outwardness rather than universality or particularity,
objectivity is an orientation towards reality. But what is reality? The real is not the universal or
the purely rational. The real is not Platonic Form. The real is not that which exists as an Idea for
infinite Mind. The real is not the indeterminate thing-in-itself. The real is not the determinate
object of generic human cognition. The real is not that which appears only to specific social
collectives, let alone individual members thereof. The real is not the entirety of things that exist.
The real is not everything that is the case. The real is not the empirical. The real is not God.
The real—the 'really real'—is that which explains and underlies appearances. The real is
the fundamental, the basic, the elemental, the essential ground of all else. The real is that which
determines things, whether it be other things or itself, as the objects through which it appears.
The real is that which exerts determinative force in relation to its objects. And the reality of that
which is real is its determinative force. The real is power. And reality itself is power.
Objectivity is an outward orientation towards reality. Objectivity is receptivity to that
which underlies and explains our own being, among other natural phenomena. Objectivity is the
678I do not claim that these notions are identical in all respects; I claim that they are identical in essential spirit.
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way that things appear to us insofar as we are receptive to higher modes of determinative force.
Scientific objectivity is the way that things 'appear' to elemental reality or higher force as
mere objects. The explanatorily-fundamental aspects of reality that ground scientific objectivity
are arational natural forms, corresponding to causally basic modes of impersonal natural force.
Here I mean to draw an explicit parallel to Kant's claim that we can only experience things as
they appear to us mediated by the general 'forms' of our own cognitive powers, as 'phenomena'
rather than 'things in themselves'. The account of natural forms I am advocating, but which I can
here only sketch in rough outline, is semi-Kantian but realistic and anti-rationalistic—a kind of
transcendental naturalism. I largely accept Kant's view that scientific cognition presents us with
appearances, which exceed mere (subjective) appearances only insofar as they are structured by
basic underlying conditions of objective experience. But as a naturalist I reject the idea of
unknowable things-in-themselves, and insist that the forms of our own cognitive powers need not
be merely ideal, as Kant takes them to be. (For example, Kant claims that “space is not a form
that is proper to anything in itself,”679 and the representation of space “signifies nothing at all” if
we “depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can acquire outer intuition.”680)
The forms of our experience need not just reflect human nature.
Rather, our cognitive powers can and should be determined by essential features of the
broader world. Our powers of sensory apprehension and intellectual comprehension are natural
powers. The basic 'transcendental' forms of objective scientific experience can and should be
fundamental natural forms. Unlike Kant, I am not interested in justifying scientific knowledge by
appeal to transcendental forms of experience, or in refuting Humean skepticism. I simply wish to
understand or explain our scientific knowledge of mind-independent reality as itself a natural
phenomenon, in terms of the basic features of the world that science discloses. 
Scientific objectivity is the way that things 'appear' to basic modes of force as mere
'objects', systematically ordered by corresponding forms. Scientific objectivity is the standpoint
of force in relation to its objects. Scientific objectivity is a view from explanatory power.
14. Physical Force as Transcendental Ground (I):
Dynamic Structuralism
679KrV A30/B45.
680KrV A26/B42. See also KrV B148.
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14.1. The notion of a 'view' or 'standpoint' corresponding to loci of explanatory power 
may still seem implausible or underdeveloped. To this end, it bears elaborating several concrete 
examples. One of these I have already mentioned: representing objects in physical spacetime is a 
way of normalizing the impact of real gravitational force, by formally re-encoding this impact as 
the 'background structure' of a spatial form. In this context, again, there is a crucial difference 
between structural and causal explanation. I will further elaborate this distinction, as well as the 
gravity-spacetime example, in the present chapter. And I will do so in the context of defending a 
set of more abstract claims that I made at the outset of the previous chapter.
Namely, empirical scientific explanation is a cognitive spatialization of natural forces 
distinguished by virtue of their impact on observable phenomena. And physical scientific 
explanation is a species of scientific explanation, which involves spatializing purely intelligible 
natural forces with empirical impact—i.e. physical forces without sensory qualities or 
spatiotemporal properties, which produce observable phenomena ordered into purely intelligible 
physical structures constituted by mathematical relations among physical properties. Physical 
structure, in this sense, is a species of dynamic structure as characterized in part I above: higher 
force has impact on inferior force; this impact has real structural form, or dynamic structure; and 
this real dynamic structure in turn merely appears as objective spatial form, in which inferior 
force-loci impacted by the given higher force are represented as spatially-located objects.
This is another basic example of a 'view' or 'standpoint' relevant to scientific objectivity, 
then: comprehending observable phenomena under the ambit of basic physical structures is a 
way of occupying the 'standpoint' of physical forces, generally speaking.
14.2. The historical transition from Newtonian gravitational theory to Einstein's general
theory of relativity presents an apparent challenge for scientific realism. Newton's claims about
an unobservable 'force' of gravity no longer seem to be even approximately true, given
relativistic accounts of gravity in terms of spacetime curvature. Yet traditional scientific realists
typically claim that if scientific theories are true, then the unobservable entities they postulate
exist; and that 'mature' enough scientific theories are at least 'approximately' true.681 In principle,
a realist could insist that Newton's theory was not 'mature' enough for its radically-incorrect
681E.g. see Psillos 1999, xvii; Putnam 1975, 69 and 73; Boyd 1983, 45.
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unobservable ontology of gravitational force to speak against the viability of scientific realism.
But this is unappealing, insofar as Newton's theory was highly developed and enjoyed great
predictive success. Realists would do better to try to salvage the 'approximate' truth of
Newtonian physics.
Below, I work to address this challenge, of explaining the transition from Newton to
Einstein, and the problem of 'radical' theory change more broadly, on scientific realists' behalf. I
do so in part by advancing a novel physical interpretation of general relativity. On this
interpretation, the relativistic gravitational field, i.e., the metric field whose curvature Einstein's
field equations functionally relate to the stress-energy tensor, is not a force; but gravity itself is a
force. Namely, relativistic gravity is an unobservable force that causes inertial motion. And the
gravitational field is just the concrete but purely intelligible 'pattern' of this inertial motion. Thus
spacetime curvature is not a force; but it is the form of a real force's observable causal impact.
Some commentators reject causal interpretations of general relativity altogether.682 And those
who embrace causal interpretations typically identify the gravitational field as the cause of
inertial motion, arguably in keeping with Einstein himself.683 Hence, my claim that the
gravitational field is only the 'pattern' or form of an effect, and not itself a cause, diverges from
existing accounts.684
More broadly, I use this case to motivate a form of scientific realism that I call dynamic
structuralism, synthesizing elements from existing realist, empiricist, and neo-Kantian emphases
on 'structure'. According to this dynamic structuralist version of realism, physical science
systematically invokes relations between actual but unobservable causal powers, or natural
forces, and the observable phenomena that they (do or can) produce.685 Physics describes natural
682E.g. see DiSalle 1994, 1995; Nerlich 1994; Brown 2005. See also Hoefer 2009, 701–704.
683For this causal reading of Einstein's interpretation of the gravitational field, see e.g. Brown 2005, 161; Hoefer 
2009, 701–702; Weaver [forthcoming], 11–12. Likewise, a standard textbook claims that “[s]pace acts on matter,
telling it how to move” (Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler 1973, 5), which at least suggests the causal claim. See also
Weaver [(forthcoming], 32) for a list of more or less overtly causal interpretations in this vein. Representatively, 
e.g., Geroch (1978, 180) appeals to “[t]he effect of curvature on matter in relativity, via Einstein's equation.”
684Here one may contrast existing accounts of scientific realism in terms of dispositions or powers that bring about 
observable phenomena—e.g. see Mumford 2004; Bird 2007. Note that Bird (2007, 215) attributes a 'disposition' 
to spacetime (“each spacetime point is characterized by[...]its disposition to affect the kinetic properties of an 
object at that point, captured in the gravitational field tensor at that point”), whereas I ascribe causal power to 
gravity, and not to spacetime; see also Bird 2009. (Mumford does not address this case.) Esfeld (2009) pairs a 
broadly Mumford- or Bird-style account with structural realism, arguing that “fundamental physical structures 
possess a causal essence, being powers.” I deny this: dynamic structures are just effects, not causes, on my view.
685Note that I will not endorse any particular metaphysical account of causation, because doing so is not necessary 
for my basic purpose of outlining, contextualizing, and motivating the 'dynamic structuralism' here on offer.
246
forces' impact in terms of purely intelligible 'patterns' that order the observable phenomena they
produce. These dynamic structures are concrete, not abstract, but unobservable because
constituted by purely intelligible mathematical relations between physical properties, like the
algebraic relation [-Gm/r2]n that describes gravitational acceleration in Newtonian mechanics.686
The Newtonian theory of an impressed gravitational force implies approximately the
same dynamic structure of physically-possible gravitational acceleration as does Einstein's
theory of geodesic motion in a curved spacetime. And this continuity at the level of empirical
structure is a meaningful similarity between Newtonian gravitational force and relativistic
spacetime curvature themselves, because the Newtonian gravitational field [Gm/r(t)2]n just is the
dynamic structure of physically-possible gravitational acceleration, and non-zero spacetime
curvature as described by Einstein likewise just is an approximately similar dynamic structure of
physically-possible gravitational acceleration. Newtonian gravity is just the cause of
gravitational acceleration ordered by the dynamic structure [Gm/r(t)2]n, and relativistic gravity is
just the cause of gravitational acceleration ordered by an approximately similar structure.
Note that I do not mean to provide a self-standing defense of scientific realism against
anti-realistic positions like constructive empiricism, although my argument is meant to evidence
the coherence and explanatory power of my brand of realism. Rather, I presuppose a realist
perspective and argue that, from this standpoint, my account provides the best explanation of the
relationship between unobservable reality, observable phenomena, and physical scientists. That
said, I do argue that van Fraassen subtly mischaracterizes both 'structure' and intelligibility,
insofar as he apparently denies, or at least discounts, that a structure might be purely intelligible
and yet still concrete (not abstract). I also do not mean to be offering an argument against radical
skeptics who doubt that our intellect reliably affords us knowledge of mind-independent reality.
Rather, I hypothesize that the human intellect is in essence a power to apprehend mind-
independent natural forces, by enacting corresponding dynamic structures' explanatory power,
and I demonstrate the explanatory power of this hypothesis. Moreover, I argue that scientific
realists must posit actual natural forces, to ground the concrete reality of law-like order among
686By something 'purely intelligible', I mean something insofar as it lacks both sensory qualities (e.g. color, hotness,
or smell) and spatiotemporal properties (e.g. temporal duration, or spatial form). In loosely Kantian terms, then, 
purely intelligible things are things insofar as they are possible objects of purely conceptual understanding, as 
opposed to things as they are given to us via sensible intuition. Note that for something to be purely intelligible 
does not mean that it is mind-dependent, on my view. The dynamic structures disclosed by science are mind-
independent. And if super-human forms of intellect exist, or if they are possible, then there could be dynamic 
structures that are intelligible, yet not intelligible by us—or even by any actually-existing intelligent beings.
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merely possible phenomena, if they are to avoid unintentional slides into metaphysical idealism.
In section 14.3, I further elaborate the basic features of my account, specifically in
relation to John Worrall's influential 'best of both worlds' motivation for structural realism and
Bas van Fraassen's anti-realist 'empiricist structuralism'. I contrast dynamic structures with
phenomenal structures, or observable spatiotemporal 'patterns' of physically-possible observable
phenomena. In turn, I describe how dynamic structures and observable phenomena are
interrelated in science, via physical principles. In section 14.4, I argue that my account is more
responsive than is standard structural realism to the objection that there is no clear distinction
between things' 'structural' properties and their 'intrinsic' properties or 'natures'. Here I also
differentiate my account from neo-Kantian structuralism. In section 14.5, I address several
residual objections.
In section 14.6, I conclude that in physical science we objectively represent two main
classes of thing: observable phenomena, and unobservable dynamic structures. However, we also
apprehend causally-basic but unobservable natural forces, which produce observable phenomena
ordered by corresponding dynamic structures. We apprehend natural forces in part by using them
to mathematically organize physical properties, in the image of corresponding dynamic
structures. Through physical principles, in turn, we relate this apprehension of dynamic structure
to measurement, or the direct coordination of observable phenomena with determinate values of
physical properties. I will refer to this principled comprehension of phenomena, using dynamic
structures, as physical explanation. Most deeply, then, physical science aims at the apprehension
of natural forces, through explanation. In using dynamic structures to explain phenomena, we
intellectually re-enact natural forces' impact on observable reality, and thereby understand them.
14.3. Structural realism has been advanced by John Worrall and other more recent
commentators as a 'best of both worlds' response to the 'no miracles' argument for scientific
realism and the 'pessimistic meta-induction' against it.687 According to the 'no miracles' argument,
we should believe that our best scientific theories are at least approximately true, because
687See Worrall 1989. Before Worrall, Grover Maxwell also advocated 'structural realism' (see e.g. Maxwell 1970), 
and Ronald Giere proposed a 'constructive realism' that he suggests is “a variety of what is sometimes called 
structural realism,” citing Maxwell (Giere 1985, 83). See Gower (2000) for a broader survey of historical 
antecedents, saliently including Poincaré, Duhem, Russell, and Cassirer. Cf. Magnus and Callender 2004 for the 
charge that the 'no miracles' argument and 'pessimistic induction' are grounded in base-rate fallacies.
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otherwise the empirical success of science would be miraculous and thus incredible.688 According
to the 'pessimistic meta-induction', however, history shows us that scientific descriptions of
unobservable reality change radically over time—e.g., scientists no longer refer to phlogiston,
the luminiferous aether, or anything remotely resembling them—and we have no reason to think
that current theory is any better in this regard. While pessimists often allow that the empirical
adequacy of science increases more or less monotonically, they conclude that we have good
reason to think that all or most current scientific claims about unobservables will be radically
overturned by future theory change.689
Structural realists like Worrall concede to pessimists that scientific claims about the
'natures' or 'intrinsic' properties of unobservable things have changed radically over time, and
will presumably continue to do so. However, they insist that science does yield accumulative
knowledge of unobservable but objectively real 'structure', or the objective 'structural' properties
of unobservable objects. For instance, Worrall claims that from the vantage point of Maxwell's
electromagnetic theory, Fresnel’s earlier theory of light as consisting of vibrations transmitted
through a mechanical medium (viz., the aforementioned 'luminiferous aether') has “exactly the
right structure—it's 'just' that what vibrates according to Maxwell’s theory, are the electric and
magnetic field strengths [i.e., not the aether].” Worrall infers that “[a]lthough Fresnel was quite
wrong about what oscillates, he was, from this later point of view, right, not just about the optical
phenomena, but right also that these phenomena depend on the oscillations of something or other
at right angles to the light.”690 Similarly, Worrall “can see no clear sense in which an action-at-a-
distance force of gravity is a 'limiting case' of, or 'approximates' a space-time curvature.” But
“Einstein’s equations undeniably go over to Newton’s in certain limiting special cases.” And
from this Worrall infers that “there is 'approximate continuity' of structure in this case.”691
Structural empiricists likewise emphasize continuity of 'structure' across theory change,
but insist contra realists that this is just the structure of observable phenomena. Thus Bas van
Fraassen claims that acceptable new theories explain their predecessors' empirical success by
“implying approximately the same predictions for the circumstances in which the older theories
were confirmed and found adequately applicable,” and “definitely not by explaining how
688See e.g. Putnam 1975; Boyd 1990; Musgrave 1988; Psillos 1999, ch. 4. Cf. van Fraassen 1980, 34-40.
689See e.g. Poincaré 1905, 160; Putnam 1978, 25; Laudan 1981. Cf. Psillos 1999, ch. 5. 
690Worrall 1989, 118-119. Here Worrall is self-consciously following Poincaré (see Poincaré 1905, 160 ff.).
691Worrall 1989, 121.
249
essentially right the old theory was about the underlying structure of nature.”692 Van Fraassen
nevertheless embraces 'structuralism', since he argues that science advances abstract models as
representations of observable phenomena; that these models are mathematical objects; and that
“[i]n mathematics, things are described only up to isomorphism—it makes no sense there to
speak of differences between isomorphic structures.”693 Notably, van Fraassen conceives of
'structure', in this context, as “a universal or similar abstract entity.”694 Thus he discounts the kind
of concrete structures that I argue are in fact most relevant.
Neither structural realists like Worrall nor structural empiricists like van Fraassen
appreciate that physical scientific characterizations of empirical structure are descriptions of
unobservable reality's nature or essence. Physical science yields basically accumulative
knowledge of explanatorily-powerful dynamic structures, or concrete but unobservable wholes
whose parts are physical properties (e.g. mass, spatial separation, charge, and spin angular
momentum), specifically insofar as they are ordered into physically real but strictly intelligible
forms. Namely, the physical properties in dynamic structures are ordered into determinable
mathematical relations whose determinate values, given the values of these component properties
in actual physical systems, correspond to the measurable values of physically-possible
observable phenomena.695 For instance, Newton's laws of motion suggest that Gm/r2 (where G is
the gravitational constant, m is the mass of a given body, and r is a variable distance from it) is
the dynamic structure of physically-possible gravitational acceleration vis-à-vis actual massive
bodies. Notably, this Newtonian representation of gravitational acceleration's dynamic structure
is approximately retained in general relativity, despite Einstein's reconceptualization of gravity as
that part of non-zero spatiotemporal curvature which is due to the distribution of mass-energy,
rather than as a Newtonian 'impressed' force.696 (Below, I will distinguish between gravity
692Van Fraassen 2006, 298. See also van Fraassen 2008. Compare Bueno's 'structural empiricism' (1999, 2010).
693Van Fraassen 2006, 304.
694Van Fraassen 2008, 248.
695By 'value' I mean a definite mathematical object, not necessarily a number—e.g., a value might be a vector.
696More precisely, general relativity evidently describes gravity as that aspect of spatiotemporal curvature which is 
due to energy, momentum, and stress associated with matter and all non-gravitational fields, as represented by 
the stress-energy tensor. Note that there can be spatiotemporal curvature in parts of spacetime where the stress-
energy tensor is zero—e.g. there is positive cross-sectional curvature in the vacuum outside a massive body like 
Earth, which causes other bodies like apples to converge in the 'horizontal' direction as they fall towards its 
center. My point is just that this gravitational effect in the vacuum outside a massive body is still due to its mass-
energy. Note also that the mathematical formalism of general relativity is consistent with the possibility that not 
all non-zero spatiotemporal curvature is due to mass-energy—e.g. it could be due to purely inertial phenomena 
like gravitational waves or Einstein-Rosen bridges. But on my view, mass-energy is the only real physical source
of non-zero spatiotemporal curvature. Hence, for instance, I would insist that all physically possible gravitational
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construed as a real but unobservable causal power, or natural force, and the gravitational field
construed as the dynamic structure of this real force's empirical impact.) Consider, in this light, a











Here a is the relative acceleration between the two bodies, v is their relative velocity, n is their
normalized separation (i.e., n = r / r, where r is the bodies' separation), M1 and M2 are the bodies'
respective mass-energies, c is the speed of light, m = M1+M2, η = (M1M2)/(M1+M2)2, and O(c-4) is
another correction term whose exact meaning is unimportant here. For my most basic point is
just that the above expression clearly involves a Newtonian term ([-Gm/r2]n) along with several
relativistic corrections—collectively, the “post-Newtonian piece of the acceleration vector.”698
More originally, I claim that the Newtonian term [-Gm/r2]n approximately represents a dynamic
structure that is concrete, not abstract, yet strictly unobservable because purely intelligible.
Dynamic structures like [-Gm/r2]n must be distinguished from phenomenal structures, or
observable 'patterns' constituted by explanatorily-salient spatiotemporal arrangements of actual
or physically-possible observable phenomena. For instance, the phenomenal structure of an
actual or possible body's gravitational acceleration can be represented by a function a(t), which
associates every time with a vector representing the magnitude and direction of the body's
(gravitational) acceleration at that time. (All physically-possible gravitational acceleration is
observable, in principle, by recording the free motions of appropriate test particles. Of course,
there may be no actual thing that realizes a given physically-possible inertial trajectory, relative
to the actual structure of spacetime. Hence I am concerned not just with actual phenomena, but
with all those phenomena that actual natural forces can causally produce.) Nor should dynamic
structures be conflated with phenomenal spaces, or structures comprising all physically-possible
phenomenal structures of a given kind. Whereas dynamic structures are unobservable wholes
comprising real but purely intelligible relations between physical properties', phenomenal spaces
are observable spaces of physically-possible phenomena's spatiotemporal interrelation.
Physical principles do, however, equate values determined by mathematical forms
representing dynamic structures (e.g. [-Gm/r(t)2]n) with the values of functions representing
waves have sources in mass-energy, e.g. exploding supernovae—and likewise for Einstein-Rosen bridges.
697Poisson and Will 2014, Eq. (9.142).
698Poisson and Will 2014, 440.
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corresponding phenomenal structures (e.g. a(t)).699 For instance, a classical physical principle is
expressed by the Newtonian equation a(t) = [-Gm/r(t)2]n. Higher-order physical principles relate
dynamic structures, not directly to phenomenal structures, but to other dynamic structures of
physical properties. However, higher-order principles still thereby indirectly equate (i) values
determined by actual dynamic structures with (ii) values of physical properties which are directly
coordinated, via possible acts of measurement, with physically-possible observable phenomena.
(The somewhat elaborate formulation in (ii) is necessary because some measurable
properties, like the spin of an electron in a singlet state, may not be observable. Electron spin
states can certainly be measured, e.g. in Stern-Gerlach experiments. But insofar as observation is
direct perception—e.g. to observe a dog is to perceive it as a dog, on my view—electron spin
need not therefore be observable.700 We can measure an electron's spin in a Stern-Gerlach
experiment, by observing its angular deflection in interaction with a magnetic field gradient. But
observing this angular deflection is not the same thing as perceiving the deflection a s a spin
state. One can know that the deflection which one observes is coordinated with a given spin
state, without observing this spin state. Note also that 'direct perception' does not mean
'perception unaided by instruments like microscopes'. I take it to be possible to observe things,
like fine-grained details in the crystalline structure of salt, through microscopes.701 This is
because microscopic crystalline structure is still determine spatial form, and so is still a possible
object of sensible intuition, in the Kantian sense, even if only with the aid of instruments.702)
 In sum, physical principles relate unobservable dynamic structures to observable
phenomenal spaces, 'within' which phenomenal structures are observable 'shapes', and
physically-possible phenomena are observable 'points'. Dynamic structures are empirical
structures, in that they are essentially related via physical principles to observable phenomena.
But dynamic structures and phenomenal structures are two distinct kinds of empirical structure. 
Contra van Fraassen and other empiricists, then, it is not just phenomenal structure that is
preserved across radical theory change. Rather, in cases like the transition from Newtonian to
relativistic physics, there is also an approximate continuity of unobservable dynamic structure.
699I use the term 'principle' rather than more common ones like 'law' because I wish to remain agnostic about the 
relationship between physical principles and laws of nature, to avoid introducing unnecessary complications.
700To be clear: 'direct perception' does not mean 'perception unmediated by concepts or theoretical frameworks'. 
One must have the concept [dog] in order to directly perceive something as a dog, for instance. Hence, to 
observe dogs (as such) still involves a kind of 'theory-laden' perception.
701Cf. van Fraassen 2008, chapter 4.
702See also section 4A below.
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(In section 14.5, I respond to the objection that dynamic structure is not truly preserved in this
case.) 
Contra Worrall, however, this continuity of dynamic structure is continuity at the level of
unobservable entities' natures. The Newtonian theory of an impressed gravitational force implies
approximately the same dynamic structure of physically-possible gravitational acceleration as
does Einstein's theory of geodesic motion in a curved spacetime. And this continuity at the level
of empirical structure is a meaningful similarity between Newtonian gravitational force and
relativistic spacetime curvature themselves, because the Newtonian gravitational field [Gm/r(t)2]n
just is the dynamic structure of physically-possible gravitational acceleration, and non-zero
spacetime curvature as described by Einstein likewise just is an approximately similar dynamic
structure of physically-possible gravitational acceleration.703 Newtonian gravity is just the cause
of gravitational acceleration ordered by the dynamic structure [Gm/r(t)2]n, and relativistic
gravity is just the cause of gravitational acceleration ordered by an approximately similar
structure. (In general relativity, gravitational acceleration is interpreted as a kind of geodesic
motion, hence arguably as merely apparent acceleration, insofar as it involves no deviation from
four-dimensional 'straight' lines. This is not a problem for my account: I am concerned with
gravitational acceleration qua observable. We observe things like apples falling; this suffices.)
 For a more intuitive sense of the point at issue, imagine dropping a bowling ball in a
vacuum chamber on the surface of the Earth, and recording its motion. One could thereby
determine the ball's acceleration as a function of time. In turn, imagine conducting this
experiment at various locations on Earth, or on the Moon. Imagine performing it at an arbitrary
point in outer space, 'dropping' the ball by letting it go and seeing how it moves. The results of
all such possible experiments, at every spatiotemporal location and with a bowling ball of
infinitesimal mass, would give an indication of everything that gravity is in fact capable of
doing, throughout the universe as it actually is.704 And what better way is there to characterize the
703Note that it is also possible to 'geometrize away' gravitational forces in Newtonian theory by incorporating the 
gravitational potential into the affine connection, such that freely falling particles follow the geodesics of a new, 
nonflat derivative operator. The result is called 'Newton-Cartan theory' (see Cartan 1923). Friedman (1983, 95) 
calls this a “new theory of gravitation,” as opposed to Newton's. But in fact, Newton-Cartan theory is just an 
alternate representation of the same dynamic structure that Newton described by appeal to an 'impressed' force of
gravity. See also Jones 1991. Admittedly, my claim that Newton-Cartan theory is not a genuinely new theory of 
gravitation stands in apparent tension with my explanation of the sense in which dynamic structuralism is not 
positivism, in sub-section 4B below. I address this tension elsewhere, but cannot pursue the issue further here.
704One might think that, in addition to this information about the possible acceleration of test-masses, one would 
also need information about the bowling balls' deformation by tidal forces, gravitational waves, etc. But that is 
not true. Information about possible deformation by tidal forces or gravitational waves can be inferred from 
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nature of gravity, as an actual causal power, than to systematically indicate the entire range of its
possible causal impact? One way to do so is just to exhaustively describe all physically-possible
phenomenal structures of gravitational acceleration. But in order to explain these physically-
possible 'patterns' of phenomena, one must also invoke dynamic structures like [-Gm/r(t)2]n.
More broadly, every real dynamic structure is the structure of a concrete but unobservable
causal power, or natural force. If there are no charged objects for an electrostatic field to act on,
for example, it will not realize its potential accelerative impact. But the dynamic structure of
electrostatic force indicated by Coulomb's law would not be a concrete structure, or an actual
physical property, if there were no actual force field to which it corresponds. Without an actual
natural force, a corresponding dynamic structure is a merely ideal 'shape' of physical properties.
To give another example, if there were no mass-energy located in spacetime, there would
be no actual inertial motion. But the geodesic structure of the metric field defined on the
spacetime manifold would still indicate the structure of all physically-possible inertial
trajectories. This geodesic structure of physically-possible inertial trajectories is a phenomenal
structure, insofar as physically-possible inertial trajectories are in principle observable. But
Einstein's field equations in turn indicate a functional relationship between this phenomenal
structure and a corresponding dynamic structure, namely, insofar as the values of the metric field
defined on the spacetime manifold functionally depend upon values of the stress-energy tensor.
We may call the former phenomenal structure spacetime's inertial structure, and the latter
dynamic structure the gravitational field or the metric field defined on the spacetime manifold.
Hence, the gravitational field is the unobservable dynamic structure of observable gravitational
acceleration, and is related to the observable inertial structure of spacetime via a physical
principle, expressed in Einstein's field equations. But gravitational structure is also the impact-
structure of a natural force (gravity) which causes geodesic motion by mass-energy.
Of course, many commentators believe that general relativity shows that gravity is not a
force. But I claim that this is wrong, or at least imprecise. Inertial structure is certainly not a
force. And the gravitational field described by Einstein's field equations is also not a force. But
gravity itself is a force: the unobservable force which causally produces the observable inertial
motion that is only formally explained by the metric field defined on the spacetime manifold.
information about accelerative impact at every spacetime point. Tidal forces are due to differential accelerative 
effects across extended bodies; and the experiments I suggest—with bowling balls that are perfectly rigid, 
infinitesimally small, and infinitesimally massive—already provide all the relevant information about the purely 
gravitational aspect of this differential accelerative impact.
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The causally inert gravitational field is just the dynamic structure of gravity's causal impact.
Here contrast Christopher Weaver's claim that “the gravitational field understood as spacetime
curvature causally generates the inertial and time-like geodesic motion of free massive
bodies.”705 On my view, gravity construed as an unobservable force causes the observable inertial
and time-like geodesic motion of free bodies, whereas the gravitational field is just the concrete
but purely intelligible 'pattern' of this inertial and time-like geodesic motion. Observable
phenomena are represented in physical science as the effect or causal impact of unobservable
forces. This causal impact in turn has structure, including the kind of concrete but purely
intelligible dynamic structure that physical scientific explanation highlights. But impact is not
caused by its own structure. Impact is caused by real causal power. Observable inertial motion is
caused by a real but unobservable natural force of gravity, not by the gravitational field or
curvature of spacetime.
 One might object that the distribution of mass-energy influences, but does not determine,
the geodesic structure of spacetime. For example, there are many vacuum solutions to Einstein's
field equations. So, fixing the distribution of mass-energy as zero throughout spacetime fails to
determine inertial structure. Hence it might seem that gravitational force cannot be the cause of
geodesic motion, per se—at least not insofar as gravitational force is exerted by mass-energy.
But the fact that relativistic field equations admit of a wide range of vacuum solutions, some of
which have non-zero curvature, does not entail that these mathematically possible solutions are
physically possible.706 Indeed, on my view they are unphysical solutions, or mathematical
artifacts that elide mass-energy's role as the physical source of non-zero spatiotemporal
curvature.707
This interpretive scheme suggests that physical scientific explanation—if not also
empirical scientific explanation more broadly—follows a standard form, insofar as it is construed
realistically: an actual feature of unobservable reality causally produces observable phenomena
ordered into a corresponding dynamic structure, or at least has the power to do so.  Realistically
construed, then, physical science posits natural forces, or actual but unobservable causal powers,
705Weaver (forthcoming), 14.
706Aside from the vacuum case, moreover, it is arguably difficult to devise truly natural examples of relativistic 
worlds that have the same matter content but different geoemetries. 
707See n. 696. Note also that with respect to Maxwell's theory, the corresponding view (all fields have sources) was 
not especially non-standard—e.g. consider Lorentz's remark that “[w]e need not[...]speak of other solutions, if 
we assume that an electromagnetic field in the ether is never produced by any other causes than the presence and 
motion of electrons” (Lorentz 1916, 20). For further references, see Ritz 1908, 170 fn. 1; Frisch 2014, 193 fn. 3.
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which are essentially characterized by the intelligible structures of the observable phenomena
they can produce. The dynamic structures disclosed by physical science are objectively real only
insofar as they are forms of actual natural forces' possible impact on observable reality.
Unobservable natural forces causally explain actual observable phenomena. And the dynamic
structures of these forces structurally explain the full range of physically-possible phenomena.
14.4. So much for an outline of the dynamic structuralism here on offer. In this section, I
offer further reasons to prefer dynamic structuralism over other structural and non-structural
realisms.
Dynamic structuralism is more responsive than other structural realisms to the objection
that there is no clear distinction between things' 'structural' properties and their 'intrinsic'
properties or 'natures'. Stathis Psillos' version of this objection to structuralism is representative:
According to the alleged dichotomy between structure and nature, it is as if the
nature of a scientific entity is something over and above its structure. Or,
equivalently, it is as if the physical content of a mathematical symbol, (that is,
the physical entity or process it stands for) is somehow on top of the totality of
the mathematical equations in which it features, (that is, the totality of laws
which describe its behaviour). But when scientists talk about the nature of an
entity, what it is normally understood is a bunch of basic properties and a set of
equations, expressing laws, which describe the behaviour of this entity. That is,
they rather speak of the way in which this entity is structured. I think that talk
of ‘nature’ over and above this structural description (physical and
mathematical) is reminiscent of the medieval ‘forms’ and ‘substances’.708 
Notably, Psillos' implication that a physical entity or process is nothing 'on top of' the totality of
equations involving a 'mathematical symbol' that stands for it sounds much like what Laudan
diagnoses as 'closet positivism' in his rejection of Worrall-style 'structural' realism: “[w]here
'closet positivists' might be content with capturing only the formal mathematical relations or only
the observable consequences of T1 within a successor, T2,” Laudan insists, “any genuine realist
must insist that T1's underlying ontology is preserved in T2's, for it is that ontology above all
which he alleges to be approximately true.”709 When Psillos claims that physical phenomena's
'behavior' is 'described' by equations, on the other hand, his view sounds more robustly realist. 
708Psillos 1995, 31. Compare McMullin 1984, 15.
709Laudan 1981, 40. Although Laudan wrote this in 1981, his objection clearly applies to Worrall's 1989 account.
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Structural realists attempting to differentiate themselves from traditional realists hence
face two main pitfalls: (i) unintentional slides into positivism, or at least empiricist structuralism;
and (ii) reifications of abstract mathematical structure. With respect to the latter, for example, the
physicist Max Tegmark claims that “our physical world [i.e., 'external physical reality'] is an
abstract mathematical structure.”710 Most will reject Tegmark's view, of course. Most realists,
including most structural realists, think that the mathematical forms disclosed by empirical
science represent a distinct and concrete physical world. But it is far from trivial to actually show
that the 'structures' disclosed by science are concrete. I return to this issue in section 4. Regarding
the former pitfall, if 'structure' is interpreted so that observationally-equivalent theories entail the
same 'structural' relations, then structural 'realism' collapses into empiricism.
On the other hand, if 'structure' is taken to be constituted by mathematical relations
among otherwise-indeterminate unobservable things, then it seems that structural realism is a
genuine realism only if this uninterpreted mathematical structure is real despite being purely
abstract. But even if one believes that uninterpreted mathematical structures are objectively real
or mind-independent, it is not clear that they should count as genuine physical objects, let alone
basic constituents of unobservable physical reality. I do not accept this, at least. On my view, any
'structural realist' worth their salt should insist that the 'structures' in question are concrete.
Thus structural realists should concede that 'structure' is physically-interpreted
mathematical structure. But then, as Psillos says, it is not clear that 'structural' realism differs
from traditional realism. I think this objection to standard forms of structural realism is basically
correct. Hence, I take my own motivation for structuralism about science to be different.
One somewhat better motivation for structuralism has to do with the difference between
extrinsic and intrinsic properties. Here it is helpful to note that structural realism has historical
roots in (neo-)Kantian transcendental idealism, insofar as it involves the thesis that we can know
things' extrinsic properties—namely, how they affect subjects like us as 'phenomena'—but not
the properties of these same things as they are 'in themselves'.711 We may parse this Kantian
motivation into two claims: we can only have knowledge of things insofar as they are related (i)
to us, as subjects; and (ii) to each other, as spatiotemporally- and causally-interconnected objects.
Dynamic structuralism emphasizes a slightly different class of extrinsic properties,
namely, causal relations between unobservable reality and observable phenomena. My basic
710Tegmark 2008, 101. Compare Tumulka 2017.
711See Langton 1998. Compare Langton and Lewis 1998, Lewis 2009. See also Massimi 2011. 
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point is simple: empirical scientific knowledge of unobservable things cannot extend beyond
knowledge of the ways in which they causally impact aspects of the world that we can observe.
Unlike standard structural realists, then, I am not focused on 'structural' relations between
unobservable objects and other unobservable objects. Unlike Kant, I am not focused on causal
relations between 'objects' of experience in general. I am focused specifically on causal relations
between unobservable forces and observable phenomena. Further unlike Kant, finally, I do not
believe that causality is merely a form of our understanding: I believe that there are mind-
independent causal relations between unobservable natural forces and observable phenomena.
14.5. The above analysis raises several natural questions. First, is dynamic structuralism
really a kind of structural realism, or just a strange gloss on traditional scientific realism?
Second, is dynamic structuralism really a scientific realism, or just a baroque form of
constructive empiricism, if not positivism? Third, does dynamic structuralism really do any
better vis-à-vis the 'pessimistic meta-induction' than does traditional scientific realism? And
fourth, why focus on causal relations, rather than other kinds of relations or extrinsic properties? 
A. Dynamic structuralism is not just traditional scientific realism. Even my above
claim, to the effect that genuine empirical scientific knowledge of unobservable reality is
restricted to knowledge of things insofar as they are or have causal powers vis-à-vis observable
phenomena, would not be endorsed by all, or perhaps even by many, scientific realists. Thus in
this respect dynamic structuralism already differs from traditional forms of scientific realism.
However, dynamic structuralism is 'structuralist' in a far more robust sense than just this.
I take 'structure' to refer not simply, or even primarily, to causal relations between unobservable
natural forces and observable phenomena. Rather, I take 'structure' to refer primarily to the
distinctive kind of impact that natural forces have, as basic objects of scientific understanding.
Insofar as it is a natural force, for example, Newtonian gravity is an unobservable causal
power vis-à-vis massive bodies. The impact of this causal power, evidently, is observable
gravitational acceleration. But how is acceleration 'structure', or accelerative impact 'structural'?
Gravitational acceleration is not itself 'structure' or 'structural' in any important sense.
Rather, the dynamic structure of gravitational acceleration is 'structural'. The dynamic structure
of Newtonian gravitational acceleration vis-à-vis a given massive body, [-Gm/r(t)2]n, is a purely
intelligible whole comprising algebraic relations between physical properties: the mass of a
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given body, and a given spatial separation from it. The gravitational acceleration of a falling
apple at a given time is observable. The mathematical operation of multiplying the mass of the
Earth by the Newtonian gravitational constant, and dividing this product by the square of the
apple's distance from the center of the Earth, is not observable. It is a purely intelligible relation.
It has no sensory qualities. And it has no spatiotemporal structure—it involves a spatial property,
of course, but it places this spatial property in non-spatiotemporal relation to another physical
property, mass. This algebraic relation between physical properties is a purely intelligible form.
But this algebraic relation is nevertheless a genuine physical property. Not every algebraic
relation between physical properties is systematically equivalent in value to the measurable
values of observable phenomena. You cannot predict the apple's acceleration by dividing its
electrical resistivity by the binary representation of your birth year. This is not a real physical
property. But [-Gm/r(t)2]n is. (More precisely, it is either an approximation to a real physical
property, or else it is a real but inexact, or an imperfectly accurate, physical property—like the
straightness of a drawn line, or the rectangularity of a book.)
Dynamic structuralism thus resonates with a broader tradition of observing that modern
physical objects are difficult, if not impossible, to imagine or 'picture'. It is impossible to imagine
how quarks smell, because they do not have sensory qualities—although they do have properties
like mass. This is the underlying realist import of Ernst Cassirer's observation that “it is precisely
the complex mathematical concepts, such as possess no possibility of direct sensuous realization,
that are continually used in the construction of mechanics and physics.”712 Likewise, it is the
'structural realist' insight obliquely conveyed through his claim that “[t]he individual thing is
nothing for the physicist but a system of physical constants.”713
While Cassirer means to describe modern physical objects in general, others make related
points about the non-intuitable character of quantum mechanical phenomena, in particular. Thus
Paul Dirac claims that observable properties (e.g. an electron's position) generally speaking lack
determinate values until they are measured, even for fully specified physical states. This is
because quantum mechanics allows that fully specified states can be unmeasurable
superpositions of the measurable (eigen)states of observables.714 Likewise, Niels Bohr suggests
that quantum theory confronts us with “an essential failure of the pictures in space and time on
712Cassirer 1910/1923, 116.
713Cassirer 1910/1923, 148. Compare Cassirer 1957, 436 and 473. See also Ryckman 2018.
714Compare e.g. Dirac 1958, vii.
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which the description of natural phenomena has hitherto been based.”715
Note that this putative un-imaginability or un-representability of modern physical objects
is not supposed to be simply a matter of their being unfamiliar, or very different from the things
we encounter in everyday experience. Hence, we should not rest content with Ernan McMullin's
suggestion that “[i]f we cannot quite imagine what [electrons] are, this is due to the distance of
the microworld from the world in which our imaginations were formed.”716 McMullin is surely
right that theoretical entities do not have to be 'imaginable in the categories of the macroworld' in
order to be real.717 Yet the point raised by Cassirer, Dirac, and Bohr is not just that (some or all)
modern physical objects are unimaginable in terms of categories applicable to everyday things
like rocks or trees or people. Their claim is that modern physical objects are unimaginable per se,
or in principle, because they lack features prerequisite for being possible objects of imaginative
acts of 'mental picturing'. In particular, Cassirer, Dirac, and Bohr—along with Schrödinger,718
Heisenberg,719 and others—all associate the failure of 'mental pictures' in modern physics, or at
least in quantum mechanics, with a failure of spatiotemporal representation. Whether or how this
relates to lack of sensory qualities like color or smell is debatable, but here Kant's account of
space and time as the forms of our intuition is clearly lurking in the shadows.720
Dynamic structuralism is responsive to these sort of observations, yet without sliding into
any kind of idealism, 'transcendental' or otherwise. The dynamic structures of fundamental
natural forces' empirical impact are unobservable because they are purely intelligible relations. (I
claim that a given thing's being unobservable, in the relevant sense, is analytically entailed by its
being purely intelligible. Purely intelligible things are strictly imperceptible, and in this sense are
unobservable.721) But these dynamic structures are nevertheless concrete physical properties.
None of the above analysis is standard in scientific realism. Some realists may have had
in mind something like dynamic structuralism, all along. But many evidently do not. For
instance, Michael Friedman considers Newton-Cartan theory to be a “new theory of gravitation,”
as opposed to Newton's, whereas I do not.722 Similarly, recall Worrall's claim that he 'can see no
715Bohr 2011, 34-5.
716McMullin 1984, 15.
717McMullin 1984, 14. Compare Eddington 1928, xiii.
718Compare Schrödinger 2014, 130-131 and 143-4.
719Compare Heisenberg 1958, 152.
720...or out in the open, as the case may be. See e.g. Schrödinger 2014, 152.
721Observation, in the sense relevant to science, is direct perception. We can directly conceive purely intelligible 
structures, as well as use them to comprehend observable phenomena, but we cannot directly perceive them.
722Friedman 1983, 95. See note 703 above.
260
clear sense in which an action-at-a-distance force of gravity is a “limiting case” of, or
“approximates” a space-time curvature.' In this respect, Worrall is more like a traditional
scientific realist than I am: he seems to invoke a kind of 'intrinsic' difference between relativistic
spacetime curvature and the field of an action-at-a-distance Newtonian force that many realists
would recognize as physically significant, but which dynamic structuralists as such do not. And,
regardless, I have articulated the dynamic structuralist position clearly and explicitly, in a way
that others have not. I have explained the precise relationship between dynamic structuralism and
other 'structuralist' theories, whereas other realists inclined to agree with me have not.
B. Dynamic structuralism is not just empiricist structuralism, or positivism.
Dynamic structures are not just observable phenomena, or phenomenal structures. The
gravitational acceleration of an apple at a given time is an observable phenomenon. The values
of this observable parameter across time trace out a phenomenal structure or observable 'shape'.
But the dynamic structure of gravitational acceleration is not reducible to observable
acceleration, either at a given time or as a function of time. The apple's observable acceleration at
a given time has a magnitude and direction. But the dynamic structure [-Gm/r(t)2]n is nowhere to
be found 'inside' of this magnitude and direction. There are infinitely many ways of combining
numbers algebraically to arrive at the given magnitude. Not all of these mathematical relations
constitute genuine physical properties. But [-Gm/r(t)2]n does, at least approximately.
Nor are dynamic structures simply abstract representations of observable phenomena.
Genuine dynamic structures are themselves concrete physical properties, albeit purely intelligible
ones. Here it is important to distinguish clearly between dynamic structures, like [-Gm/r(t)2]n,
and mathematical representations thereof. Consider again the gravitational acceleration of a
falling apple. We can mentally represent the mass of the Earth, which is about 5.97x1024 kg. But
our mental representation of this physical property—this quantitatively determinate physical
magnitude—is distinct from the physical property itself. The physical property itself, the Earth's
mass, is not an abstract entity. It is concrete. Likewise, the spatial separation between the apple
and the Earth's center of mass is not an abstract entity, but a concrete physical relation. In turn,
the algebraic relation {[(the Earth's mass) multiplied by (the Newtonian gravitational constant)]
divided by (the square of the spatial separation between the apple and the Earth's center of
mass)} is a purely intelligible relation. But it is a purely intelligible relation between concrete
physical properties or relations. And, I claim, it is a real relation—a natural, physical relation—
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between these concrete physical properties. This relation is not a universal, a concept, or a mere
idea. It is a singular, physical entity. It is a concrete but unobservable dynamic structure.
Nor is dynamic structuralism a kind of positivism. I posit the existence of unobservable
natural forces, and claim that we gain genuine knowledge of their dynamic structures, i.e., the
purely intelligible aspect of their causal impact vis-à-vis observable phenomena. Positivists say
nothing of the sort. Further, I do not claim that the meaning of 'theoretical' terms is reducible to a
pure 'observation language'. Indeed, I do not believe in a pure 'observation language'. I believe
that empirical scientific observations are always 'theory-laden', in the basic sense of being
mediated by specific conceptual frameworks for parsing phenomena. In part for this reason, I do
not believe in immediate awareness of anything like 'sense-data'. I believe that physical
properties like electron spin-states are genuinely observable by the modern scientific community,
but were not observable by early modern natural philosophers. Hence, I believe that the most
long-standing dynamic structures disclosed by science involve less esoteric physical properties,
like mass or relative motion, which have been stably observable for many centuries. 
Relatedly, I claim that competing theories can be observationally equivalent without
disclosing the same unobservable dynamic structures. The same values of observable
gravitational acceleration could be generated by arbitrarily many mathematical functions, cooked
up to 'spit out' the right numbers. For instance, one could simply multiply and divide a genuine








3m 5 . This is not a real dynamic structure, although it yields the same 'predictions'
about observable gravitational acceleration as does Newton's theory of gravity. The second and
third terms have no physical significance. The first does: it is a real physical property.
C. Dynamic structuralism is more responsive to the 'pessimistic meta-induction'
than traditional scientific realism is. A traditional scientific realist would have to explain how
Newtonian action-at-a-distance gravitational force 'in itself' approximately resembles relativistic
spacetime curvature 'in itself'. But a dynamic structuralist like myself can simply point to
continuity in mathematical structure, as indicated in section 1 above, with the following
interpretation. Qua natural force, gravity is an unobservable causal power to produce a certain
kind of impact on observable phenomena—namely, a certain kind of acceleration in massive
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bodies, and geodesic motion in mass-energy more broadly.723 This empirical impact has a purely
intelligible aspect, indicated by a corresponding dynamic structure. Spacetime curvature is this
dynamic structure. Hence, gravity is essentially characterized by physical science as an
unobservable causal power to produce a distinctive empirical impact whose intelligible form is
indicated by a corresponding dynamic structure. And mathematical representations of this














is approximated by the Newtonian
structure [-Gm/r(t)2]n, for example, and we can expect a similar dynamic in all or most instances
of acceptable theory change in mature physical science.
The traditional scientific realist's basic mistake is to try to find continuity across theory
change in unobservable causal powers viewed 'in themselves', rather than continuity in their
empirical impact. The structural empiricist's mistake is to deny that science tells us about
unobservable causal powers, and correlatively to insist that the relevant empirical structures are
just something like what I have called phenomenal structures. The structural empiricist fails to
appreciate the distinction between observable acceleration and unobservable dynamic structures
like [-Gm/r(t)2]n, which physics shows us determine the measurable values of these observable
phenomena. And the standard structural realist's mistake, à la Worrall, is to fail to understand
that physics does tell us about the natures of unobservable things, qua natural forces, because a
causal power's nature just is what it can do. Newtonian gravity is just the cause of gravitational
acceleration ordered by the dynamic structure [Gm/r(t)2]n, and relativistic gravity is just the
cause of gravitational acceleration ordered by an approximately similar structure.
Admittedly, dynamic structuralism is somewhat harder to defend against the 'pessimistic
meta-induction' than is standard structural realism. For the standard structural realist, who often
simply refuses to offer any physical interpretation of the mathematical expressions they
highlight, it is easier to maintain that 'structure' thus construed is retained across theory change.
But, as we have seen, the cost of this refusal is that uninterpreted mathematical structure is not a
genuine physical entity or property. (Moreover, it has been widely argued that any physical
system can be said to realize a given uninterpreted mathematical structure, as long as the
physical system in question has the right cardinality—i.e., roughly, enough objects.724)
723E.g. photons, which are massless, are nevertheless affected by gravity (as in gravitational lensing, etc.).
724See e.g. Newman 1928 and Demopolous and Friedman 1985. French and Ladyman (2003) seem to suggest that 
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What exactly does the dynamic structuralist as such have to be ontologically committal
about? The two basic things that dynamic structures comprise: physical properties like mass,
charge, spatial separation, etc.; and purely intelligible algebraic relations that obtain between
these physical properties, like the relation [-Gm/r(t)2]n. What does this mean, vis-à-vis the
pessimistic meta-induction? Clearly, there is no problem with respect to the algebraic relations.
The meaning of multiplication, division, etc., does not change across radical theory change. The
more troublesome component of dynamic structures is their constitutive physical properties. For
instance, the 'm' in the long general relativistic expression for relative acceleration in a binary
system on the previous page refers to mass-energy (see section 1 above), whereas the 'm' in [-
Gm/r(t)2]n refers to the gravitational mass of a given body. Does this difference not undermine
my claim to continuity across theory change? Or what about broader differences between mass
as Newton understood it, and mass as it is understood in relativistic physics? Or what about the
difference between Newtonian gravity construed as the cause of acceleration in massive bodies,
and relativistic gravity construed as (I claim) the cause of geodesic motion in loci of mass-
energy, including but not limited to gravitational acceleration in massive bodies?
I cannot fully address this issue here: it is critically important, but complex, and demands
further investigation. I hope that I have shown that dynamic structuralism has many advantages
over salient alternatives even if it does not ultimately fulfill Worrall's ambition for a 'best of both
worlds' response to the pessimistic meta-induction and the no-miracles argument. But I will
make a few points in defense of dynamic structuralism, vis-à-vis the pessimistic meta-induction.
First, certain physical properties that figure prominently in many dynamic structures do
not raise the kind of worries that properties like mass do. For instance, the meaning of spatial
separation seems to me to have been stable enough across the past several hundred years of
physical science that the 'r' in the above classical and general relativistic expressions for
gravitational acceleration is legitimately construed as referring to the same physical property.
Second, some apparent changes in the meanings of variables in expressions representing
dynamic structures are not as problematic as they may seem. For instance, the transition from the
classical understanding of gravitational force as the cause of observable acceleration to my more
modern (albeit still somewhat esoteric) understanding of gravity as the cause of a certain
component of observable geodesic motion does not seem to me especially damaging vis-à-vis the
Newman's objection does not arise if one adopts the semantic view of theories. Cf. Ainsworth 2009.
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prospects for some kind of convergent realism. Geodesic motion is a more general phenomenon
than is gravitational acceleration, per se, but it still encompasses it. And to say that gravity is the
cause of gravitational acceleration in massive bodies does still seem to me approximately correct,
even though it may be more accurate, or at least comprehensive, to say that gravity is the cause
of that component of geodesic motion which corresponds to non-zero spatiotemporal curvature,
insofar as this curvature is influenced (but not determined) by the distribution of mass-energy.
Relatedly, although we now draw certain distinctions with respect to mass that Newton
did not, like the distinction between rest-mass and relativistic mass, these do not seem to
undermine the prospects for a dynamic structuralist response to the pessimistic meta-induction.
Mass is still widely construed (qua inertial) as a power of resistance to acceleration, and (qua
gravitational) as a source of gravity. Mass-energy stands in a straightforward functional
relationship to relativistic mass, which in turn stands in a straightforward functional relationship
to rest mass. And mass construed by Newton as a locus of inertia, or the 'inherent force of
matter', is approximately similar to rest mass as construed in modern relativistic physics.
Finally, again, I concede that scientific advancement sometimes constitutes as measurable
physical properties which were previously unmeasurable—e.g. subatomic particles' spin and
color charge. In such cases, physical science discloses radically new dynamic structures. But this
seems perfectly true, and no real threat to any plausible kind of convergent realism. The isolation
of new physical properties does not undermine the validity of previous scientific theorizing. It
simply suggests that earlier scientific knowledge is incomplete, and sometimes radically so. But
this fact is already acknowledged by every serious-minded scientific realist. 
D. Dynamic structuralism emphasizes causal relations because they help to ground
realistic explanations of the empirical success of science. It is one thing to notice that there are
certain 'patterns' in phenomena that we have observed. It is quite another thing to explain these
already-observed patterns, or why we should believe that they are projectable beyond existing
observations, let alone to explain the individual observable phenomena they comprise.
Dynamic structuralism offers this explanatory ground. Individual observable phenomena
like an apple's gravitational acceleration at a given time are causally explained by appeal to
unobservable natural forces—in this case, gravity. And they are structurally explained by appeal
to corresponding dynamic structures like [-Gm/r(t)2]n. Without positing an actual but
unobservable causal power, one cannot adequately explain the full range of physically possible
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accelerations that are not actually realized—e.g., if there were no massive body to be causally
impacted at a given point in space. Without positing the corresponding dynamic structure, one
cannot adequately explain the systematic interrelation between different actual or physically-
possible instances of gravitational acceleration. That is, without positing dynamic structures, one
can causally explain phenomenal spaces comprising observable effects that actual natural forces
can produce; but one cannot fully understand the nature of these unobsevable natural forces.
Why causal relations, rather than something like nomological relations? Simply put,
because I am skeptical that nomological relations suffice to ground truly realistic scientific
explanations, absent further grounding of these nomological relations in actual causal powers.
Here it is helpful to consider a third kind of scientific 'structuralism': structural idealists claim
that the explanatorily-basic 'structures' disclosed by science are abstract entities, whether it be
mathematical objects, ideal Forms, laws of nature, or mental arrangements of 'sense data'. Note
that structural idealism is compatible with standard forms of structural realism, if one claims that
the explanatory-basic structures disclosed by science are objectively real but abstract. Again,
recall Tegmark's claims that “our physical world [i.e., 'external physical reality'] is an abstract
mathematical structure.”725 Again, most will reject Tegmark's view. Most people think that
mathematical forms preserved across theory change represent a distinct, concrete physical world.
Nevertheless, I claim that structural idealism is ubiquitous in contemporary philosophy of
science, albeit in subtler forms. To take just one suggestive (if inconclusive) case, consider Tim
Maudlin's proposal that the laws of nature “operate to generate or produce” later states of the
universe from its initial state.726 Maudlin is not a self-described structuralist, let alone structural
idealist. But if the laws of nature—“the patterns that nature respects”727—are abstract entities,
then Maudlin would be committed to the view that abstract 'patterns' literally 'generate' physical
states of affairs.728 This would in turn bear conspicuous resemblance to early modern natural
philosophers' understanding of the laws of nature as pure acts of Will whereby God rationally
orders matter. Some may find idealistic views like this acceptable, but I do not. Electrons are not
pushed around by words, rules, or abstract entities like numbers—especially in the absence of a
divine Mind. This leaves two plausible options: one can deny that laws of nature 'generate'




728I do not claim that Maudlin conceives of the laws of nature as abstract entities, although he may: it is hard to tell.
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But then why not just appeal to dynamic structures, in the absence of underlying natural
forces? Because a dynamic structure that it not grounded in an underlying mind-independent
causal power would be a merely ideal structure, i.e., something like a Platonic Form. And I do
not believe that Forms are capable of causing phenomena like gravitational acceleration. To
suggest otherwise is to indulge in metaphysical idealism, or crypto-idealism, masked by a veneer
of scientific realist commitment to the approximate truth of claims about unobservable entities.
Dynamic structuralism makes more realistic sense of things. Unobservable natural forces
have a causal impact on observable phenomena, e.g. by producing observable gravitational
acceleration. In turn, fields of observable phenomena causally impact us, as intelligent subjects
with powers of sensory perception. Dynamic structures are this causal impact, of unobservable
natural forces on us as intelligent subjects, mediated by observable phenomena. Unobservable
natural forces are objective causal powers to impact observable phenomena, and corresponding
dynamic structures are the purely intelligible aspect of this empirical impact. Gravity causes
apples and other things to fall, and thereby indirectly causes us to have a purely intellectual
apprehension of its dynamic structure, which is approximated by the Newtonian expression [-
Gm/r(t)2]n. An intellectual apprehension of the dynamic structure [-Gm/r(t)2]n is of course a
mental representation. But the dynamic structure itself is a mind-independent physical property.
14.6. In physical science, we objectively represent two main classes of thing: observable
phenomena, and unobservable dynamic structures. The dynamic structures disclosed by physical
science are concrete, not abstract, but they are nevertheless unobservable because they are
constituted by purely intelligible mathematical relations between concrete physical properties.
Dynamic structures have no sensory qualities, nor spatiotemporal properties—although they
make be constituted in part by algebraic relations between spatiotemporal properties.
But in physical science we also apprehend causally-powerful natural forces, or
unobservable causal powers to produce observable phenomena ordered by corresponding
explanatorily-powerful dynamic structures. We apprehend natural forces in part by using them to
mentally order physical properties—namely, by mathematically relating physical properties to
one another, in the image of corresponding dynamic structures. Through physical principles, in
turn, we systematically relate this intellectual apprehension of dynamic structures to observable
phenomena, or the quantitatively determinate measurement of physical properties. This
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principled comprehension of observable phenomena under the ambit of unobservable dynamic
structures is physical explanation, as I understand it. Physical science thus aims at intellectual
apprehension of causally-basic natural forces, through physical explanation. In using dynamic
structures to explain phenomena, we intellectually re-enact fundamental natural forces' impact on
observable reality, and thereby understand them.
15. Physical Force as Transcendental Ground (II): Natural Form
As we have seen, then, Cassirer and a range of physicists—including Dirac, Bohr,
Schrödinger, and Heisenberg—associate the failure of 'mental pictures' in quantum theory or
modern physics more broadly with a failure of spatiotemporal representation. And here, again,
Kant's account of space and time as the 'pure forms' of our sensible intuition is directly on at
least some of their minds. In turn, the more that a traditionalist takes spatiotemporality to be
'merely' a way that things appear to sensuously-perceiving human beings, the more inclined she
will be view modern physics' liberation from 'mental pictures' and “the causal space-time model
of description”729 as progress in the quest for objectivity.
Ironically, then, the modern structuralist aversion to 'intrinsic' properties is often
essentially in keeping with the aspiration to objectivity interpreted as knowledge of things 'in
themselves' rather than as they 'merely appear' to us. For most if not all modern structuralists, our
purely 'structural' knowledge of unobservables is explicitly or implicitly contrasted against our
knowledge of observable things. Hence, there is every reason to suspect that sensory properties
are the paradigmatic 'non-structural' or 'intrinsic' properties for modern structuralists, whether or
not they publicly admit this or even privately recognize it. In turn, sensory qualities like color
and smell are often taken to be the quintessential properties that things have 'merely insofar as
they appear to us', rather than as they are 'in themselves'. So, it seems fair to conclude that many
modern structural realists interpret 'non-structural' or 'intrinsic' properties as precisely those
properties that things have only insofar as they 'appear' to us, by contrast to 'structural' properties
which things supposedly have 'in themselves'. (Neo-Kantians like Cassirer would agree with
729Bohr 1961, 92. More fully: “This theory [viz., 'symbolic quantum mechanics'] may be regarded as a natural 
generalization of the classical mechanics with which in beauty and self-consistency it may well be compared. 
This goal has not been attained, still, without a renunciation of the causal space-time model of description that 
characterizes the classical physical theories which have experienced such a profound clarification through the 
theory of relativity.”
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structural realists that the assignment of 'structural' properties differentiates 'physically
determinate objects' from mere 'sensuous things', but insist that physical objects are still
phenomena rather than things-in-themselves.) Thus structuralism may involve the
epistemological reification of an underlying hostility to sensation, or fetishization of rational
form.
Admittedly, structuralism need not be grounded in this sort of rationalistic bias, given
that there is no hostility to sensation necessarily involved in pointing out that truly unobservable
things have no sensuous properties—and possibly no intuitable or 'picturable' form at all. But the
connection is plausible enough to warrant serious consideration. The drive of Cassirer and many
others to overcome “[t]he anthropomorphism of the natural sensuous picture of the world”730
arguably reflects a hostility to sensation and intuitive 'picturing' that is rooted in over-
identification with 'reason' over 'sense', if not the poisonous resentment towards material reality
that Nietzsche finds operative in Plato.
It is pathological for us, as spatiotemporal creatures with basic powers of intuition, to
spurn sensation and imagistic knowledge as the merely 'anthropomorphic' residue of a 'higher'
imageless intellectual truth. Of course it is right that, as Schrödinger says, “imagination and
thought take an increasingly important part (as against crude sense-perception), as science,
[scientific] knowledge of nature, progresses.”731 However, this reflects the nature of scientific
objectivity, not objectivity in general. Setting aside the prejudices of modernity, then, empirical
science is not the only cultural form that provides human beings with genuinely objective
knowledge of the natural world.
One salient alternative canvassed above is to view 'non-structural' or 'intrinsic' properties
as essentially 'private', i.e., as putative qualities that things have independently of their capacity
to impact or be impacted by other things. On this interpretation, a given thing's 'structural'
properties are its real powers, whereas its 'intrinsic' properties are qualities that it supposedly has
qua purely inert, or perhaps qua purely 'self-subsistent' substance. If this is what structuralists
mean by 'structural' as opposed to 'intrinsic' properties, then metaphysical versions of
structuralism basically amount to dynamism, i.e., commitment to a fundamental ontology of
force or causal power. Naturalists in this vein, like myself, will insist that all real properties (as
730Cassirer 1921/1923, 381.
731Schrödinger 1954/2014, 94. I have added the qualifier scientific to Schrödinger's 'knowledge of nature' because I
do not take science to exhaust the field of our knowledge of nature—nor even the field of our objective 
knowledge of nature.
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opposed to merely ideal ones) are powers to impact other natural things, and hence that no real
properties are 'intrinsic', in this specific sense. Thus I claim that real things—i.e. natural things—
have no real properties 'in themselves', if 'in themselves' is taken to mean 'apart from their power
to impact other real things'. My own brand of dynamistic naturalism is thus broadly similar in
spirit to Dirac's view that “science is concerned only with observable things, and […] we can
observe an object only by letting it interact with some outside influence.”732 ('Observability' in
this sense is clearly meant to encompass both 'observables' and 'unobservables' in the distinct
sense that is more immediately relevant to debates about scientific realism.)
But the best interpretation of the distinction between 'structural' and 'intrinsic' properties,
as it pertains to modern structuralism, is perhaps that a thing's 'intrinsic' properties are its causal
powers vis-à-vis ourselves construed as perceiving subjects, whereas 'structural' properties are
objects' causal powers vis-à-vis other objects. For traditionalists who endorse the account of
objective representation as a universally-valid 'view from nowhere', it follows that 'intrinsic'
properties are excluded in principle from objective representation, except insofar as things have
some causal powers vis-à-vis a 'universal subject', i.e. a subject who is no-kind-of-subject-in-
particular. The traditional candidate for this sort of 'causal power in relation to no-kind-of-
subject-in-particular' is form—specifically, rational or purely intelligible form, as opposed to
intuitive form amenable to 'picturing'. Kantians counter that the objects we encounter in
experience are phenomena, not noumena or things-in-themselves, and hence insist that the
concepts through which we comprehend things' intelligible form in fact have valid application
only for subjects with our spatiotemporal form of sensible intuition. Thus strict Kantian
structuralists claim that objective representation is necessarily that of structural relations between
objects rather than objects' immediate sensory impact on perceiving subjects, but insist that
neither sensory qualities nor structural relations can be predicated of things-in-themselves.
Once one understands the distinction in this third way, though, it should become clear
that there is no essential epistemic asymmetry between 'structural' and 'intrinsic' properties. The
way that objects causally impact us can give us perfectly genuine knowledge of them. Of course,
only certain kinds of things are subjects capable of experiencing sensations of color, smell, taste,
etc., and even then only with respect to certain objects. But that does not entail that descriptions
of objects in terms of their sensuous qualities are inaccurate, non-factual, or otherwise
732Dirac 1930/1958, 3. Of course, Dirac is focused specifically on the role that measurement plays in quantum 
mechanics.
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epistemically illegitimate. Objects' sensory properties are real causal powers to impact subjects
with certain perceptual faculties, but this is not 'mere appearance' in any epistemically
problematic sense. Likewise, things' causal powers vis-à-vis other objects are no more properties
of these things 'in themselves' than are their sensory qualities, i.e. their real causal powers of
sensory impact in relation to perceiving subjects. Through their immediate sensory impact on us,
observable things appear to us as they really are—not as they are 'in themselves', but as they
truly are in relation to us.733 In turn, by learning about how they impact other objects, we can
know other aspects of how the same observable things really are—not 'in themselves' or 'inter-
subjectively', but as they truly are in relation to other objects.
Even if we do not have to experience unobservable things through sensation in order to
know them scientifically, clearly our knowledge of unobservables requires that they be brought
under the ambit of some other human faculty. If we cannot sense an electron in a singlet state, or
even intuitively picture it in any more abstract sense, nevertheless we think or conceptualize it.
Bypassing sensation and intuition in favor of purely intelligible 'structure' does not remove us
from 'anthropomorphism' or the 'particularity' of human experience, in a totally unremarkable
sense. Our 'reason' is just as much a human power as is our 'sense'. Pure conceptualization or
strictly intellectual knowledge simply places different 'anthropomorphic' constraints on us than
does intuition or sensation. For instance, aesthetic experience can provide genuinely objective
understanding of mind-independent things, even though the apprehension of beautiful form and
733Can we have experiences of color, tactile sensation, etc., not immediately caused by external objects? Are there 
cases of abnormal sensory experiences, like people with jaundice tasting even normally-sweet things as bitter? 
Of course. How do we know when this is happening? Well, in a variety of ways—e.g. by noticing that someone 
experiencing a given sensation of color or smell is remembering a past experience, or is sleeping rather than 
awake, or is simply imagining, or is sick. I take this to be a question of merely secondary epistemological 
interest, despite how much figures like Descartes have been bothered by the (bizarrely abstract) possibility of an 
'evil demon' sadistically feeding us false impressions about everything. Cartesian radical skepticism is (by 
design) impossible to refute on its own terms. But it has has nothing to do with any remotely plausible theory of 
reality or conception of human knowledge. Cartesian skepticism is predicated on a childish demand for an 
answer to the idiotic question, 'Is the external world really real?' Only someone already fallen prey to 
hypertrophied subjectivity—to excessive interiority and inadequate receptivity to broader reality—could find this
question fully intelligible, let alone urgent.
Compare Heisenberg's suggestion that “metaphysical realism” and the correlative “disagreeable question 
whether 'the things really exist'” (Heisenberg 1958, 88) should be distinguished from 'practical' and 'dogmatic' 
realism: “We 'objectivate' a statement if we claim that its content does not depend on the conditions under which 
it can be verified. Practical realism assumes that there are statements that can be objectivated and that in fact the 
largest part of our experience in daily life consists of such statements. Dogmatic realism claims that there are no 
statements concerning the material world that cannot be objectivated.[...]Natural science is actually possible 
without the basis of dogmatic realism. Metaphysical realism goes one step further than dogmatic realism by 
saying that 'the things really exist.' This is in fact what Descartes tried to prove by the argument that 'God cannot 
have deceived us.'[...]The difficulty of metaphysical realism was felt soon after Descartes and became the 
starting point for the empiricistic philosophy, for sensualism and positivism” (ibid., 81-83).
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sublime force is basically non-conceptual. Thus there are forms of objectivity that are orthogonal
to intellectualization. On the other hand, purely intellectual knowledge or conceptual
understanding can be perversely subjective. For instance, the God of the Judeo-Christian
tradition is quintessentially unobservable: totally devoid of sensory qualities, and existing
outside of space and time.734 Yet idealization of this infinitely intelligent, perfectly moral,
transcendent God is also a paragon of collective subjectivity and self-involvement. The
Enlightenment vision of nature as a rational system made in the image of God's perfect
Intelligence and Beneficence yields only subjective knowledge—an understanding of nature that
is anthropocentric even when not anthropomorphic.
The anthropomorphic picture of an 'intelligent' nature or transcendent God can be
rendered objective in two stages:
First, one must embrace Kant's 'Copernican' revolution, recognizing that the 'intelligence'
or essential 'rationality' that the Judeo-Christian tradition ascribes to nature qua law-governed is
more plausibly the form of our own power of intellect, projected onto nature as an a priori
objective condition of possibility for cognitive experience—albeit not of aesthetic, mythic, or
pragmatic modes of experience. This Kantian inversion is echoed in Hegel's replacement of the
standard God with a 'Spirit' that supposedly achieves self-knowledge in the historical realization
of universal human autonomy in modern liberal society, and in Left Hegelians' more radically
'materialist' diagnosis of consciousness of God as nothing beyond an alienated mode of human
self-consciousness. Hence, I have argued above that specific Judeo-Christian conceptions of God
continue to exert significant influence on contemporary interpretations of scientific objectivity,
laws of nature, and so forth—albeit mediated by real historical processes of secularization.
Second, one must then naturalize our cognitive powers and so reject the idealism of the
Kantian tradition. That is, we must identify the natural grounds of our objective experience. We
must understand how the basic forms of our 'sense' and 'reason' are determined by essential
features of mind-independent reality—without slipping back into the theory of either a
beneficent God or an amoral 'intelligence' manifest in the law-governed order of nature.
734Setting aside traditions that characterize God as immanent in nature (e.g. Spinozism).
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16. Physical Force as Transcendental Ground (III):
Physical Systematicity as the Natural Form of Human Intellect
16.1. There are several ways to see that the basic natural form of our intellectual
understanding is mind-independent physical systematicity: impersonal, amoral, arational
physical order. (Insofar as scientific objectivity involves this distinctively intellectual mode of
understanding, physical systematicity is hence the primal natural form underlying the possibility
of scientific objectivity.) First, we may examine physical systematicity directly in relation to the
ur-form of scientific understanding: the explanatory subsumption of observable phenomena by
an underlying unobservable reality. This is what I have done in the previous section on 'dynamic
structuralism', with attention to the idiosyncratic emphasis on strictly intelligible structures in
physical scientific explanation. Second, we may examine physical systematicity in relation to
early modern conceptions of law-governed order, and the latter's connection to ideas of a
personal 'God' as well as the impersonal 'intelligence' envisioned by Einstein and other
secularized pantheistic rationalists. I have done so earlier above, in Chapter II. Third, we may
look to the relationship between physical systematicity and scientific conceptions of theoretical
virtue, or the explanatory desiderata that guide scientists' choices between competing theories.
16.2. Scientists choose between competing theories using criteria beyond just empirical
fit, or 'saving the phenomena' that have been observed to date. Philosophers of science have
proposed various such 'superempirical' virtues.735 (More precisely, by a 'superempirical' virtue I
will mean a theoretical virtue besides empirical fit or empirical adequacy, where the latter
indicates accuracy with respect to all possible observations, not just those already performed.736)
But Kuhn captures a fairly broad consensus in pointing to consistency, breadth of scope,
simplicity, and fruitfulness as generic virtues of scientific theories, besides the basic virtue of
735The first use of the term 'superempirical' in the context of theory choice seems to be Churchland 1985. Ernan 
McMullin also used 'superempirical' in to refer to theoretical virtues in his earlier work (McMullin 1998), but 
later retreated from it (“'superempirical' and 'non-empirical'[] do not quite fit”) to “complementary virtues” 
(McMullin 2014, 565). 
736McMullin draws the same distinction, and makes a good point about its relation to theory choice: empirical 
adequacy “cannot[...]be employed in theory assessment as a criterion. Attributing empirical adequacy to a theory
is a promissory claim; it cannot be definitively made good. Empirical adequacy is a goal of theory, of course, and
as such could qualify as a theory virtue but not one itself relevant to the task of assessment” (McMullin 2014, 
565). Cf. van Fraassen 1980.
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accuracy (by which he means empirical fit).737 Kuhn allows that this list is incomplete, but
insists that “together with others of much the same sort” these desiderata constitute “the shared
basis” of historical scientific theory choice.738 Some commentators even claim that philosophical
theory choice should be guided by the same theoretical virtues that underlie 'abductive' inference
to the best explanation in the sciences.739
Kuhn argues that these basic desiderata, the “characteristics of a good scientific
theory,”740 all function as values amenable to highly variable interpretation and application, not
as precise rules that always dictate a clear 'winner' among any given set of competing theories.
This of course amounts to a direct repudiation of logical empiricists' quest to develop a precise
'inductive logic'.741 Kuhn suggests that this inherent vagueness, along with tension between
different explanatory values and the ambiguity of their relative weighting,742 makes it possible
for scientists to disagree about the merits of a given theory while nevertheless sharing the same
basic criteria of explanatory success.743 Thus Kuhn's model of theory choice lends simultaneous
credence to two intuitive but superficially incompatible notions: that there is broad scientific
agreement about basic theoretical virtues, but that substantial disagreement among experts in a
given domain of scientific research is nevertheless often perfectly reasonable.744 
Notably, then, philosophers of science generally agree that researchers do and should
choose between competing theories with an eye towards desiderata beyond empirical adequacy.
These 'superempirical' theoretical virtues are best construed as values, as Kuhn argues, rather
than precise rules or norms. And the virtues that ground distinctively scientific conceptions of
explanatory success apparently include criteria like simplicity, fertility, and scope. However,
737Kuhn 1977. By 'accuracy', Kuhn means that “consequences deducible from a theory should be in demonstrated 
agreement with the results of existing experiments and observations” (ibid., 321)
738Kuhn 1977, 322 (original emphasis).
739For instance, see Williamson 2016, 268. Williamson explicitly links the 'broadly abductive methodology' he 
advocates to “the intrinsic virtues of a good theory,” specifically 'simplicity' and 'strength' (ibid., 266). Notably, 
these are the two virtues highlighted in David Lewis' 'best systems' account of laws of nature (see Lewis 1973, 
1983, and 1994).
740Ibid., 321.
741Cf. Carnap 1962, 223.
742Ibid., 322-324.
743 In particular, Kuhn identifies five explanatory norms widely shared over time and across disciplinary 
boundaries: accuracy, consistency, breadth of scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness. Kuhn acknowledges that this 
list is not exhaustive, but claims that “together with others of much the same sort,” these five values are 
constituents of “the shared basis” underlying historical theory choice (Kuhn 1977, 322, original emphasis). 
744 Kuhn argues that it is also beneficial for scientific decision-making to support divergence: disagreement 
grounds the simultaneous pursuit of incompatible theories, which serves as a form of bet-hedging for the 
scientific community, facilitating the pursuit of nascent (and potentially revolutionary) theories while remaining 
responsive to the reality that new theories rarely enjoy sustained success (Kuhn 1977, 332).
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there has been protracted disagreement about the justificatory status of even commonplace
virtues like simplicity and fertility.745
The major fault lines in this debate are intuitive. Some claim that virtues like simplicity
or fertility are related to epistemic phenomena like (approximate) truth, likelihood, confirmation,
or the projectability of empirical regularities—at least, insofar as these 'virtues' are truly
appropriate criteria for scientific decision-making.746 Thus some scientific realists try to show
that virtues like simplicity have confirmational value, in an effort to justify their abductive
inferences to the (approximate) literal truth of our best scientific theories. Similarly, some
scientific anti-realists argue that the history of science grounds legitimate inductive arguments to
the effect that deference to traditional standards of superempirical theoretical virtue—perhaps
subject to specific interpretations and relative weightings that vary between domains of inquiry747—
has reliably resulted in the development of empirically adequate (or increasingly empirically
adequate) theories, and hence plausibly will continue to do so. Of course, this inductive
argument is equally available to scientific realists if it is strengthened by insisting that a theory's
(increasing) empirical adequacy evidences its (at least approximate) truth. Kuhn, Quine and
Ullian, and McMullin have all endorsed realist or anti-realist variations on this basic inductive
defense of traditional superempirical virtues.748 Finally, some more old-fashioned metaphysical
realists assert the epistemic value of traditional superempirical theoretical virtues by claiming a
priori insight into the universe's amenability to accurate description via mathematically elegant,
ontologically parsimonious, far-ranging theories749—perhaps because 'God made it so,' as Dirac
once casually justified his view of mathematical beauty as a hallmark of sound physical
theory.750
But other parties reject this epistemic approach. Some non-epistemic theorists insists that
desiderata like simplicity are just pragmatic or aesthetic virtues.751 Others emphasize political
745I will not distinguish between 'fertility', 'fruitfulness', and 'fecundity' in this context.
746With respect to truth, see Hempel ([2000], ch. 5) and van Fraassen ([1980], p. 87). Van Fraassen (ibid., p. 90) 
also denies a link between traditional superempirical desiderata and empirical adequacy.
747On the contextually-varying value of simplicity, see Salmon [1990], p. 186. 
748See Kuhn 1977, 335; Quine and Ulian 1970, 47; McMullin 1988, 366.
749Relatedly, Kantian metaphysical anti-realists may claim that traditional superempirical virtues are at least 
partially constitutive of an idea of the unity of science that is 'required by reason' as a regulative ideal.
750Hempel 2000, 81. Cf. the less metaphysically-loaded explanation that Dirac offered in print ([1954], p. 268). 
Relatedly, Duhem notes intuitive associations between superempirical theoretical virtues and truth, claims that 
we cannot justify them, and yet retains a place for them as necessary 'acts of faith' (Duhem 1906/1991, 26-7).
751Here recall, for instance, that Mach and neo-instrumentalists like van Fraassen all interpret features like 
simplicity and breadth of scope as essentially pragmatic virtues. Recall also Duhem's appeal to the 'beauty' of 
physical theories.
275
factors that make certain theoretical virtues seem attractive or unattractive, in specific social
contexts.752 Others see virtues like simplicity as aims valuable 'finally', or purely for their own
sake.753 Still others treat virtues like simplicity as constitutive features of science that have no
force on those outside the scientific 'game'.754 Members of either the epistemic or the non-
epistemic camp may claim that the more virtuous a theory is, the more explanatory power it has
and understanding it provides.755
These conventionalist, pragmatic, epistemic, and naive realist interpretations are all
inadequate. We should instead look to find traditional theoretical virtues' ontological
significance. Their epistemic status, and their epistemological function as basic transcendental
conditions underlying the possibility of scientific objectivity, can only be fully understood in
relation to this ontological analysis.
16.3. Physical order is the ontological correlate to a cluster of standard theoretical virtues
that I will refer to collectively as the virtue of systematicity: empirical adequacy, precision,
simplicity, and breadth of scope. The unobservable phenomena posited by a given scientific
theory are more likely to be real insofar as it strongly displays the virtue of systematicity. This is
not because 'God made it so,' or anything of the sort. It is because unobservable things' empirical
reality just is their causal power to produce corresponding fields of physically-ordered
observable phenomena, and the virtue of systematicity is directly constitutive of the scientific
notion of evidence for the existence of this causal power. This is not meant to be a non-question-
752E.g. see Longino's argument in defense of a set of alternative 'feminist theoretical virtues', such as ontological 
heterogeneity and novelty (Longino 1995, 1996, 1997): she argues that these alternative virtues 'reveal gender' 
(1996, 50) in social contexts structured by gendered power asymmetries, and by contrast that the structure and 
mechanisms of gender are obscured by commitment to traditional theoretical virtues (1995, 1996).
753For a thing to be valuable for its own sake or finally (as opposed to merely instrumentally) is distinct from its 
being valuable intrinsically or 'in itself' (as opposed to extrinsically or in relation to something else). See 
Korsgaard ([1983]).
754In this vein, Kuhn (1977, 331) argues that “[d]ifferent creative disciplines are characterized, among other things, 
by different sets of shared values,” and suggests that desiderata like empirical adeuquacy, simplicity, breadth of 
scope, and fruitfulness are essential characteristics of the scientific discipline. (He elaborates: “Change the list, 
for example by adding social utility as a criterion, and some particular choices will be different, more like those 
one expects from an engineer. Subtract accuracy of fit to nature from the list, and the enterprise that results may 
not resemble science at all, but perhaps philosophy instead” [ibid.].) Likewise, Hempel notes that science “is 
widely conceived as seeking to formulate an increasingly comprehensive, systematically organized, world view 
that is explanatory and predictive,” and suggests that traditional explanatory desiderata like accuracy, 
consistency, simplicity, scope, and fruitfulness “may best be viewed as attempts to articulate this conception 
somewhat more fully and explicitly” (Hempel 1983, 91).
755However, many realists will here add the qualifier '…provided that the given theory is also at least 
approximately true'.
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begging argument against scientific anti-realism. It is meant to be an account of the specific
sense in which systematicity is a sign of theories' literal truth, presupposing scientific realism.
Here my view is helpfully compared to Quine's. He argues as follows, in an essay on
“Posits and Reality”:756 Basic physics teaches us that everday solid objects like desks are really
'swarms' of vibrating molecules. Physicists' evidence for this 'molecular doctrine' is at root a
matter of its realizing basic explanatory virtues like simplicity, scope, fecundity, familiarity of
principle (analogous to Kuhn's 'external consistency'),757 and empirical adequacy. So while the
molecular doctrine evidently “bears directly on unobservable reality,” nevertheless “any defense
of it has to do rather with its indirect bearing on observable reality.”758 Notably, we could
eliminate the molecular doctrine's unobservable 'core' while preserving the observable
consequences we derived from it as 'autonomous empirical laws'. This raises a skeptical worry:
“Might the molecular doctrine not be ever so useful in organizing and extending our knowledge
of the behavior of observable things, and yet be factually false?”759
After all, Quine notes, science clearly arrived at the notion of a 'swarm' of molecules by
way of analogy to the experience of observable swarms—of hovering gnats, floating dust
particles in a shaft of sunlight, and so forth. So perhaps the idea of an unobservable swarm of
molecules is mere ly analogical or figurative, not literally true. Indeed, the famous
complementarity of particle-like and wave-like descriptions in quantum mechanics suggests that
the picture of an unobservable 'swarm' of atoms or elementary particles is at best incomplete, and
in the final analysis perhaps even entirely dispensable. Thus it may seem that apparent physical
posits of unobservable particles may really just be devices for organizing our experience of
observable objects. But then one might argue that our evidence for the existence of observable
objects is ultimately of the same kind as our evidence for the existence of unobservable objects:
perhaps “[t]he positing of either sort of body is good science insofar merely as it helps us
formulate our laws—laws whose ultimate evidence lies in the sense data of the past, and whose
ultimate vindication lies in anticipation of sense data of the future.”760 The result would seem to
be the radical phenomenalist's “double verdict of unreality,” which leaves us with an ontological
756Quine 1966, 233-241.
757“Another [benefit credited to the molecular doctrine] is familiarity of principle: the already familiar laws of 





fundament of “nothing[...]but the raw sense data themselves.”761
But Quine argues that this is a fallacious inference, stemming from a conflation of three
different types of 'fundamentality'. Unobservable physical particles are 'naturally' fundamental:
“laws of behavior of those particles afford, so far as we know, the simplest formulation of a
general theory of what happens.”762 Common-sense bodies like tables and rocks are 'conceptually
fundamental': “it is by reference to them that the very notions of reality and evidence are
acquired, and that the concepts which have to do with physical particles or even with sense data
tend to be framed and phrased.”763 Thus “[u]nless we change meanings midstream, the familiar
bodies around us are as real as can be.”764 Likewise, “[h]aving noted that man has no evidence
for the existence of bodies beyond the fact that their assumption helps him organize experience,
we should have done well, instead of disclaiming evidence for the existence of bodies, to
conclude: such, then, at bottom, is what evidence is, both for ordinary bodies and for
molecules.”765 And sense-data are 'evidentially' fundamental: “every man is beholden to his
senses for every hint of bodies.”766 Quine notes (rightly) that sense-data are no less 'posits' than
bodies are: “[t]hey are posits of psychological theory,” which “may be construed as a
hypothetical component of subjective experience standing in closest possible correspondence to
the experimentally measurable conditions of physical stimulation of the end organs.”767
My own scheme can be understood in relation to Quine's, although it differs in several
respects. On my view, empirical scientific understanding treats observable phenomena as
existentially and hence confirmationally fundamental. The 'empirical basis' functions in science
as the paradigm of that which truly exists or actually happens. Again, observability in the sense
relevant to empirical science is a joint pragmatic-psychological designation, grounded in a
liberal-universalistic appeal to the amenability of certain natural phenomena to direct sensory
perception by more or less anyone. Only sensible objects, i.e. things with sensory qualities, can
be 'observed' or 'directly perceived', in the sense relevant to empirical science. But direct sensory
perception that a given thing is a certain kind of observable object also requires the pre-









really just to observe another conceptually-determinate kind of thing or else a purely
indeterminate something, from which the existence of a dog can at most be indirectly inferred.
Observations and facts about observability are thus inevitably 'theory-laden'. It matters to
scientific epistemology whether one observes the mountains on the Moon through the telescope
a s the mountains on the Moon, or just 'observes' them a s a pattern of light and dark in the
telescope lens itself. Hence, what we are and are not able to directly perceive does indeed vary as
our theoretical understanding of the world changes. But human beings in fact have enough stable
folk-theoretical common ground that science can still be empirically progressive or accumulative
at the level of observable facts. At root, then, in empirical scientific understanding we know that
unobservable things exist because they successfully explain observable things that we know to
exist by simple common sense. Empirical science is thus essentially liberal-universalistic, or
mass-democratic.
Contra Quine, sense-data are no more evidentially fundamental in empirical science than
are observable objects like a needle on the dial of a laboratory device. If anything, common-
sense observable objects are evidentially prior to sense-data. In virtually any imaginable domain
of empirical scientific inquiry, the existence of the needle on the dial would be taken to be more
secure than the existence of a cluster of sense-data that (hypothetically) grounds observers'
mental representations of this needle. Sense-data may be psychologically fundamental in
empirical scientific cognition, but they are existentially and evidentially derivative for scientific
understanding. The existence of dial-needle-sensations is grounded in the existence of the dial
needle, not vice versa. And in scientific experience we are immediately aware of the needle
itself, not pre-objectual needle-sensory-impressions. Aesthetic experience, however, does
essentially involve the direct non-cognitive awareness of sensory qualities.
Unobservable or 'hypothetical' things are explanatorily fundamental in empirical science.
Scientific understanding essentially involves explaining observable phenomena by appeal to the
properties of unobservable things or 'theoretical' entities. Note that 'unobservability' in the
relevant sense is a contextual rather than absolute designation: something is 'unobservable'
insofar as we infer its existence from its explanatory power vis-à-vis 'observable' phenomena,
rather than by directly perceiving it. In principle, then, a given thing can be observable in some
contexts (when directly perceived) and unobservable in others (when its nature is inferred from
the way it explains directly perceivable phenomena). But the basic objects of modern physical
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theory are strictly unobservable. Unobservable physical phenomena do not causally explain
observable phenomena, in scientific understanding. Rather, in purely scientific understanding
observable phenomena are structurally explained by unobservable physical phenomena.
Systematicity is transcendentally fundamental in empirical scientific understanding. Here
it is crucial to respect the distinction between reality and mere existence. The immediately
observable objects of common-sense experience clearly exist. This is undeniable to all but
Cartesian skeptics, who are trapped inside their own minds in a way that is plainly pathological.
In turn, the existence of unobservable things that are causally responsible for certain
commonsensically observable phenomena is evidenced by the systematicity of corresponding
theories. Every good scientific theory as such displays the theoretical virtue of systematicity.
Hence, every good scientific theory as such discloses mind-independent physical order, which I
argue reflects causal hierarchies between unobservable and observable things. Scientific
understanding distinctively involves taking systematicity as the basic criterion of (empirical)
reality. The absence of systematicity is always merely apparent, for scientific understanding.
Natural phenomena become scientifically real only to the extent that they are systematized. A
plainly observable phenomenon like the position of a needle on a dial has no inherent scientific
significance. The needle clearly exists, of course. But this does not guarantee its intelligibility for
scientific understanding, nor even its empirical reality. Neither observable nor unobservable
things are scientifically intelligible in themselves. Unobservables are scientifically intelligible
only in relation to observable phenomena that they produce systematically. And observables are
scientifically intelligible only in relation to the unobservables that systematically produce them.
Observable things are objective appearances, for empirical science. And they become objective
appearances for science only insofar as they are explained by appeal to unobservable reality.
Scientific intelligibility is directly predicated on systematicity. 
Imperceptible things exist. And the way that we know about them, through science, is to
use theoretical accounts of their properties and behavior to systematically explain observable
phenomena. Successful explanation of observable phenomena using theories that strongly
display the virtue of systematicity just is how it is possible for us to know facts about
unobservable reality. This is not an empirical claim. We do not learn from experience that
systematic theories give us accurate factual knowledge of unobservable reality. The link between
systematicity and the approximate literal truth of scientific claims about unobservables cannot be
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empirically refuted, and it cannot be empirically confirmed. Scientific understanding stipulates a
priori that systematicity is the hallmark of empirical reality, and that its absence is always only
apparent.
16.4. Systematicity is the a priori form of human intellectual understanding, and hence
functions as the basic transcendental ground of scientific objectivity. But this does not entail
Kantian idealism. For what does it mean that systematicity is the basic form of the human
intellect? Is it just a brute fact that we are so constituted? Or can this fact about the human mind
be accounted for naturalistically, in relation to a broader understanding of mind-independent
reality? Clearly the latter. Physical systematicity is a basic feature of the natural world.
One might attempt to naturalize the claim that systematicity is the basic transcendental
form of intellectual understanding by appeal to broadly Darwinian considerations of
evolutionary fitness. That is, one might claim that differential receptivity to physical
systematicity promoted human reproductive fitness, in a way that was favored by natural
selective pressure. In short, one could argue that we use physical systematicity as a criterion of
empirical reality because doing so 'works' for us, in a pragmatic sense. However, this raises a
skeptical worry about the relationship between pragmatic value and truth: could it not be that it
works for us, pragmatically, to take physical systematicity as if it were a basic criterion of
empirical reality, even without this being true or epistemically correct? The sensible reply is that
while this may be conceivable, in the same vague sense as is Descartes' skeptical hypothesis that
we may be trapped in a lucid dream or constantly fed false sense-impressions by an 'evil genius',
nevertheless it is highly implausible and bizarrely paranoiac. A far more plausible explanation,
evidently, is that our a priori appeal to systematicity as a theoretical virtue 'works' for us—to the
extent that it does—because systematicity in theories corresponds directly to mind-independent
physical order, which really is a basic feature of nature. For surely, as John Dewey notes, the
basic “requirements of continued existence make indispensable some attention to the actual facts
of the world.”768 And the pervasiveness of physical order is quite plausibly central among this
768Dewey 1920, 10. He elaborates: “The sailor is more likely to be given to what we now term superstitions than 
say the weaver, because his activity is more at the mercy of sudden change and unforeseen occurrence. But even 
the sailor while he may regard the wind as the uncontrollable expression of the caprice of a great spirit, will still 
have to become acquainted with some purely mechanical principles of adjustment of boat, sails and oar to the 
wind. Fire may be conceived as a supernatural dragon because some time or other a swift, bright and devouring 
flame called before the mind s eye the quick-moving and dangerous serpent. But the housewife who tends the 
fire and the pots wherein food cooks will still be compelled to observe certain mechanical facts of draft and 
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class of pragmatically-indispensable facts.
But the a priori stipulation of physical order in scientific understanding, which grounds
the a priori scientific appeal to the theoretical virtue of systematicity, is not essentially
pragmatic. The evolutionary-psychological explanation by appeal to adaptive fitness is not
entirely plausible, and at any rate is not ontologically fundamental. It is often not pragmatically
beneficial to apprehend the kinds of real physical order that our intellect makes salient. Einstein
understood this perfectly well, noting that “[t]hose whose acquaintance with scientific research is
derived chiefly from its practical results easily develop a completely false notion of the mentality
of the men who, surrounded by a skeptical world, have shown the way to those like-minded with
themselves, scattered through the earth and the centuries.”769 Foundational research in science is
clearly often divorced from any real concern for practical utility. This could be a non- or
indirectly-adaptive use of a faculty that was naturally selected for use in more immediately
useful contexts, of course. But it is not clear that this is a strong explanation. Relatedly, but even
more importantly, a Darwinian evolutionary explanation of physical order's role as the basic
form of our intellectual understanding still places humans and their needs at the center of human
experience. It is still unduly anthropocentric. It is still excessively subjective.
More objectively, physical order is the a priori form of human intellectual understanding
because systematic theories as such disclose physical order, and physical order is a fundamental
aspect of the natural world. Here a skeptic may protest: 'Why should we assume or expect that
human nature, or one of our essential cognitive powers, neatly tracks the fundamental aspects of
mind-independent reality?' But this skepticism is misguided. We should expect that human
nature is determined by fundamental aspects of mind-independent reality because we are natural
beings, where to be a natural being is to either be a fundamental feature of the natural world, or
else to have one's essence determined by fundamental features of the natural world. Hence, for
beings like us that do not in fact lie at the center of reality—who are not gods—, to be natural is
to be essentially determined by higher modes of force. In this light, then, it need not be 'adaptive'
for us to be cognitively determined by order-producing physical force. It is simply a fact about a
replenishment, and passage from wood to ash. Still more will the worker in metals accumulate verifiable details 
about the conditions and consequences of the operation of heat. He may retain for special and ceremonial 
occasions traditional beliefs, but everyday familiar use will expel these conceptions for the greater part of the 
time, when fire will be to him of uniform and prosaic behavior, controllable by practical relations of cause and 
effect” (1920, 11). See also ibid., 89-91.
769Einstein 1949, 28.
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natural hierarchy. Physical force is elemental, and it determines the basic form of our intellect. 
Nature is not intelligent. It is not trying to achieve self-consciousness or 'know itself' in
human thought. We are intelligent, as humans. But the broader natural world is also not
essentially intelligible or amenable to our power of intellectual understanding. Although physical
order is amenable to our intellectual understanding, this is not its essence or nature. Rather, it is
part of o u r nature to be intellectually receptive to it. Physical order is amenable to our
intellectual understanding because ordering force determines the basic form of our intellect.
The objective representational contents of empirical science are observable phenomena
and the unobservable things that systematically explain them. The intelligible form of these
contents is physical order: the systematic determination of observable phenomena by
unobservable reality. And the real causal ground of this form is elemental physical force.
16.5. This framework helps to explain why quantum mechanics is so strange: it closely
approximates the ideal of strictly scientific explanation, or purely intellectual understanding of
empirical reality. A quantum mechanical wavefunction is not a measurable phenomenon, but an
unobservable physical structure which systematically explains measurable phenomena. Namely,
a physical system's wavefunction is an unobservable structure that explains the statistical form of
the results of possible observations performed on this system. A wavefunction is not essentially a
pragmatic tool for organizing our experience of observable phenomena, although of course it has
this instrumental effect. Somewhat more deeply, a wavefunction is a strictly intelligible physical
structure. It has no sensory qualities or determinate spatiotemporal form that could be directly
perceived or imaginatively 'pictured'. It has no intuitable ('intrinsic') properties, only intelligible
(purely 'structural') properties. Wavefunctions' existence can only be inferred indirectly from the
systematic explanatory power of quantum mechanics. More deeply, wavefunctions are not
merely ideal forms, mental representations, or abstract entities. They are concrete but strictly
intelligible dynamic structures that explain the phenomenal structure of possible measurements.
But we must dig deeper still. How can unobservable physical structure explain
observable phenomena? How can structure explain anything, if not by a kind of magical-
idealistic power of 'formal causation'?
The structural explanations of maximally objective empirical science are ontologically
grounded in underlying, non-structural causal relations. Namely, real physical structure is the
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structure of a real mode of natural force. Observable phenomena are the effect that scientific
understanding explains. A specific mode of unobservable natural force—which we may refer to
generically as elemental physical force—is the real cause of this effect. And unobservable
physical structure is the form of this force. That is, explanatorily-basic physical structures are the
unobservable 'shapes' of elemental physical forces' real causal impact on observable things.
Scientific objectivity involves the sensory perception of observable phenomena, the
intellectual comprehension of physical structures that explain them, and the purely intuitive
apprehension of the elemental forces of which these physical structures are the intelligible forms.
Physical structures are intelligible fields of causally fundamental but 'intrinsically' unobservable
modes of natural force. Physical structures are elemental force fields.
Quantum mechanical wavefunctions are are the fields of elemental quantum force.
Quantum force (which is apparently non-local) plays a role in quantum mechanics analogous to
that of gravitational force in the general theory of relativity. Construed as an elemental physical
force, gravity causes the observable inertial motion of free bodies. The gravitational field, or the
metric field defined on the spacetime manifold, is just the concrete but purely intelligible
'pattern' of this inertial motion. Observable phenomena are represented in physical science as the
effect or causal impact of unobservable forces. This causal impact in turn has structure, including
the kind of concrete but purely intelligible dynamic structure that physical scientific explanation
highlights. But impact is not caused by its own structure. Impact is caused by real force.
Observable inertial motion is caused by a real but unobservable natural force of gravity, not by
the gravitational field or curvature of spacetime.
Why do theorists normally not discuss 'quantum force' or 'gravitational force', then? Why
do they only discuss wavefunctions and spatiotemporal curvature, along with 'the phenomena'?
Because elemental physical forces are not part of the objective contents of purely scientific
representation. Nevertheless, they ground its objective validity. Modern physical scientific
explanation collapses into metaphysical idealism if one refuses to posit 'transcendent' forces.
17. Physical Force as an 'Immanent' (Quasi-)Empirical Object (I):
Inertial Force as Pure Impetus, Not Resistance, for Poetic Understanding
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17.1. What happens when you take a step onto the hard earth? One standard narrative is
as follows: you exert a downwards force on the ground through your foot, and the ground 'pushes
back' up on your foot with an 'equal and opposite' force. But you move up more than the Earth
moves down, despite the equality of the 'opposite' forces in this interaction, because the Earth is
far more inertially massive than you, i.e. it has a far greater power of resisting acceleration.
This common story raises several questions, for the dynamist who claims that 'reality is
force'. First, is inertial mass a 'force'? Second, is this interaction 'agonistic' or 'hierarchical'? If
every interaction involving 'equal and opposite' forces is agonistic, then 'hierarchy' will be hard
to come by. Third, if this interaction is not agonistic, then which term is dominant, and why?
More broadly, the physicist's systematic appeal to phenomena like inertia and the
conservation of momentum or energy constitutes one respect in which modern physics seems
especially far from Nietzsche's metaphysics, if not also that of pre-modern paganism and child
dynamism. For these physical phenomena seem not to involve any self-overcoming of the sort
that Nietzsche emphasizes, but rather precisely the kind of self-preservation that he disdains as a
“superfluous teleological principle[]” (BGE 13). (Recall that he views the Darwinian 'struggle for
existence' as a a derivative phenomenon, arising only where life's basic self-expansive impulse is
denied in confrontation with a superior power, to which the lesser can only react or adapt. Hence,
self-preservation is self-overcoming as it manifests in the relatively weak.)
So, again, how should the modern scientific dynamist—for whom reality is force, but
who is nevertheless also more scientifically responsible than Nietzsche—understand 'self-
preservative' phenomena like inertia that are so basic to modern physics? Below, I will briefly
develop the following proposal:
It is possible to construct more dynamic ways of viewing apparently 'self-preservative'
physical phenomena like inertial mass. I will do so here, by showing how inertial mass can be re-
interpreted as a power of pure active and reactive impetus, rather than any kind of resistance to
acceleration. The resulting picture is (by design) entirely consistent with the empirical
predictions and mathematical formalism of Newtonian and relativistic physics. But it
nevertheless seems 'off', as will become clearer below, in a way that I argue illuminates the
nature and limits of scientific representation, as well as its relation to more 'poetic' ways of
looking at the world. That is, I argue that the dynamic interpretation of inertial mass presented
below involves a systematic departure from strictly scientific representation.
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In other words, I proceed in this section as if inertia were a real force, like Nietzschean
will to power. The resulting scheme is no less empirically adequate or explanatorily powerful
than the standard view of inertia as 'resistance to acceleration'. Nevertheless, I argue that this
novel interpretive scheme passes beyond the limits of truly scientific description. Hence, I do not
claim that this account shows how inertia should be viewed within a modern scientific outlook.
Quite the opposite: I claim that this re-interpretation of inertia is not scientific, despite being just
as accurate and explanatorily powerful. Thus inertial force is not a genuine physical
phenomenon or empirical scientific object.
Why develop this self-consciously non-scientific re-interpretation of inertia, then? My
basic goal is to concretely demonstrate the difference between scientific and poetic modes of
objectivity, as well as their perspectival interrelation. The relatively 'static' or 'passive' quality of
objective scientific representation, which is on full display in the standard characterization of
inertia as resistance to acceleration, is an essential part of the 'game' of modern science. This is
not the only game in town—notwithstanding the prevalence of chauvinistic scientism in our
time. But scientific representation plays a central role in modern society. And it can involve its
own genuine mode of objectivity. Scientific objectivity is a view of mere objects from the
standpoint of elemental reality or higher force. Poetic objectivity is a view of elemental reality or
higher force, from the standpoint of lesser force.
 Inertial force is real, but can only be immediately apprehended as force from a non-
scientific standpoint. On a scientific outlook, inertial force is formally represented as a power of
resistance to acceleration. This is an objectively valid mode of representation, in the scientific
sense of objectivity. But the objective validity of this scientific mode of representation does not
undermine the perfectly genuine reality of inertial force as pure impetus (not 'resistance'). Inertial
resistance to acceleration is a scientific representation o f inertially-impacted objects, from the
standpoint of inertial force or impetus. This inertial force is real, but it only 'shows up' as force
from outside the bounds of science. Inertial resistance is the scientific representation of a real
force that can only be poetically described as such.
One more word of warning: in this section, I will focus on inertia in a Newtonian context.
Many of the things I say will be directly transferable to an analysis of general relativity. But an
account of the relationship between inertial mass and gravity must also be explicitly introduced.
The upshot of this is straightforward enough: inertial mass is identical to passive gravitational
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mass. That is, the power of inertial 'resistance to acceleration' is identical to the passive power of
'receptivity' to external gravitational fields. In other words, inertial mass is just a power of
coupling to the metric field, or the geodesic structure of spacetime. This relativistic description
should be compatible with everything I say below, and at the end of this section I will briefly
elaborate the relation between reactive impetus and the 'power' of coupling to the metric field.
17.2. As Newton defines it, the 'force of inertia' [vis inertiae] or 'inherent force of matter'
is the 'power of resisting' [potentia resistendi] by which every body 'perseveres' [perseverat] in
its given state of rest or uniform rectilinear motion. Thus inertial force is that by which a body
'strives' or 'struggles' against [reluctatur] a given impressed force 'in order to maintain
[conservandum] its state'.770 ('Impressed force' is the “action [actio] exerted on a body to change
its state either of resting or of moving uniformly straight forward.”771 For instance, one 'source'
[originum] of impressed force is centripetal force, 'by which' [qua] bodies are drawn in
[trahitur], impelled [impellitur], or in any way tend [tendit] toward a central point.772) Insofar as
Newton envisions the basic structure of physical reality partly in terms of massive bodies'
ubiquitous exercises of inertial force, then, he seems to view self-preservation both as a
fundamental natural phenomenon and as essentially consistent with the nature of force. Newton
evidently does not care about the Nietzschean distinction between self-preservation and self-
overcoming.
But here we must consider the 'force of inertia' more carefully. A first point worth noting
is that—contra Newton—inertia does not actually seem to correspond to a force, as we currently
understand the latter term. (Hence, inertial force is often referred to as a 'fictitious force'.) After
all, Newton's own first law of motion states that “[e]very body perseveres in its state of being at
rest or of moving uniformly straight forward except insofar as it is compelled to change its state
by forces impressed.” And one might have thought that the basic point of this law is precisely
that no force at all is required for a body to persist in a given state of rest or uniform rectilinear
motion. In other words, one might have thought that the point of the law of inertia is precisely
that there is no self-preservative force of inertia. As Bernard I. Cohen suggests, in this vein,
Newton's appeal to the vis inertiae involves using 'force' [vis] in “a sense very different from
770Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica, Def'n 3. All translations of the Principia are from (Newton et al. 
1999).
771“...to change its state either of resting or of moving uniformly straight forward” (Definition 4).
772Ibid. Definition 5.
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later usage,” and is “[n]o doubt[...]a legacy from the traditional (pre-inertial) natural philosophy
which held that there can be no motion without a mover.”773
However, this first worry involves a straightforward misconstrual of the Newtonian
notion of inertial force. Newton does not claim that the force of inertia is required to maintain a
given state of uniform rectilinear motion in the absence of impressed force. Rather, he claims
only that insofar as a (massive) body actually undergoes acceleration due to an impressed force,
it actively resists this acceleration by means of the 'inherent force' of its matter. Cohen is
therefore mistaken: it is not clear that Newton's notion of inertial force is a legacy of the
traditional view that there can be 'no motion without a mover'. For there certainly can be motion
without a mover, according to Newton. His claim is just that there can be no acceleration of
(massive) bodies without resistance or 'difficulty'. If this claim is any kind of legacy of traditional
proscriptions against 'motion without a mover', then, it can only be via an implicit shift in the
meaning of 'motion' from movement to acceleration.
In fact, then, the general thrust of Newton's account of inertial force basically comports
with Nietzsche's theory of the essential relationship between willing power and overcoming
resistance. Nietzsche claims (the reader may recall) that “[...]all expansion, incorporation, growth
is striving against something that resists” (WP 704 / KSA 13:11[111]), proposes that “the will is
never satisfied unless it has opponents and resistance” (WP 696 / KSA 13:11[75]; compare GS
56), explicitly associates the “feeling that power is growing” with the feeling “that resistance is
overcome” (A 2), suggests that “the will to power can manifest itself only against resistances”
and “seeks that which resists it” (WP 656 / KSA 12:9[151]), and emphasizes the value of having
enemies to struggle against (BGE 260; GM I:10; EH “Wise” 7; Z I: “On War and Warriors” et
passim). In short, Nietzsche insists that “every event[...]presupposes a resistance overcome” (WP
708 / KSA 13:14[174]). (On my own view, however, powerful things do not in general strive to
overcome resistance, as Nietzsche suggests; rather, powerful things just do overcome resistance,
because and insofar as they exert real force.) With respect to the question of the relationship
between force and resistance, then, the Newtonian doctrine of a 'force of inertia' actually
comports well with the Nietzschean theory of will to power.
One important caveat to this compatibility is that whereas Nietzsche claims that every
event presupposes a resistance overcome, Newton claims only that all accelerative motion in
773Cohen 1999, 56.
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(massive) bodies presupposes a resistance overcome. The only 'event' that Newton does not take
to presuppose a resistance overcome is thus inertial motion. That said, note that inertial motion is
for Newton evidently an absence of 'action'774—a non-event, as it were, which (as such) requires
no further explanation.
These may seem like fairly superficial points of connection. But as will become clearer
below, more intuitive notions of force like Nietzsche's, or those of prehistoric man and young
children, arguably make better sense of modern physical theory than do standard hermeneutic
frameworks. The idea that inanimate objects have a power of self-preservation, or even a basic
tendency towards self-preservation, is arguably a bizarre metaphysical conceit rooted in an
unduly conservative worldview.
Less judgmentally, however, I simply wish to argue that there is another equally viable
interpretation of inertial mass, as a power of impetus. Newton argues that 'impetus' and
'resistance' are simply two different ways of looking at inertia. In a sense, I agree. But Newton's
explanation of their 'perspectival' interrelation is unsatisfactory: he privileges the standpoint of
'resistance', and interprets 'impetus' only as a derivative phenomenon—a second-order 'resistance
to resistance'. 
Newton's perspective is scientifically legitimate, but metaphysically illegitimate. He
succeeds in fully embodying the standpoint of scientific objectivity. Indeed, his relatively one-
sided emphasis on inertial 'resistance' is a direct sign of his having fully embodied the standpoint
of scientific objectivity. But scientific objectivity is not the only genuine mode of objectivity. A
more dynamic account of inertial force, which privileges 'impetus' instead of 'resistance', sheds
light on this limitation.
This more dynamic account of inertia manifests the appropriation of scientific
representation by a drive to poetic depiction. From the equally-objective standpoint of this poetic
drive, what appears to the scientist as an inertial power of self-preservation is in fact an inertial
power of kinematic self-propagation, in the mode of both active and reactive impetus. In both
modes, the 'goal' of inertia is not to maintain or preserve a given state of motion or rest, but
rather to impart it to other things. For the poetic theorist, inertial 'resistance' is not trying to
remain unchanged when pushed or pulled, but rather something closer to pushing or pulling
back when one is pushed or pulled.
774Recall that Newton defines impressed force as an 'action' [actio].
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17.3. A concrete example will help to illustrate just how puzzling it is that Newton posits
a basic distinction between inertial force and impressed force. Imagine two massive spheres, S1
and S2, in stable orbit around their common center of mass. According to Newton, S2 experiences
an impressed gravitational force whereby it is continually accelerated towards S1 (and vice
versa). In turn, the force of inertia is exerted [exercet] by a given body “only during a change of
its state, caused by another force impressed upon it.”775 Insofar as S2 is continually accelerated
towards S1 by an impressed gravitational force, then, Newton would evidently say that S2 also
continually exerts its own counterposing inertial force.776 Yet we also know that S1 is reciprocally
accelerated by an impressed gravitational force due to S2. And this raises a question: how does
the inertial force of S2, i.e. the force whereby S2 actively 'resists' its continual gravitational
acceleration towards S1, relate to the impressed gravitational force whereby S1 is reciprocally
attracted toward S2? Are they distinct forces, or the same force simply viewed from a different
perspective?
Perhaps surprisingly, I claim that the latter is not so far from the truth of the matter—
from the poetic-not-scientific point of view. Each sphere inertially 'resists' its gravitational
acceleration toward the other precisely insofar as it causes the other sphere to undergo 'opposite'
acceleration toward itself. If the two spheres have equal mass, then this 'opposite' acceleration
will of course be equal in magnitude. But if the spheres have unequal masses, the gravitational
acceleration induced in the more massive sphere is less than the 'opposite' acceleration it
reactively induces in the less massive sphere. And this is the sense in which bodies with greater
mass exert a greater 'force of inertia' when undergoing acceleration. The greater the inertial mass
of a given body, the greater the 'opposite' acceleration or momentum-change it induces in any
source or locus of an impressed force of a given magnitude by which it is accelerated. Indeed,
inertial mass in its reactive aspect777 just is this power to induce 'opposite' acceleration or
reciprocal changes of momentum. Thus the force of inertial 'resistance' is not the active exercise
of a power of self-preservation, but rather the active exercise of inertial mass understood as (in
part) a power of reaction or reciprocal accelerative impact.
775Principia Definition 3.
776Although Newton says that the force of inertia is exerted 'only' during massive bodies' acceleration, the clear 
implication is that it is also exerted whenever massive bodies accelerate.
777I also take inertial mass to have an active aspect, insofar as it is a power to exert inertial impetus. This point is 
elaborated below at length.
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Note that in the context of a field-theoretic interpretation of either gravity or non-
gravitational 'impressed' forces, the 'opposite acceleration' induced by an inertially-reacting 'test'
body will be opposite momentum-change. That is, an inertially-massive body will reactively
induce momentum-change, not acceleration per se, in an external field whereby it is accelerated.
And this momentum-change will be 'opposite' to the originary momentum-change that it
undergoes due to the field, in the sense that it will be equal in value and opposite in direction.
Hence, the overall conservation of momentum in this interaction is the result of a real inertial
force of reaction, balancing an active force. 
In order to further motivate this poetic (not scientific) interpretation of inertia, which
many readers will presumably still find obscure if not counterintuitive, it helps first to note that
Newton posits the force of inertia in relation to his observation that “every body is only with
difficulty put out of its state either of resting or of moving [ut corpus omne de statu suo vel
quiescendi vel movendi difficulter deturbetur].”778 His thought is then evidently that this
'difficulty' of inducing acceleration is either itself aptly characterized as a force, or else has a
source (cause, explanatory ground, etc.) that is aptly characterized as a force. In other words, one
might wonder, 'Granted, it's clearly difficult to accelerate (massive) bodies—but how or why is
it difficult?'; Newton evidently responds, 'It is difficult insofar as massive bodies actively resist
being accelerated'. And the 'force of inertia' just is this active exercise of massive bodies'
essential 'power of resisting'. Admittedly, a different answer to the question might seem better.
Namely, one might insist that it is 'difficult' to accelerate bodies, not because they exert an
'inertial force' of resistance to any acceleration they undergo, but rather because and insofar as
they are massive—or perhaps better still, because massive bodies as such have inertia.779 But
note that Newton himself insists that the force of inertia “does not differ in any way” from 'the
inertia of the mass' of a given body, “except in the manner in which it is conceived.”780 
Consider the gravitational interaction between the Sun and Earth again, in this light. In
what sense, exactly, is it 'only with difficulty' that the Sun undergoes acceleration toward Earth?
Two options are salient: (1) it is 'only with difficulty' that the Sun accelerates toward Earth just in
the sense that this acceleration requires an impressed force (i.e. gravity, in this case), rather than
778Principa Definition 3, elaboration.
779To the extent that a 'force of inertia' is also attributable to massless particles like photons, 'because and insofar as
they are massive' might ultimately have to be replaced with something like 'because and insofar as they have 
momentum'.
780Principia Definition 3, elaboration.
291
being possible absent any forces; or alternatively (2) it is 'only with difficulty' that the Sun
accelerates toward Earth in the sense that the inertial body as such reactively 'pushes or pulls
back' against the source or locus of the impressed force by which it is accelerated, thereby
inducing an 'opposite' acceleration or change of momentum in it (i.e. the Sun induces reciprocal
acceleration in Earth). The first of these options may seem preferable, but in fact it is inadequate.
The inertial 'difficulty' of accelerating the Sun cannot simply be constituted by the fact that this
acceleration requires an applied force. For then the force of inertia would not actually be a
distinct force. Rather, the inertial force of a given massive body would just be another way of
identifying the impressed force that is required to induce the acceleration that it in fact
undergoes. Yet this is clearly not how Newton views the force of inertia. Again, he insists that “a
body exerts this force only during a change of its state, caused by another force [vis aliam]
impressed upon it.” So he evidently sees a given body's force of inertia as distinct from the
impressed force that accelerates it. The second option is better: the 'difficulty' involved in
accelerating an inertial body is just the reactive 'opposite' acceleration that it induces in whatever
accelerates it. A given body's reactive force of inertia is the active exercise of its causal power to
induce this 'opposite' acceleration. This is the only real 'cost' borne by a locus of impressed force
acting on a given inertially-massive body, beyond the exertion of impressed force itself, and
therefore the only other real 'difficulty' in accelerating this body.
17.4. Newton himself makes a superficially similar point, arguing that the force of inertia
is “both resistance and impetus,” simply “depending on the viewpoint”: 
[The exercise of the force of inertia is] resistance insofar as the body, in order to
maintain its state, strives against the impressed force, and impetus insofar as the
same body, yielding only with difficulty [difficulter cedendo] to the force of a
resisting obstacle, endeavors to change the state of that obstacle. Resistance is
commonly attributed to resting bodies and impetus to moving bodies; but motion
and rest, in the popular sense of the terms, are distinguished from each other only
by point of view, and bodies commonly regarded as being at rest are not always
truly at rest.781
For instance, imagine that you find yourself suspended in free space, when all of a sudden a
small cannonball hurtles towards you and strikes you in the chest, knocking you backwards as it
781Principa Definition 3, elaboration.
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bounces off—suppose moreover that the collision is perfectly elastic, for the sake of simplicity.
Now consider the cannonball's inertial force during the collision. Newton's point is as follows:
from the point of view of 'resistance', the inertial force of the cannonball is its 'striving' against
deceleration by the impressed force of your body; but from the point of view of 'impetus', the
same inertial force manifests as the way in which the cannonball 'yields only with difficulty' to
your own force as a 'resisting obstacle'—i.e. the cannonball's inertial force now manifests as the
source of the difficulty you yourself experience in inertially 'striving' to maintain your own state
of rest as it collides with you.782 Viewed as 'resistance', in other words, the cannonball's inertial
force is its active power of self-preservation, i.e. maintaining its state of inertial motion in the
face of impressed forces; whereas viewed as 'impetus', the cannonball's inertial force is that by
which it actively resists ('yields only with difficulty to') your active power of self-preservation.
Another example will better illuminate Newton's specific point concerning the relativity
of (apparent) motion and rest. Imagine dropping a weight from a bridge over a river straight
down into a boat passing below, which hitherto had been traveling at a constant speed
downstream. From the point of view of the weight itself, or that of onlookers standing on the
bridge or the river bank, the weight appears to have no horizontal motion as it falls, and hence it
appears to exert a lateral force of inertia in the mode of resistance: 'trying' to maintain its state of
rest in the horizontal direction, the weight actively resists being accelerated downstream by the
boat. But from the point of view of the boat, on the other hand, the weight appears to be moving
in the upstream direction as it falls, and hence to exert a lateral force of inertia in the mode of
impetus: the boat is 'trying' to maintain its state of uniform motion downstream, while the weight
flies in with horizontal momentum and thereby 'pushes' the boat back in the upstream direction;
thus the weight's inertial force manifests as the 'difficulty' with which the weight 'yields' to the
boat's inertial force of resistance to being slowed down by it. The greater a projectile's mass, the
782A different interpretive option might seem more natural: qua impetus, the cannonball's force of inertia is the 
source of difficulty you face in 'striving', not to maintain your own state of rest, but rather simply to slow the 
cannonball down—i.e. the cannonball's inertial impetus manifests in the fact that it is difficult for you to make it 
stop; it tends to keep going.
But this interpretation raises the question: why or in what sense is it difficult to make the cannonball stop? 
Here two options are salient: (1) it's difficult to make the cannonball stop because it exerts a force of inertial 
resistance to deceleration by impressed forces; (2) it's difficult to make the cannonball stop because when 
something slows it down, it speeds that thing up in the opposite direction. And both options are unsatisfactory, 
for similar reasons. The problem with (1) is that it undermines the distinction between inertial impetus and 
resistance, given Newton's account of the latter—not just in the sense that this distinction would be merely 
perspectival, but in the more damaging sense that it would lack any discernible content. The problem with (2) is 
that it undermines the distinction between inertial impetus and resistance, given the account of inertial resistance 
that I (qua poetic theorist) developed in the previous sub-section.
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'harder' it is to avoid being accelerated when hit by it—hence the greater a projectile's inertial
impetus, the more strongly it opposes its target's inertial resistance to acceleration.
If this seems somewhat baroque, that is because it is. Newton's point about the relativity
of motion and rest is perfectly correct, but his description of 'impetus' involves a basic
prioritization of 'resistance' that I take to be characteristic of scientific (not poetic) understanding.
The idea that, for instance, a cannonball's inertial force consists in its 'yielding only with
difficulty to the force of a resisting obstacle' is putting the cart before the horse, from the poetic
point of view. For this makes it sound as though the cannonball's inertial force is its own active
resistance to its target's passive resistance to being accelerated by it. But this is an absurd way to
characterize the situation, from a poetic standpoint, and an especially absurd way to describe the
sense in which the cannonball 'endeavors to change the state' of obstacles in its path. The
cannonball's 'endeavoring' to knock you backwards is not a matter of its resisting your resistance
to being knocked backwards, or the difficulty with which it yields to your own force. Rather, the
cannonball's 'trying' to knock you backwards is essentially a matter of its 'trying' to impart its
own motion to you. Impetus is not active resistance to another thing's inertial resistance, or
yielding only with difficulty to another thing's power of self-preservation. Impetus—from a
poetic standpoint that is non-scientific yet nevertheless just as accurate and explanatory as the
scientific one—is closer to real force in the mode of kinematic self-propagation.
A different example will further clarify the point at issue. Consider a hurricane making
landfall on the Gulf Coast, rotating furiously counterclockwise as it creeps northward at a few
miles per hour, fueled by the energy of the warm water to the south. Palm trees bend crazily as
the high winds strip their fronds away. Rain whips down, at times nearly horizontally. Roofs are
ripped off of houses. And all of these phenomena involve transfers of momentum from the
hurricane winds to other objects, whether it be trees, droplets of rain, or shingles. In other words,
the hurricane winds accelerate various other objects, and holistically speaking this accelerative
action has the 'shape' of the hurricane's counterclockwise rotation. Thus as the hurricane
approaches a given location from the south, its winds blow east to west, and so generally 'push'
or 'pull' things on the ground westward. As the first eye wall passes to the north, the winds die
and everything falls quiet. Soon enough, though, the winds rapidly pick up again as the southern
eye wall approaches. Now the rising winds blow in the opposite direction, from west to east, and
so 'push' or 'pull' things eastward. The hurricane winds, or the air molecules out of which they
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are composed, undergo deceleration by the force of every such interaction. Holistically speaking,
that is, the hurricane is continually decelerated—i.e. accelerated in the 'opposite' clockwise
direction—by the reactive influence of all that it accelerates counterclockwise.
What is the inertial force exerted by the hurricane in these interactions, specifically in the
mode of impetus? For the poetic theorist, it is something like the hurricane's successful exercise
of its capacity to impart its own motion to other things. Thus the hurricane exerts inertial force in
the mode of impetus in part insofar as it in fact accelerates objects on the ground in the (location-
dependent) direction of its own counterclockwise cyclonic motion. More intuitively, but perhaps
also more deeply: the hurricane's inertial impetus is a dynamical aspect of its power to make
other things hurricane-like.
For the poetic theorist, the inertial impetus of the hurricane is not manifest in the
'difficulty' with which it 'yields' [cedere] to the force of the obstacles that resist it—say, the roofs
it rips off, the trees it strips and uproots, or the trash cans it tosses around like toys. For this
'yielding only with difficulty' to resisting obstacles is itself evidently a form of resistance to these
obstacles' force, i.e. a reaction, which as such presupposes a corresponding action. Namely,
impetus understood à la Newton as 'yielding only with difficulty to obstacles that resist' is
evidently a reaction to obstacles' inertial resistance. However, obstacles' inertial resistance is
itself also evidently a reaction, which hence presupposes a corresponding action. In short, as
Newton conceives of inertial impetus, it is essentially a reaction to a reaction. Thus construed,
neither the hurricane nor any of the obstacles it confronts is truly active. But this is
metaphysically and ethically otiose—from a poetic standpoint.
The Newtonian notion of pure mutual reactivity is roughly evocative of Nietzsche's idea
of the 'will to power of the weakest'. Pure mutual reactivity is degenerate interaction, ethically
speaking, for Nietzsche—and also from the standpoint of my own dynamistic ethos. More
specifically, pure mutual reactivity is evidently the degenerate appearance of weakness
masquerading as strength, by way of a perverse abstraction of the 'form' of genuine power from
its 'content'. But pure mutual reactivity is also evidently the mere semblance of genuine
interaction, and hence more deeply is literally unreal. Pure mutual reactivity is a non-interaction—
a non-event, a mere appearance of being that is really nothing. To be clear: Nietzsche is not
concerned to analyze inertia or physical interactions in this way. However, I take the above
analysis to mirror the general form of his highly critical response to the ongoing historical
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'triumph' of Judeo-Christian 'slave morality' (notwithstanding his additional diagnosis of Judeo-
Christian morality as a formation of will to power, in its own right).
Put more abstractly, the basic problem with Newton's account of inertial impetus—from
a poetic standpoint—is that in focusing on the 'difficulty' experienced by the obstacles that resist
the given locus of impetus, he essentially characterizes an active inertial force merely in terms of
'reactivity' to the objects it impacts. This problem is only compounded by the fact that Newton
sees inertial resistance essentially as passivity o r self-preservation. Hence, he characterizes
active inertial impetus as a reaction against self-preservative force. From a poetic standpoint,
however, force is not simply constituted by the disruptive (read: 'accelerative') effect it has on the
objects it changes. More fundamentally, rather, the effect ('accelerative impact') that appears to
mere objects ('obstacles') of active force ('impetus') simply as a disruption to the given state (of
'inertial motion') that they are 'trying' to maintain (via 'inertial resistance') is in reality an
objective image or expression of this active force's nature (i.e. the 'state of motion of rest' which
it imparts to the 'obstacles' it confronts).
As opposed to Newton's characterization, then, I propose on behalf of the poetic theorist
that inertial 'impetus' is the action of accelerative force correlative to the reaction of inertial
'resistance'. Thus inertial action is not essentially the impressed force of the hurricane insofar as
it encounters the inertially-resisting palm tree, for instance, but rather the hurricane's originary
accelerative impact on the inertially-reacting palm tree. The hurricane's active inertial impetus is
thus manifest in the 'ease' with which it impacts the obstacles it confronts, by determining their
motion in accordance with its own 'state of motion or rest'. For these obstacles to be genuine
obstacles, of course, they must be capable of exerting a reactive inertial force. But again this is
just to say that these obstacles must have reciprocal accelerative impact on the locus of
impressed force by which they are accelerated—e.g. the palm tree must decelerate the hurricane
winds even as it is uprooted by them, albeit only slightly. Really, then, there is only active and
reactive inertial impetus. 
The greater the active impetus of the hurricane, the greater the extent to which it induces
its own counterclockwise rotation in the land or sea beneath it. The greater the reactive impetus
of the land or sea, the more it responds to being thus accelerated counterclockwise by inducing
reciprocal clockwise acceleration in the hurricane (i.e. slowing it down). The greater the reactive
impetus of the hurricane, in turn, the more it responds to being accelerated clockwise by
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inducing counterclockwise acceleration. And the greater the active impetus of the land or sea, the
greater the extent to which it induces its own state of motion or rest in the hurricane (e.g. the
house or tree or coastal mountain exerts impetus insofar as it makes the hurricane more
unmoving-like-a-house-or-tree-or-mountain).
More generally, the positive results of this sub-section may be summarized as follows:
According to the poetic theorist, inertial mass is a power with both active and reactive aspects.
Inertial force is the active expression of this power, i.e. inertial force is the real ground of inertial
mass' accelerative impact. Insofar as inertial mass is a reactive power, its objective expression is
reciprocal accelerative impact, i.e. inertial force in the mode of 'resistance' or 'opposite'
acceleration. Insofar as inertial mass is an active power, on the other hand, its objective
expression is kinematic self-propagation, i.e. inertial force in the mode of originary impetus—as
in momentum transfer via mechanistic 'contact'.
To the extent that 'contact forces' all prove to be reducible to underlying non-contact
forces, inertial impetus via mechanistic 'contact' is correspondingly reducible to the accelerative
impact of non-contact forces. Here it should be noted that mass has a second active aspect
besides its power to exert inertial impetus—i.e. gravitational mass, the power of every locus of
mass to actively induce continual acceleration towards itself among all other loci of mass in the
universe, and to 'passively' respond to external gravitational fields.783 Inertial mass is identical to
'passive' gravitational mass.
17.5. We may now return more productively to Newton's claim regarding (what he takes
to be) the merely perspectival difference between inertial force in the modes of resistance and
impetus. Again, his point is that we intuitively associate inertial resistance with bodies that are at
rest and impetus with bodies in motion, but that motion and rest are commonly differentiated
'only by point of view.' As Galileo recognized, for instance, if a boat is moving smoothly at
constant velocity, then everything (besides any rocking motion from waves, etc.) seems to people
below deck just as if the boat were completely at rest. That is, the physical behavior of all of the
objects below deck appears just as it would if the boat were at rest. Hence laws of motion are
evidently indifferent to perspectival 'shifts' between a given frame of reference and another that
moves in relation to it with constant velocity. (As Newton puts it, “When bodies are enclosed in
783This issue will be elaborated at greater length below.
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a given space, their motions in relation to one another are the same whether the space is at rest
or whether it is moving uniformly straight forward without circular motion.”784) This basic idea
is more formally encoded in the 'Galilean invariance' of Newtonian mechanics. Newton's basic
point about inertia, then, is that insofar as it tracks intuitive judgments of motion or rest, the
distinction between inertial impetus and resistance merely 'depends on the viewpoint' and so has
no real physical significance. (Of course, given his substantivalism regarding space and time,
Newton could claim to differentiate objective inertial resistance and inertial impetus by appeal to
the distinction between absolute motion and rest. He does not actually do so—my point is just
that his own metaphysics contains adequate resources for drawing an objective distinction
between inertial resistance and impetus, as he seems to conceive of them.)
But note that my own poetic-not-scientific account of the distinction between inertial
impetus and 'resistance' is not vulnerable to Newton's deflationary point. For as I put it, active
inertial impetus is kinematic self-propagation, i.e. a body's imparting its own motion or rest to
something else—which is, more deeply, just one specific mode of external self-propagation or
determinative influence; whereas reactive inertial impetus is reciprocal accelerative impact.
Thus construed, the Newtonian distinction between 'impetus' and 'resistance' is in fact grounded
in that between action and reaction, not motion and rest.
One might naturally wonder, then: is there a perspective-independent difference between
actions and reactions? Or are they, too, distinguished 'only by point of view'?
A salient reason to think that there is not a perspective-independent difference between
actions and reactions has to do with Newton's third law of motion: “To any action there is
always an opposite and equal reaction; in other words, the actions of two bodies upon each
other are always equal and always opposite in direction.” Thus, for instance, imagine striking a
cue ball such that it knocks the eight-ball into a corner pocket. Intuitively speaking, of course,
the cue ball seems like the 'active' body by comparison to the merely 'passive' eight-ball. But in
what sense is the contact force exerted by the cue ball on the eight-ball really the action, and the
equal contact force exerted by the eight-ball on the cue ball really just a reaction? Why not say
instead that the eight-ball acts on the cue ball by slowing it down, and the cue ball reacts by
accelerating the eight-ball? Or—more plausibly—why not say that the cue ball and eight-ball
equally act on and react to one another? What could it add to our physical or metaphysical
784Principia, 'Axioms, or the Laws of Motion', Corollary 5.
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understanding to insist that one ball is 'really' more active or reactive than the other?
Yet this deflationary line of argument mistakenly presupposes that any objective
distinction between actions and reactions must correspond to a quantitative asymmetry of
physical 'force'—in the sense of Newtonian 'impressed force', i.e. the 'F' in 'F=ma'. This is
misguided in (at least) two respects, from a poetic standpoint. First, the objective poetic
distinction between actions and reactions is in fact grounded partly in quantitative asymmetries
of real force, not physical 'force'. Second, the objective poetic distinction between actions and
reactions is grounded partly in qualitative asymmetries between active and reactive forces. In
short: there is a poetically objective and metaphysically-significant difference between actions
and reactions, hence between two modes of inertial impetus.
(i) The objective poetic (not scientific) distinction between actions and reactions is
grounded partly in quantitative asymmetries of force. The Sun is clearly the 'dominant' term in
its interaction with the Earth, in some perfectly real sense. In turn, this objective asymmetry is
evidently grounded partly in the fact that the Sun has a far greater mass than the Earth. The Sun
attracts the Earth far more rapidly toward itself than Earth attracts the Sun toward itself. That is,
the Sun has far greater gravitational impact than the Earth, reflecting the Sun's far greater
gravitational mass. The Sun is more active than Earth to the extent that it has greater
gravitational mass; but Earth is still active vis-à-vis the Sun, and the Sun hence reactive to it,
insofar as Earth has gravitational mass and so attracts the Sun. The Sun exerts a greater real
active force of gravity on Earth than vice versa, even though the net physical 'force' of gravity
between them is 'equal and opposite'. The Sun produces a stronger gravitational field than does
the Earth. The ratio of the inertial masses of the Sun and Earth determines the ratio of these two
effects. And the field strength of each body is a measure of a perfectly-real active force whereby
it impacts the other. I elaborate and defend these admittedly obscure statements about 'real force'
in the following section. For now, let us simply take them for granted. Each body is both
gravitationally active and reactive, but the Sun is more active and Earth is more reactive. 
Yet this does not in itself entail that the Sun exerts inertial force on Earth predominantly
in the mode of active impetus. For the distinction between objective action and reaction does not
by itself determine the distinction between objective inertial action and reaction. Inertial action
maps onto a particular kind of action, namely accelerative impact whereby one thing imparts its
own motion or rest to something else, as in transfer of momentum via mechanistic 'contact'. Note
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that there is no objective difference between imparting speed and imparting rest, insofar as the
difference between uniform motion and rest is purely perspectival. This is part of the real
ontological significance of the Galilean relativity of motion. The inertially active term in a
purely mechanistic 'collision' between two bodies is not the more rapidly moving one, but rather
the more inertially massive and hence less rapidly accelerating one.785 Differential acceleration is
objectively real, whereas differential speed is not.786
Understood as accelerative impact in the mode of a given thing's imparting its own state
of motion or rest to something else, inertial impetus is distinct from accelerative impact via 'non-
contact' forces like electromagnetism, which often induce states of motion that are not present in
the loci or sources of the impressed force in question. For example, whereas a whirlpool induces
its own rotational motion in flotsam that approaches it, the Sun could induce orbital motion in
planets even if it, or its gravitational field, had no angular momentum to begin with. (Imagine
that a new planet were to float into the solar system, initially traveling in a straight line with
constant speed, but was then drawn into orbit around the Sun...) In fact, the orbital rotation of the
planets evidently reflects not the Sun's rotational motion, but more so the rotational motion of the
swirling cloud of gas and dust from which the Sun and planets both formed billions of years ago
—or the interaction between the planets' instantaneous momenta and the form or 'shape' of the
Sun's gravitational field, or the form of the curvature of spacetime around the Sun. Hence, if we
can envision fields as having inertia, then the orbital trajectories of the planets around the Sun
can be understood as (in part) the result of inertial action on the planets by the gravitational field
due to the Sun's mass-energy.
The whirlpool is active vis-à-vis the comparatively reactive flotsam that it rotates around
its focal point. And the Sun is active vis-à-vis the comparatively reactive Earth insofar as it has
greater gravitational impact on Earth than vice versa. But of these two modes of asymmetrical
accelerative impact, only the whirlpool's swirling the flotsam obviously amounts to an objective
asymmetry in inertial impetus. That is, while the Sun's having greater gravitational impact on
Earth than vice versa constitutes a way in which the Sun is objectively active vis-à-vis the
785i.e. in a mechanistic 'collision' between bodies, the more massive body is more active than the other to the extent
that its mass exceeds the other's; but it is also still reactive to the extent that the other body has mass.
786Here my view is helpfully contrasted against Newton's. He says, in De Gravitatione: “That the absurdity of this 
position [Descartes's] may be disclosed in full measure, I say that thence it follows that a moving body has no 
determinate velocity and no definite line in which it moves. . . . On the contrary, there cannot be motion without 
a certain velocity and determination” (Hall and Hall 1962, 129; quoted in Earman 1989, 41).
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reactive Earth, it does not straightforwardly constitute a way in which the Sun's inertial force is
objectively exerted as impetus.
(ii) The objective poetic (not scientific) distinction between inertial actions and
reactions is grounded partly in qualitative asymmetries of mutual force. If one focuses only on
quantitative asymmetries of inertial force, then things with more mass will always be inertially
active or 'dominant' with respect to less massive things. But this analytic framework does not
yield entirely satisfactory results, for the poetic theorist. For example, imagine slapping your
hand against a huge boulder, which remains totally unmoved. Shall we say that the boulder is the
active term in this interaction, and your hand the merely reactive one? The boulder does
'successfully' stop your hand, after all, whereas you do not accelerate it (except at the level of
microscopic excitations of some of its constitutive molecules). So in this sense the boulder does
seem objectively active in relation to your hand, and to exert inertial force in the mode of
impetus: the boulder actively imparts its own state of rest to your hitherto rapidly moving hand.
Thus the boulder objectively renders your hand boulder-like, kinematically speaking.
Yet there is a different sense in which your hand is the genuinely active term in this
interaction, and the boulder the merely reactive one. Namely, the boulder rapidly decelerates
your hand by exerting a basically hand-shaped force on it: you exert a hand-shaped force on the
boulder, and it 'pushes back' with an 'equal and opposite' force in the (mirror image of the) same
shape. So while the accelerative impact of the interaction is determined by the boulder—which
imparts its state of rest to your hand—nevertheless the form of the 'equal and opposite' forces is
determined by your hand.
Take another example: imagine throwing eight small pebbles simultaneously at eight
different points on a wall, roughly in the shape of a circle. Newton's point was that the apparent
motion of the pebbles and the apparent rest of the wall are not legitimate grounds for judging that
the pebbles objectively exert inertial force in the mode of impetus, or that the wall objectively
exerts inertial force in the mode of resistance. My response, on behalf of the poetic theorist, is
twofold. First, the objective asymmetry in quantitative accelerative impact between the pebbles
and the wall constitutes a distinct and legitimate reason to judge that the wall objectively exerts
inertial force in the mode of impetus. The wall really does induce greater acceleration in the
pebbles than the pebbles induce in the wall, thereby imparting its own state of wall-like rest to
the pebbles. Second, however, the pebbles qualitatively determine the form of the wall's inertial
301
force more so than vice versa. The pebbles 'push' on the wall in the shape of a circle, and it is
genuinely for this reason that the wall 'pushes' on the pebbles in the shape of a circle. In this
qualitative respect, then, the wall is objectively speaking not active, but reactive: the wall's
impressed force on the pebbles is merely a reactive 'push back' against the pebbles insofar as the
form of the pebbles' force on the wall determines the form of the wall's force on the pebbles, and
not vice versa. Hence with respect to this formal dimension of the interaction, the pebbles
objectively exert inertial force in the mode of active impetus, and the wall in the mode of
reactive impetus. This distinction is salient poetically and metaphysically, even if not
scientifically.
17.6. What about general relativity? In the relativistic context, inertial mass is identical to
passive gravitational mass, or a given body's strength of 'coupling' to the gravitational field
whose strength is given by the metric tensor indicated in Einstein's field equations. In the
following section, I argue that 'passive' gravitational mass, like other kinds of 'passive charge', is
in fact a reactive power. Hence, in particular, I claim that 'passive' gravitational mass is a thing's
power to reactively exert accelerative (or momentum-changing) force upon itself whenever it
undergoes 'impressed' gravitational force (i.e. whenever it is acted upon by an external
gravitational field). In the case of passive mass, in particular, the resultant acceleration is
geodesic motion. Hence, on my view, passive gravitational mass is a power to cause oneself to
undergo 'free' geodesic motion when exposed to a gravitational field. And I claim that this power
is identical to the reactive power of inertial mass, i.e. the power to exert a reactive force of
impetus whenever one is exposed to an external 'impressed' force-field.
In this light, imagine a small but highly-charged ball, initially at rest in free space near to
a huge free-floating wall. The wall is much more massive than the ball, and has an electric
charge of the same 'sign' as that of the ball, but much smaller magnitude. What happens? The
ball is repelled rapidly away from the wall, which moves infinitesimally in the opposite
direction. The more highly-charged the ball, the more rapidly it will be repelled from the wall.
The physical 'force' of electrostatic repulsion between the wall and the ball before they have
begun to move away from one another, given (approximately) by Coulomb's law, is directly
proportional to the charge of both. The standard scientific interpretation of this is that the ball
and the wall repel one another with equally strong opposing 'pushes'. The wall is accelerated less
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than the ball by the equally-strong 'push' on both, on this view, because the more-massive wall
has a greater force of inertial resistance to being accelerated. 
An alternative poetic interpretation of this situation is as follows: The electromagnetic
field of the ball is stronger than that of the wall (because the ball is more highly charged). A
stronger field exerts a stronger active force. Each charged body responds to the field of the other
by exerting reactive force upon itself, qua locus of inertial mass, which is proportional to both
the strength of the impressed field and its own electric charge. The net results are the two 'equal
and opposite' forces of standard physical scientific description. Qua locus of inertial mass, in
turn, each body is coupled to the gravitational field. So when either body is accelerated—i.e.
pushes itself (qua inertial mass) out of the geodesic 'grooves' of the gravitational field, insofar as
it is electromagnetically reactive—it also pushes itself (qua locus of impressed electromagnetic
force) in the opposite direction, insofar as it is a gravitationally reactive inertial mass. This
'pushing itself back' towards prior geodesic paths is the inertial 'resistance' or reactive impetus of
the accelerated charge. And active impetus is the active 'push' that a mass exerts on other things
as a bearer of gravitational field-structure, viz., its own geodesic trajectory through spacetime.
18. Physical Force as (Quasi-)Empirical Object (II):
Passivity, Reactivity, and Real Physical Interaction
18.1. Modern physics often represents interactions in terms of 'equal and opposite' forces,
or at least balanced exchanges of momentum and energy. In a basic process described by atomic
physics, for instance, a hydrogen atom may 'absorb' a photon; this causes the electron in the atom
to 'jump' to an excited state; the electron may then 'fall' back down to its original lower energy
state; and this causes the atom to emit a photon with energy and frequency corresponding to the
one that impinged upon it.
Conservation principles are arguably no longer as sacrosanct as they once were, however,
for instance insofar as it is debatable whether energy is truly conserved in general relativity. (One
would have to count the energy of the gravitational field along with that of matter and radiation,
etc., using a 'stress-energy-momentum pseudotensor', but this has strange features that make
some theorists doubt whether it truly sustains energy conservation.) Moreover, it is now widely
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claimed that basic conservation principles like those of energy or momentum are 'less
fundamental' than certain other symmetries in the behavior of physical systems, e.g. under
conditions of time-reversal, rotation, or linear translation. This is primarily because Emmy
Noether proved in the early 20th century that every differentiable symmetry in the action of a
physical system gives rise to a corresponding conserved quantity—like energy or momentum.
(The action of a physical system is a certain measure of its state as it evolves along a given
temporal path, which when minimized yields its actual equations of motion.) Hence, many
theorists take these symmetries in action to be more fundamental than conservation laws.
Nevertheless, both conservation of momentum and Newton's third law of motion ('when
one body exerts a force on a second body, the second exerts an equal and opposite force on the
first') have a wide range of valid application, in both practical and theoretical contexts. It is
therefore of substantial interest to consider how the modern scientific dynamist should
understand them. Centrally, e.g., how is putatively widespread 'natural hierarchy' consistent with
pandemic equal and opposite forces? To this end, and following the basic method of the previous
section, I will now develop a poetic account of physical interaction. The upshot is that physical
'force' is not real force, exactly. From a poetic standpoint, physical interaction is always the
interaction between an active source (e.g. a source-field or source-charge) and a reactive test-
object (e.g. a 'test-charge' or 'test-field'). The 'equal and opposite' forces invoked by physics are
merely 'net' forces, which obscure these further interactions. Scientific representations of 'equal
and opposite forces' exerted on loci of 'passive charge' are merely the objective appearances of
real hierarchical interactions among underlying active and reactive forces.
In the previous section, I argued that inertial 'resistance' can be poetically reinterpreted as
(roughly) 'pushing' or 'pulling' back when 'pushed' or 'pulled' by something. This is by contrast to
the standard scientific interpretation of inertial resistance as 'trying' to remain unchanged (i.e.
preserve a given state of geodesic motion) when 'pushed' or 'pulled' by something. Hence, for
poetic theorists inertial 'resistance' is not a measure of the energy it 'costs' you to accelerate or
impart momentum to something. Quite the opposite: inertial 'resistance' is a measure of a given
object's power to reactively impose its state of motion or momentum on you, whenever you
accelerate or impart momentum to it.
In the present section, I will extend this analysis by relating inertial mass to a broader
phenomenon that applies to forces beyond gravity: passive charge, or the power to 'couple' to
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external fields (the greater a thing's passive charge, the more physical force it experiences in a
given field of the corresponding kind). Inertial mass is identical to passive gravitational mass.
That is, inertial 'resistance' to acceleration is identical to 'receptivity' to the gravitational field, or
the capacity to couple to the metric field defined on the spacetime manifold, and hence to realize
'free' geodesic motion. This follows immediately from Einstein's general theory of relativity.787
Notably, there is no 'inertial electric charge' in the way that there is inertial mass, because
gravitational force is uniquely related to spatiotemporal structure. But there is passive electric
charge, just as there is passive gravitational mass. Hence, a poetic-not-scientific reinterpretation
of passive charge will have a wider range of application than does a poetic-not-scientific
reinterpretation of inertial mass, in particular. This account will suggest a poetic perspective on
Newton's third law, and hence also on momentum conservation, insofar as balanced forces (qua
rates of momentum-change) yield equal exchanges of momentum.
'Passive' charge can be poetically reinterpreted as a power of responsivity, or the capacity
to exert reactive force when stimulated by an originary active force. Larger 'passive' charges thus
produce greater input-output gain, 'boosting' originary active forces into larger reactive forces.
Hence, for instance, the passive electric charge of a given 'test-charge' can be poetically viewed
as a power to exert reactive electromagnetic force on itself qua locus of inertial mass, not to
'passively' experience greater 'impressed' force in a given external electromagnetic field. Note
that it does not matter, in this context, whether this 'impressed' force is said to be exerted by an
external 'source' charge or a 'sourceless' external electromagnetic field or a photon or a 'virtual
photon' or whatever else.
This poetic reinterpretation arguably helps to explain the equality of passive and active
charge, or the curious fact that things' ability to produce force-fields is apparently equal in
strength to their capacity to be affected by external force-fields. In other words, charges (electric
charge, gravitational mass, etc.) seem to have exactly the same degree of power to impact and be
impacted by other charges (or fields, etc.). Poetically viewed, this is plausibly because the
passive 'power' to be impacted is just a power to reactively impact—i.e. the same power as 'active
charge', simply manifesting as reaction rather than originary action. (Admittedly, this still does
not explain why a charge has the same strength qua active as qua reactive.) For poetic theorists,
787A given body's inertial mass is also an objective scientific representation of all other masses' impressed force 
upon it: inertial 'resistance' to accelerative deviation from geodesics is just a 'normalization' of being 
gravitationally impacted. This is another way to see that inertial mass is identical to the 'passive' power of 
coupling to external gravitational fields.
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then, inertial mass is just passive gravitational mass; passive gravitational mass is just a
scientifically objective representation of reactive gravitational mass (i.e. a representation of
reactive forces as mere passively-impacted objects); and reactive gravitational mass is essentially
the same power as active gravitational mass: the power to exert gravitational force. Likewise,
passive electric charge is just a scientific representation of reactive electric charge, and reactive
electric charge is essentially the same power as active electric charge.
Reactions have a twofold character. On the one hand, reactions are the impact of forces,
viz., the impact or effect of corresponding actions. On the other hand, however, reactions are
also forces in their own right—e.g. reactive forces exerted back upon the loci of originary active
forces. As pure impact, reactions are unreal or merely abstract entities. As forces in their own
right, reactions are real. As both the impact of originary actions and forces in their own right,
reactions are actions' real impact. Hence, a given physical interaction between two objects
(bodies, fields, etc.) can be poetically characterized in terms of two active forces, exerted
differentially by each interacting object on the other, as well as two reactions, which
differentially 'boost' these original active forces into two 'net' equal and opposite forces that
impact both objects qua loci of momentum. Poetically viewed, then, physical interactions are
constituted by opposing pairs of active forces and responsive reaction-forces. The 'equal and
opposite' forces invoked by modern physics are merely 'net' forces. And the originary active
'input' forces with respect to which these equal and opposite forces are responsive 'outputs' need
not be equally strong—nor need be the real 'boosts' whereby each object reacts to the other's
force.
The point of this exercise is not to arrive at a 'correct' view of physical interaction,
exactly. Rather, it is to present a dynamic-poetic interpretation of interaction that is as
empirically adequate as the passive-scientific standard, so as to illuminate the nature and
limitations of objective scientific representation. Poetic characterizations of physical interaction
are true, and yet not scientifically valid. Scientific representations of physical interaction, as
reciprocal actions on merely passive objects, are not direct presentations of active forces.
Scientific representations of interactions, in terms of 'equal and opposite forces' exerted on loci
of 'passive charge', are the unreal but objectively valid appearances of real interacting active
forces—real interactions that can be directly presented only via poetic modes of description.
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18.2. According to a standard definition in introductory physics textbooks, force is the
cause of acceleration.788 In classical mechanics, for instance, the continual acceleration of Earth
towards the Sun, and vice versa, is caused by an impressed attractive force of gravity that is
directly proportional to both bodies' masses. Here an applied force induces acceleration in
massive bodies. More generally, however, things need not be massive in order to exert or
experience physical force. For instance, a beam of massless photons exerts pressure (i.e. force-
per-unit-area) on a piece of paper, and experiences an 'equal and opposite' force of reaction.789
Photons are evidently capable of exerting and experiencing force insofar as they have, not mass,
but momentum. Thus physical force is to be understood more deeply as the cause, not of
acceleration in massive bodies, but change of momentum. (For a massive body, the temporal rate
of change of its momentum (mv) is the product of its mass (m) and the temporal rate of change of
its velocity (dv /dt), i.e. its acceleration (a). Hence Newton's second law, F = ma.)
On a naive interpretation of this scheme, a physical force is a 'push' or 'pull' whereby a
given thing is sped up or slowed down—or at least whereby it would be sped up or slowed down,
if there were no opposing 'pushes' or 'pulls'. Hence, on this view, the greater the magnitude of the
physical force, the stronger the push or pull that induces acceleration or momentum-change. This
account has the virtue of being (or seeming) intuitive: we all know what it is like to push
something and to see that it moves little or not at all, but then to push harder and see that it now
moves, or speeds up, or slows down. On this account, then, the classical gravitational interaction
between the Sun and Earth involves two opposing pulls. The Sun pulls Earth toward itself, and
Earth pulls the Sun toward itself.790 Moreover, these pulls have the same strength: the
gravitational force exerted by the Earth on the Sun, as given by Newton's law of universal
gravitation, is equal and opposite to the Sun's force on the Earth.
How could this be, though, given that the Sun is so much more massive than the Earth,
and hence presumably so much more gravitationally 'forceful' than it? What does the Sun's
greater power of gravity consist in, if not its pulling harder on less massive bodies than they pull
on it? Or consider a non-gravitational example from the previous section: a small but highly-
charged ball, initially at rest in free space near to a huge free-floating wall. The wall is much
788Coelho (2010) surveys about a hundred 20th- and 21st-century physics textbooks, and reports that the definition of
force most commonly offered therein is (in his words) 'the cause of acceleration' (Coelho 2010, 103).
789See also Sebens 2018 for an argument to the effect that forces from electromagnetic fields on matter are 
balanced by equal and opposite forces from matter on electromagnetic fields.
790Note that this is not actually how Newton himself interpreted his gravitational theory.
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more massive than the ball, and has an electric charge of the same 'sign' as that of the ball, but
much smaller magnitude. Again, the ball is repelled rapidly away from the wall, which moves
infinitesimally in the opposite direction. How could this be, though, given that the ball is so
much more electrically charged than the wall, and hence presumably so much more
electromagnetically potent than it? What does the ball's greater power of electricity consist in, if
not its pushing harder on less-charged bodies than they push on it?
Here the scientific theorist may respond with two interrelated claims. First, although the
forces between the ball and the wall are equal and opposite, the electrostatic field produced by
the more-charged ball is stronger than the electrostatic field produced by the less-charged wall.
Second, the ball and the wall contribute differentially to the equal and opposite forces of
repulsion between them. The physical force of electrostatic repulsion between the wall and the
ball, given (approximately) by Coulomb's law, is directly proportional to the charge of both.
Hence, the more-charged ball adds more to this repulsive force than does the less-charged wall.
These two claims are interrelated as follows: the force experienced by the wall is determined by
taking the strength of the ball's electric field at the location of the wall, and multiplying this
field-strength by the wall's passive charge; this is because an electric field is just a measure of
force-exerted-per-unit-of-passive-electric-charge.
This standard scientific narrative is strange in several ways. First, it is unclear what it
means for passive charge to 'contribute' to a force. Does passive charge 'contribute' to force like a
tributary contributes to a larger river? Or is its 'contribution' more abstract—perhaps even merely
conceptual? Is the way that passive charge 'contributes' to force different from the way that
active charge 'contributes' to field strength? What about the way that the gravitational constant,
G, 'contributes' to the gravitational field (according to both the classical field theory of gravity
and Einstein's general theory of relativity)? Second, how exactly do a passive charge and a field
'combine' to make a force? Third, is a physical force distinct from the 'combination' of a field and
a passive charge, or identical to this 'combination'? In other words, is a physical force the effect
of a passive charge's interaction with an external field? Or is a physical force identical to a
passive charge's interaction with an external field? Is a passive charge's interaction with an
external field 'equal and opposite'? Or can it be hierarchical?
Note that directly analogous questions can be posed even in the context of quantum field
theory. Consider a modern physicist who insists that “fields are all there is,” such that even
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electrons and atoms are really just “quanta of matter fields.”791 Fine. So, then, are fundamental
physical interactions the effect of fields interacting with one another (by 'exchanging force-
carrier particles', etc.)? Or are fundamental physical interactions identical to these interactions
among fields? The latter, evidently. But then are the interactions among fields 'equal and
opposite', always or at least generally speaking? Or can energy- and momentum-conserving
'exchanges' of force-carrying field-quanta be hierarchical?
18.3. From a poetic standpoint, physical interaction is always that between an active
source (e.g. a source-field or source-charge) and a reactive test-object (e.g. a 'test-charge' or 'test-
field'). This interaction is inherently hierarchical: whereas the test-object's reaction is the impact
of the source's active force, the source's action is not the impact of the test-object's reactive force.
Rather, the impact of the test-object's reactive force is its own momentum-change. The active
source causes the reactive test-object to accelerate itself, or more generally to impart momentum
to itself. The 'equal and opposite' force highlighted by classical physics is just the reactive force
whereby the test-object accelerates itself. This is one way to characterize a given physical
reaction: as accelerative force. But the same reaction can also be characterized as an input-output
gain or 'signal boost' to an original active force. Each test-object's responsivity or reactive 'signal
boost' is the causal process that produces an 'equal and opposite' accelerative force. The originary
action by the source-field (or source-charge, etc.) is not the immediate cause of the test-object's
momentum-change. It is the immediate cause of the test-object's reactive force, and hence the
mediate cause of the test-object's momentum-change.
The distinction between active sources and reactive test-objects is not absolute, but
aspectual. Hence, in a given physical interaction between two things, each can function both as
active source and as reactive test-object vis-à-vis the other. But this is so only if each truly
causally produces a reactive force in the other: the relation between sources and test-objects in
real interactions is genuinely causal.
Although the causal relations between active sources and reactive test-objects in physical
interactions are real, they are not part of the representational contents of objective scientific
theory. Rather, objective empirical science directly presents only observable phenomena and the
unobservable dynamic structures into which the phenomena are 'lawfully' ordered. The forms of
791Hobson 2013.
309
empirical causes, like 'equal and opposite impressed forces' in classical physics, or 'exchange
forces' mediated by 'carrier particles' in modern quantum field theory, are part of this
unobservable dynamic structure.
Objection: Why couldn't this be all that there is? Why couldn't 'empirical causes' produce
law-governed order in the phenomena? What explanatory role is left for 'causal relations between
active sources and reactive test-objects' that somehow falls beyond the scope of ordinary
empirical causes?
Reply: We have to take into account the dynamically-relevant properties of causally-
impacted objects in some way—whether these objects are electrons engaged in a quantum field
theoretic photon-exchange or Newtonian 'point masses'. So it is then a matter of deciding how
exactly to do so. (One note: a conspicuous case in which the properties of test-objects do not
matter, in an important sense, is that of gravity. This is because gravity is a 'universal force': it
has the same impact on all 'material' things, regardless of their different masses, charges, etc.
More broadly, any universal force can be 'geometrized away' by incorporating its field variables
directly into the affine structure of spacetime—as has been done for gravity in Einstein's theory
of general relativity, as well as in the subsequent geometric reformulation of Newtonian
gravitational theory developed by Élie Cartan in the 1920s. I will return to this point in the next
section, in elaborating the connection between forces and spatial forms.)
How exactly should we treat dynamically-relevant properties of test-objects, then? As
genuine active powers to have real impact? Or as passive 'powers' to be impacted? Or as inertial
'powers' to resist being impacted? Or as genuine reactive powers to have real impact when
impacted?
Empirical causes like 'equal and opposite impressed forces' in classical physics, or
'exchange forces' mediated by 'carrier particles' in modern quantum field theory, are causes
insofar as they impact merely 'passive' or 'resistant' objects. But merely 'passive' or 'resistant'
objects are unreal. Reality is force. To be real is to exercise power, to be a locus of force. A thing
that is only determined by higher forces, as a mere object for their outlet, is unreal—nothing but
an appearance, nothing but an image of underlying reality. Reality is not subjective effort, but
objectively impactful force. And reality is force with impact, not on mere objects, but on other
forceful things. Impact considered abstractly, apart from its own force, is only the effect of force.
Abstract impact is pure appearance. Empirical causes are thus pseudo-causes, albeit pseudo-
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causes whereby we objectively represent real causes.
'Transcendent' physical causes—i.e. elemental physical forces—are these real causes,
insofar as they impact real, reactively-forceful things. Hence, empirical causes cannot be 'all
there is', because their reality presupposes the reality of the things they impact, whereas qua
empirical they impact only passive or inertially-resistant objects. Objective scientific
representation directly presents us only with abstract causal interactions, between empirical
causes and mere objects. The only way to directly apprehend real causal relations, between
forces, is to posit 'transcendent' causal powers that act on reactive things. The 'equal and
opposite' forces or 'exchange forces' highlighted by physical theory are the products of real
causal chains whereby active forces ('fields', 'source-charges', etc.) causally produce reactive
forces (in 'test-charges', other fields, etc.) that impart momentum to test-objects.
Objection: If the reality of causal relations presupposes the 'force' of causally-impacted
things, then how does this not create an infinite-regress problem? For instance, what is the 'force'
of the acceleration that 'reactive forces' produce in 'test-objects'? 
Reply: Accelerating masses or electric charges produce radiative forces. More broadly,
this is not a real 'regress problem'. Rather, it is a fruitful heuristic for developing dynamic-poetic
physical descriptions: anything that appears not to be a force is either in fact a locus of force, or
else is unreal—albeit perhaps still the abstract impact or pure objective appearance of reality.
19. Real Structure, Objective Field, and Universal Spatial Form
19.1. Science threatens to reduce reality to a system of pictures. Heidegger makes a
similar point regarding Plato's emphasis on 'Form' [eidos], in a 1938 lecture on 'The Age of the
World Picture' [Die Zeit des Weltbildes]: “that the beingness of whatever is [die Seiendheit des
Seienden], is defined for Plato as eidos (aspect, view [Aussehen, Anblick]) is the presupposition,
destined far in advance and long ruling indirectly in concealment, for the world's having to
become picture [Bild].”792 For Heidegger, this 'world-picturing' attitude is to be criticized. And I
agree, provided that one systematically distinguishes mere pictures from both real images and
objective images. Here I speak only for myself, not for Heidegger. A picture is a subjective
image: an abstract form produced by viewing real impact apart from both its own force (as real)
and the force that produces it (as impact). Objective science yields objective images of reality.
792Heidegger 1977a, 91 / 1977b, 130. 
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Universals—rational forms—are just pictures, or merely subjective images. Idealism
attempts to conceptualize things as determinate objects by appeal to universals, e.g. to
conceptualize the Sun's brilliance as just one among many particular instances of the universal
Light, which also appears in lamps and candle flames. But this is mere picturing or depiction,
insofar as the Sun's paradigmatic brilliance is the real ground of the universal Light. Depiction
thus forecloses a certain kind of mythic or poetic understanding, wherein the lamp or candle
instead owes its light directly or essentially to the Sun—wherein the candle's light is the Sun's
light, microcosmically, hence wherein the Sun (not the Platonic Form of Light) is exalted as the
higher reality underlying lesser modes of light. In this sort of mythic or poetic consciousness, the
concept [light] functions as an image of the Sun's force. In idealistic depiction, the concept [light]
functions as an image of our own power of abstraction.
Science evidently cannot treat the concept [light] as an image of the Sun's force, in
particular, however impressive it might be. Science evidently must relate the Sun and the candle
alike to a broader scale of light o r radiance. But this scale need not be a universal form or
subjective image of our own reason. In natural science, rather, general concepts like [light] are
images of light's holistic impact on other things, considered merely as (illuminated) objects.
What is an 'image', exactly, and what makes an image 'subjective' or 'objective'? An
image is an appearance in the mode of extension. To elaborate any further, then, we must turn to
extension and appearance—which again are both commonly denoted by a single term: form. 
19.2. In Plato's Greek, the word 'form' [eidos] denotes (among other things) that which is
seen: appearance, especially in the sense of outward or sensible appearance, and even
shapeliness or beauty. Hence, presumably, the traditional association between form and
aesthetics, understood as episteme aisthetike or the science of aesthesis (meaning perception, and
especially sensory perception).793 This unity of form and appearance also holds for the Greek
793“The Greek philosophers and the Church fathers have already carefully distinguished between things perceived 
[aistheta] and things known [noeta]. It is entirely evident that they did not equate things known with things of 
sense, since they honored with this name things also removed from sense (therefore, images). Therefore, things 
known are to be known by the superior faculty as the object of logic; things perceived [are to be known by the 
inferior faculty, as the object] of the science of perception, or aesthetic” (Baumgarten 1954, 78); “The term 
'aesthetics' is formed in the same manner as 'logic' and 'ethics.' The word episteme, knowledge, must always 
complete these terms. Logic: logike episteme: knowledge of logos, that is, the doctrine of assertion or judgment 
as the basic form of thought. Logic is knowledge of thinking, of the forms and rules of thought. Ethics: ethike 
episteme: knowledge of ethos, of the inner character of man and of the way it determines his behavior. Logic and
ethics both refer to human behavior and its lawfulness. The word 'aesthetics' is formed in the corresponding way:
aisthetike episteme: knowledge of human behavior with regard to sense, sensation, and feeling, and knowledge 
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morphe, the Latin forma, and our own form.794 In this sense of 'form', then, things show up for us
precisely by virtue of their form: their outward appearance. Form is thus that-which-appears. 
But 'form' also denotes extension, including both shape and space. Shape, in turn, is
structure: holistic order, or the way that distinct elements are interrelated as parts of a whole.795
Shape can be internal structure (organization o r composition) or external structure (surface,
boundary, or outline). As the two basic modes of dynamic interaction, agon and hierarchy are
fundamental modes of structural form. Form is not just shape or structure, however. Again, form
is also space. One familiar spatial form is, of course, space. A second is time. A third is
spacetime. Material things can be parts of structures. And they can have surfaces or internal
composition. But material things are not parts of spacetime. Rather, matter is located in
spacetime, or structurally determined by it. More broadly, objects are determined inside of or
within spaces. Note that spatial form, in this broad sense, evidently encompasses phenomena like
scale or dimension. Structure and space are the two basic modes of form as extension.
Any structure or space that is itself a locus of force is thus real extension, or a real form.
Real form has impact. Inert form, forceless form, is unreal. There are real structures; but all
spaces are unreal. Not all unreal forms are merely subjective, however, for some inert forms are
pure objective appearances. And, indeed, objectively valid spatial forms are just pure objective
appearances, or mere images of universal forces' real impact. That is: universal force has impact;
this impact has real structural form, or dynamic structure; and this real dynamic structure in turn
merely appears as objective spatial form, in which things impacted by the given universal force
are represented as spatially-located objects. Objective spaces are just abstract representations of
universal forces' real dynamic structures. 
Form is thus extension, encompassing both structure and space, as well as appearance.
But how can form denote both extension and appearance? Is this just a linguistic accident? It is
not. Extension and appearance are interrelated. And the ground of their interrelation is force.
of how these are determined” (Heidegger 1991a, 77-78); “[The term 'aesthetics'] comes from the Greek 
[aisthánomai], meaning 'perceive', and thus encompasses the entire realm of sensory experience; and Kant[...]and
a number of German Enlightenment writers, applied it generally to all forms of scientific conditions of 
sensuality” (Adorno 2018, 18). See also Guyer 2016.
794'Beauty' is given as an archaic definition of 'form' in the Collins English Dictionary and in the Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary. For the Latin and Greek, see Lewis and Short 1879; Liddell and Scott 1889, 1940; Cunliffe 1924.
795Susanne Langer calls this 'logical form', or “'form' in its most abstract sense”: “structure, articulation, a whole 
resulting from the relation of mutually dependent factors, or more precisely, the way that whole is put together” 
(Langer 1957, 16). I am hesitant to call it 'form', per se, because it seems to describe only shape, and not space.
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19.3. Appearance is pure impact. Pure impact is the effect of force on its objects,
considered only as effect. Pure impact is thus unreal. Only force is real; not its effects, merely as
effects. 'Pure impact' designates that which is determined by force, considered apart from its own
force. 'Pure appearance' designates that which is determined by reality, considered apart from its
own reality. These are alternative descriptions of the same thing. Pure impact just is appearance.
The identity of appearance and pure impact corresponds directly to the identity of reality and
force. Form-as-appearance is form construed as the pure impact of force.
Impact can be extensive or non-extensive. That is, the impact of a given force can be a
spatial or structural form, or not be either. For example, imagine hitting a concrete wall with
your hand. The force your hand exerts on the wall has structure: the shape of your hand. The wall
in turn pushes back against your hand—if it did not, after all, your hand would simply pass
through it. But in fact your hand is halted by the wall. And this is because the wall pushes back
against your hand when your hand pushes on it. The wall's push-back in turn has structure: it is a
push-back on your hand, in (approximately) the shape of your hand. The wall doesn't push back
in places where your hand is not—there is nothing there to push back against, after all.
Moreover, the wall's push-back is (at least part of) the impact of your push. And it has shape or
structure. Hence, the wall's push-back is the extensive impact of your push. But the wall's push-
back is also a force. Hence, the wall's push-back is real extensive impact, not abstract or pure
impact. For an example of abstract extensive impact, imagine shaping a piece of clay into a cube.
The clay's cubic shape is the impact of your shaping force. But if it is considered apart from its
own force (say, insofar as the cube presses down against the table in a square shape, or against
impinging air molecules in a distinctively cube-like way …), then this cubic shape is not real,
but pure appearance: the pure appearance or pure extensive impact of your sculpting force.
An image is just the extensive impact of a force. Images can be real (like the wall's hand-
shaped push-back) or purely abstract (like the clay cube's shape, considered apart from its own
force). Images are reality's appearance in the mode of extension: the extensive impact of forces.
A real image is real extensive impact. An objective image is semi-abstract extensive impact:
extensive impact considered in relation to the force that produces it, but apart from its own force.
How could a force possibly have a space or spatial form as its impact? I will return to this
issue shortly. At present, it will be more helpful to consider non-extensive modes of impact.
Non-extensive impact is quality. For example, whereas melody and rhythm are modes of
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structure whereby sonic force has extensive impact on us, tone is a non-extensive sonic quality.
Likewise, pure color is a non-extensive visual quality, whereas the spatiotemporal configuration
of colors is a visual structure. Hence, a large steel cube—e.g. the minimalist sculptor Tony
Smith's Die (1968)—has qualitative chromatic impact on us insofar as it is reddish-black (say),
and extensive chromatic impact insofar as this quality is 'formed' into a cubic shape or structure.
Qualitative impact can be real, or purely abstract. For instance, the rustling of the leaves is the
impact of the wind's force. But the rustling of the leaves also has sonic force in its own right.
This sonic force has structure, but it also has non-extensive quality. Hence, it is real quality.
What is qualitative impact among inanimate physical objects, then—where appeal to
sensory qualities like color or tone is evidently inappropriate, or at best only metaphorically apt?
Here is one example: increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations acidify the ocean. Here is
another: the Sun heats the rock. Here are two more: the baseball shatters the window; the proton
attracts the electron. There is nothing anthropomorphic or metaphorical about these examples,
clearly. But they can nevertheless be understood to involve non-extensive modes of impact.
Every dynamic interaction can be characterized in terms of extensive or qualitative impact.
Qualitative modes of impact can in turn be spatialized. For example, heat can be
represented as a scale or dimension, of temperature, within which a given act of heating can be
located or formally determined. For instance: 'The Sun causes the rock to warm by 4° Celsius.'
Or, without any exact scale: 'Sunlight causes the rock to warm more than does candlelight.' In
this way, a given force's qualitative impact can be represented as a particular point o r shape
within a qualitative space. Hence, to return to a previous example, the large steel cube's reddish-
black finish might be spatially determined or located within a broader color-space. Thus any
given qualitative mode of impact can be formally represented as a structural mode of extensive
impact, within a corresponding quality-space. The location of a given mode of qualitative impact
within a corresponding quality-space might be determinate or indeterminate, as the case may be.
For instance, if I simply hear some kind of tone, or see some kind of color, then this qualitative
impact can be represented as an indeterminate structure within a corresponding quality-space.
Spatialization transforms qualitative modes of impact into universal forms.
What is the status of such 'qualitative spaces'? Are they real? Or just imaginary? On my
view, qualitative spaces are universal forms or spaces, just like any other. As spaces, they are
never real. They have no genuine impact. But they can be objectively valid, nevertheless. And an
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objectively valid qualitative space is a purely intelligible formal representation of a qualitative
force, within which corresponding modes of qualitative impact are located. By something 'purely
intelligible', I mean something insofar as it lacks both sensory qualities (e.g. color, hotness, or
smell) and spatiotemporal properties (e.g. temporal duration, or spatial form). Note that for
something to be purely intelligible does not mean that it is mind-dependent, on my view.
Objective qualitative spaces are mind-independent spatial forms. In loosely Kantian terms,
purely intelligible things are just things insofar as they are possible objects of purely conceptual
understanding, as opposed to things as they are given to us via sensible intuition. 
Every objective qualitative space can be intellectually represented as an objectively valid
concept. Again, to be clear: qualitative spaces themselves are not concepts. Objective qualitative
spaces are mind-independent spatial forms. Concepts are mind-dependent mental
representations. But qualitative spaces are purely intelligible. And objectively valid concepts, or
natural concepts, are just mental representations of objective qualitative spaces.
One cognitively constructs an object by conceptually determining a thing with respect to
an objective qualitative space. Hence, for instance, one constitutes the sculptural work as a mere
object, rather than a work, by conceptualizing its color as a generic 'location' in a broader 'space'.
This is to constitute something as a particular vis-à-vis a universal. But an objective qualitative
space is a universal form that encodes the impact of a corresponding mode of qualitative force.
Its objective validity is not grounded in the relationship of particulars to one another, but rather
in the relationship of the total field of particulars it subsumes to a corresponding universal force.
For instance, the objective validity of universal color-space is grounded in the real force of color.
An objective qualitative space is a purely intelligible spatial image of a qualitative force.
Corresponding modes of qualitative impact are the determinative features of objects located
within this space. Natural concepts are mental representations of objective qualitative spaces.
19.4. Clearly, deeper examination of spatial form is required, if any of the above analysis
is to be sustained. To this end, it should first be noted that the metaphysical status of space, time,
and spacetime is famously contested.796 One major axis of this debate concerns ongoing tension
between substantivalism and relationalism. Another axis concerns tension between realism and
anti-realism. Realists about space (time, spacetime, etc.) claim that objective reality has
796For the description of the broader theoretical landscape, in this paragraph, I am closely following Belot 2011.
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determinate spatial (temporal, spatiotemporal) structure.797 Anti-realists deny this .
Substantivalism and relationalism are in turn best construed as two competing varieties of
realism. Substantivalists claim that space consists of parts, and that geometric relations between
material things located in space are determined by relations among the parts of space that they
occupy. As a slogan: 'Material geometry is derivative upon spatial geometry.' (The material
geometry at a world is “the pattern of geometric relations instantiated by the parts of matter at
[the given] world at a time.”798) Relationalists deny this. Hence, some relationalists might deny
my earlier claim that spatially-located objects are thereby 'structurally determined by' space.
Other relationalists might accept that spatially-located objects are structurally determined by
space, but claim that they are not therefore impacted by space. The latter is my own view.
I am concerned with both of these standard metaphysical debates, but only insofar as they
extend to my own broader notion of dimension or spatial form. This broader category of spatial
form, which I take to be more fundamental, naturally encompasses space, time, and spacetime.
But it is not restricted to these particular spaces. (On my view, what is called 'space' is often only
kinematic space, i.e. a three-dimensional spatial form in which material objects interact via
accelerative forces. Modern physical spacetime is in turn just gravitational space, i.e. a kinematic
space in which objects interact as loci of non-gravitational accelerative forces.) I am a realist
about spatial form, insofar as I believe that mind-independent things like trees and people are
objectively located in various spatial forms—including space, time, and spacetime. Thus I am
not an idealist. But while I believe that mind-independent things stand in objectively valid spatial
relations to one another, I do not believe that the spaces in which they are located are real.
No spatial forms are real, on my view (to repeat for the sake of clarity), but some unreal
spatial forms are objectively valid, and hence more than merely ideal. Objective spaces are pure
objective appearances, in a non-idealistic sense of 'appearance'. Namely, objective spaces are the
pure objective appearance of real dynamic structures, or the real forms of universal forces'
impact on corresponding spatially-located objects. I will elaborate below. But first, a question:
How should the ontologist who understands reality as force assess the putative reality of
797Another intuitive characterization of realism is more stringent: one might say that realists about space claim that 
mind-independent reality has determinate spatial structure. Thus construed, Kant would be an anti-realist, insofar
as he claims that space is merely a form of our sensible intuition. But Kant endorses a notion of objective validity
that applies to mind-dependent phenomena, including spatial and temporal relations among empirical objects. 
Hence, he would not be an anti-realist about space, in my preferred sense of 'anti-realism'. I will return to the 
issue of objectivity below.
798Belot 2011, 3.
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forms? Can a force-ontologist allow that there are real structures, or real spaces? How should a
force-ontologist understand the relationship between spatial and material geometry, or between
spatial geometry and dynamic relations among objects in space? What could it mean for a
structure or space to exercise power? Moreover, what could it mean for structural or spatial form
itself to be essentially definable only in relation to force? How could form itself be force?
This question is both 'ontological' and 'ontic', again in Heidegger's sense. I am asking how
structural form can be real, and how spatial form can objectively appear, given my basic
ontological hypothesis that reality is force. But I am also asking how form itself, both structural
and spatial, can be fully understood only in relation to force. In other words, I am implying that
form considered in abstraction from force is not just merely ideal; it is also not genuinely form.
Ideal form—viz., universal form—is precisely form thus abstracted entirely from force.
These last claims are analogous to Nietzsche's aforementioned view that power [Macht]
characterizes not only the relationship of every drive [Trieb] to all others (i.e., insofar as it strives
“to be master” of “all the other drives” (BGE 6)), but also the ultimate aim of every real drive.
'Power' is for Nietzsche both the relational 'form' and the ultimate 'content' of every real drive.
Likewise, then, I claim that force not only aptly characterizes how real forms relate to other
things (viz., by impacting them) and how objective forms relate to other things (viz., by being
forces' abstract impact), but also indicates the essence o r nature of structural or spatial form
itself. Rational (i.e. universal) form is merely the subjective appearance of form. Universal form
is not truly form. Only form-as-impact (i.e. objective field-of-effect) is true field-structure or
spatial form. Objective spatial form is a special case of objective impact- or field-structure, in the
case where the corresponding force is universal. Only form-as-force (i.e. real structure) is true
structural form. Only objective fields or real structures are truly forms at all. True forms,
objective fields and real structures, are natural forms.
19. 5 . I will return to spatial form in the next sub-section, with sustained analysis
extending through the rest of this section. But first, a few more words on structure are in order,
as they will prove directly relevant to my discussion of space.
Structural form is the coherent external force of two or more dynamically-interacting
parts, i.e., these parts' holistic exercise of power in relation to external things. Putative structures
that do not function as holistic force-loci are not genuine structural wholes. And putative
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structures that do not impact things beyond their own parts are not genuine structures. Idealists
tend to view the reality of wholes as grounded simply in their 'determination' of their own parts
—e.g. organs as being determined by the well-functioning of the organism. This is a profound
metaphysical error. Indeed, it is a major constitutive element, if not even the defining feature, of
idealistic confusion about force. And it has direct ramifications on idealistic (mis)conceptions of
spatial form, in particular: idealists often take objects to be determined or impacted by the spaces
in which they are located. But they are not. Spaces are forms within which objects causally
impact each other. Spaces themselves impact nothing. But, again, objective spaces are
spatializations of forces that do have real impact or causal influence.
How are these errors (assuming that I am right that they are indeed errors) related to
idealism? The idealist fetishizes abstraction, or considering things apart from both (1) the force
that grounds their reality (to the extent that they are real) and (2) the force by which they are
impacted (to the extent that they are objective appearances). Treating wholes as self-contained
monads is a way to ignore their actual impact on things, and instead to treat them as essentially
self-regulating o r self-determining. This is how the idealist thinks of human beings: as self-
determining subjects. But we are not. To the extent that we are coherent subjects, as opposed to
just aggregated drives, it is in part because our constitutive drives have coherent effect—i.e.,
because we act as coherent subjects in relation to external things that we impact. We are not
coherent subjects just because our constitutive drives are part of a 'system' or interrelated by
'principles'. Our real unity as subjects is just the holistic subject-like force that our constitutive
drives exert on external things. (Not all real wholes are subjects, however, of course.) The
idealist understands individuality subjectively—is caught up in inwardness, rather than by a more
objective orientation outward towards reality. The idealist sees the subject as essentially self-
determining (i.e. free, autonomous), and only inessentially as determined from without (i.e.
unfree, heteronomous). The dynamist or true naturalist sees the subject as essentially both
impacting other things and being impacted from without by higher forces—i.e., as being both
impactful or truly real, and truly impacted as a site of higher forces' objective appearance.
 Internal structure is 'inner shape': organization or composition. Genuine internal structure
can be a locus of organic force, i.e. force whereby an organic whole or organism impacts things
beyond itself. The parts of an organism are in some sense 'determined' by the whole, as its
organs. But this internal 'determination' of organs by the organism is not genuine impact. It is a
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merely ideal mode of 'determination'. The functional arrangement of organic parts is not actually
produced by the whole—or by the idea of the whole, or by its well-functioning, etc. To pretend
otherwise is to invoke an idealistic mode of teleological explanation. The reality of an organic
whole is not grounded in the way it 'determines' its constitutive parts as organs. The reality of an
organic whole is grounded in the coherent organic force whereby it impacts external things.
Genuine internal structure can also be a locus of mechanical force, i.e. force whereby a
mechanical whole or mechanism impacts things beyond itself. The parts of a mechanism are in
some sense 'determined' by the whole, as its gears. But this internal 'determination' of gears by
the machine-whole is not genuine impact. Gears are not actually ordered by the mechanical
wholes they constitute. And gears are often not actually ordered by any intelligent designer who
arranges them in accordance with an idea or plan of the machine-whole. For instance, the solar
system can be viewed as a mechanical whole. But the individual orbital trajectories of the planets
around the Sun are not determined by their holistic arrangement into the solar system as we
know it, or by any architect aiming to produce this holistic pattern of concentric planetary orbits.
Even when mechanical wholes are actually produced by design, finally, this is not aptly
described in terms of the determination of the gears by the machine-whole. The idea of the
machine-whole truly impacts the engineer, who in turn truly impacts the gear-parts. But the idea
of the mechanical system is not the same as the mechanical system. The machine itself never
determines the gears' operation. Rather, the gears determine one another, as interacting forces.
Recall, in this light, that in order for something to be real it must exert force on other
impactful things, not upon things that are merely objects for higher forces. Hence, in order for
the organs in an organism to be real, they must exert force on other impactful things. Here there
is a natural candidate: other organs. In a real organic whole, that is, organs dynamically interact
with each other, as loci of vital force. Thus, in real organisms, organs stand in real tension or
harmony with one another. They are not simply 'side by side' inside of the organism, each doing
its part to promote the well-being of the whole. Here compare Nietzsche's claim that “[w]hat
every smallest part of a living organism wants, is an increase of power” (W P 702 / KSA
13:14[174]).799 The functional interrelation of the organic parts emerges from their dynamic
799Here consider also: “Even the body within which individuals treat each other as equals[...]if it is a living and not 
a dying body, has to do to other bodies what the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other: it will 
have to be an incarnate will to power, it will strive to grow, spread, seize, become predominant[...]because it is 
living and because life simply is will to power” (BGE 259); “For fundamentally it is the same active force that is 
at work on a grander scale in those artists of violence and organizers who build states, and that here, internally, 
on a smaller and pettier scale, directed backward[...]creates for itself a bad conscience and builds negative 
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interaction; the holistic functional unity of the organs does not cause, determine, or impact their
dynamic interaction. Quite the opposite: the organs' dynamic interaction grounds or determines
the holistic force of the organism. Likewise, the gears in a real mechanism must truly engage
each other, as loci of machine-force.
The holistic force of a real structure is not reducible to the force of its dynamically-
interacting parts. One might claim that the force of the whole is simply identical to the
aggregated force of the parts. But then the whole has no genuine reality, apart from the reality of
its distinct parts. One might in turn attempt to avert this problem by distinguishing the parts from
their dynamic interactions with one another. But this is to distinguish these parts from the ground
of their own reality: their own nature. This would be bad metaphysics. The dynamic relations
among parts are not merely superimposed on them, in a real structural whole. Rather, these parts
are essentially defined by their mutual interactions. (Here recall Dewey on “the intimacy of the
relations that hold the parts together,” which he calls '[t]he characteristic of artistic design': “A
work of art is poor in the degree in which [these relations] exist in separation, as in a novel
wherein plot—the design—is felt to be superimposed upon incidents and characters instead of
being their dynamic relations to one another.”800) Structure is real only insofar as its holistic force
is distinct from the force of its dynamically-interacting parts. The external force of a real
structural whole emerges from internal dynamic interactions among its parts. 
Can the external force of a real structure be, not just distinct from the internal forces of its
dynamically-interacting parts, but also greater than these internal forces? Yes, certainly. Is the
force of a real structural whole always greater than the forces of its parts? No—why would it be?
Some wholes are more real than their parts; other wholes are less real than their parts. For
instance, a highly anti-individualistic human society (or an ant colony, etc.) might well be a locus
of greater force, as a whole, than the aggregated force of all its constitutive members. On the
other hand, a collection of interacting bodies with strong electric charges may have virtually no
external impact as a whole, if parts with positive and negative charges are perfectly balanced.
External structure is 'outer shape': surface, boundary, border, outline, etc. Genuine
external structure is a locus of surface-force, i.e. surface or boundary insofar as it exercises real
power. Putative boundaries that do not function as loci of force are not genuine boundaries. The




misunderstood. A forceful border need not be an impenetrable or non-porous one, for instance. A
real border can be a site of attractive force, after all, not just repulsive force. Likewise, a forceful
border need not be a static or unchanging border. That said, my view here does diverge starkly
from (facile but apparently still surprisingly prevalent) views on which borders—say, those
between nations—are just imaginary lines drawn in the sand, with no real significance or
normative force. To the extent that this is true of a given border, on my view, it just means that
this border is unreal. This says nothing about the nature of borders, in a positive sense, and
indirectly supports my own view: a 'border' that is only an inert, purely ideal line is not a border.
Real external structure has impact in the mode of external impression o r imprint: the
ring's surface is externally imprinted on the wax seal, for example. By contrast, real internal
structure has impact on external things in the mode of surface impression: something's 'inner
form' is projected onto its surface, from within—and thereby potentially impressed onto external
things. For instance, an engine heats up in certain areas of its outer surface more than others
while running, due to corresponding differences in internal structure and function. The engine
therefore heats up other parts, or the air around it, or your hand if you touch it, differentially,
depending on which part of its surface they touch. The structure of the engine's impact on
surrounding things, in the mode of heat, can thus be interpreted as an external impression of its
surface-heat, which is in turn a surface-impression of its internal force of combustion.
In the case where internal structure is thus 'externalized', mediated by its impact from
within on its own surface, the resultant form of impact is aptly termed expressive form.
('Expressive', because the internal structure is 'expressed' externally, like an idea or feeling being
artistically 'expressed'.) For example, the agon between Christian drives to transcendence and
older pagan drives to telluric natural force, within medieval architects, was arguably
'externalized' in the vaulted organic forms of Gothic cathedrals.801 Likewise, Émile Durkheim
describes concepts of space as what might naturally be called 'expressive' forms of cultural force:
There are societies in Australia and North America in which space is conceived in
the form of a vast circle because the encampment itself is circular, and the spatial
circle is divided just like a tribal circle and in its image. There are as many regions
as there are clans in the tribe, and it is the place occupied by clans inside the
801Here I am loosely summarizing a suggestion made by Ruskin (Ruskin 1853/2004)
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encampment that determines the orientation of the regions.[...]Thus, social
organization has been the model for spatial organization, which is like a tracing of
it. (Durkheim 1912/2008, 11–14)
Finally, a possible instance of inorganic 'expressive' form arises in relation to geologists’
widespread acceptance of the theory of continental drift in the early- to mid-1960s. What proved
to be crucial evidence in favor of drift theories was the success of a model, accounting for
previously observed magnetic anomalies around mid-ocean ridges, due to Vine and Matthews,
and independently developed by Morley.802 The Vine-Matthews-Morley (VMM) proposal
synthesized the (at the time controversial) theory of sea-floor spreading803 with the notion of
thermo-remanent magnetization in the oceanic crust804 and the (also controversial) hypothesis of
periodic global magnetic pole reversals. This synthesis led to the inference that there should be
alternating stripes of oppositely polarized magnetic materials in the oceanic crust extending
outwards from mid-ocean ridges, with a central anomaly along the ridge axis magnetized in the
current direction of the Earth’s magnetic field.805 The upshot, for my purposes, is this: the pattern
of alternating stripes of magnetic material around mid-ocean ridges is at least fairly aptly
characterized as an 'expressive' form of the Earth's dipolar magnetic force. (It may be more apt,
however, to say that the magnetized stripes on the ocean floor are only a spatial impression of the
temporal structure of the Earth's magnetic force, acting just as a real surface.)
19.6. Question: Are agon and hierarchy real structures?
Answer: Agon and hierarchy both can be real structures—namely, insofar as agonistic or
hierarchical interactions function as holistic loci of force. However, not every objectively valid
relation of agon or hierarchy corresponds to a real agonistic or hierarchical structure. For
instance: the natural world comprises no real things other than dynamically-interacting forces.
802Frankel 1982.
803 In essence: upwelling material from the Earth’s mantle forms new oceanic crust along the axis of mid-ocean 
ridges. This new crust is gradually pushed away from the ridge by the formation of new crust, and old ocean 
crust melts back into the mantle as it is pushed down at the edge of oceanic basins. Hence the rock comprising 
the ocean crust is youngest near mid-ocean ridges, and oldest at the edge of the ocean. Interestingly, this fact of 
varying crustal age was not securely established empirically until 1970 (LeGrand 1988, 235-236), well after 
geologists had collectively accepted continental drift as a research program.
804 Certain types of rocks become permanently magnetized in the direction of externally applied magnetic fields 
(e.g. the magnetic field of the Earth) present at the time of their formation.
805Vine and Matthews 1963.
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So, then, is objective reality itself a real thing—namely, a real structure comprising all
agonistically- and hierarchically-interacting forces? No, objective reality is not a real all-
encompassing structure. Objective reality is just the all-encompassing field of interacting forces.
This basic field is not itself a force. It is an unreal but objectively valid space, or dimensional
structure, that contains all things insofar as they are objects impacted by force. Objective reality
is an unreal but objectively valid representation of nature as an all-encompassing field-of-effect.
Nature is real, however. Nature is the real order of primitive forces, interacting prior to
any containment by embedding spaces or unifying Forms. We directly apprehend nature in
poetry. And we represent nature as objective reality in science. Poetry presents mind-
independent reality as a real order of forces. Science represents the same mind-independent
reality as an all-encompassing field of appearances: impact-images—objects.
Objective reality is a qualitative space, in the sense outlined above. Namely, objective
reality is a spatial representation of force, generically. Force, generically, can be understood as a
universal qualitative force. The impact of force, as a universal qualitative force, is its universal
quality or non-extensive impact. What is that? It is generic impact: force, generically, produces
impact in its objects. The objects located within objective reality or total dynamic space,
construed as the qualitative space corresponding to the quality, force, are thus things insofar as
they are impacted. What is a thing insofar as it is impacted? It is a thing insofar as it has generic
passive charge or inertial charge, i.e. generic powers of receptivity or resistance to being
impacted in the way that it is. Thus, to objectively represent things insofar as they are generically
dynamically impacted is to represent them as loci of passive or resistive 'powers'. Hence, the
objects located within objective reality or total dynamic space are just objects, or things insofar
as they are impacted by real forces.
The concept [force], in turn, is just an objectively valid mental representation of this total
dynamic space. Thus the concept [force] is an objective intellectual image of an objective mind-
independent total image of nature. We use the concept [force] to mentally organize, not our
experience of forces 'in themselves', but rather our experience of forces in relation to their
objects, and specifically our experience of objects insofar as they are impacted by forces.
19.7. Spaces are objectively valid only insofar as they are pure formal appearances of
universal forces—i.e. forces that impact all of the objects located within them in the same way.
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To spatialize a universal force is to treat is as a background structure. Spaces thus function
epistemologically as representational norms or ways of seeing, rather than as any actual objects
viewed thereby. Here it is helpful to compare Kant's notion of transcendental form. On Kant's
view, recall, the pure forms of our sensible intuition (space and time) and the categorical forms
of our understanding are not objects, but rather background structures in and through which our
experience of objects first becomes possible.806 In my terms: Kantian transcendental forms are
spatializations of universal cognitive forces. Here it is worth noting that Kant's notion of
'transcendental form' has exerted wide-ranging influence on later modern thought.
For instance, Heidegger develops a broadly similar notion of 'world'. A Heideggerian
'world' is a historically- and culturally-specific understanding of Being, or horizon of
intelligibility—a historical people's basic sense of 'what is and matters', as one commentator puts
806Kant allows that space and time manifest both as pure 'forms of intuition' and as pure 'formal intuitions'. Qua 
'formal intuitions', space and time are a priori mental representations in which every object we experience and 
sensation immediately given to us is located. Qua 'forms of intuition', they are the “merely potential form[s]” of 
a “mere capacity to take in a manifold, devoid of any capacity to unify the manifold” (Longuenesse 1998, 103-
4). But let me set aside this nuance for now, in the main text.
Although it does not directly impact my overall argument, it should be noted that there is in fact substantial 
interpretive controversy surrounding the nature of Kant's distinction between 'formal intuitions' and 'forms of 
intuition'. Following Hegel (1977, 69-70), Béatrice Longuenesse has argued that Kant takes the pure intuitions of
space and time described in the Transcendental Aesthetic to be produced via the “transcendental synthesis of 
imagination,” or “figurative synthesis,” characterized in the second-edition version of the Transcendental 
Deduction of the categories (KrV B150-1, B154). On Longuenesse's reading, sensibility itself—i.e., in 
abstraction from its affection by understanding—provides only “merely potential form,” or “the form of a mere 
capacity to take in a manifold, devoid of any capacity to unify the manifold” (Longuenesse 1998, 103-4). Qua 
“formal intuitions” (which Longuenesse thinks just are the 'pure intuitions' of the Aesthetic), space and time are 
in turn the synthetically-produced actualizations of these 'merely potential' “form[s] of intuition” (ibid., 221). 
Namely, the 'formal intuitions' of space and time are produced via an imaginative synthesis of the manifold of 
sensations given by space and time qua mere 'forms of intuition'. Compare Kant's claim that “inner 
sense[...]contains the mere form of intuition, but without combination of the manifold in it, and thus it does not 
yet contain any determinate intuition at all, which is possible only through the consciousness of the 
determination of the manifold through the transcendental action of the imagination (synthetic influence of the 
understanding on the inner sense), which I have named the figurative synthesis” (KrV B154)
Others interpreters have contested this Hegelian interpretive strategy. Thus, Henry Allison (2000, 74; 2004,
114) insists that the figurative synthesis simply yields determinate [bestimmte] versions of indeterminate pure 
intuitions of space and time that are antecedently given by sensibility alone. Allison identifies these determinate 
pure intuitions of space and time as 'formal intuitions'. And he identifies the indeterminate 'forms of intuition' 
with the unified and all-encompassing space and time that are the “main focus” of the Aesthetic. Note that 
Longuenesse, too, agrees that space and time are forms of intuition—she thinks that space and time are both 
forms of intuition and formal intuitions. Here, consider her implicit agreement with Heidegger when she says 
that he “recognizes the identity between space and time as pure intuitions and space and time as forms of 
intuition” (Longuenesse 1998, 225). (She takes 'pure intuition' and 'formal intuition' to be co-referential.) But 
Longuenesse suggests that certain properties of space and time as described in the Aesthetic—in particular, their 
“unity, unicity, [and] given infinity”—are “products of our imagination” (Longuenesse 2000, 104); and hence 
she insists that space and time qua 'forms of intuition' are not the space and time of the Aesthetic, i.e. the pure 
“intuitions in which all appearances are combined and ordered” (Longuenesse 2000, 104).
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it.807 Hence 'world' is a clearing, both in the sense of a process of clearing and the resultant
cleared region. It is in and through this clearing that all projects of ordinary matter-of-factual
knowledge—truth-as-correspondence, as Heidegger would say—must take place. World-as-
clearing is thus a (phenomenological) condition of possibility of ordinary factual truth. World is
not an object or a collection of objects of possible experience, notably. Worlds are rather the
“ever-nonobjective” transcendental conditions of possibility of objective experience, which
Heidegger takes to be historically-varying and culturally specific.808 
 Likewise, Émile Durkheim endorses a broadly Kantian notion of transcendental forms,
specifically in the mode of “categories” that he takes to “dominate and encompass all other
concepts:”809
 
At the source of our judgments are a certain number of essential notions that
dominate our entire intellectual life. These are what philosophers since
Aristotle have called the categories of understanding: notions of time, space,
genus, number, cause, substance, personality, and so on.810 They correspond to
the most universal properties of things. They are the solid frames that enclose
all thought. Thought does not seem able to break out of them without
807Thomson 2011. Compare other similar explications “World is the whole context of shared equipment, roles, and 
practices on the basis of which one can encounter entities and other people as intelligible” (Dreyfus 2005, 407); 
“We could, then, think of under- standing one's world as possession of a kind of metaphysical map (world, 
remember, is a kind of space), a map detailing both the regions of being and the kinds of beings that dwell there, 
a map that is internalized by all fully-fledged members of the culture[...]To understand one's world is, then, to 
understand what, fundamentally, there is.[...]In and around the temple passage, however, Heidegger's 
presentation of world seems to be focused not on ontology but rather on ethics; not on what is but rather on what 
ought to be the case[...]In general, when the artwork opens up our world for us we understand 'what is holy and 
what unholy' (ibid.), 'the shape of destiny for human being' (PLTp. 42), the broad outline of the 'simple and 
essen- tial decisions' (PLT p. 48) which constitute, for us, the proper way to live, our, as I shall call it, 
fundamental ethos” (Young 2001, 24).
808“The world is not the mere collection of the countable or uncountable, familiar and unfamiliar things that are just
there. But neither is it a merely imagined framework added by our representation to the sum of such given 
things. The world worlds, and is more fully in being than the tangible and perceptible realm in which we believe 
ourselves to be at home. World is never an object that stands before us and can be seen. World is the ever-
nonobjective to which we are subject as long as the paths of birth and death, blessing and curse keep us 
transported into Being. Wherever those decisions of our history that relate to our very being are made, are taken 
up and abandoned by us, go unrecognized and are rediscovered by new inquiry, there the world worlds. A stone 
is worldless. Plant and animal likewise have no world; but they belong to the covert throng of a surrounding into 
which they are linked. The peasant woman, on the other hand, has a world because she dwells in the overtness of
beings, of the things that are” (Heidegger 1971, 43).
809Durkheim 1912/2008, 335. See also ibid., 11.
810Kant identifies space and time as intuitions, not concepts, and hence asserts that they are not categories, or pure 
forms of understanding, but rather pure forms of sensible intuition. Durkheim does not draw this Kantian 
distinction, however.
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destroying itself, since we seem unable to think of objects that are not in time
or space, that are not countable, and so on. Other notions are contingent and
shifting; we can imagine a person, a society, or an era that can do without
them; but the primary categories seem inseparable from the normal
functioning of the mind. (Durkheim 1912/2008, 11)
Durkheim argues that all concepts are 'collective representations', which are not abstract or
universal, but “impersonal” in the sense of being social.811 Thus he proposes that even
'categories' are collective representations, modeled on features of the specific societies from
which they causally derive:
[The basic categories of understanding] are born in religion and of religion; they
are a product of religious thought.[...]But if these categories of thought have
religious origins, they must participate in what is common to all religious
phenomena: they too must be social things, the products of collective thought.
[...]Even now this social dimension can be glimpsed in some of them.[...][T]ime is
like a continuous canvas on which all duration is spread out in the mind's eye, and
on which all possible events can be located in relation to fixed and detemrinate
reference points. It is not my time that is organized this way, but time as it is
objectively conceived by everyone in the same civilization. This alone suggests
that such an organization must be collective. And indeed observation confirms that
these indispensable reference points, in relation to which all things are located
temporally, are borrowed from social life. The divisions into days, weeks, months,
years, and so on correspond to the recurring cycle of rituals, holidays, and public
ceremonies. A calendar expresses the rhythm of collective activity while ensuring
its regularity.
“The same is true of space,” Durkheim adds—recall his aforementioned appeal to 'societies in
Australia and North America in which space is conceived in the form of a vast circle because the
811Durkheim 1912/2008, 329. Likewise: “To think conceptually is not simply to isolate and group together qualities
common to a certain number of objects; it is to subsume the variable to the permanent, the individual to the 
social” (ibid. 334). Hence Durkheim allows that some concepts are particular—e.g. the representation of a god 
(ibid., 328).
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encampment itself is circular.' More broadly, then, Durkheim takes our recognition of the force
that certain concepts have on us to be an indirect apprehension of the force that society has upon
the individual812—just as in the case of more traditional religious representations.813 Even the
'impersonality' of scientific reason and 'logical thought' is thus ultimately rooted in the social
nature of all conceptual representations, on his view. 
If Durkheim's theory of the “social origin of categories” is correct, then, Kantian 'pure
forms' of experience are not actually valid for all humans—or at least, if there are any universally
valid forms of experience, then they must be differently interpreted in different societies:
[T]he categories of human thought are never fixed in a definite form. They are
made, unmade, and remade incessantly; they vary according to time and place.
[...]They depend on the way this collectivity is constituted and organized, on its
812“[I]mpersonal reason is simply another name for collective thought[...]The reign of impersonal aims and truths 
can come into being only through the cooperation of particular wills and sensibilities[...]In short, there is 
something impersonal in us because there is something social in us” (Durkheim 1912/2008, 341-2); “The value 
that we ascribe to science depends, in short, on the idea that we, collectively, have of its nature and its role in 
life” (ibid., 334).
813In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912), Durkheim defines a religion as a “unified system of beliefs 
and practices relative to sacred things[...], which unite its adherents in a single moral community called a 
church” (1912/2008, 46). As in his earlier work (see Durkheim 1893/2014, 131), Durkheim here insists that 
religiosity is predicated upon the existence of a set of collective representations. But in Elementary Forms, 
unlike before, he also insists that all religious systems rely upon a distinction between the sacred and the profane
(Durkheim 1912/2008, 36). Durkheim elaborates this distinction in several ways: (1) sacred things are protected 
and isolated by prohibitions (ibid., 40); (2) the difference between sacred and profane things is categorical (“The
energies at play in one are not merely different their degree of intensity; they are different in kind” (ibid., 38); 
and (3) the sacred is tied to self-reinforcing “current[s]” of “common passion” arising within assembled groups 
of people, which phenomenon Durkheim terms collective “effervescence” (ibid., 154-162).
In The Division of Labor (1893), Durkheim's claims that collective representations have become 
increasingly abstract or universal, and hence less “concrete” (1893/2014, 228) or “well-defined” (ibid., 64), in 
modern society. i.e., modern moral principles, such as the injunction to assume a specialized function in the 
division of labor (ibid., 35-6), don't guide individual behavior to the same level of specificity that traditional 
religious law and modern 'repressive' law do (ibid., 134; 226-7). In turn, he argues that this universalization tends
to decrease the intensity and effervescent reinforcement of collective feelings. Hence the division between the 
sacred and profane is attenuated. 
In Elementary Forms, by contrast, Durkheim decouples the degree of abstraction of a given state of 
collective consciousness from its (lack of) intensity and potential for effervescent amplification. For instance, he 
suggests that the French Revolution was marked by a “general effervescence characteristic of revolutionary or 
creative epochs,” even though Revolutionary fervor centered around highly abstract ideals like those of 
“homeland, liberty, and reason” (Durkheim 1912/2008, 159-161). This decoupling of effervescence and 
abstraction or generality allows Durkheim to identify collective effervescence, and hence the reinforcement of a 
division between the profane and the (effervescently-tinged) sacred, in an increasingly wide range of situations. 
Indeed, he concludes that, even in modernity, “there is no moment in our life without some rush of energy 
coming to us from the outside” (ibid., 159). Thus although Durkheim possesses a proto-theory of collective 
effervescence even in his earlier work, it is not until his later work that he allows for the possibility of 
effervescent reinforcement of highly abstract collective feelings or ideas, and hence for the ubiquity of religiosity
in modern scientific societes, as well as pre-modern ones.
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morphology, its religious, moral, and economic institutions, and so on.814
Hence, even if a theorist following broadly in Durkheim's footsteps were to accept that space is a
truly universal form of human intuition, she would presumably insist that the precise structure or
nature of intuitive space changes over the course of human history, and also varies between
societies at a given time.815 Regardless of debates about categories' cultural specificity, however,
the basic point remains: the broadly Kantian notion of transcendental forms underlying the
possibility of objective experience is explanatorily powerful, and it has had a deep and far-
ranging impact on modern thought. (Again, further examples could plausibly be found in
Foucault, Bourdieu, and Butler, among many others.)
My account of spatial form is intended to preserve the explanatory power of broadly
Kantian notions of transcendental form, while removing their idealistic baggage. Again, I believe
that space, time, and various other spatial forms are mind-independent things in which mind-
independent objects are genuinely located. Objective spaces are only objective appearances of
universal forces, on my view, but they are not merely ideal, or subjective appearances only for
human beings. Thus, again, I am no transcendental idealist. But I do believe that objective spatial
forms—including spacetime—stand in a kind of relationship to the objects within them that is
importantly similar to the relationship that Kant identifies between pure forms of human
cognitive powers (i.e. space, time, and the categories) and the phenomenal objects whose
cognition (Kant claims) these forms render possible.
Objective reality is the ur-space, or absolute universal form. Objective reality is just the
universal field of all interacting forces. This is an unreal but objectively valid space that contains
all things insofar as they are objects generically impacted by any natural forces. 
814Durkheim 1912/2008, 16-17.
815Durkheim (1912/2008, 14) hence suggests that “[f]ar from being inherent in human nature in general, there is not





Force and Modern Understanding
… Groß sind des Berges Kräfte;
Da wirkt Natur so übermächtig frei,
Der Pfaffen Stumpfsinn schilt es
Zauberei.
 -Goethe, Faust II (1832)
There are many forces in nature—exactly as many as there are truly real things. The
lightning strike is force. The wind is a force that moves the leaves. The rustling of the leaves is
sonic force. Melody is one kind of force, and rhythm another. Color is force. The Sun's
illumination is force. The explosion's shock wave is force. The hawk-shriek is force. The ordered
battle march is force. The lawless leap of joy is force. The ocean's ebb and flood is force. The
mountain's repose is force. The soil's fertility is force. The hard ground is force, pressing upward
against the driving rain. The water's force erodes rock. The canyon is a real image of the river's
force. Intellect is mental force. Life is vital force: self-amplifying and self-depleting force, the
force of organic growth and decay. Life exerts force in its collective impact on inorganic nature.
Life does not only react and adapt, but also contends with its environment. Life exerts force on
inorganic nature. And inorganic nature, in its own right, exerts force on life.
Reality is force. To be real is to exercise power, to be a locus of force. A thing that is only
determined by higher forces, as a mere object for their outlet, is unreal—nothing but an
appearance, nothing but an image of underlying reality. Objective reality is the all-encompassing
field of interacting forces. This basic field is not itself a force. It is an unreal but objectively valid
space, or dimensional structure, that contains all things insofar as they are objects impacted by
force. Objective reality is an unreal but objectively valid representation of nature as an all-
encompassing field-of-effect. Nature is real, however. Nature is the real order of primitive
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forces, interacting prior to any containment by embedding spaces or unifying Forms.
Form encompasses both appearance and extension. The ground of this interrelation is
force. Unreal but objectively valid structures are fields-of-effect. Objective fields are the
extensive impact or pure structural appearance of forces. Objective spaces are a species of
objective field, viz., the pure extensive impact of universal forces. Objective spaces are abstract
images of real structures that universal forces produce in their objects. Gravity is a universal
force, vis-à-vis all loci of mass-energy. The exercise of human cognitive powers can be
understood as a universal force, vis-à-vis all cognitively-determinate objects of experience, as in
Kantian transcendental philosophy. Culture can be understood as a universal force, vis-à-vis the
objects within historically-specific Heideggerian 'worlds' of shared intelligibility. Natural culture
is an irruption of elemental natural forces, in and through responsive human beings. Poetic
objectivity and scientific objectivity are two fundamental modes of natural culture. Poetic works
make this irruption of elemental forces directly apparent, whereas scientific theories do not.
Rather, objective science focalizes elemental forces into explanations of observable phenomena.
Scientific objectivity involves an unconscious understanding of causally-basic forces, realized in
and through conscious acts of explanation and empirical representation. Scientific objectivity
only gives us unconscious insight into reality. This is why science cannot but be 'disenchanted'.
None of this is mystical, or un-scientific. It is just elemental, and prior to all science. We
directly apprehend nature in poetry. And we represent nature as objective reality in science.
Science represents things as objects determined with respect to elemental physical forces' fields-
of-effect, and hence directly presents us only with impact-images, or causally-basic forces' pure
objective appearance as explanatorily-basic 'patterns' in the phenomena. Poetry directly presents
the same natural world as a real order of hierarchically- and agonistically-interacting forces.
This basic vision of reality as force is not self-serious. It is just direct. Nor is it childish. It
is just de-sublimated, and so in a sense more 'primitive'. However, our worship of our own
'spiritual' nature—our faith in a moral God or a cosmic Intelligibility, our self-satisfaction as
'enlightened', our self-love as a 'species being' free to radically re-shape nature in its own image
—this modern idealism is all too self-serious, all too childish. And it is all too funny that the
modern idealist is most vehement in denying what is most obvious: that his ideals are 'pure' only
in the sense of being unreal, because elemental reality is not rational Form, or self-determining





Newton on God in Natural Philosophy
Newton was relatively cautious about invoking God in his natural philosophical writings, 
presumably in the name of self-imposed methodological rigor. Thus his substantive discussion of
God in the Principia is relegated to the brief General Scholium appended to the end of the 
second edition. And broaching the subject in Query 31 of the Opticks, he claims merely that it 
“seems probable to [him]” on the basis of his preceding natural philosophical discussion “that 
God in the Beginning form'd Matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable Particles, of such Sizes 
and Figures, and with such other Properties, and in such Proportion to Space, as most conduced 
to the End for which he form'd them[...].” Here Newton's appeal to the purposive activity of an 
all-powerful Creator is explicitly described as 'probable', which Howard Stein suggests is “a 
lower degree of confidence than Newton attaches to his principal results in physics.”816 (Hence, 
in part, Stein defends his opposition to “a tradition that sees the basic conceptions of Newton’s 
natural philosophy, most especially his conceptions of space and time, as derivative from, or 
grounded in, his theology.”817) In short, Peter Harrison is presumably correct that “Newton’s 
reticence about identifying God as the direct cause of gravity can be attributed to his strictures 
against hypothesizing in natural philosophy.”818 (Of course, even those commentators who agree 
that Newton took God to be a mediate cause of gravity can deny that Newton took God to be an 
immediate or 'direct' cause of gravity.819 But the basic point that Newton's frequent reluctance to 
speak assertively about God is bound up with his natural philosophical methodology clearly 
remains valid regardless of any such subtleties.)
Notably, however, Newton also maintains in the General Scholium that “[t]his most 
beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets, could only [non nisi] proceed from the counsel 
and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being,” and later in Query 31 that “the wonderful 
816Stein 2002, 261.
817Stein 2002, 297 n.17. Stein is especially concerned to show that Newton “does not derive his “Idea” of space – 
its ontological status included – from his theology (as has often been claimed)” (2002, 268).
818Harrison 2013, 142. 
819See e.g. Henry 1994.
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Uniformity in the Planetary System must be allowed the Effect of Choice” (emphases added).820 
Contra Stein, it is far from clear—to say the least—that in these latter passages Newton invokes 
God's activity with a 'lower degree of confidence than[...]he attaches to his principal results in 
physics'. 
Rather, perhaps at the beginning of Query 31 Newton uses the word 'probable' in an 
archaic sense821 with respect to which Stein's deflationary epistemological inference is misplaced.
If this were so, then the apparent tension between Newton's various remarks might well be 
merely apparent. Perhaps Newton would equally allow that his statements of physical principles, 
like the law of universal gravitation, are 'probable'. Alternately, perhaps Stein is right that 
Newton uses the term 'probable' in order to indicate an epistemological contrast between his 
claims about God and his statements of his 'principal results in physics', but is wrong about the 
nature of this contrast. For instance, perhaps Newton takes his inference to divine Design and his
postulation of the law of universal gravitation to be epistemically justified in different ways, but 
not to different degrees. (Note that either of the preceding alternatives to Stein's interpretation 
could—but need not—be developed in a manner consistent with the truth of his further claim 
that Newton takes the metaphysical conclusions he characterizes as 'probable' to be “open to 
possible re-consideration when more things have been learned” through further empirical 
inquiry.822)
Or perhaps, although in my judgment implausibly, Stein's interpretation of the word 
'probable' in terms of a reduced degree of confidence is accurate, and Newton's occasional less 
guarded statements—e.g. his aforementioned claim that our astronomical system 'could only' 
proceed from an intelligent and powerful Being's dominion and counsel—are simply the 
products of his rare indulgence in hyperbole, or self-consciously unjustifiable expressions of his 
820To be more precise, Newton is here likely alluding to the relative situation of the bodies in the solar system, 
rather than to the law of universal gravitation per se. Compare his remark in correspondence with Richard 
Bentley that “[...]Gravity may put the Planets into Motion, but without the divine Power it could never put them 
into such a circulating Motion as they have about the Sun; and therefore, for this, as well as other Reasons, I am 
compelled to ascribe the Frame of this System to an intelligent Agent” (1958, 298).
821E.g. see Garber and Zabell's discussion of different historical meanings of the Latin word probabilis (1979, 44-
47). Thanks to Gordon Belot for raising this possibility.
822“The second respect in which the metaphysics is left open to revision is more far-reaching (and commensurately 
vaguer). It is related to Newton’s statement in 'De gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum' that we cannot know 
with certainty the ultimate constitution of things: namely, the general 'probable' metaphysical conclusions 
Newton has reached on the basis of a comprehensive consideration of what has been discovered from 
phenomena are in the nature of the case open to possible re-consideration when more things have been learned; 
hence the form in which Newton expresses his hopes for the success of his program in the Preface to the 
Principia: 'I hope the principles here laid down will afford some light either to that, or some truer, method of 
Philosophy' (Stein 2002, 291).
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religious faith. More implausibly still, finally, perhaps Newton's epistemological views are 
simply manifestly inconsistent in this regard.
Newton's appeal to God's activity at the beginning of Query 31 is furthermore evidently 
intended to be justified empirically rather than by pure rational reflection. This anti-aprioristic 
tendency is on display again later in the General Scholium, where Newton prefaces his claim that
God “does certainly belong to Natural philosophy” with the qualification, “from the appearance 
of things …”.823 Yet Newton also never rejected the authority of Scripture, and was like many 
other early proponents of his system concerned to argue against what he took to be the heresy, 
endemic to deism, of propounding natural religion to the exclusion of Christian revelation.824
In his private communications, Newton was at times still more candid about the 
connection he perceived between his natural philosophy and his Christian faith. Thus William 
Whiston, his disciple, records asking him:
...why he did not at first draw such Consequences from his Principles, as 
Dr. Bentley soon did in his excellent Sermons at Mr. Boyle’s Lectures; and 
as I soon did in my New Theory;825 and more largely afterward in my 
Astronomical Principles of Religion; and as that Great Mathematician Mr. 
Cotes did in his excellent Preface to the later Editions of Sir. I. N.’s 
Principia: I mean for the advantage of Natural Religion, and the 
Interposition of the Divine Power and Providence in the Constitution of the
World; His answer was, that He saw those Consequences; but thought it 
better to let his Readers draw them first of themselves. . . .826
823Howard Stein (2002, 261) appeals to the same quotations to make the same point.
824Newton was no deist: he did not reject the authority of Scripture, and he allowed for the possibility that God 
could at any moment suspend the laws of nature established by his ordained (as opposed to absolute) power. As 
James E. Force puts the point: “[Newton's] Arian position is definitely unorthodox, even heretical, but it is 
clearly not deistic. Even in his Arianism, Newton takes the Bible seriously” (Force 1990a, 60); “Newton's God 
of dominion causes him to spurn as idolatrous anyone who dilutes the dominion of God whether through deistic 
mockery of God's power or through misguidedly worshipping false images of God or false metaphysical 
conceptions of God. This includes deistic radical Whigs who laugh at the story of Moses and the flood as well as 
moderate low churchmen who subscribe to the Trinitarian heresy and the moderate Whig political establishment 
which supports that false creed” (Force 1990b, 94). So too Richard Popkin: “Newton's stress on God's dominion,
on God's omnipresence and transcendence, and on God's being beyond all human conceptions definitely sounds 
very much like the traditional Jewish view, rather than a deistic conception of a supreme architect” (Popkin 
1990, 5). More in the same vein: “Moreover, the Scholium places stress on the counsel and will of God. This 
voluntarist conception of God as an active, willful God of dominion establishes Newton's position as opposing 
Deism. His is neither the abstract deity of the ancient philosophers nor the remote, impersonal God of 
contemporary Deists, and this Newton is intent on making absolutely clear to his readers” (Snobelen 2001, 176). 
See also Jacob and Jacob 1980, 265.
825E.g. Whiston insists that “the Effects of Nature” are “nothing but” the “Divine Power” “acting according to fix'd 
and certain Laws” (1737/1696, 296).
826Quoted in Force 2004, 82.
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In a well-known correspondence with Richard Bentley, similarly, Newton frankly acknowledges 
that “[w]hen I wrote my Treatise about our System,827 I had an Eye upon such Principles as 
might work, with considering Men, for the Belief of a Deity, and nothing can rejoice me more 
than to find it useful for that Purpose.”828
In sum, then, while commentators continue to debate various more nuanced aspects of 
Newton's view regarding the relationship between God and the law-governed order of nature,829 
Stephen Snobelin is right that “few today would doubt that Newton's advocacy of the design 
argument and his belief in God played an active role in his natural philosophy.”830 Somewhat 
more specifically, John Henry is likewise right to identify as the “general consensus among 
historians of Newton's thought” the interpretive conclusion that, in one way or another, “God 
was Newton's most favoured explanation for Gravity.”831 For Newton, “active Principles, such as
is that of Gravity” are “general Laws of Nature,” by the “help” of which “all material Things 
seem to have been composed of the hard and solid Particles[...], variously associated in the first 
Creation by the Counsel of an Intelligent Agent.” And this process ultimately reflects the fact 
that “it became him who created them to set them in order.”832
Newton's careful insistence that such Principles “appear to us by Phaenomena” although
their “Causes be not discover'd” hence coincides with his profession of belief that God has
827I.e. the Principia—this is clear in context, but for a concurring opinion see also Snobelen 2001, 173.
828Newton 1958, 280.
829E.g. for a controversy about Newton's attitudes regarding action at a distance, in relation to his views on the role 
of God vis-à-vis gravity, see Henry 1994 (arguing against A. Rupert Hall, Alexandre Koyré, and I. Bernard 
Cohen's view that “Newton relied more or less directly upon God to explain the force of gravity,” which Henry 
plausibly suggests is “bound up with their belief that he did not believe action at a distance to be possible and 
that gravitational attraction could not, therefore, be a property of matter” (125) that Newton did in fact believe in 
the possibility of gravitational attraction as a form of action at a distance, grounded in a non-essential power of 
mutual attraction superadded to matter by God). Cf. Janiak 2008 and 2013; and see Henry 2011 and 2014 for 
responses. See also Koyré 1965, 149.
830Snobelen 2001, 198.
831Henry 1994, 123.
832It is not obvious whether Newton, in Query 31, associates God's 'setting in order' of created matter with His 
'variously associating' material Particles, or alternatively with the 'Law of Nature'-governed 'composition' of 'all 
material Things' out of these Particles—or both, as seems to me possible. If Newton intends only one of these 
two options, however, it seems likely that it would be the former rather than the latter. Consider, for instance, his
insistence, following the remark that “it became him who created them to set them in order,” that “if he [i.e. this 
'intelligent Agent' responsible for the 'first Creation'] did so, it's unphilosophical […] to pretend that [the World] 
might arise out of a Chaos by the mere Laws of Nature; though being once form'd, it may continue by those 
Laws for many Ages.” Here Newton warns that if God 'set in order' his creation, then “the World” should not be 
said to have arisen “by the mere Laws of Nature,” even if these Laws are responsible for this World's 
'continuation'. This suggests that Newton may associate God's 'setting in order' of the matter he has created with 
the formation of “the World” and not with the “continuation”, via the operation of “the Laws of Nature”, of this 
World “once form'd”. Either way, it seems undeniable that Newton takes the Laws of Nature, including the 
Principle of Gravity, to be in some way directly expressive of God's free and absolute will.
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deployed the “general Laws of Nature”—including the Principle of Gravity, whatever its
“unknown Causes” may be—to maintain (if not also to partly constitute) the 'order' that He 'sets'
into His Creation.833 Newton, like his immediate followers, took his theory of universal
gravitation to illuminate “such Principles as might work, with considering Men, for the Belief of
a Deity,” and in particular the almighty Pantokrator of his religious faith.834 The Newtonian
world is a world viewed in the image of God—a Christian cosmos.
833Opticks Query 31.
834See the General Scholium for Newton's characterization of God as 'Pantokrator' and 'Lord God', whereby he 
places special emphasis on God's power and 'true', all-encompassing dominion.
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APPENDIX B:
Nietzsche on the Will to Truth as a Will to Nothingness and Will to Power
Nietzsche systematically distinguishes between the conditional will to truth of 'genuine
philosophers', which he praises highly, and the unconditional will to truth that he associates with
sublimated Judeo-Christian moral conscience, in a pejorative sense. In the case of 'genuine
philosophers', recall, the impulse “to assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the manifold, and
to overlook or repulse whatever is totally contradictory” is not unconditional or selfless pursuit
of truth. Rather, it expresses the “spirit's power to appropriate the foreign” precisely by
“retouching and falsifying the whole to suit itself,” its drive to “growth, in a word—or, more
precisely, the feeling of growth, the feeling of increased power.”835 In short, the genuine
philosopher's creative appropriation of reality in systematically 'falsifying' bodies of theory is for
Nietzsche a mode of artistic representation. And here just as elsewhere, presumably, “[w]e
possess art lest we perish of the truth.”836
Yet despite the creative freedom implied by the genuine philosophical spirit's drive to
'retouch and falsify the whole to suit itself', producing the highest forms of knowledge evidently
demands the highest levels of intellectual discipline. And Nietzsche understands this perfectly
well, in fact. He indicates as much, albeit somewhat obliquely, in describing the ongoing
historical defeat of Christian metaphysical belief at the hand of 'scientific conscience':
You see what it was that really triumphed over the Christian god: Christian
morality itself, the concept of truthfulness that was understood ever more
rigorously, the father confessor's refinement of the Christian conscience,
translated and sublimated into a scientific conscience, into intellectual
cleanliness at any price. Looking at nature as if it were proof of the goodness
and governance of a god; interpreting history in honor of some divine
reason, as a continual testimony of a moral world order and ultimate moral
835Beyond Good and Evil sec. 230. The context here is not explicitly cognitive or epistemological—i.e. Nietzsche is
discussing a general impulse towards simplification. But he would presumably endorse the connection I am 
drawing.
836The Will to Power sec. 822 [1888]. There is no mention of science in this context, so I am quoting quite freely.
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purposes; interpreting one's own experiences as pious people have long
enough interpreted theirs, as if everything were providential, a hint, designed
and ordained for the sake of the salvation of the soul—that is all over now,
that has man's conscience against it, that is considered indecent and
dishonest by every more refined conscience—mendaciousness, feminism,
weakness, and cowardice. In this severity, if anywhere, we are good
Europeans and heirs of Europe's longest and most courageous self-
overcoming.837
In the course of its immanent development, moralized asceticism comes to deny itself the
metaphysical solace838 afforded by belief in Christianity's personal God, and ultimately even the
residual comfort of secularized belief in the purposiveness of historical social development or
the natural order more broadly. Hence Christian morality triumphs over the Christian God, as
Nietzsche says, but also over itself. Modern history reveals an ongoing “self-overcoming of
morality, out of truthfulness” (E H “Destiny” 3)839 reflected not only in post-Enlightenment
society's growing disillusionment with attempts to view nature as 'proof of the goodness and
governance of a god', or even 'as if' it were such proof, but also in a concomitant increase in
societal “faith in science” (GS 344; GM III:24) and ensuing collapse into radical “nihilism” (GM
P 5 et passim)840 as this secularized form of “Christian truthfulness” (G M III:27),841 too,
ultimately turns against itself.
Nietzsche's vision of Western civilizational decay into anomie and listless decadence is
obviously highly critical. Nevertheless, his broader attitude towards the modern self-overcoming
of 'Christian truthfulness' is profound ambivalence. For he sees this 'self-overcoming of morality
out of truthfulness', including the self-overcoming of truthfulness that is its negative apotheosis,
as producing a world-historical crossroads. On the one hand, the 'self-overcoming of morality
837The Gay Science sec. 357.
838On 'metaphysical solace' and the later Nietzsche's thoroughgoing skepticism thereof, see the prefatory “Attempt 
at a Self-Criticism” that he appended to The Birth of Tragedy (1772) in 1886.
839Similarly: “The priest too knows[...]that there is no longer any 'God', any 'sinner', any 'Redeemer'—that 'free 
will' and 'moral world order' are lies: seriousness, the profound self-overcoming of the spirit, no longer permits 
anybody not to know about this” (A 38).
840See also KSA 12:7[64], KSA 12:10[42], KSA 13:14[86], KSA 12:10[192], KSA 12:9[35], KSA 13:11[108].
841More fully: “All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming[...]In this way 
Christianity as a dogma was destroyed by its own morality; in the same way Christianity as morality must now 
perish, too: we stand on the threshold of this event. After Christian truthfulness has drawn one inference after 
another, it must end by drawing its most striking inference, its inference against itself'” (GM III:27). Consider 
also: “[...]in us the will to truth becomes conscious of itself as a problem[...]As the will to truth thus gains self-
consciousness[...]morality will gradually perish now” (GM III:27); “It is not the victory of science that 
distinguishes our nineteenth century, but the victory of scientific method over science” (KSA 13:15[51]); “...
[H]istory must itself resolve the problem of history, knowledge must turn its sting against itself” (HL 8).
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out of truthfulness' gives rise to pandemic nihilism. This is, to put it mildly, not good. On the
other hand, the 'self-overcoming of morality' also amounts to a destruction of slavish Judeo-
Christian values, which may yet facilitate the creation of new and more 'life-affirming' values.
Thus in the latter respect—but not the former—the self-overcoming of morality constitutes “that
long secret work which has been saved up for the finest and most honest, also the most
malicious, consciences of today” (BGE 32).842 Correspondingly, intellectual conscience can be
ascetic in a strictly pejorative sense, a sign of rabid self-loathing and the festering resentment of
the weak towards the power of superabundant life to 'retouch' and 'falsify' the world in its own
image; but it can also be a mark of natural strength and a ground of the possibility of humanity's
self-overcoming in the creation of a new and higher type: the notorious 'Übermensch'.
Admittedly, one might object that Nietzsche's apparent praise for intellectual conscience
in the above passage is in fact entirely ironic. Or, relatedly, one might insist that he is implicitly
distancing himself from 'good Europeans' and their 'more refined conscience', to a greater degree
than I have allowed. Indeed, the plausibility of this objection seems to be reinforced by
Nietzsche's harsh criticism of science in other passages. Thus, in the Genealogy of Morals, he
capaciously diagnoses modern science and post-Kantian critical philosophy as expressing a
chronic “will to self-belittlement,” such that they simply constitute a “more elusive, more
spiritual, [and] more captious” expression of the perverse “ascetic ideal” underlying Christian
moral conscience.843 Moreover, even when he does not analyze science in terms of overt 'self-
842“...the self-overcoming of morality—let this be the name for that long secret work which has been saved up for 
the finest and most honest, also the most malicious, consciences of today” (BGE 32).
843“The ascetic ideal has decidedly not been conquered: if anything, it became stronger, which is to say, more 
elusive, more spiritual, more captious, as science remorselessly detached and broke off wall upon wall, external 
additions that had coarsened its appearance. Does anyone really believe that the defeat of theological astronomy 
represented a defeat for that ideal? Has man perhaps become less desirous of a transcendent solution to the riddle
of his existence, now that this existence appears mote arbitrary, beggarly, and dispensable in the visible order of 
things? Has the self-belittlement of man, his will to self-belittlement, not progressed irresistibly since 
Copernicus? Alas, the faith in the dignity and uniqueness of man, in his irreplaceability in the great chain of 
being, is a thing of the past—he has become an animal, literally and without reservation or qualification, he who 
was, according to his old faith, almost God ('child of God,' 'God-man'). 
Since Copernicus, man seems to have got himself on an inclined plane—now he is slipping faster and faster
away from the center into--what? into nothingness? into a 'penetrating sense of his nothingness'?) Very well! 
hasn't this been the straightest route to—the old ideal? 
All science (and by no means only astronomy, on the humiliating and degrading effect of which Kant made 
the noteworthy confession: 'it destroys my importance' . . . ), all science, natural as well as unnatural—which is 
what I call the self-critique of knowledge—has at present the object of dissuading man from his former respect 
for himself, as if this had been nothing but a piece of bizarre conceit. One might even say that its own pride, its 
own austere form of stoical ataraxy, consists in sustaining this hard-won self-contempt of man as his ultimate and
most serious claim to self-respect (and quite rightly, indeed: for he that despises is always one who 'has not 
forgotten how to respect' …) Is this really to work against the ascetic ideal?” (GM III:25)
Compare: “The expulsion of Man from his self-assumed position at the centre of Nature owes much to the 
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belittlement' or active self-abnegation, Nietzsche sometimes takes it to reflect a more sedated
form of nihilistic despair—'passive' rather than 'active' nihilism, as he might put it.844 Such is the
case, for instance, in his characterization of “really scientific men” in whom the “drive for
knowledge” functions as a “small, independent clockwork that, once well wound, works on
vigorously without any essential participation from all the other drives of the scholar”:
The real 'interests' of the scholar therefore lie usually somewhere else—say,
in his family, or in making money, or in politics. Indeed, it is almost a matter
of total indifference whether his little machine is placed at this or that spot in
science, and whether the 'promising' young worker turns himself into a good
philologist or an expert on fungi or a chemist: it does not characterize him
that he becomes this or that. In the philosopher, conversely, there is nothing
whatever that is impersonal; and above all, his morality bears decided and
decisive witness to who he is—that is, in what order of rank the innermost
drives of his nature stand in relation to each other.845 
Nietzsche here renders palpable the quiet ennui of the 'really scientific man' in his scholarly
capacity.846 In so doing, moreover, he indicates its essential spiritual kinship with the enervation
of the “undangerous” and mediocre “bonhomme” whose status as modern ethical ideal is a
“logical consequence of slave morality,”847 and with the shallow bourgeois contentment of the
decadent “last man” decried by the Nietzschean Zarathustra.848
Copernican principle that we do not occupy a privileged position in the Universe” (Barrow and Tipler 1986, 1; 
quoted—critically—in Roush 2003, 29).
844“Nihilism. It is ambiguous: A. Nihilism as a sign of increased power of the spirit: as active nihilism. B. Nihilism 
as decline and recession of the power of the spirit: as passive nihilism” (WP 22); “[Nihilism] can be a sign of 
strength: the spirit may have grown so strong that previous goals ('convictions,' articles of faith) have become 
incommensurate (for a faith generally expresses the constraint of conditions of existence, submission to the 
authority of circumstances under which one flourishes, grows, gains power). Or a sign of the lack of strength to 
posit for oneself, productively, a goal, a why, a faith. It reaches its maximum of relative strength as a violent 
force of destruction—as active nihilism. Its opposite: the weary nihilism that no longer attacks; its most famous 
form, Buddhism; a passive nihilism, a sign of weakness. The strength of the spirit may be worn out, exhausted, 
so that previous goals and values have become incommensurate and no longer are believed; so that the synthesis 
of values and goals (on which every strong culture rests) dissolves and the individual values war against each 
other: disintegration—and whatever refreshes, heals, calms, numbs emerges into the foreground in various 
disguises, religious or moral, or political, or aesthetic, etc.” (WP 23).
845Beyond Good and Evil sec. 6.
846Here also consider: “The worst and most dangerous thing of which scholars are capable comes from their sense 
of the mediocrity of their own type—from that Jesuitism of mediocrity which instinctively works at the 
annihilation of the uncommon man and tries to break every bent bow or, preferably, to unbend it” (BGE 206).
847“The opposition [between master morality and slave morality] reaches its climax when, as a logical consequence
of slave morality, a touch of disdain is associated also with the 'good' of this morality—this may be slight and 
benevolent—because the good human being has to be undangerous in the slaves' way of thinking: he is good-natured, 
easy to deceive, a little stupid perhaps, un bonhomme. Wherever slave morality becomes preponderant, language 
tends to bring the words 'good' and 'stupid' closer together” (Beyond Good and Evil sec. 260).
848“'I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: 
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In many other cases, however, Nietzsche expresses perfectly clear-cut esteem for
intellectual conscience. Representatively:
[...]the great majority of people lacks an intellectual conscience. Indeed, it
has often seemed to me as if anyone calling for an intellectual conscience
were as lonely in the most densely populated cities as if he were in a desert.
[...]I mean: the great majority of people does not consider it contemptible to
believe this or that and to live accordingly, without first having given
themselves an account of the final and most certain reasons pro and con, and
without even troubling themselves about such reasons afterward: the most
gifted men and the noblest women still belong to this 'great majority.' But
what is goodheartedness, refinement, or genius to me, when the person who
has these virtues tolerates slack feelings in his faith and judgments and when
he does not account the desire for certainty as his inmost craving and
deepest distress—as that which separates the higher human beings from the
lower. 
Among some pious people I found a hatred of reason and was well
disposed to them for that; for this at least betrayed their bad intellectual
conscience. But to stand in the midst of this rerum concordia discors
['discordant concord of things'] and of this whole marvelous uncertainty and
rich ambiguity of existence without questioning, without trembling with the
craving [Begierde] and the joy [Lust]849 of such questioning, without at least
hating the person who questions, perhaps even finding him faintly amusing
—that is what I feel to be contemptible, and this is the feeling for which I
you still have chaos in yourselves. 
Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer give birth to a star. Alas, the time of the most despicable 
man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise himself. Behold, I show you the last man. 
'What is love? What is creation? What longing? What is a star?' Thus asks the last man, and he blinks. 
The earth has become small, and on it hops the last man, who makes everything small. His race is as 
ineradicable as the flea-beetle; the last man lives longest. 
'We have invented happiness,' say the last men, and they blink. They have left the regions where it was hard
to live, for one needs warmth. One still loves one's neighbor and rubs against him, for one needs warmth. 
Becoming sick and harboring suspicion are sinful to them: one proceeds carefully. A fool, whoever still 
stumbles over stones or human beings! A little poison now and then: that makes for agreeable dreams. And much
poison in the end, for an agreeable death. 
One still works, for work is a form of entertainment. But one is careful lest the entertainment be too 
harrowing. One no longer becomes poor or rich: both require too much exertion. Who still wants to rule? Who 
obey? Both require too much exertion. 
No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same: whoever feels different goes
voluntarily into a madhouse. 
'Formerly, all the world was mad,' say the most refined, and they blink. 
One is clever and knows everything that has ever happened: so there is no end of derision. One still 
quarrels, but one is soon reconciled—else it might spoil the digestion. 
One has one's little pleasure for the day and one"s little pleasure for the night: but one has a regard for 
health. 'We have invented happiness,' say the last men, and they blink” (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
“Zarathustra's Prologue” 5).
849Kaufmann translates the German Lust as 'rapture' rather than 'joy'. The rest of the translation is his.
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look first in everybody.850
Here there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of Nietzsche's professed contempt for facile
self-certainty, or the passion underwriting his depiction of 'craving' for and 'joy' in the
questioning demanded by the 'whole marvelous uncertainty and rich ambiguity of existence'. Nor
is Nietzsche's explicit respect for intellectual conscience in such passages particularly hard to
understand, on his own terms. Clearly, intellectual conscience can be an expression of strength,
courage, inhuman severity, joyful play amidst the static forms of lesser thought, and noble
disdain for the spiritual impoverishment that all too often underlies incuriosity and intellectual
superficiality—not simply a compulsion to pursue the truth dispassionately even in cases where
it may be harsh, but rather an impassioned taste precisely for the harshest truths and the distinct
savor of their brutal impersonality, a drive to stand firm against their crushing weight and
ultimately to master it, in a test of one's own strength and as a stimulus to increasing power.
On the other hand, though, intellectual conscience can also be an expression of sickly
asceticism. Intellectual conscience can be rooted in a self-abnegating drive to escape from any
and all perspectival limitations in attaining a fully 'disinterested' vision of reality—a 'God's-eye'
view of the world that is at root a chimerical view from Nowhere. (A 'view from Nowhere' is just
a 'view from Nothing', or an 'appearance' of unreality; but genuine views are appearances of
reality.) Nietzsche's seemingly self-contradictory remarks concerning the value of intellectual
conscience thus simply indicate his sensitivity to its multivalence, as well as his recognition that
the healthy intellectual conscience of 'genuine philosophers' is genealogically intertwined with
the sickly “unconditional will to truth” that just recapitulates the “concealed will to death” of
Christian moral conscience.851 In the case of intellectual conscience as that of punishment, then,
one must carefully distinguish between “that in it which is relatively enduring, the custom, the
act, the 'drama,' a certain strict sequence of procedures” and “that in it which is fluid, the
meaning, the purpose, the expectation associated with the performance of such procedures.”852
But while Nietzsche's distinction between strong ('life-affirming') and weak ('life-
denying') forms of intellectual conscience is surely intuitive, in the abstract, its concrete
850GS 2. See also GS 355.
851GS 344.
852On the Genealogy of Morals, Essay II sec. 13. Nietzsche is here talking about punishment, not intellectual 
conscience; I am simply suggesting that certain general features of his analysis of punishment plausibly apply to 
the case at hand.
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application may seem hopelessly contentious. For instance, Nietzsche presents Copernican
astronomical theory as exemplary of the way in which science “has at present the object of
dissuading man from his former respect for himself, as if this had been nothing but a piece of
bizarre conceit” (such that “[s]ince Copernicus[...man] is slipping faster and faster away from the
center into—what? into nothingness? into a 'penetrating sense of his nothingness'?”.853 But it is
perhaps not clear that Nietzsche's own philosophy is any less expressive of a 'will to self-
belittlement', or any more expressive of a drive to 'growth' and 'the feeling of increased power'.854
After all, it is far from obvious that Nietzsche avoids 'self-belittlement' in his own vision of a
God-less world, in which the mass of mankind has overcome the natural stupidity of its
traditional religious faith only by virtue of its perversely hypertrophied impulse to self-denial.
Moreover, Nietzsche's interpretation of the 'self-belittling' transition from geocentric to
heliocentric accounts of the solar system is somewhat glib, if not just essentially incorrect.855 The
rise of Copernican astronomy evidently constituted a challenge to the doctrinal authority of the
Church more than an immediate threat to broader societal belief in the existence, personality, and
beneficence of the Christian God, the unique moral and rational dignity of human beings, or
humanity's God-given dominion over nature. This is not to deny that the development of modern
physical theory is plausibly connected to historical processes of secularization and correlative
growth in antipathy towards the perceived anthropocentrism of traditional religious metaphysics
and mythology. It is, however, to demand a more substantive account of this putative connection
and its significance relative to Nietzschean ethical ideals.
This example also underscores the ambiguity of the relationship between Nietzsche's
embrace of (life-affirming) intellectual conscience and his insistence that, in the knowledge of
853GM III: 25.
854Even on Nietzsche's own terms, this situation is complicated by the fact that the ascetic 'will to nothingness', 
despite being “an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions of life” (GM III: 28), 
is expressive of the universal will to power—i.e. the historical triumph of the 'ascetic ideal' demonstrates that 
humankind would “rather will nothingness than not will” (GM III: 1), such that when confronted with a “lack of 
external enemies and resistances and forcibly confined to the oppressive narrowness and punctiliousness of 
custom,” man of internal necessity “impatiently lacerated, persecuted, gnawed at, assaulted, and maltreated 
himself” (GM II:16).
855Koyré observes that “[i]t is not always, or perhaps not sufficiently, appreciated that by placing the Sun at the 
centre of the Universe in virtue of its dignity, Copernicus returned to the Pythagorean conception and completely
overthrew the hierarchy of positions in the ancient and medieval Cosmos, in which the central position was not 
the most honourable, but, on the contrary, the most unworthy. It was, in effect, the lowest, and consequently 
appropriate to the Earth’s imperfection. Perfection was located above in the celestial vault, above which were 
‘the heavens’ (Paradise), whilst Hell was deservedly placed beneath the surface of the Earth” (Koyré 1973, 114-
115 n.24).
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'genuine philosophers', the 'spirit' creatively 'retouches' and 'falsifies' the 'whole' so as to 'suit
itself'. For if modern astronomical theory is 'self-belittling' because it systematically undermines
the symbolically-potent pride of place humanity often enjoys in traditional mythological and
religious metaphysics—revealing Earth to be just one among a handful of planets orbiting a
relatively small star at the edge of an apparently unremarkable galaxy (and so on)—, do such
mythological and religious modes of representation exemplify the kind of 'retouching and
falsifying [of] the whole to suit itself' that Nietzsche associates with 'genuine philosophers'?
Either way, finally, how could 'intellectual conscience' manifest in astronomical theorizing
except as a drive to objectivity that is inherently opposed to this kind of self-expressive
'retouching and falsifying', and hence as a 'concealed will to death' or principle hostile to 'life'?
How can scientific or humanistic inquiry satisfy the demands of intellectual conscience
and yet be truly artful? How is genuinely Nietzschean science possible? Is it actually possible?
And even if it is possible, is Nietzschean science truly valuable? Should science be a 'retouching
and falsifying' in the image of creative theorists' superabundant power? Or should it be less 'self-
expressive'? Can science be more objective than Nietzsche's ideal, without collapsing into
moralized asceticism? How is a forceful yet objective science possible? Indeed,—is it possible?
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APPENDIX C:
Feuerbach and Marx as Exoteric Christians (On God in 'Materialism')
Like Marx more famously in his wake, Feuerbach argues that consciousness of God is
simply an alienated mode of human self-consciousness:
Religion, at least the Christian, is the relation of man to himself, or more
correctly to his own nature (i.e., his subjective nature); but a relation to it,
viewed as a nature apart from his own. The divine being is nothing else than
the human being, or, rather, the human nature purified, freed from the limits of
the individual man, made objective—i . e . , contemplated and revered as
another, a distinct being. All the attributes of the divine nature are, therefore,
attributes of the human nature.856
Of course, Feuerbach acknowledges, there is an obvious sense in which “God is not what man
is” and “man is not what God is”: man is finite, imperfect, temporal, weak, and sinful; whereas
God is infinite, perfect, eternal, almighty, and holy.857 Yet despite this apparent difference, God's
attributes are ultimately just “our positive, essential qualities, our realities,” projected beyond all
actual human limitations by our understanding in the fullest expression of its abstractive
power.858 God is nothing more than humanity “purified” of all features of real human existence
that the religious believer sees as evils or imperfections.859 “What man praises and approves, that
is God to him; what he blames, condemns,[—'what oppresses him, obstructs him, affects him
repulsively'860—]is the non-divine.”861 God is “the nature of man made objective,” created
856Feuerbach 1957, 14.
857Feuerbach 1957, 33.
858Feuerbach 1957, 38-9, emphasis added. Consider also: “'Where Nature ceases, God beings.' because God is the 
ne plus ultra, the last limit of abstraction. That from which I can no longer abstract is God, the last thought which
I am capable of grasping—the last, i.e., the highest” (Feuerbach 1957, 98).
859“What man praises and approves, that is God to him; what he blames, condemns, is the non-divine” (Feuerbach 
1957, 97); “As God is nothing else than the nature of man purified from that which to the human individual 




“unconsciously and involuntarily” by humankind in its own image in an act of displaced self-
exaltation.862 
The Christian God, in particular, is the “essence of the species,” the totality of all human
perfections “freed from all the limits which exist in the consciousness and feeling of the
individual,” paradoxically conceived of as immediately identical with “individual, personal
being”.863 Christianity distinctively presupposes that “the individual by himself is a perfect being,
is by himself the adequate presentation or existence of the species.”864 And so the God of
Christianity is just the perfection of the human species made present to itself under the alienated
guise of God's absolute self-standing individuality.865 The Christian conception of God reflects
man's desire to individually achieve a distinctively human mode of being that is in fact realizable
(to the extent that it is in fact realizable) only by the social whole.866
862Feuerbach 1957, 118.
863“With the Christians God is nothing else than the immediate unity of species and individuality, of the universal 
and individual being. God is the idea of the species as an individual[...]Essence and existence are in God 
identical; which means nothing else than that he is the idea, the essence of the species, conceived immediately as
an existence, an individual” (Feuerbach 1957, 153); “...the Christians are distinguished from the heathens in this, 
that they immediately identify the individual with the species—that with them the individual has the significance
of the species, the individual by himself as held to be the perfect representative of the species—that they deify 
the individual, make him the absolute being” (Feuerbach 1957, 154).
864Feuerbach 1957, 155.
865“All divine attributes, all the attributes which make God God, are attributes of the species—attributes which in 
the individual are limited, but the limits of which are abolished in the essence of the species, and even in its 
existence, in so far as it has its complete existence only in all men taken together” (Feuerbach 1957, 152); 
“Christ is the omnipotence of subjectivity, the heart released from all the bonds and laws of Nature, the soul 
excluding the world, and concentrated only on itself, the reality of all the heart's wishes, the Easter festival of the
heart, the ascent to heaven of the imagination:—Christ therefore is the distinction of Christianity from 
heathenism” (Feuerbach 1957, 150); “ … Christianity, thus, from exaggerated subjectivity, knows nothing of the 
species … “ (Feuerbach 1957, 159); “The individual man attains his end by himself alone; he attains it in God,—
God is himself the attained goal, the realised highest aim of humanity; but God is present to each individual 
separately. God only is the want of the Christian; others, the human race, the world, are not necessary to him; he 
is not the inward need of others. God fills to me the place of the species, of my fellow-man” (Feuerbach 1957, 
160); “Individuality or personality is agreeable to [God], but only as unencumbered by objective forces; hence, 
he includes individuality also, but pure, absolutely subjective individuality” (Feuerbach 1957, 182-3); “the 
Divine Being is the subjective human being in his absolute freedom and unlimitedness” (184); “The divine being
is the pure subjectivity of man, freed from all else, from everything objective, having relation only to itself, 
enjoying only itself, reverencing only itself” (98); “...egoism conceived as absolute (God is the absolute Self)...” 
(82).
866Consider: “...the species, which as a species, as universal being, as the totality of all perfections, of all attributes 
or realities, freed from all the limits which exist in the consciousness and feeling of the individual...” (Feuerbach 
1957, 153); “In isolation human power is limited, in combination it is infinite. The knowledge of a single man is 
limited, but reason, science, is unlimited, for it is a common act of mankind[...]Wit, acumen, imagination, feeling
as distinguished from sensation, reason as a subjective faculty,—all these so-called powers of the soul are 
powers of humanity, not of man as an individual; they are products of culture, products of human society” 
(Feuerbach 1957, 83); “[...]the idea of the species becomes the idea of God, who again is himself an individual 
being, but is distinguished from human individuals in this, that he possesses their qualities according to the 
measure of the species” (Feuerbach 1957, 195).
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This individualistic impulse is given its “most unequivocal expression”, on Feuerbach's
view, in the Christian doctrine of divine Incarnation.867 God is a “perfect universal being”,
absolutely free from the limitations of individual existence; but the same God is also Christ, the
“ideal of humanity become existent” in one person—one “pure, heavenly, sinless man.”868 In the
idea of Christ, the human “individual by himself” is quite literally “held to be the perfect
representative of the species.”869 Correlatively, in Christian consciousness man's salvation lies
not in his fellow man or in the natural world, but only in God—the “realised highest aim of
humanity” that is yet “present to each individual separately”870; the one, unconditioned, personal
God in whom the essence of the species takes the form of individual subjectivity, and who
moreover literally incarnates himself as an individual man. In Christian consciousness, essential
humanity is figured not in utopic images of enlightened society or culture, but rather in God's
oneness, consciousness, unlimited freedom, and absolute will; in the availability to all of
individual salvation through personal relationship to God; and, most notably, in Christ's
realization of moral perfection as a self-subsistent individual human being—in spite of, and even
selflessly suffering as man from, others' sinful failure to reciprocate his universal love. Thus in
Christian consciousness man subsumes the anti-egoistic 'heathen' drive to value universal human
nature above his own particular identity under his egoistic drive to assert himself as an
autonomous individual. 
(Feuerbach here makes an allowance for “the Christianity of the present day, which has
incorporated with itself the culture of heathenism” in recovering a degree of the ancients'
evaluative subordination of the individual to the species.871 Although he does not further specify
the sort of view he has in mind, such rapprochement between 'Christian' hyper-individualism and
'heathen' anti-individualism is plausibly evident in the Hegelian theory of historical and
conceptual interdependence between the development of autonomous individuality, or self-
determined particular identity, and the formation of social structures that concretely ground the
universal identity of all such particularized individuals as equal moral subjects and right-bearing
persons. In this respect, Hegel anticipates—and of course likely inspires—Feuerbach's assertion







is “an infinite, reciprocally compensating variety” among qualitatively differentiated
individuals.872)
In turn, Feuerbach characterizes the “historical progress of religion” as the process of
mankind re-appropriating this alienated mode of self-consciousness, such that “what by an
earlier religion was regarded as objective, is now recognised as subjective; that is, what was
formerly contemplated and worshipped as God is now perceived to be something human.”
Therefore, he concludes, every true “advance in religion” amounts to a higher level of self-
knowledge on the part of humanity873—i.e. the species, “in which alone” lies “the redemption,
the justification, the reconciliation and cure of the sins and deficiencies of the individual”.874 This
collective self-knowledge culminates, finally, in the realization of a universal moral community,
structured not by faith in or love of God, but rather by “the highest and first law” of the
immediate love of all human beings for one another as fellow “rational and loving being[s].”875
According to the Feuerbachian theory of religion, in short, belief in God is a “childlike”876
state that should erode as humankind comes to understand that God is simply the hypostatization
of its own “infinite nature,”877 which is an essentially social nature realizable only in universal




875Feuerbach 1957, 268; 270-271. Feuerbach moreover takes love and rationality to be interrelated: “Only where 
reason rules, does universal love rule; reason is itself nothing else than universal love” (Feuerbach 1957, 257). 
Relatedly: “Christian love is already signalized as a particular, limited love, by the very epithet, Christian. But 
love is in its nature universal. So long as Christian love does not renounce its qualification of Christian, does not 
make love, simply, its highest law, so long is it a love which is injurious to the sense of truth, for the very office 
of love is to abolish the distinction between Christianity and so-called heathenism;—so long is it a love which by
its particularity is in contradiction with the nature of love, an abnormal, loveless love, which has therefore long 
been justly an object of sarcasm. True love is sufficient to itself; it needs no special title, no authority. Love is the
universal law of intelligence and Nature;—it is nothing else than the realization of the unity of the species 
through the medium of moral sentiment. To found this love on the name of a person, is only possible by the 
association of superstitious ideas, either of a religious or speculative character. For with superstition is always 
associated particularism, fanaticism. Love can only be founded on the unity of the species, the unity of 
intelligence—on the nature of mankind; then only is it a well-grounded love, safe in its principle, guaranteed, 
free, for it is fed by the original source of love, out of which the love of Christ himself arose. The love of Christ 
himself arose. The love of Christ was itself a derived love. He loves us not out of himself, by virtue of his own 
authority, but by virtue of our common human nature” (Feuerbach 1957, 265-6)
876Feuerbach 1957, 13.
877Feuerbach 1957, 2. “There is no other spirit, […] no other intelligence which man can believe in or conceive 
than that intelligence which enlightens him, which is active in him. The 'infinite spirit,' in distinction from the 
finite, is[...]nothing else than the intelligence disengaged from the limits of individuality and corporeality,—for 
individuality and corporeality are inseparable,—intelligence posited in and by itself. God, said the schoolmen, 
the Christian fathers, and long before them the heathen philosophers,—God is immaterial essence, intelligence, 
spirit, pure understanding” (Feuerbach 1957, 35).
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self-awareness so long as he has not found himself or has lost himself again,”878 and concluding
that the “criticism of religion” comes to an end with “the doctrine that man is the supreme being
for man,” along with a corresponding “categorical imperative to overthrow all those conditions
in which man is an abased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being.”879
But Marx objects that Feuerbach is inadequately responsive to the significance of
“revolutionary” activity in which we bring the world into 'objective' alignment with our
otherwise purely 'subjective' essence.880 In thus “regarding the theoretical attitude as the only
genuinely human attitude,” Marx suggests, Feuerbach fails to grasp the necessary role to be
played by “practice”—i.e. “human, sensuous activity,” presumably including political, economic,
and technological alterations to existing forces and relations of production—in overcoming the
alienated “duplication of the world into a religious, imaginary world and a real one.”881 Even to
the extent that Feuerbach succeeds in “resolving the religious world into its secular basis,”882 he
“overlooks the fact” that upon completing this philosophical critique still “the chief work
remains to be done.”883 
(While there is a kernel of genuine insight in Marx's criticism, it should be noted that
Feuerbach, too, posits a link between theoretical self-alienation in religious consciousness and
forms of concrete social deprivation that evidently require practical redress. In his words: “[t]he
878Marx 1978, 53. As Eric Fromm explains, “[f]or Marx, as for Hegel, the concept of alienation is based on the 
distinction between existence and essence, on the fact that man's existence is alienated from his essence, that in 
reality he is not what he potentially is or, to put it differently, that he is not what he ought to be, and that he 
ought to be that which he could be” (Fromm 1961, 47). Similarly: “The distortion in what Marx takes to be 
human nature is generally referred to in language which suggests that an essential tie has been cut in the middle. 
Man is spoken of as being separated from his work (he plays no part in deciding what to do or how to do it) – a 
break between the individual and his life activity. Man is said to be separated from his own products (he has no 
control over what he makes or what becomes of it afterwards) – a break between the individual and the material 
world. He is also said to be separated from his fellow man (competition and class hostility has || rendered most 
forms of cooperation impossible) – a break between man and man. In each instance, a relation that distinguishes 
the human species has disappeared and its constituent elements have been reorganized to appear as something 
else. What is left of the individual after all these cleavages have occurred is a mere rump, a lowest common 
denominator attained by lopping off all those qualities on which is based his claim to recognition as a man. Thus 
denuded, the alientated person has become an 'abstraction'[...]Alienated man is an abstraction because he has lost
touch with all human specificity” (Ollman 1976, 134).
879Marx 1978, 60.
880Marx 1978, 145: “Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the 'religious sentiment' is itself a social product, 
and that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs in reality to a particular form of society.”
881Marx 1978, 143-4.
882As Feuerbach himself puts it: “it is precisely our task to show that theology is nothing else than an unconscious, 
esoteric pathology, anthropology, and psychology, and that therefore real anthropology, real pathology, and real 
psychology have far more claim to the name of theology than has theology itself, because this is nothing more 
than an imaginary psychology and anthropology” (Feuerbach 1957, 88-9).
883Marx 1978, 144.
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more empty life is, the fuller, the more concrete is God. The impoverishing of the real world and
the enriching of God is one act. Only the poor man has a rich God. God springs out of the feeling
of a want; what man is in need of, whether this be a definite and therefore conscious, or an
unconscious need,—that is God.”884 Similarly, despite characterizing the “turning-point of
history” in seemingly one-sidedly contemplative terms as “open confession, that the
consciousness of God is nothing else than the consciousness of the species,”885 Feuerbach
quickly proceeds to advocate that man be not just “declared” but moreover “constituted” the
'first' in relation to God's 'second',886 and to insist that the love of all human beings for one
another must be “practically also” the “highest and first law”.887) 
By self-intended contrast with Feuerbach, Marx insists that alienated religious
consciousness is rooted in humankind's chronic state of practical isolation from the exercise of
essential human capacities, including capacities for universal social solidarity, within a sequence
of historical modes of production up to and including global capitalism. Religious alienation
stems from “cleavage and self-contradictions” within the “secular basis” of the religious world,
and can be resolved only if this secular basis is not simply “criticised in theory” but moreover
“revolutionised in practice.”888 In other words, Marx argues that the conflict between the
appearance and the reality of the contemporary human condition cannot be resolved—which he,
like Feuerbach, wishes it to be889—except through a concrete process of progressive social
change, namely the collective development and expression of essential human powers, achieved
by means of humankind's distinctive capacity to produce the objects of its own essential needs
and thereby to determine the form of its own “mode of life”.890 Whereas the mere “animal is
884Feuerbach 1957, 73.
885Feuerbach 1957, 270.
886Relatedly: “To [religious speculation] God is the first, man the second. Thus it inverts the natural order of things.
In reality, the first is man, the second the nature of man made objective, namely, God” (Feuerbach 1957, 118).
887Feuerbach 1957, 270-271, emphasis added.
888Marx 1978, 144.
889“It is superficial to read Marx as expressing an activist's impatience with the analytical response to illusion. He is
not merely announcing his unwillingness to rest content with intellectual victories. It is false that whereas 
Feuerbach's concern is theory, his is practice. Their primary interest is the same. Both want to suppress illusion, 
and Marx's complaint is that theory alone will not do so.[...]The illusions occupying both thinkers survive 
theoretical exposé because theory does not cure the conditions which produce them. And that is because they are 
not, in the first instance, errors of thought, but distortions in the world, which theory is impotent to rectify. Marx 
thought social conditions must themselves be conflicted to be capable of generating a conflict between reality 
and appearance. And as long as society remains riven, the rift between reality and appearance will persist too” 
(Cohen 2001, 410).
890“Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or by anything else you like. They 
themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of 
subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their means of subsistence 
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immediately identical with its life-activity,” man is uniquely capable of autonomy, of “mak[ing]
his life-activity itself the object of his will and consciousness.”891 The “true natural history of
man” is precisely the protracted moral struggle of man to thus realize himself as a “species
being”892—a “universal and therefore free,”893 essentially human894 being.
On Marx's view, in sum, alienated religious consciousness can be overcome only insofar
as historical social development fosters “spontaneous activity, free activity,” and in particular the
“practical activity” whereby man collectively “duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness,
intellectually, but also actively, in reality.” Through such an autonomous “working-up of the
objective world,” man concretely “contemplates himself in a world that he has created.”895
Marx's utopic vision of communism is therefore one in which an originally alien natural world
has been supplanted by a “world of man's essential powers,” such that “all objects become for
h i m t h e objectification of himself, become objects which confirm and realize his
individuality.”896 Man realizes his essential identity as a “universal and therefore free being” by
thus expanding the “sphere of inorganic nature on which he lives” to the point where he “makes
all nature his inorganic body.”897 In the communist utopia there is no practical gulf between man
and nature—nor, on Marx's view correlatively, is man estranged from his own productive power
or his fellow man—and as a result there is simply no cause for humanity to worship a personal
God onto which it has projected its own essential “species character” of “free, conscious
men are indirectly producing their actual material life.[...]This mode of production must not be considered 
simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of individuals. Rather, it is a definite form of activity 
of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals 
express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they 
produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions 
determining their production” (Marx 1978, 150); “The force of life [for Marx] is fertility. The living organism is 
not exhausted when it has provided for its own reproduction, and its 'surplus' lies in its potential multiplication. 
Marx's consistent naturalism discovered 'labor power' as the specifically human mode of the life force which is 
as capable of creating a 'surplus' as nature herself. Since he was almost exclusively interested in this process 
itself, the process of the 'productive forces of society,' in whose life, as in the life of every animal species, 
production and consumption always strike a balance, the question of a separate existence of worldly things, 
whose durability will survive and withstand the devouring processes of life, does not occur to him at all. From 
the viewpoint of the life of the species, all activities indeed find their common denominator in laboring” (Arendt 
1958, 108). See also Marx 1940.
891Marx 1978, 76.
892Marx 1978, 116-117. See also Ollman 1976, 95–99.
893Marx 1978, 75.
894“The real, active orientation of man to himself as a species being, or his manifestation as a real species being 
( i.e., as a human being ), is only possible by his really bringing out of himself all the powers that are his as the 





activity.”898 Here Christian moral paradise has become worldly—natural, objective, Godless. In
Marx's communism universal human freedom in autonomous productive activity, our species
being, is concretely realized in social praxis.
Marx's communism is thus a secular humanistic heaven on earth, in a fairly strict sense.
A world where not God but rather man himself, man's species life itself, is the supreme being for
man. A world of universal freedom concretely grounded in a system of humanized social
relations, economic and political institutions, and technological developments in productive
capacity. A world in which individual man constitutes himself, for himself, as a human being—a
being whose life-activity is free, conscious, and universal—by producing the objects of his own
and his fellow man's essential needs. A world in which the human species realizes itself as such
in appropriating the natural world as a field of outlet for essential human powers. A world in
which all of nature is the body of man, the essential object of a collective human subject. A
world of secularized Judeo-Christian morality. For as Feuerbach earlier noted, “Love is only the
exoteric, faith the esoteric doctrine of Christianity; love is only the morality, faith the religion of
the Christian religion.”899 Marx retains total faith in the Christian doctrine of love: the moral (if
not also moralistic) vision of a world remade in the image of shared humanity. Like Feuerbach
before him, then, Marx is thus essentially a Christian moralist—a purely exoteric Christian.
898“The whole character of a species—its species character—is contained in the character of its life-activity; and 
free, conscious activity is man's species character” (Marx 1978, 76); “... in degrading spontaneous activity, free 
activity, to a means, estranged labour makes man's species life a means to his physical existence” (ibid, 76-7).
899Feuerbach 1957, 263. Similarly: ““It is the species which infuses love into me. A loving heart is the heart of the 
species throbbing in the individual. Thus Christ, as the consciousness of love, is the consciousness of the species.
We are all one in Christ. He therefore who loves man for the sake of man, who rises to the love of the species, to 
universal love, adequate to the nature of the species, he is a Christian, is Christ himself. He does what Christ did, 
what made Christ Christ. Thus, where there arises the consciousness of the species as a species, the idea of 
humanity as a whole, Christ disappears, without, however, his true nature disappearing; for he was the substitute 
for the consciousness of the species, the image under which it was made present to the people, and became the 
law of the popular life” (Feuerbach 1957, 269).
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APPENDIX D:
Marxist-Hegelian Dialectics as a Moralized Denial of Natural Hierarchy
From one important vantage point, for a given thing to exert force on something else is
for it to manifest its nature through this other thing, which it thereby determines as its object.
Marx offers an example that is here illuminating, in part because he partially misconstrues:
“[t]he sun is the object of the plant—an indispensable object to it, confirming its life—just as the
plant is an object of the sun, being an expression of the life-awakening power of the sun, of the
sun's objective essential power” (“Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a
Whole”).900 Marx thus presents the relationship between the sun and the plant as importantly
symmetric: each is the 'object' of the other, or (as Marx previously elaborates) that in which the
other's essential 'need' achieves satisfaction.
Yet there is an intuitive sense in which the plant is an object of the sun in a way that the
sun is not an object of the plant. In short, the plant needs the sun in a way that the sun does not
need the plant—causally speaking, certainly, but also perhaps in an evaluatively richer sense.
While the plant (or, perhaps better, the plant's energy and growth) is evidently an 'expression' of
the sun's 'life-awakening power', the sun is not as aptly characterized as an 'expression' of the
plant's power. And, indeed, Marx claims not that the sun is an 'expression' of the plant's power
(or its 'life'), but only that the sun 'confirms' the plant's life. But in what, exactly, consists this
putative distinction between being an 'expression' of something's 'life-affirming power' and being
that in which something's 'life' is 'confirmed'? And how does this distinction relate to the
accounts of force and power that I am advancing? Marx's description demands clarification and
metaphysical critique, albeit in a way responsive to its intuitive poetic force.
To this end, it is helpful first to consider the broader context in which Marx describes
what he sees as the sun and plant's mutual objectification. Namely, he is concerned to
characterize 'natural beings', including human beings, in distinction to 'nullity' or 'un-being':
900Marx and Engels 1978, 116.
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Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural
being he is on the one hand furnished with natural powers of life—he is an
active natural being. These forces exist in him as tendencies and abilities—as
impulses. On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being
he is a suffering, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants.
That is to say, the objects of his impulses exist outside him, as objects
independent of him; yet these objects are objects of his need—essential
objects, indispensable to the manifestation and confirmation of his essential
powers. To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being
full of natural vigor is to say that he has real, sensuous, objects as the objects
of his being or of his life, or that he can only express his life in real, sensuous
objects. To be objective, natural and sensuous, and at the same time to have
object, nature and sense outside oneself, or oneself to be object, nature and
sense for a third party, is one and the same thing. Hunger is a natural need; it
therefore needs a nature outside itself, an object outside itself, in order to
satisfy itself, to be stilled. Hunger is an acknowledged need of my body for an
object existing outside it, indispensable to its integration and to the expression
of its essential being. The sun is the object of the plant—an indispensable
object to it, confirming its life—just as the plant is an object of the sun, being
an expression of the life-awakening power of the sun, of the sun's objective
essential power.
A being which does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural
being, and plays no part in the system of nature. A being which has no object
outside itself is not an objective being. A being which is not itself an object
for some third being has no being for its object; i.e., it is not objectively
related. Its be-ing is not objective.
An unobjective being is a nullity—an un-being. (Marx 1978, 115–116)
Here Marx seems to distinguish between 'active' and—implicitly—non-active (whether in the
sense of passive, reactive, receptive, etc., as yet remains to be seen) natural beings by appeal to
the 'natural powers' of the former. This distinction demands further explication than he himself
provides, however.
Marx evidently suggests that 'living' natural beings are, qua living, 'active'. But it is less
clear whether he is identifies all 'active' natural beings as 'living': there is some indication that
being an 'active' natural being for Marx essentially involves having 'natural powers of life' (my
emphasis), which in turn manifest as 'impulses' or 'tendencies and abilities'; but it is also possible
that being an 'active natural being' simply involves having 'natural powers', with 'natural powers
of life' constituting only a special case thereof. (Of course, it is also possible that Marx himself
has no clear view on the matter; regardless, I will try to clarify the matter on his behalf and
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pursuant to my own broader goals.) Since he introduces the term 'object' in relation to 'impulses'
or 'needs', and proceeds to attribute 'objects' to the sun, in either case it seems fair to conclude
that Marx treats both animate and inanimate 'natural beings' at least as if they had, and perhaps
even as literally having, the sort of 'needs' for or 'impulses' towards other natural beings that are
more intuitively attributable only to living things.
In turn, the characterization of 'active' natural being that Marx seemingly offers which is
farthest from radical organicism, whether literally- or figuratively-intended, is his appeal to the
'expression' or 'manifestation and confirmation' of an active natural being's 'essential powers' in
another natural being. Thus again it could be in this 'expressive' sense that the sun displays the
'active' character of its 'natural being' in relation to the plant. But since Marx does not here
distinguish between 'manifestation' and 'confirmation', anyone defending this interpretive
proposal would plausibly be compelled to interpret Marx as implicitly claiming that the plant,
too, is 'active' insofar as he claims that its 'life' is 'confirmed' in the sun. (And this of course runs
counter to my earlier suggestion that there is an important asymmetry between the sun and plant
in this context.)
Regardless, this is not the view that Marx in fact advances in the above passage: that man
'expresses', 'manifests', and 'confirms' his 'natural powers of life' in things that 'exist outside of
him, as objects independent of him' for Marx explains not the sense in which man is an 'active'
natural being, but rather the sense in which man is a 'suffering' or 'conditioned and limited' being.
Hence that a given thing 'expresses', 'manifests', or 'confirms' its 'essential powers' in external
things cannot be what it means for this thing to be 'active', on Marx's view—at least, if 'activity'
is to remain distinct from 'suffering' (as is suggested by the phrase 'on the other hand' at the
beginning of the fourth sentence in the above passage).
Relatedly, it is only in a qualified sense that the 'active' character of 'active natural beings'
can be understood in terms of their having 'natural powers'. For on Marx's view the 'naturalness'
of 'natural powers' apparently just consists in these powers' having external objects: 'a being
which does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural being', Marx insists; hence if
something is a 'natural' being, it evidently 'has its nature outside itself'; and it is even plausible to
interpret this last claim as definitional, such that 'natural' beings for Marx just are those that 'have
their natures outside of themselves'. Thus for Marx the 'active' character of 'active natural beings'
appears to essentially involve their possession of powers, not natural powers per se.
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What, then, could it (implicitly) mean for a natural being to have a 'power', and hence to
be 'active', for Marx? The only remaining interpretive resource he seems to provide here is the
distinction between 'having object, nature and sense outside oneself' and 'being object, nature
and sense for a third party'. That is, perhaps to have an external object is to be an active or
powerful natural being, whereas to b e an external object for something is—we might say,
building upon Marx's own fairly skeletal view—to be a receptive natural being. And receptivity
thus construed might in turn be differentiated from passivity or impotence understood simply as
the absence of power.
Yet when Marx insists that the sun and plant are each an object for the other, he thus
seems either to simply conflate having and being an object, or else to be claiming implicitly that
natural beings always are objects o f the objects of their own essential powers. The latter, far
more interpretively plausible view would in turn jibe with Marx's deep indebtedness to the
Hegelian dialectic, notwithstanding his widely-touted 'materialist inversion' of Hegel's absolute
idealism:901 in broadly the same spirit that Hegel is concerned to dialectically resolve or 'sublate'
901The popular notion that Marx 'inverts' the Hegelian system is somewhat misguided and indeed verging on 
incoherent, given that Hegel is precisely concerned to argue that the 'material' and 'ideal' orders are equally-
fundamental 'moments' or aspects of 'Absolute Spirit' in its constitutive process of self-knowledge: Hegelian 
Spirit is not simply mind or mental substance as opposed to body or material substance; the Hegelian subject-
object dialectic has no 'top' or 'bottom'; and for both (interrelated) reasons it makes no sense to 'invert' the 
Hegelian system.
Moreover, brute 'economic determinist' variants of Marxian social theory according to which the 'base' of 
purely material forces of production determines ideological 'superstructure' are, on my view, very far from the 
more resolutely dialectic tenor of Marx's own writings. Marx claims in the German Ideology (Marx and Engels 
1978, 165) that the “real basis of history” is the mode of production, comprised of historically-specific and ever-
developing forces of production (e.g. including particular forms of technological capacity) and relations of 
production (i.e. particular level and formation of the division of labor); and mere appearance, by contrast, is the 
domain of ideas or ideology. But Marx seems to allow that ideas can be part of the mode of production, and 
indeed even that ideas can be productive forces. For example, Derek Sayer suggests that “the idea[...]of free self-
determination, of liberty, makes a much better worker of the one than of the other,” and hence that “'[s]ocial 
forms of consciousness'— 'superstructural' phenomena par excellence for most Marxists—would seem here to be
part of capitalism's productive forces” (Sayer 1987, 36). Indeed, it seems that, for Marx, the very same idea can 
have a dual existence, as both an 'appearance' and a 'reality'. Here consider e.g. the very same 'idea of free self-
determination, of liberty' that Sayer appeals to as a productive force: in other contexts, Marx treats this idea as a 
paradigmatic example of an appearance that masks or conceals a conflicting underlying reality—consider, e.g., 
his claim that the dissolution of feudalism and the development of capitalist production has yielded not liberty 
per se, but simply a “liberty of egoistic man” (Marx and Engels 1978, 45) that exists only in relation to the 
historical expropriation and ongoing exploitation of labor (ibid., 433).
In short: Marx himself arguably misrepresents the scope of his philosophical distance from Hegel by 
representing the latter as if he were one-sidedly idealistic or focused on 'consciousness' in a naive sense, perhaps 
so as to make his (i.e. Marx's) own system seem more original, whether consciously or unconsciously, 
intentionally or unintentionally; but the endpoint of Marx's dialectic is in fact very much like that of Hegel's 
(particularly upon 'Left Hegelian' interpretations). And, of course, this is all consistent with the perfectly-correct 
observation that Marx has a much more highly sophisticated theory of political economy than Hegel, and uses it 
to his philosophical advantage.
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[aufheben] the antinomies resulting from Cartesian mind-body dualism and its lingering
residuum in the Kantian distinction between 'phenomenal' and 'noumenal' reality (i.e. the 'object'
of 'experience' as mere 'appearance' for the cognizing 'subject', in opposition to the 'thing in itself'
[Ding an sich]), Marx is concerned to insist that things which have objects (i.e. subjects or wills,
roughly speaking) are real only insofar as they are objects, and vice versa. Or, using a more
ethically-revealing aspect of the Hegelian system: in broadly the same spirit that Hegel is
concerned to 'sublate' the opposition or apparent 'contradiction' between 'master' (corresponding
roughly to 'subject') and 'slave' (roughly, the 'object' for this 'subject'), Marx is concerned to
insist that the (apparently 'masterful') sun does not merely have the plant ('slave') as its object,
but moreover is itself the plant's object—the sun needs the plant, in other words, like the master
on Hegel's view needs or demands recognition from the slave in whom her otherwise merely
subjective will is objectively realized.
Notwithstanding these intuitive (and as it stands somewhat loose) associations, Marx's
emphasis on the 'naturalness' of 'real' beings, or the externality of the essential objects of their
needs, also evidently reflects his rejection of central aspects of Hegelian metaphysics, as he
understands it. Here note first that Hegel endorses the post-Kantian truism that to be a subject, to
have agency or will (note the relationship between notions like 'will' or 'agency' and the concepts
of 'impulse' and 'need' that Marx associates with 'powers'...), is to be capable of positing oneself
as an object for oneself—that is, to be self-conscious. In turn, although something like this notion
of subjectivity or self-consciousness may seem to be reflected in Marx's implicit claim that
natural beings always are objects for the objects they have, in fact there is a crucial difference.
Namely, Marx insists emphatically that natural beings as such have objects that are external to
themselves. And this occurs precisely in the broader context of Marx's rejecting what he takes to
be Hegel's misguided construal of human nature in terms of the mere “abstraction of man—self-
consciousness”:
Because [for Hegel] man equals self-consciousness, his alienated, objective
essence, or thinghood, equals alienated self-consciousness, and thinghood is thus
established through this alienation (thinghood being that which is an object for
man and an object for him is really only that which is to him an essential object,
therefore his objective essence. And since it is not real Man, nor therefore Nature—
Man being human Nature—who as such is made the subject, but only the
abstraction of man—self-consciousness—thinghood cannot be anything but
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alienated self-conciousness). It is only to be expected that a living, natural being
equipped and endowed with objective (i.e., material) essential powers should have
real natural objects of his essence; as is the fact that his self-alienation should
lead to the establishing of a real, objective world—but a world in the form of
externality—a world, therefore, not belonging to his own essential being, and an
overpowering world. There is nothing incomprehensible or mysterious in this. It
would be mysterious, rather, if it were otherwise. But it is equally clear that a self-
consciousness can only establish thinghood through its alienation—i.e., establish
something which itself is only an abstract thing, a thing of abstraction and not a
real thing. It is clear, further, that thinghood is therefore utterly without any
independence, any essentiality vis-a-vis self-consciousness; that on the contrary, it
is a mere creature—something posited by self-consciousness. And what is
posited, instead of confirming itself, is but a confirmation of the act of positing in
which is concentrated for a moment the energy of the act as its product, seeming
to give the de-posit—but only for a moment—the character of an independent,
real substance. 
Whenever real, corporeal man, man with his feet firmly on the solid
ground, man exhaling and inhaling all the forces of nature, establishes his real,
objective essential powers as alien objects by his externalization, it is not the act
of positing which is the subject in this process: it is the subjectivity of objective
essential powers, whose action, therefore, must also be something objective. A
being who is objective acts objectively, and he would not act objectively if the
objective did not reside in the very nature of his being. He creates or establishes
only objects, because he is established by objects—because at bottom he is
nature. In the act of establishing, therefore, this objective being does not fall from
his state of 'pure activity' into a creating of the object; on the contrary, his
objective product only confirms his objective activity, establishing his activity as
the activity of an objective, natural being.
Here we see how consistent naturalism or humanism distinguishes itself
both from idealism and materialism, constituting at the same time the unifying
truth of both. We see also how only naturalism is capable of comprehending the
act of world history. (Marx and Engels 1978, 114-115)
On Marx's understanding of Hegelian absolute idealism, Hegel claims that 'man equals self-
consciousness'; perhaps 'absolute Spirit' or 'infinite substance' would here be more to the point
than 'man'—but then one could still, on Marx's behalf, insist that Hegel wrongly depicts infinite
substance in the image of abstract self-consciousness. More broadly, Marx evidently attributes to
Hegel the view that 'self-consciousness' is something like pure subjectivity, rational self-activity,
or willing abstracted from its real (and hence on Marx's view inevitably external) objects. More
intuitively, Marx's thought seems to be that the 'self' implied by Hegel's notion of 'self-
consciousness' is a purely ideal or rational self, rather than a 'natural or corporeal, living, real,
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sensuous, objective' self. Hence every particular, spatiotemporally located, material thing—every
'real natural object', in Marx's terms—is “utterly without any independence, any essentiality” in
relation to the pure self-consciousness of Hegelian man. According to Marx, in other words,
Hegelian idealism reduces the object to the status of 'a mere creature—something posited by
self-consciousness,' as opposed to a genuinely 'independen[t]' thing that 'confirm[s] itself.'
Thus on Marx's interpretation, Hegelian idealism posits man as a being for which every
external object is inessential—an essentially unconditioned and purely self-determining being
that has its nature entirely within itself and so 'plays a part in the system of nature' only
incidentally, or in short a 'nullity' and an 'un-being'. In turn, one might say on Marx's behalf that
Hegelian self-consciousness amounts to an empty relic of anti-naturalistic Christian conceptions
of the soul (in Hegel's theory of human nature) and an absolutely unconditioned God (in Hegel's
theory of infinite substance as Spirit). Consequently, on Marx's view we must ultimately
“abstract from the Hegelian abstraction,” replacing its illusory vision of pure “Self-
consciousness” with a substantive notion of “the self-consciousness of man,”902 which is to say
the self-consciousness of a natural (i.e. 'suffering', 'conditioned') being who is also a “species
being”903—a “universal and therefore free,”904 essentially human905 being.
In this light, finally, it is possible to understand why Marx claims that the sun and plant
are mutually objectifying, and moreover to see that he is in fact wrong to do so. As we have
seen, Marx insists contra Hegelian idealism as he understands it that the naturalness (and so for
902Marx and Engels 1978, 118.
903Marx and Engels 1978, 116-117. “Every sphere of life provides both occasions and materials for the 
objectification of man's essential powers. Production, religion, politics, art, literature, family, state, law, morality 
and science are each to be regarded in this light.[...]Material production, because of the necessary character of 
this task and the amount of time devoted to it, is the area of life where the individual's powers are most evident. 
According to Marx, 'The object of labor is...the objectification of man's species life: for he duplicates himself not
only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality'. Man's species life, which is the operation of
his essential powers, is said to become visible in production through the various modes adopted and products 
produced. Both are referred to, in Marx's peculiar terminology, as man's 'duplication' of himself in the real 
world” (Ollman 1976, 95); “According to Marx, 'Neither nature objectively nor subjectively is directly given in a
form adequate to the human being.' In creating a nature which is adequate, in producing food which he can eat, 
clothes he can wear and a house he can live in, man is forever remolding nature, and with each alteration 
enabling his powers to achieve new kinds and degrees of fulfillment. Industry exists in order to satisfy human 
needs, but industry in turn creates conditions of life which generate new needs. These make necessary a new 
advance in industry and a diversification of products. It is such a development Marx is describing when he 
declares, 'the needs of people are themselves the ultimate grounds (letzten Gründe) for their satisfaction'.” 
(Ollman 1976, 99).
904Marx and Engels 1978, 75.
905“The real, active orientation of man to himself as a species being, or his manifestation as a real species being 
( i.e., as a human being ) , is only possible by his really bringing out of himself all the powers that are his as the 
species man … ” (Marx and Engels 1978, 112).
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Marx, as a naturalist, the reality) of humankind is predicated on our not merely 'positing' the
objects of our essential needs as 'alienated self-consciousness' or emanations of pure will—in
other words, as a mere 'confirmation of the act of positing in which is concentrated for a moment
the energy of the act as its product'—, but rather as things that 'confirm' themselves as
'independent, real substance' in relation to us. That is, the naturalness of man requires not just
that man has external things as the objects of his essential powers, but moreover that he is
conditioned precisely by these objects, such that he needs every external thing in which his
power finds expression. In short, Marx seems to believe that every real power grounds a real
need for the external objects in which it finds expression, and reciprocally that every object of a
real need has power in relation to that which needs it. Hence the reality of the sun and the
naturalness of its 'life-awakening power' for Marx entail that the sun's external objects are more
than just the 'expression' or 'confirmation' of its power, and specifically that they display a kind
of 'independence' and 'essentiality' in relation to the sun, such that the sun is conditioned by and
needs the objects of its essential powers. If the plant were a 'confirmation' of the sun's life-
awakening power but the plant's life were not 'confirmed' by the sun in a way that reciprocally
constituted the sun as the object of the plant's vital power, then the sun would be functioning as a
'nullity' or 'non-being' in the mode of Hegelian abstract subjectivity positing external objects
merely as alienated projections of this selfsame act of positing.
Marx's view, at least as interpreted here, is unsatisfactory in several respects. First, he
interpolates the relationship between the sun and plant into a framework designed and primarily
suitable for analysis of the relationship between the 'ideal' and 'material' orders. But—of course
—the sun is not in fact a mind, a subject, or a will; the sun in fact has no desires, impulses,
instincts, drives, purposes, goals, perceptions, or values; and insofar as the sun in fact does have
a 'life-awakening power' that it actively 'expresses', it certainly does not aim, intend, or need to
do so. A metaphysical analysis of power in the domain of inorganic natural phenomena should
not be beholden to our fraught relationship to our own seemingly hybrid 'sensuous-rational'
nature.
Second, and relatedly, even if Marx is right that real or natural powers as such 'confirm'
the self-standing reality of the objects in which they find expression and hence in some sense
depend upon these objects, it does not follow that the sun (for example) depends upon the plant
to the same degree or in the same way that the plant depends upon the sun. The dependence of
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the plant's life on the life-awakening power of the sun seems meaningfully different from the
dependence of the sun's life-awakening power on the living things in which it manifests. And the
metaphysical notion of power I am working to isolate makes appeal to this evident difference.
Marx is of course entitled to use the term 'object' in such a way that any such differences in
degree or kind of dependence are immaterial. But in so doing he sacrifices the intuitive
explanatory power of the distinction between having an object and being an object, or
equivalently the distinction between activity and receptivity, since he consequently sees activity
and receptivity as mutually entailing.
Admittedly, there may well be good reasons to deny the propriety, or even the stable
existence, of fundamentally asymmetrical relations of objectification or activity in the domain of
human affairs. Here recall Hegel's insistence that despite her apparent independence from and
asymmetrical power over the 'slave', the 'master' in fact needs the slave's recognition. And, Hegel
further insists, the master can never actually achieve this recognition insofar as she maintains the
slave in a position of dehumanizing subservience, since mere systematic obedience or even
sincere praise from someone occupying a position of subordination can never constitute genuine
recognition. This is not to deny that the relationship between 'master' and 'slave' is in on its face
obviously asymmetrical, for Hegel. However, Hegel is concerned to argue that this manifest
asymmetry is contradictory or self-undermining, by contrast to states of mutual recognition
predicated on concrete institutional realization of and individual subjective respect for universal
moral subjectivity and equal political personhood.
But the sun and plant are not human beings, of course, and have no moral status or
agency. The sun has no need or drive to become self-conscious through mutual recognition with
an equally self-standing 'other', and is entirely incapable of doing so. It is neither morally bad nor
morally good that the sun expresses its power in and through the plant in a way that the plant
does not vis-à-vis the sun. In a broadly Nietzschean spirit, though, I claim that the sun's power in
relation to the plant is good in some other sense, the ethical significance of which remains to be
fully explored. More generally, there are objective hierarchies of power or determinative force;
where these hierarchies concern only inorganic natural entities or phenomena, they evidently are
not morally good or bad; yet objective hierarchies of power or determinative force nevertheless
have extra-moral ethical significance. This does not mean that power is good only insofar as it
manifests in asymmetrical relations of determinative force. But power is certainly no less
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exemplified in asymmetrical relations of determinative force than in relations of mutual
recognition.
Third, Marx's claim that real powers inevitably correspond to real needs for their objects
is implausible, and distorts the nature of power by representing it from the perspective of things
affected or determined by the powerful, rather than from that of power itself. Marx is perfectly
correct that power as such necessarily manifests against resistance: the objects of essential
powers must 'confirm themselves' as 'independent, real substances' in order for these powers to
b e realized. For example, Hegel observes that a child's naive 'appropriation' of objects by
declaring them 'Mine!' obviously falls short of genuine appropriation demanding recognition.
(“It often happens that children lay stress on their prior willing in preference to the seizure of a
thing by others. But for adults this willing is not sufficient, since the form of subjectivity must be
removed and must work its way beyond the subjective to objectivity.”906) And Nietzsche often
emphasizes the same overarching point: he claims that “[...]all expansion, incorporation, growth
is striving against something that resists” (WP 704 / KSA 13:11[111]), proposes that “the will is
never satisfied unless it has opponents and resistance” (WP 696 / KSA 13:11[75]; compare GS
56), explicitly associates the “feeling that power is growing” with the feeling “that resistance is
overcome” (A 2), suggests that “the will to power can manifest itself only against resistances”
and “seeks that which resists it” (WP 656 / KSA 12:9[151]), and emphasizes the value of having
enemies to struggle against (BGE 260; GM I:10; EH “Wise” 7; Z I: “On War and Warriors” et
passim). In short, recall, Nietzsche insists that “every event[...]presupposes a resistance
overcome” (W P 708 / KSA 13:14[174]). But—contra Marx and the Nietzschean doctine of
universal will to power—a powerful thing does not in general need o r strive to overcome
resistance. A powerful thing simply does overcome resistance, because it is powerful.
Moreover, a powerful thing can arguably still be powerful in the absence of external
objects in which to entirely display or fully manifest its power. The sun would evidently in some
sense still possess life-awakening power in a way that the moon does not, for example, even if
the broader conditions in our solar system were not suitable to sustain life. Here one must avoid
a flat-flooted interpretation of Nietzsche's claim that there is no 'doer' behind the deed:
To demand of strength that it should not express itself as strength, that it
should not be a desire to overcome, a desire to throw down, a desire to
906Hegel Philosophy of Right sec. 51A.
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become master, a thirst for enemies and resistances and triumphs, is just as
absurd as to demand of weakness that it should express itself as strength. A
quantum of force is equivalent to a quantum of drive, effect—more, it is
nothing other than precisely this very driving, willing, effecting, and only
owing to the seduction of language (and of the fundamental errors of
reason that are petrified in it) which conceives and misconceives all effects
as conditioned by something that causes effects, by a 'subject,' can it appear
otherwise. For just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its
flash and takes the latter for an action, for the operation of a subject called
lightning, so popular morality also separates strength from expressions of
strength, as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong man,
which was free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such
substratum; there is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer'
is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything. The popular
mind in fact doubles the deed; when it sees the lightning flash, it is the
deed of a deed: it posits the same event first as cause and then a second
time as its effect. Scientists do no better when they say 'force moves,' 'force
causes,' and the like—all its coolness, its freedom from emotion
notwithstanding, our entire science still lies under the misleading influence
of language and has not disposed of that little changeling, the 'subject' (the
atom, for example, is such a changeling, as is the Kantian 'thing-in-itself');
no wonder if the submerged, darkly glowering emotions of vengefulness
and hatred exploit this belief for their own ends and in fact maintain no
belief more ardently than the belief that the strong man is free to be weak
and the bird of prey to be a lamb—for thus they gain the right to make the
bird of prey accountable for being a bird of prey. (GM I, 13)
Nietzsche is obviously right that appealing to unrealized powers or capacities can be a way for
people who in fact lack these powers to feign as if they are simply choosing not to exercise them.
He is also right, on my view, to deny the existence of a 'subject' (ego, soul, free will, etc.) that
somehow sits beyond or outside of all one's natural drives and subjects them to independent
rational appraisal. And it is on my view also plausibly true that in a sense there are no unrealized
capacities: every thing in every moment does what it must by virtue of what it is. In short,
nothing in nature is genuinely 'free to do otherwise' (which is of course consistent with human
freedom as construed by compatibilists).
But it is also true, as well as consistent with the above, that it is often possible to
realistically assess the way that things are likely to behave under counterfactual circumstances.
Moreover, it seems reasonable and indeed prudent to allow these counterfactual judgments to
inform one's assessments of things' power or lack thereof. In this context, one might distinguish
between gauging what a given thing would do if it were 'free to do otherwise' or essentially
364
different than it in fact is (which seems to be illegitimate, on broadly Nietzschean grounds) and
gauging what this thing would do if it retained its nature or essential identity but were situated in
relation to different external phenomena (which seems more intuitively legitimate). But, of
course, this intuitive distinction is complicated if not necessarily undermined by the fact that
some things'—including individual human beings'—essential identities are evidently determined
at least in part by environmental conditions.
Finally, Marx fails to adequately respect the distinction between activity grounded in
lack or deprivation and that grounded in excess or strength. One needs the objects of one's desire
—such as food when one is hungry—in a way that one does not need the objects of one's passion
or love. For, as Schiller rightly observes, “One loves what he has; one desires what he has not;
Only the rich soul loves; only the poor one desires.”907 Here recall Nietzsche's distinction
between the drive to self-overcoming and the mere drive to self-preservation, for instance as
manifested in the difference between 'primitive nourishment' construed as a drive to “overcome,
appropriate, assimilate” what one encounters and thereby to “become stronger” (WP 702 / KSA
13:14[174]), and 'hunger' construed as a mere “desire for self-preservation” or “replacing a loss”
(W P 652 / KSA 13:14[174]). As a legitimate ground of praise or veneration, the sun's life-
awakening power is more aptly viewed in relation to the richness that overflows from
superabundant life than the hunger of deprived life that pulls its objects inward. Nor is it at all
clear that this association is 'merely' metaphorical: the sun literally does exert determinative
force in relation to the plant, and the sun is not reciprocally determined by the plant in anything
importantly like the way in which we are determined by the objects of our needs or desires.
Marx's claim that real powers give rise to real needs is not entailed by broadly naturalistic
acknowledgement that all real things condition or are conditioned by external things—or even by
the more stringent naturalistic hypothesis that no real thing conditions other things without itself
being conditioned by something beyond itself. It does not follow logically from the fact that
everything is conditioned by something that it is conditioned by precisely the things that it itself
conditions (if it conditions something)—let alone that all forms of 'conditioning' are qualitatively
or quantitatively on par. Thus one must provide independent grounds for rejecting the possibility
of asymmetric relations of objectification, or determination more broadly. I have tried to indicate
what such grounds might be, for Marx, while arguing that they are metaphysically dubious.
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